Crater, K. v. Vernace, J.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket2113 EDA 2025
JudgeFord Elliott
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-A19034-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
KAREN CRATER, INDIVIDUALLY AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF : PENNSYLVANIA
MARK E. CRATER :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JOSEPH V. VERNACE, M.D., AND MAIN : No. 2113 EDA 2025
LINE ORTHOPAEDICS, PC KAREN :
CRATER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS :
EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MARK :
E. CRATER :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT J. BRAUNFELD, D.O., LESTER :
J. GROVERMAN, M.D., AND ROBERT J. :
BRAUNFELD, D.O. ASSOCIATES, :
JOSEPH V. VERNACE, M.D., KENNETH :
M. TOTO, PA, AND MAIN LINE :
ORTHOPAEDICS, P.C. :
:
:
APPEAL OF: ROBERT J. BRAUNFELD, :
D.O., LESTER J. GROVERMAN, M.D., :
AND ROBERT J. BRAUNFELD, D.O. :
ASSOCIATES :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 14, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Civil Division at No(s): CV-2017-009905
KAREN CRATER, INDIVIDUALLY AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF : PENNSYLVANIA
MARK E. CRATER :
:
:
v. :
:
:
J-A19034-26
JOSEPH V. VERNACE, M.D. AND MAIN : No. 2730 EDA 2025
LINE ORTHOPAEDICS, P.C. :
:
:
APPEAL OF: ROBERT J. BRAUNFELD, :
D.O., LESTER J. GROVERMAN, M.D., :
AND ROBERT J. BRAUNFELD, D.O. :
ASSOCIATES :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 14, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Civil Division at No(s): 2017-004570
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2026
In this medical malpractice case, Robert J. Braunfeld, D.O., Lester J.
Groverman, M.D., and Robert J. Braunfeld, D.O. Associates (collectively,
“Appellants”) appeal from the judgment entered, following a jury trial, in the
amount of $6,168,878.33 in favor of Karen A. Crater, individually and as
executrix of the estate of Mark E. Crater (“Appellee”) and against Appellants. 1
Appellants argue: (1) the court erred by denying both their request for a
nonsuit and subsequent request for a directed verdict because Appellee
presented insufficient expert testimony to establish that Dr. Braunfeld’s
purported negligence was a factual cause of Mark E. Crater’s (“Decedent”)
harm; and (2) the court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a
mistrial after allegedly improper statements were made during direct
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Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Said judgment consists “of the jury trial verdict entered on May 19, 2025[,]
and delay damages.” Order, 10/14/25, at 1 n.2.
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examination by Appellee’s medical expert. After thoroughly reviewing the
record, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following factual and procedural history of
this matter:
. . . [Appellee] filed a complaint on or about May 18, 2017[,]
alleging that [Appellants as well as Joseph V. Vernace, M.D.,]
Kenneth M. Toto, P.A., and Main Line Orthopaedics, P[.]C[.], were
negligent.[2] Specifically, [Appellee] alleged that the defendants
failed to properly evaluate and diagnose [Decedent] who died as
the result of a pulmonary embolism following a doctor’s visit on
February 23, 2016. Sadly, the Decedent died later that afternoon.
A jury trial was held[,] which began on May 12, 2025, and
concluded on May 19, 2025. [Appellee] presented evidence that
the Decedent had injured his left Achilles [tendon] playing
basketball on December 25, 2015. Because Christmas Day was on
a Friday, he followed up with his primary care physician three days
later, on Monday[,] December 28, 2015. The Decedent underwent
surgery on January 8, 2016[,] and after wearing a cast for two
weeks, he was then placed in a [controlled ankle motion (“CAM”)
walking] boot. About a month later, on February 12, 2016, the
Decedent complained of shortness of breath. When it grew worse,
the Decedent called his primary care physician. He saw Dr.
