Ana Morales v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc.
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJuly 1, 2020
Docket3D19-0795
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed July 1, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D19-0795
Lower Tribunal No. 17-10753
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Ana Morales,
Appellant,
vs.
Ross Dress for Less, Inc.,
Appellee.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michael A.
Hanzman, Judge.
Friedland & Associates, and Michael T. Gelety (Fort Lauderdale), for
appellant.
Gaebe, Mullen, Antonelli & DiMatteo, and Emily C. Smith, and Miriam
Merlo, for appellee.
Before SCALES, MILLER, and GORDO, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Appellant, Ana Morales, challenges a final summary judgment rendered in
favor of appellee, Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (“Ross”), in her lawsuit alleging damages
for personal injuries sustained during a fall in the aisle of a retail establishment
located in Hialeah, Florida. As the record below demonstrates Ross lacked the
requisite “actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition,” we affirm. §
768.0755, Fla. Stat. (2019).
By Florida statute, “[i]f a person slips and falls on a transitory foreign
substance in a business establishment, the injured person must prove that the
business establishment had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition.” § 768.0755(1), Fla. Stat. “Constructive notice may be inferred from
either: (1) the amount of time a substance has been on the floor; or (2) the fact that
the condition occurred with such frequency that the owner should have known of its
existence.” Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087, 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
(citing Schaap v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 579 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 1st DCA
1991)); see also § 768.0755(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat.
In the instant case, because there was no evidence “suggesting the existence
of the foreign substance on the floor was known” to the store, it was incumbent upon
Morales to come forward with circumstantial evidence that Ross, “in the exercise of
ordinary caution, should have known of the condition.” Encarnacion v. Lifemark
Hosps. of Fla., 211 So. 3d 275, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
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In her operative complaint, Morales attributed her loss of footing to pieces of
smashed plastic, purportedly originating from a clothes hanger. Nonetheless, in her
deposition, directly contradicting earlier verified answers to interrogatories, Morales
disavowed any knowledge as to either the cause of the fall or origin of the hanger.
Observing this incongruity, the trial court rejected any reliance upon the written
discovery. See Ellison v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 1954) (“Baldly
repudiated” testimony prohibited in avoidance of summary judgment); see also
Carriage Hills Condo., Inc. v. JBH Roofing & Constructors, Inc., 109 So. 3d 329,
337 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (Parties to the litigation are “‘bound,’ . . . as any witness
is bound ‘by his or her . . . deposition testimony.’”) (citation omitted). Morales has
not demonstrated that “no reasonable man [or woman] would take the view adopted
by the trial court.” Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980)
(citation omitted); see Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150,
1152 (Fla. 1979) (“In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the
presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate
error.”); see also Lesnick v. Duval Ford, LLC, 185 So. 3d 577, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA
2016) (reviewing the application of Ellison by the trial court under an abuse of
discretion standard).
Regardless, the summary judgment record, in its entirety, was devoid of facts
evidencing the length of time the pieces were on the floor, “[t]he condition occurred
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with regularity and was therefore foreseeable,” or any other salient factor that would
serve to lawfully impute constructive notice to Ross. § 768.0755(1)(b), Fla. Stat.
Accordingly, “given the limited evidence presented to the trial court,
[Morales]’s theory of the case . . . would require the stacking of inferences . . . in
order to find liability,” and we decline to embrace the assertion of error. McCarthy
v. Broward Coll., 164 So. 3d 78, 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
Affirmed.
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