Keith Marella v. Robert A. Lieberum
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA-0594-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0594-24
KEITH MARELLA and
PATRICIA MARELLA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ROBERT A. LIEBERUM and
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE,
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
SOUTH STATE, INC. and
WILLIAM BLANK, JR.,
Third-Party Defendants.
___________________________
Argued November 5, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026
Before Judges Mawla, DeAlmeida, and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. L-0027-21.
Stephen J. Pokiniewski argued the cause for appellants
(Edelstein Law LLP, attorneys; Jay L. Edelstein, on the
briefs).
Elizabeth Merrill, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondents (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney
General, attorney; Christopher Weber, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth Merrill, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Keith and Patricia Marella 1 appeal from an August 30, 2024
order denying their motion for a new trial. We affirm.
I.
On August 8, 2019, plaintiff was injured while working as a roadside
construction worker for a paving project on U.S. Highway 40 in Franklin
Township. Primarily, plaintiff worked as "the dump man" or "the spotter."
When the accident resulting in his injuries occurred, he had been working for
roughly nine hours from approximately 7:00 p.m. on August 7 to around 4:00
a.m. on August 8.
Per plaintiff's testimony, his job was to "make sure the trucks get in [] and
out[,]" and his responsibilities included "mak[ing] sure there's nothing in the
1
Though plaintiffs, Keith and Patricia Marella, brought this action jointly, only
plaintiffs' third and fourth counts—loss of consortium—are relevant to Patricia.
As such, factual discussions refer to Keith Marella as "plaintiff."
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lanes, [and] mak[ing] sure there's room for the trucks." If he saw someone or
something was in the way, he "would let everyone else know[] [to] stop the
operation."
The construction project included the use of an asphalt machine, otherwise
known as a transfer machine, 2 which moves paving materials from the dump
trucks to the paving machines, and travels at a maximum speed of five miles per
hour. Importantly, the asphalt machine and plaintiff worked in conjunction with
each other—plaintiff was the "eyes" for the machine and needed to alert the
driver if something was in the way on the left side. If the asphalt machine
operator needed to be alerted to an obstacle, plaintiff could either run towards
the operator, activate a horn, or press the emergency stop button on the machine.
Defendant, New Jersey State Police Lieutenant Robert Lieberum, was on
a "construction overtime shift." Essentially, he was tasked with monitoring
traffic in and around the construction zone. Upon arrival, he was not provided
with instructions on where to park his vehicle. Based on his training and
2
The terms "asphalt machine," "transfer machine," and "asphalt transfer
machine" are each used interchangeably throughout the record. For uniformity,
it will be referred to as an "asphalt machine."
A-0594-24
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experience with "hundreds" of construction sites between 2003 and 2019, he
parked his police vehicle in the "buffer zone."3
Defendant claimed he was safely parked in the buffer zone, because: (1)
the lane was closed to traffic; (2) there was roughly six to seven feet between
his vehicle and the shoulder being paved by the asphalt machine; and (3) based
on his observations upon arrival, drivers could not clearly see the end of the
construction zone, thus, his presence there was necessary.
As the project progressed, plaintiff and his supervisor Christopher Jackson
felt defendant's vehicle was parked in a spot that would make it difficult for the
empty dump trucks to exit the area. After Jackson and plaintiff agreed
defendant's vehicle needed to be moved, plaintiff walked over to defendant's
window, without informing or asking the operator of the asphalt machine to stop.
According to plaintiff's testimony, he banged on the window to get
defendant's attention; however, defendant was unresponsive. When plaintiff
bent down to look inside the vehicle, he believed defendant "was asleep."
Defendant contested the assertion he was asleep, and Jackson testified he was
3
A "buffer zone" refers to the lane adjacent to the shoulder in a highway
construction area, separated by cones where vehicles, such as defendant's
vehicle, may be parked.
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not aware of anyone besides plaintiff who claims to have seen defendant
sleeping.