Braunfeld on February 16, 2016. At the appointment, the
Decedent complained of shortness of breath. [Doctor] Braunfeld
performed a chest x-ray and advised the Decedent that his
symptoms were likely caused by his use of crutches with a CAM
walker. He did not consider a pulmonary embolism or order a D-
dimer test[, a blood test that measures a protein fragment made
when a blood clot dissolves]. On February 18, 2016, the Decedent
attended a six week follow up appointment with his surgeon Dr.
Vernace who advised him to undergo physical therapy two or
three times a week. That same day[,] he began physical therapy.
At a physical therapy appointment on February 23, 2016, the
Decedent complained about his wound and reported that he was
having significant hamstring pain. As a result, his physical
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2 The three other defendants were ultimately found not liable by the jury.
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therapist called over to Dr. Vernace’s office to request that
someone come over and evaluate the wound. Kenneth Toto, P.A.,
from Dr. Verance’s office came over to evaluate the Decedent’s
incision. According to the records, he did a quick check of the
wound, changed the dressing[,] and discharged the patient.
Tragically, the Decedent passed away that same afternoon at
home.
In presenting [her] case, [Appellee] first offered Dr. Jay Stahl-
Hertz, an expert in the field of forensic pathology and anatomic
and clinical pathology. According to Dr. Stahl-Hertz, the cause of
the Decedent’s death was a pulmonary thromboembolism, which
resulted from “a blood clot that formed in his left leg and traveled
to his lungs.” [Doctor] Stahl-Hertz stated that the shortness of
breath that the Decedent complained of during his visit with Dr.
Braunfeld on February 16, 2016[,] was directly related to his
pulmonary embolism[] and ultimately his death. According to Dr.
Stahl-Hertz, a patient presenting with shortness of breath can be
a very strong indication that there may be a clot in the lungs.
[Doctor] Franco D’Alessio, an expert in internal medicine and
pulmonary and critical care, also testified for the [Appellee].
[Doctor] D’Alessio maintained that Dr. Braunfeld was negligent
and breached the standard of care. [Doctor] D’Alessio opined that
80% of patients with Achilles tendon repair will have a clot by day
[fifty-one] postoperatively. According to the testimony at trial, the
Decedent was [thirty-five] days post-op when he appeared before
Dr. Braunfeld complaining of shortness of breath. [Doctor]
D’Alessio testified that Dr. Braunfeld fell “way below” the standard
of care by not considering pulmonary embolism in his differential
diagnosis when the Decedent complained of shortness of breath
and asserted that the history taken by Dr. Braunfeld was
incomplete. [Doctor] D’Alessio opined that this failure in the
standard of care by Dr. Braunfeld led to the death of the Decedent.
[Appellee] also offered Dr. Mitchell Gittelman, an expert in family
practice and family medicine, who stated that “the first thing that
should come to anybody’s mind in this set of circumstances is a
pulmonary embolism.” [Doctor] Gittelman stated that if
pulmonary embolism was suspected, the patient should have been
sent to the emergency room as treatment can only be provided in
the hospital. According to Dr. Gittelman, the failure to consider
and evaluate pulmonary embolism by Dr. Braunfeld was the cause
of Decedent’s death.
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[Appellee] also called Dr. Paul Nylas, an expert in [the field of]
physician assistants, who recounted his review of the physical
therapy that the Decedent underwent following his surgery.
[Doctor] Nylas testified that in his experience, the standard of care
on February 23, 2016[,] by Kenneth Toto required a proper history
and physical exam instead of a 60-90 second assessment. He
believed that [Toto deviated] from the standard of care in failing
to perform a proper physical exam[, which also increased the
Decedent’s risk of death.
David L. Hopkins, an economist, provided testimony regarding the
Decedent’s economic losses by calculating factors such as his life
expectancy, actual earnings, fringe benefits, and personal
maintenance expenses. According to Mr. Hopkins, the Decedent’s
economic damages ranged between 1.8 and 2.8 million dollars.
