Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0594-24 KEITH MARELLA and PATRICIA MARELLA, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROBERT A. LIEBERUM and STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. SOUTH STATE, INC. and WILLIAM BLANK, JR., Third-Party Defendants. ___________________________ Argued November 5, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026 Before Judges Mawla, DeAlmeida, and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. L-0027-21. Stephen J. Pokiniewski argued the cause for appellants (Edelstein Law LLP, attorneys; Jay L. Edelstein, on the briefs). Elizabeth Merrill, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Christopher Weber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth Merrill, on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiffs Keith and Patricia Marella 1 appeal from an August 30, 2024 order denying their motion for a new trial. We affirm. I. On August 8, 2019, plaintiff was injured while working as a roadside construction worker for a paving project on U.S. Highway 40 in Franklin Township. Primarily, plaintiff worked as "the dump man" or "the spotter." When the accident resulting in his injuries occurred, he had been working for roughly nine hours from approximately 7:00 p.m. on August 7 to around 4:00 a.m. on August 8. Per plaintiff's testimony, his job was to "make sure the trucks get in [] and out[,]" and his responsibilities included "mak[ing] sure there's nothing in the 1 Though plaintiffs, Keith and Patricia Marella, brought this action jointly, only plaintiffs' third and fourth counts—loss of consortium—are relevant to Patricia. As such, factual discussions refer to Keith Marella as "plaintiff." A-0594-24 2 lanes, [and] mak[ing] sure there's room for the trucks." If he saw someone or something was in the way, he "would let everyone else know[] [to] stop the operation." The construction project included the use of an asphalt machine, otherwise known as a transfer machine, 2 which moves paving materials from the dump trucks to the paving machines, and travels at a maximum speed of five miles per hour. Importantly, the asphalt machine and plaintiff worked in conjunction with each other—plaintiff was the "eyes" for the machine and needed to alert the driver if something was in the way on the left side. If the asphalt machine operator needed to be alerted to an obstacle, plaintiff could either run towards the operator, activate a horn, or press the emergency stop button on the machine. Defendant, New Jersey State Police Lieutenant Robert Lieberum, was on a "construction overtime shift." Essentially, he was tasked with monitoring traffic in and around the construction zone. Upon arrival, he was not provided with instructions on where to park his vehicle. Based on his training and 2 The terms "asphalt machine," "transfer machine," and "asphalt transfer machine" are each used interchangeably throughout the record. For uniformity, it will be referred to as an "asphalt machine." A-0594-24 3 experience with "hundreds" of construction sites between 2003 and 2019, he parked his police vehicle in the "buffer zone."3 Defendant claimed he was safely parked in the buffer zone, because: (1) the lane was closed to traffic; (2) there was roughly six to seven feet between his vehicle and the shoulder being paved by the asphalt machine; and (3) based on his observations upon arrival, drivers could not clearly see the end of the construction zone, thus, his presence there was necessary. As the project progressed, plaintiff and his supervisor Christopher Jackson felt defendant's vehicle was parked in a spot that would make it difficult for the empty dump trucks to exit the area. After Jackson and plaintiff agreed defendant's vehicle needed to be moved, plaintiff walked over to defendant's window, without informing or asking the operator of the asphalt machine to stop. According to plaintiff's testimony, he banged on the window to get defendant's attention; however, defendant was unresponsive. When plaintiff bent down to look inside the vehicle, he believed defendant "was asleep." Defendant contested the assertion he was asleep, and Jackson testified he was 3 A "buffer zone" refers to the lane adjacent to the shoulder in a highway construction area, separated by cones where vehicles, such as defendant's vehicle, may be parked. A-0594-24 4 not aware of anyone besides plaintiff who claims to have seen defendant sleeping. Contemporaneously, the asphalt machine continued to pave the road in the direction of defendant's vehicle; however, unbeknownst to plaintiff or Jackson, the machine's path was directly in line with an inlet, a slotted metal cover placed over a storm drain opening. Accordingly, the asphalt machine was required to suddenly shift its path to avoid the inlet. While plaintiff was next to defendant's vehicle, and the asphalt machine made its shift, he was struck and pinned against the police vehicle until defendant moved to free him. Specifically, plaintiff testified: So . . . . at that point, I became pinned and the machine kept driving, ran into the car and I started banging on it, trying to get his attention and everything around me started crushing and it went up against my back and I was pushing against the window and I couldn't breathe no more. And I remember looking and saying I'm [f***ing] dead. I'm [f***ing] dead. And I could just feel the pain going through my body. It was – I couldn't breathe. After attempting physical therapy, plaintiff received multiple surgical procedures for the injuries sustained to his right knee, back, and neck resulting from the accident. A-0594-24 5 In November 2020, plaintiffs sued Lieutenant Lieberum, the State of New Jersey, and the New Jersey State Police (collectively defendants). In August 2023, defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court granted . Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. In November 2023, after finding plaintiffs had "at least arguably satisfied" certain elements of their claim, the court granted plaintiffs' motion and scheduled a trial for June 2024. The jury heard testimony from plaintiffs, civil engineers Jared Barket and Stan Pitera, and Jackson. Defendants called Lieutenant Lieberum, asphalt machine operator William Blank, and Jackson as witnesses. At the onset of trial, the court made clear the standard of liability was set pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. The court explained "N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 operates to trump the ordinary negligence standard." It emphasized under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, "[f]ailure to prove any one element" is fatal to the claim, and plaintiffs were required to show: . . . that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or A-0594-24 6 b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under [N.J.S.A.] 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable. [N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.] Thereafter, without objection, the court charged the jury and provided instructions pursuant to the model jury charges. The verdict sheet, approved by the parties, asked distinct questions related to each element of plaintiffs ' TCA claim. After deliberating for nearly four hours, the jury informed the court it had reached a verdict. At no point did the jury send a note asking questions. In responding to the verdict sheet, by a 6-1 vote on each question, the jury determined: (1) there was a dangerous condition present; (2) defendant's vehicle being parked within the work zone was the proximate cause of plaintiff 's injuries; and (3) the kind of injury sustained by plaintiff was not foreseeable. Since the jury voted no regarding foreseeability, deliberations were ceased and a no cause verdict was entered. A-0594-24 7 Plaintiffs moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 4:49-1. After hearing oral arguments on August 30, 2024, the court denied the motion. II. Our standard of review on a motion for a new trial is "the same as that governing the trial judge—whether there was a miscarriage of justice." Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386 (2018) (quoting Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 522 (2011)). Moreover, Rule 4:49-1(a) provides"[t]he trial judge shall grant [a motion for a new trial] if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." Generally, a miscarriage of justice arises from a lack of credible evidence, obvious disregard of crucial evidence, or a clearly unjust result. See Lindenmuth v. Holden, 296 N.J. Super. 42, 48 (App. Div. 1996); Hayes, 231 N.J. at 385-86 (quoting Risko, 206 N.J. at 521-22). Deference is owed to a jury verdict. Risko, 206 N.J. at 521 (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597-98 (1977)). As a result, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion. Ibid. (quoting Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969)). A-0594-24 8 Indeed, jury verdicts should be set aside sparingly. Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422, 432 (1994); see also Boryszewski v. Burke, 380 N.J. Super. 361, 391 (App. Div. 2005) ("Jury verdicts should be set aside in favor of new trials only with great reluctance, and only in cases of clear injustice") (emphasis added). Further, "'all evidence supporting the verdict must be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of upholding the verdict. '" Dutton v. Rando, 458 N.J. Super. 213, 224 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Boryszewski, 380 N.J. Super. at 391). However, "[i]nconsistent and irreconcilable verdicts are fatally defective and should normally be set aside. '" Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Lotito, 328 N.J. Super. 491, 508 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Brendel v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 28 N.J. Super. 500, 507 (App. Div. 1953)). III. Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred because it failed to evaluate and determine the jury verdict was inherently and fatally inconsistent. Specifically, they argue the verdict finding a dangerous condition and proximate cause while finding against foreseeability was fundamentally inconsistent. We are not persuaded. A-0594-24 9 Plaintiffs' argument is premised on the assertion Model Jury Charge 5.20A is inherently confusing or objectionable. Generally, a "presumption of propriety [] attaches to a trial court's reliance on the model jury charge[s]." Est. of Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568, 596 (2015); see also Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 79 (2018) (quoting State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017)) ("Without an objection at the time a jury instruction is given, there is a presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, because plaintiffs never objected to the jury instructions, we apply a plain error standard of review. See R. 1:7-2; R. 2:10-2; Bradford v. Kupper Assocs., 283 N.J. Super. 556, 573-74 (App. Div. 1995) ("The absence of an objection suggests that trial counsel perceived no error or prejudice, and, in any event, prevented the trial judge from remedying any possible confusion in a timely fashion"); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 1:7-2 (2027) ("[T]he objection must be made before the jury begins deliberations. It is too late to object thereafter except on the ground of plain error."). To satisfy the plain error standard, an error must be "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999). "Relief under [Rule] 2:10-2, at least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should A-0594-24 10 be sparingly employed.'" Ibid. (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J. 429, 435 (1957)). Plaintiffs assert foreseeability was embedded throughout the jury instructions in the concepts of proximate cause and dangerous condition. For example, they posit a dangerous condition means a condition that creates a substantial risk of injury when the property is "used with due care and in a manner in which it is foreseeable that it will be used." They argue if the proximate cause and dangerous condition elements are found, then a jury must find the third element, foreseeability has been met. This argument is unpersuasive and conflates differing standards. The TCA requires plaintiffs to prove: (1) a dangerous condition; (2) proximate cause; (3) foreseeability; and (4) either negligence or constructive notice. N.J.S.A. 59:4-2. Each of these elements was explained to the jury, as follows: To summarize, for [plaintiffs] to prove [their] claim against Robert Lieberum, the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey State Police, [they] must prove each of the following elements. That the presence of the parked state trooper vehicle in the buffer zone at the time a dump truck was to have exited the shoulder lane on Route 40 constituted a dangerous condition. Two, that the dangerous condition proximately caused the injury. A-0594-24 11 Three, that the dangerous condition created a foreseeable risk of the kind of injury that was incurred. Four, that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition, and enough time to have corrected it before the accident, or that an employee of the public entity acting within the scope of [their] employment created the dangerous condition. And five, that the measures taken by the public entity or the failure to take any measures in response to the dangerous condition were palpably unreasonable. This was a verbatim recitation of the summary section in Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.20A, "Dangerous Condition of Public Property" at 7-8 (rev. Jan. 2019). Primarily, plaintiffs highlight cases that conclude a finding of negligence without proximate cause is inconsistent. See Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139, 144 (1977) ("The broad test of negligence is what a reasonably prudent person would foresee and would do in the light of this foresight under the circumstances " (quoting 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 58 (1970))); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 543 (1984) ("When negligent conduct creates such a risk, setting off foreseeable consequences that lead to plaintiff's injury, the conduct is deemed the proximate cause of the injury"); Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 503 (1997) (explaining proximate cause depends on whether plaintiff's injury "reasonably flowed from defendant's breach of duty") (internal citation omitted). A-0594-24 12 Here, the jury never reached the question of negligence. Instead, the jury's verdict was: (1) the trooper car parked in the buffer zone created a dangerous condition; (2) the creation of the dangerous condition proximately caused plaintiff's injuries; however, (3) plaintiff's type of injuries were not foreseeable. Where the language of both the TCA and Model Jury Charge 5.20A unambiguously separate plaintiffs' cause of action into distinct elements, the jury's verdict here cannot be considered inconsistent. Plaintiffs' continued reference to a typical negligence analysis—not applicable to a State entity—is misplaced and unpersuasive. The trial court's explanation of negligence was broken into two parts, including: (1) a general explanation of negligence and (2) the specific standard for recovering against a public entity. Where, as here, there are separately articulated elements for a cause of action, it is not inconsistent for a jury to find some, but not all elements have been satisfied. Plaintiffs conflate "foreseeability" with the model jury charge's foreseeable use requirement. Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.20A "Dangerous Condition of Public Property" (rev. Jan. 2019); see also Robinson v. City of Jersey City, 284 N.J. Super. 596, 600-01 (App. Div. 1995) (explaining how foreseeable use works into the dangerous condition analysis). Whether the A-0594-24 13 property was being used in a foreseeable manner is a dangerous condition question; whereas whether the injury sustained by plaintiff was foreseeable is an entirely separate, but necessary element of plaintiffs' cause of action. When there are separately articulated elements for a cause of action, it is proper for a jury to find some, but not all elements have been satisfied. As the trial court maintained, a finding for plaintiffs "would negate . . . the purpose of having a third question." The jury's verdict conforms with the testimony elicited at trial. Undoubtedly, each individual present at the construction site, including plaintiff himself, testified there was no perceived risk in plaintiff walking across the construction site to the trooper car. Furthermore, it can be implied from the testimony that to the extent any type of injury or damage was foreseeable, it was damage to the dump trucks and asphalt machines, not personal injury to one of the workers. Plaintiffs also argue the court was obligated to immediately order a new trial. They premise this contention on the ruling in Love v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 366 N.J. Super. 525 (App. Div. 2004). In Love, liability was stipulated and the jury was tasked with determining only "medical causation and compensatory damages." Id. at 527. The jury voted A-0594-24 14 5-1 on each element of damages and awarded Love "$65,000 for lost wages and $0 for pain and suffering." Ibid. On appeal, Love argued the jury's verdict—by awarding economic damages for lost wages but nothing for pain and suffering— was inconsistent and entitled him to a new trial. Id. at 528. In ordering a new trial, we reasoned the jury, after having found defendant was owed lost wages, and especially considering "the extended medical treatment that resulted, including a series of surgeries," rendered an inconsistent verdict by failing to "fairly compensate plaintiff for those logically inescapable periods of pain and suffering." Id. at 532-33. We also noted trial judges should take corrective action where a damage award is "patently inadequate or excessive," id. at 533 (citing Von Borstel v. Campan, 255 N.J. Super. 24, 31 (App. Div. 1992)), or the jury's verdict "entirely omits . . . an award in a discrete category of damages where some award is manifestly appropriate." Ibid. Here, Love is inapplicable for three reasons: (1) liability was not stipulated and thus, the jury was tasked with applying the model jury charges; (2) a public entity was involved and therefore, the distinct elements of the TCA were at play; and (3) the verdict was not illogical on its face or against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, plaintiffs' reliance on Love is unconvincing. A-0594-24 15 To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because the argument was without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-0594-24 16