Contemporaneously, the asphalt machine continued to pave the road in the
direction of defendant's vehicle; however, unbeknownst to plaintiff or Jackson,
the machine's path was directly in line with an inlet, a slotted metal cover placed
over a storm drain opening. Accordingly, the asphalt machine was required to
suddenly shift its path to avoid the inlet.
While plaintiff was next to defendant's vehicle, and the asphalt machine
made its shift, he was struck and pinned against the police vehicle until
defendant moved to free him. Specifically, plaintiff testified:
So . . . . at that point, I became pinned and the machine
kept driving, ran into the car and I started banging on
it, trying to get his attention and everything around me
started crushing and it went up against my back and I
was pushing against the window and I couldn't breathe
no more. And I remember looking and saying I'm
[f***ing] dead. I'm [f***ing] dead. And I could just
feel the pain going through my body. It was – I couldn't
breathe.
After attempting physical therapy, plaintiff received multiple surgical
procedures for the injuries sustained to his right knee, back, and neck resulting
from the accident.
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In November 2020, plaintiffs sued Lieutenant Lieberum, the State of New
Jersey, and the New Jersey State Police (collectively defendants). In August
2023, defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court granted .
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. In November 2023,
after finding plaintiffs had "at least arguably satisfied" certain elements of their
claim, the court granted plaintiffs' motion and scheduled a trial for June 2024.
The jury heard testimony from plaintiffs, civil engineers Jared Barket and
Stan Pitera, and Jackson. Defendants called Lieutenant Lieberum, asphalt
machine operator William Blank, and Jackson as witnesses.
At the onset of trial, the court made clear the standard of liability was set
pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. The court explained
"N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 operates to trump the ordinary negligence standard." It
emphasized under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, "[f]ailure to prove any one element" is fatal
to the claim, and plaintiffs were required to show:
. . . that the property was in dangerous condition at the
time of the injury, that the injury was proximately
caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous
condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the
kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:
a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission
of an employee of the public entity within
the scope of his employment created the
dangerous condition; or
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b. a public entity had actual or constructive
notice of the dangerous condition under
[N.J.S.A.] 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to
the injury to have taken measures to protect
against the dangerous condition.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose
liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition
of its public property if the action the entity took to
protect against the condition or the failure to take such
action was not palpably unreasonable.
[N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.]
Thereafter, without objection, the court charged the jury and provided
instructions pursuant to the model jury charges. The verdict sheet, approved by
the parties, asked distinct questions related to each element of plaintiffs ' TCA
claim. After deliberating for nearly four hours, the jury informed the court it
had reached a verdict. At no point did the jury send a note asking questions.
In responding to the verdict sheet, by a 6-1 vote on each question, the jury
determined: (1) there was a dangerous condition present; (2) defendant's vehicle
being parked within the work zone was the proximate cause of plaintiff 's
injuries; and (3) the kind of injury sustained by plaintiff was not foreseeable.
Since the jury voted no regarding foreseeability, deliberations were ceased and
a no cause verdict was entered.
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Plaintiffs moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4:49-1. After hearing
oral arguments on August 30, 2024, the court denied the motion.
II.
Our standard of review on a motion for a new trial is "the same as that
governing the trial judge—whether there was a miscarriage of justice." Hayes
v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller
Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 522 (2011)). Moreover, Rule 4:49-1(a)
provides"[t]he trial judge shall grant [a motion for a new trial] if, having given
due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of
justice under the law." Generally, a miscarriage of justice arises from a lack of
credible evidence, obvious disregard of crucial evidence, or a clearly unjust
result. See Lindenmuth v. Holden, 296 N.J. Super. 42, 48 (App. Div. 1996);
Hayes, 231 N.J. at 385-86 (quoting Risko, 206 N.J. at 521-22).
Deference is owed to a jury verdict. Risko, 206 N.J. at 521 (quoting
Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597-98 (1977)). As a result, we do
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury even if we would have reached
the opposite conclusion. Ibid. (quoting Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6
(1969)).