[Doctor] Braunfeld testified at trial. [He] recounted that the
Decedent first came to see him following his Achilles injury on
December 28, 2015. The Decedent was on crutches when he
arrived for his appointment. [Doctor] Braunfeld’s initial impression
was that the Decedent had ruptured his Achilles tendon, but since
he could not discern whether it was a full or partial rupture, he
ordered an MRI. The MRI revealed an Achilles tendon tear, and
the Decedent was referred to Dr. Vernance, an orthopedic
surgeon.
Appellants called several experts in their defense[,] including Dr.
Christopher Haines and Dr. Gregory Kane. Both doctors testified
that based upon their training and experience[,] they were of the
opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Dr.
Braunfeld’s treatment of the Decedent met the standard of care,
and they stated that a reasonable family physician in his position
would not have suspected [deep vein thrombosis] or a pulmonary
embolism. They maintained that Dr. Braunfeld was not negligent.
[Doctor] Haines, an expert in the field of family medicine, opined
that he would not have included a pulmonary embolism on the
differential diagnosis and stated that the Decedent’s symptoms
were typical in recovery from surgery and using crutches and
reinstituting use of the healing limb. [Doctor] Kane, a
pulmonologist, stated that a review of the records showed that Dr.
Braunfeld’s standard of care was appropriate. According to Dr.
Kane, the Decedent’s symptoms that presented on February 16,
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2016[,] were not caused by pulmonary embolism, but rather a
blockage in the heart.
On May 19, 2025[,] a jury rendered a verdict in favor of [Appellee]
and awarded a total award of $4,814,631.00. [Appellants] filed a
motion for post-trial relief on May 29, 2025, in which they sought
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, and
remittitur[, which was ultimately denied on June 20, 2025, but
docketed on July 8, 2025. The court also granted Appellee’s
motion for delay damages on the same corresponding dates.].
Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/25, at 1-5 (unnecessary capitalizations, footnotes,
and record citations omitted).
Appellee filed a praecipe to enter judgment on the aggregate verdict,
inclusive of both the jury’s award and the court’s award of delay damages, on
July 17, 2025, in the amount of $6,168,878.33. However, judgment was only
entered at the docket number ending in 9905. The following day, Appellants
filed a singular notice of appeal. Nevertheless, because there were two docket
numbers in this matter, this Court, on October 2, 2025, directed the trial court
to enter judgment on the other docket number, the one ending in 4570. See
Order, 10/2/25. The court issued an order on October 14, 2025, which entered
judgment on the docket ending in 4570. Thereafter, pursuant to our direction
in that same October 2 order, Appellants filed two notices of appeal, one from
each docket. Each trial court docket number correspondingly received its own
docket number in this Court. Ultimately, following Appellants’ motion, this
Court, on January 22, 2026, consolidated this appeal, designating 2113 EDA
2025 as the lead appeal. See Order, 1/22/26.
Appellants present two questions for our review:
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1. Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying their
request for a nonsuit and subsequent request for a directed
verdict3 on all of Appellee’s claims, as she failed to present
sufficient expert testimony to support her claims on the issue
of whether Dr. Braunfeld’s alleged negligence was a factual
cause of the Decedent’s harm?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying their motion
for a mistrial after Appellee’s medical expert, Mitchell
Gittelman, D.O., improperly stated on direct examination that
he would need to explain to his medical malpractice insurance
company why he did not diagnose a pulmonary embolism in a
patient if he had failed to do so in a patient who presented with
the same signs and symptoms as the Decedent did, particularly
when this statement violated well-settled law in Pennsylvania
that juries are not to be advised of, or consider, the fact that a
party possesses insurance relevant to a claim?
See Appellants’ Brief at 4.
Although, in their argument section, Appellants suggest that the court
should have alternatively granted JNOV or a new trial given that Appellee
failed to present sufficient expert testimony on the issue of causation, their
brief contains no specificity as to where these contentions were raised (and
therefore preserved), either during trial or, as it more aptly corresponds with
JNOV and new trial, after the jury’s verdict was rendered.4 Moreover, there is
no discussion into the relevant standards of review as to nonsuit or JNOV as
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3 Appellants utilize the phrase “directed verdict” in their questions presented
but then refer to “judgment notwithstanding the verdict” (“JNOV”) in their
argument section. However, these legal concepts are relevant at different
phases, with the former applicable to trials and JNOV applicable to verdicts.
4 This portion of their brief does not mention nonsuit at all.
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applied to the underlying facts of this case, the court’s decisions on these
matters, or Appellants’ present suggestion that Appellee failed to meet her
evidentiary burden. We endeavor to address the thrust of their claim
nonetheless where we can discern a preserved issue for review. That issue,
as best we can discern, challenges whether Appellee adequately demonstrated
causation between Dr. Braunfeld’s actions or inaction and Decedent’s resulting
harm.
The standard of review we employ when reviewing a trial court’s ruling
denying a motion for a nonsuit is as follows:
A nonsuit is proper only if the jury, viewing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, could not reasonably conclude that the elements of
the cause of action had been established. Furthermore, all
conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.
In reviewing the evidence presented we must keep in mind that a
jury may not be permitted to reach a verdict based on mere
conjecture or speculation. We will reverse only if the trial court
abused its discretion or made an error of law.
Gillard v. Martin, 13 A.3d 482, 486–87 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if
in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or
the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result
of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence
or the record, discretion is abused.
Geise v. N’wide Life & Annuity Co. of Amer., 939 A.2d 409, 417 (Pa.
Super. 2007).
As to JNOV, we utilize the following standard of review:
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In reviewing a trial court’s decision whether or not to grant
judgment in favor of one of the parties, we must consider the
evidence, together with all favorable inferences drawn therefrom,
in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Our standard[s]
of review when considering motions for a directed verdict and
[JNOV] are identical. We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial
of a [JNOV] only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error
of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the
standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a
trial court.
There are two bases upon which a [JNOV] can be entered; one,
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or two,
the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree
that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the
movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes
that, even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the
movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor.
Whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record
and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the
movant was beyond peradventure.
Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 7 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting
Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc., 915 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
Concerning questions of credibility and weight accorded the
evidence at trial, we will not substitute our judgment for that of
the finder of fact. If any basis exists upon which the [court] could
have properly made its award, then we must affirm the trial
court’s denial of the motion for JNOV. A JNOV should be entered
only in a clear case.
Wilson v. Transp. Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 569 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation
omitted; brackets in original).
To the extent that Appellants are suggesting that a new trial should have
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been granted on their first issue,5 we note that our standard of review
regarding a trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is limited as follows:
“The power to grant a new trial lies inherently with the trial court and we will
not reverse its decision absent a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law
which controls the outcome of the case.” Maya v. Johnson and Johnson &
McNeil-PPC, Inc. (In re McNeill-PPC, Inc.), 97 A.3d 1203, 1224 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citation omitted). We employ a two-part analysis to assess the
denial of a mistrial: first, we determine if an error occurred. If so, we ascertain
“whether the error resulted in prejudice necessitating a new trial.” Czimmer
v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 122 A.3d 1043, 1051 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted); see also Knowles v. Levan, 15 A.3d 504, 507 (Pa. Super.
2011) (citation omitted) (recognizing the consideration of all new trial claims
“is grounded firmly in the harmless error doctrine which underlies every
decision to grant or deny a new trial” and that a new trial is not warranted
simply because an irregularity occurred or another trial judge would have
ruled differently).
We agree with Appellants’ general statement of law that a prima facie
medical malpractice case requires a plaintiff to prove duty, breach, causation,
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5 Despite Appellants’ specious request for a new trial at this point, see
Appellants’ Brief at 15, discussion as to our “new trial” standard of review is
relevant to their second issue, which suggests that the jury heard improper
information from Appellee’s expert, so we maintain its existence at this
juncture.