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Indeed, jury verdicts should be set aside sparingly. Caldwell v. Haynes,
136 N.J. 422, 432 (1994); see also Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361,
391 (App. Div. 2005) ("Jury verdicts should be set aside in favor of new trials
only with great reluctance, and only in cases of clear injustice") (emphasis
added). Further, "'all evidence supporting the verdict must be accepted as true,
and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of upholding the verdict. '"
Dutton v. Rando, 458 N.J. Super. 213, 224 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting
Boryszewski, 380 N.J. Super. at 391). However, "[i]nconsistent and
irreconcilable verdicts are fatally defective and should normally be set aside. '"
Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Lotito, 328 N.J. Super. 491, 508 (App. Div.
2000) (quoting Brendel v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 28 N.J. Super. 500, 507
(App. Div. 1953)).
III.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred because it failed to evaluate and
determine the jury verdict was inherently and fatally inconsistent. Specifically,
they argue the verdict finding a dangerous condition and proximate cause while
finding against foreseeability was fundamentally inconsistent. We are not
persuaded.
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Plaintiffs' argument is premised on the assertion Model Jury Charge 5.20A
is inherently confusing or objectionable. Generally, a "presumption of propriety
[] attaches to a trial court's reliance on the model jury charge[s]." Est. of
Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568, 596 (2015); see also Willner v. Vertical
Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 79 (2018) (quoting State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300,
320 (2017)) ("Without an objection at the time a jury instruction is given, there
is a presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the
defendant's case.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, because plaintiffs never objected to the jury instructions, we
apply a plain error standard of review. See R. 1:7-2; R. 2:10-2; Bradford v.
Kupper Assocs., 283 N.J. Super. 556, 573-74 (App. Div. 1995) ("The absence
of an objection suggests that trial counsel perceived no error or prejudice, and,
in any event, prevented the trial judge from remedying any possible confusion
in a timely fashion"); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,
cmt. 2 on R. 1:7-2 (2027) ("[T]he objection must be made before the jury begins
deliberations. It is too late to object thereafter except on the ground of plain
error."). To satisfy the plain error standard, an error must be "clearly capable of
producing an unjust result." Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999).
"Relief under [Rule] 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should
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be sparingly employed.'" Ibid. (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435
(1957)).
Plaintiffs assert foreseeability was embedded throughout the jury
instructions in the concepts of proximate cause and dangerous condition. For
example, they posit a dangerous condition means a condition that creates a
substantial risk of injury when the property is "used with due care and in a
manner in which it is foreseeable that it will be used." They argue if the
proximate cause and dangerous condition elements are found, then a jury must
find the third element, foreseeability has been met. This argument is
unpersuasive and conflates differing standards.
The TCA requires plaintiffs to prove: (1) a dangerous condition; (2)
proximate cause; (3) foreseeability; and (4) either negligence or constructive
notice. N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. Each of these elements was explained to the jury, as
follows:
To summarize, for [plaintiffs] to prove [their]
claim against Robert Lieberum, the State of New Jersey
and the New Jersey State Police, [they] must prove each
of the following elements. That the presence of the
parked state trooper vehicle in the buffer zone at the
time a dump truck was to have exited the shoulder lane
on Route 40 constituted a dangerous condition. Two,
that the dangerous condition proximately caused the
injury.
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Three, that the dangerous condition created a
foreseeable risk of the kind of injury that was incurred.
Four, that the public entity had actual or constructive
notice of the dangerous condition, and enough time to
have corrected it before the accident, or that an
employee of the public entity acting within the scope of
[their] employment created the dangerous condition.
And five, that the measures taken by the public entity
or the failure to take any measures in response to the
dangerous condition were palpably unreasonable.
This was a verbatim recitation of the summary section in Model Jury Charges
(Civil), 5.20A, "Dangerous Condition of Public Property" at 7-8 (rev. Jan.
2019).
Primarily, plaintiffs highlight cases that conclude a finding of negligence
without proximate cause is inconsistent. See Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139, 144
(1977) ("The broad test of negligence is what a reasonably prudent person would
foresee and would do in the light of this foresight under the circumstances "
(quoting 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 58 (1970))); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J.