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and damages. See Appellants’ Brief at 15; see also Mitchell v. Shikora, 209
A.3d 307, 314 (Pa. 2019) (“In order to establish a prima facie case of
malpractice, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a duty owed by the physician to
the patient; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) that the breach of duty was the
proximate cause of the harm suffered by the patient; and (4) that the
damages suffered were a direct result of that harm.”). Moreover, Appellants
are also correct insofar as they indicate that a plaintiff “must offer an expert
witness who will testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the
acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards,
and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.”
Appellants’ Brief at 15-16 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellants further concede that Drs. D’Alessio and Gittelman collectively
provided “sufficient testimony to support [Appellee’s] claim that Dr. Braunfeld
breached the standard of care[.]” Id. at 19. However, the thrust of their
argument is that the doctors’ testimony “clearly failed to satisfy [Appellee’s]
burden of proving that Dr. Braunfeld’s alleged tortious conduct caused [the
Decedent] any harm.” Id. Specifically, in challenging Appellee’s proof of
causation, Appellants aver that the doctors failed to explain
as to what, if anything, could have been done to save [the
Decedent’s] life if [a] pulmonary embolism had been part of Dr.
Braunfeld’s differential diagnosis, if Dr. Braunfeld had taken a
more detailed history from [the Decedent], or if Dr. Braunfeld had
worked-up the patient for coronary artery disease or given him
better discharge instructions.
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Id. at 20. The Appellants continue: “In fact, [Appellee’s] experts did not give
any explanation whatsoever as to what treatment the [Decedent] should have
received if he had been diagnosed with a pulmonary embolism on February
16, 2016[.]” Id. Appellants argue, without authority, that causation “required
the jury to receive and consider evidence concerning how Dr. Braunfeld’s
purported negligence deprived the [Decedent] of life-saving care.” Id.
Given the ambiguity in Appellants’ position vis-à-vis the nonsuit,
directed verdict, JNOV, and new trial standards, we find that the court, to the
best of its ability, adequately disposed of their first issue:
. . . Appellants were not entitled to JNOV in this case. Based upon
the evidence presented at trial, and despite Appellants’ arguments
to the contrary, it was both reasonable and logical for the jury to
conclude that Dr. Braunfeld was negligent. When viewing the light
most favorable to the [verdict winner], Dr. D’Alessio testified at
length that he believed Dr. Braunfeld breached the standard of
care in his misdiagnosis when the Decedent complained of
shortness of breath. Despite the fact that Appellants[’] experts
disagreed and concluded that Dr. Braunfeld was not negligent and
did not contribute to the Decedent’s death, the jury was free to
disbelieve this testimony. It is evident from the verdict that the
jury found that Dr. Braunfeld’s conduct fell below the standard of
care. The jury chose to believe the experts presented by the
[Appellee] – which opined that the Decedent died of a pulmonary
embolism during his visit to Dr. Braunfeld’s office. The evidence
presented at trial supports this verdict. . . .
...
. . . Appellants were not entitled to a new trial. [S]everal experts
testified regarding Dr. Braunfeld’s treatment of the Decedent on
February 16, 2016. Dr. Stahl-Hertz testified at length that he
believed that Dr. Braunfeld’s deviation from the standard of care
increased Decedent’s risk of harm. [Doctor] Gittelman maintained
that “the first thing that should come to anybody’s mind in this
set of circumstances is a pulmonary embolism.” [Doctor] Haines
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and Dr. Kane refuted this theory. However, the jury was free to
accept or reject the credibility of the experts.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/25, at 7-9 (record citations omitted).
In essence, Appellants’ argument fails to recognize that Appellee
satisfied all elements of her cause of action, and the jury was free to believe
or disbelieve the evidence that it received. See, e.g., Lageman v. Zepp, 266
A.3d 572, 587 n.69 (Pa. 2021) (noting that diametrically opposed testimony
alone does not require non-suit and explaining jury is free to believe all, part,
or none of evidence and to determine credibility of witnesses).
Accordingly, although Appellants presented experts to the contrary,
Appellee, through her own expert testimony, sufficiently demonstrated the
challenged element of causation. See, e.g., N.T. Jury Trial, 5/13/25, 92-93,
171 (Doctor D’Alessio testifying that, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, the failure of Dr. Braunfeld to fail to consider pulmonary embolism
increased the risk of danger to the Decedent and ultimately caused his death;
Doctor Gittelman testifying: “It is my medical opinion to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty that [Dr. Braunfeld’s] failure to consider pulmonary
embolism and evaluate for pulmonary embolism was the cause of [the
Decedent’s] death.”).6 Consequently, Appellants are due no relief on this
issue.
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6 To the extent Appellants suggest that, to establish causation, Appellee’s
experts were required to opine on the viability of possible treatment regimens
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In their second claim, Appellants assert that the court abused its
discretion in denying their motion for a mistrial, which was predicated on Dr.
Gittelman’s allegedly improper reference, during direct examination, to his
own medical malpractice insurance. The complained-of portion of Dr.
Gittelman’s testimony is as follows: “[b]ecause every three years when my
medical malpractice attorneys meet with me and our groups so I can get a
reduction in my malpractice insurance, [they] tell me that I have to be aware
of pulmonary embolism.” N.T. Jury Trial, 5/13/25, at 160.
Appellants concede that, instead of making a contemporaneous
objection, they waited until Dr. Gittelman completed his testimony on direct
before requesting a sidebar conference and moving for a mistrial. See
Appellants’ Brief at 22. At that juncture, they argued that “Dr. Gittelman’s
reference to insurance had prejudiced [them] by suggesting that [they] were
covered by malpractice insurance for any damages awarded to [Appellee].”
Id. at 23. While the court offered a curative instruction regarding insurance,
which Appellants declined, it denied their motion for a mistrial.
Appellants first contend that, notwithstanding their lack of
contemporaneous objection, their issue was properly preserved for appellate
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should the Decedent had been given the correct medical advice in the original
instance, i.e., the Decedent being correctly diagnosed with a pulmonary
embolism, Appellants have presented no authority to establish that such
testimony is necessary, and we are unable to find any authority requiring the
same.
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review. Appellants suggest that their “decision to wait until [the conclusion of
Dr. Gittelman’s testimony, which was only a few minutes after the
objectionable comments were made,] was certainly reasonable as
[Appellants] did not want to draw added attention to the witness’s prejudicial
statement.” Id. at 24.
Second, as to the substantive component of their claim, Appellants aver
that they suffered prejudice because “Dr. Gittelman’s testimony clearly
implied that all physicians in Dr. Braunfeld’s specialty possess medical
malpractice insurance and that the failure to diagnose a pulmonary embolism
in a patient can impact that coverage.” Id. at 26. Appellants continue: “[t]he
unmistakable inference from [Dr. Gittelman’s] comment was that Dr.
Braunfeld’s failure to diagnose [the Decedent’s] pulmonary embolism would
be covered by Dr. Braunfeld’s insurance.” Id. Appellants assert that, by
implication, Dr. Gittelman’s statement “suggested to the jury that Dr.
Braunfeld would not suffer any financial harm from a damages award to
[Appellee].” Id.
The trial court disposed of Appellants’ issue as follows:
This court initially submits that Appellant[s] waived this issue by
failing to lodge a timely objection. However, assuming arguendo,
that Appellant[s] preserved this issue, this [court further] submits
that there is no evidence that Appellant[s were] prejudiced by Dr.