538, 543 (1984) ("When negligent conduct creates such a risk, setting off
foreseeable consequences that lead to plaintiff's injury, the conduct is deemed
the proximate cause of the injury"); Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc.,
149 N.J. 496, 503 (1997) (explaining proximate cause depends on whether
plaintiff's injury "reasonably flowed from defendant's breach of duty") (internal
citation omitted).
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Here, the jury never reached the question of negligence. Instead, the jury's
verdict was: (1) the trooper car parked in the buffer zone created a dangerous
condition; (2) the creation of the dangerous condition proximately caused
plaintiff's injuries; however, (3) plaintiff's type of injuries were not foreseeable.
Where the language of both the TCA and Model Jury Charge 5.20A
unambiguously separate plaintiffs' cause of action into distinct elements, the
jury's verdict here cannot be considered inconsistent.
Plaintiffs' continued reference to a typical negligence analysis—not
applicable to a State entity—is misplaced and unpersuasive. The trial court's
explanation of negligence was broken into two parts, including: (1) a general
explanation of negligence and (2) the specific standard for recovering against a
public entity. Where, as here, there are separately articulated elements for a
cause of action, it is not inconsistent for a jury to find some, but not all elements
have been satisfied.
Plaintiffs conflate "foreseeability" with the model jury charge's
foreseeable use requirement. Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.20A "Dangerous
Condition of Public Property" (rev. Jan. 2019); see also Robinson v. City of
Jersey City, 284 N.J. Super. 596, 600-01 (App. Div. 1995) (explaining how
foreseeable use works into the dangerous condition analysis). Whether the
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property was being used in a foreseeable manner is a dangerous condition
question; whereas whether the injury sustained by plaintiff was foreseeable is
an entirely separate, but necessary element of plaintiffs' cause of action. When
there are separately articulated elements for a cause of action, it is proper for a
jury to find some, but not all elements have been satisfied. As the trial court
maintained, a finding for plaintiffs "would negate . . . the purpose of having a
third question."
The jury's verdict conforms with the testimony elicited at trial.
Undoubtedly, each individual present at the construction site, including plaintiff
himself, testified there was no perceived risk in plaintiff walking across the
construction site to the trooper car. Furthermore, it can be implied from the
testimony that to the extent any type of injury or damage was foreseeable, it was
damage to the dump trucks and asphalt machines, not personal injury to one of
the workers.
Plaintiffs also argue the court was obligated to immediately order a new
trial. They premise this contention on the ruling in Love v. National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, 366 N.J. Super. 525 (App. Div. 2004).
In Love, liability was stipulated and the jury was tasked with determining
only "medical causation and compensatory damages." Id. at 527. The jury voted
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5-1 on each element of damages and awarded Love "$65,000 for lost wages and
$0 for pain and suffering." Ibid. On appeal, Love argued the jury's verdict—by
awarding economic damages for lost wages but nothing for pain and suffering—
was inconsistent and entitled him to a new trial. Id. at 528.
In ordering a new trial, we reasoned the jury, after having found defendant
was owed lost wages, and especially considering "the extended medical
treatment that resulted, including a series of surgeries," rendered an inconsistent
verdict by failing to "fairly compensate plaintiff for those logically inescapable
periods of pain and suffering." Id. at 532-33. We also noted trial judges should
take corrective action where a damage award is "patently inadequate or
excessive," id. at 533 (citing Von Borstel v. Campan, 255 N.J. Super. 24, 31
(App. Div. 1992)), or the jury's verdict "entirely omits . . . an award in a discrete
category of damages where some award is manifestly appropriate." Ibid.
Here, Love is inapplicable for three reasons: (1) liability was not
stipulated and thus, the jury was tasked with applying the model jury charges;
(2) a public entity was involved and therefore, the distinct elements of the TCA
were at play; and (3) the verdict was not illogical on its face or against the weight
of the evidence. Accordingly, plaintiffs' reliance on Love is unconvincing.
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To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because
the argument was without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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