Gittelman’s rambling comment. This court offered a curative
instruction which Appellant[s] declined. Accordingly, this court
submits that the circumstances did not warrant a mistrial.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/25, at 10.
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It is well settled that in reviewing an order to grant a new trial our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion or committed an error of law. The general
rule in Pennsylvania is that evidence of insurance is irrelevant and
prejudicial and justifies the grant of a mistrial. See Pa.R.E. 411
(“Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability
is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted
negligently or otherwise wrongfully.”). However, the mere
mention of the word insurance does not necessitate a new trial
unless the aggrieved party can demonstrate prejudice.
Allied Elec. Supply Co. v. Roberts, 797 A.2d 362, 364 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(most citations omitted). When reviewing the trial court’s determination, we
consider the circumstances under which the statement regarding insurance
was made and the precautions taken by the court to prevent the statement’s
prejudicial effect. See Clark v. Hoerner, 525 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super.
1987). Furthermore, the “trial judge is in the best position to observe the
atmosphere in which a trial is being conducted and to determine whether a
statement in the heat of trial by counsel or a witness has had a prejudicial
effect on the jury.” Id.
Nevertheless, “[i]t is axiomatic that, in order to preserve an issue for
review, litigants must make timely and specific objections during trial and
raise the issue in post-trial motions.” Harman ex. rel. Harman v. Borah,
756 A.2d 1116, 1124 (Pa. 2000). The “decision to grant or deny an untimely
objection lies within the discretion of the trial court[.]” Allied Elec. Supply
Co., 797 A.2d at 364 (citation omitted).
Our Court has found waiver when a party failed to contemporaneously
object to a witness’s “reference to insurance when it was uttered.” Id. at 365
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(emphasis added). Instead, counsel, who did not “want to draw further
attention to the testimony,” “waited until after [that witness] had completed
his testimony on direct, cross, redirect and recross.” Id. Although, here as
opposed to Allied Elec. Supply Co., less time had elapsed between the
allegedly improper insurance reference and the corresponding challenge
thereto, this Court has clearly found the notion of waiting to object, so as not
to draw attention to the matter, to be unavailing. Furthermore, our Supreme
Court has reached the same conclusion. See Harman, 756 A.2d at 1126
(“While we can accept counsel’s concern about further alerting the jury, we
find no justification for counsel's inertia.”). Therefore, because Appellants
have failed to furnish any exception to the general necessity of a party to raise
a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve a claim for appellate review,
this issue has been waived.
Even if we did not find waiver, Appellants have failed to demonstrate
the requisite prejudice necessary to warrant a mistrial. Appellants argue,
without citation to authority, that Dr. Gittelman’s passing reference to his own
insurance can be extrapolated to instill, in the jury, a belief that Dr. Braunfeld
had his own insurance provider, which, by contract, was bound to “foot the
bill[,]” Appellants’ Brief at 27, of any potential damages award in this medical
malpractice case. Although, consistent with prior decisions of this Court, we
caution against essentially all references to insurance, the mere mentioning
of it does not, ipso facto, result in the award of a new trial. See Allied Elec.
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J-A19034-26
Supply Co., supra. Here, the singular insurance reference made by Dr.
Gittelman, implicitly highlighting his own insurance premiums without any
discussion into, inter alia, coverage amounts, requirements, or anything
pertaining to Dr. Braunfeld, is far too attenuated from Appellants’ suggestion
that, therefore, the jury would believe Dr. Braunfeld’s actions to be wholly
covered by insurance. Without any nexus between Dr. Gittelman’s words and
Dr. Braunfeld’s potential insurance coverage, coupled with the fact that the
court offered the Appellants a curative instruction that was declined, there is
simply no indicia of prejudice warranting the grant of a new trial.
As neither of Appellants’ two issues merit relief, we affirm the
$6,168,878.33 judgment entered in favor of Appellee and against Appellants.
Judgment affirmed.
Date: 11/17/2026
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