Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 1 of 59 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11881 ____________________ COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, NETCHOICE, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus JAMES UTHMEIER, Defendant, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 4:24-cv-00438-MW-MAF ____________________ USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 2 of 59 2 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 Before NEWSOM, LUCK, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges. NEWSOM, Circuit Judge: For better or worse, the proliferation of social media has transformed American life. Unsurprisingly, it has also generated “a raft of public policy issues.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 716 (2024). One of the most pressing is how and in what ways so- cial-media use affects minors. According to the State of Florida, social-media companies seed their platforms with “addictive fea- tures”—push notifications, auto-play, infinite scrolling, etc.—in or- der to make them, well, addictive. These features, the state says, are “psychological hooks” that “overstimulate the reward center in the brain” and “foster compulsive overuse.” Br. of Appellant at 4 (citations omitted). Florida insists that children are particularly sus- ceptible to these “addictive features” because their brains are still developing. In particular, the state contends, the features contrib- ute to “[c]ompulsive or uncontrollable” social-media use among children and threaten a “youth mental health crisis.” Id. at 1, 5. Children face “‘sleep problems, attention problems, and feelings of exclusion,’ all of which put [them] at risk of ‘depression, anxiety, and neuroticism.’” Id. at 5 (citations omitted). In an effort to protect children from social-media addiction and its ensuing effects, Florida passed HB3, which imposes age-re- striction requirements on platforms that use “addictive features.” Fla. Stat. § 501.1736(1)(e). In particular, HB3 requires platforms USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 3 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 3 within its ambit to prohibit anyone under the age of 14 from creat- ing an account, and to prohibit anyone else under 16 from doing so without parental consent. Id. § 501.1736(2)–(3). The Computer & Communications Industry Association and NetChoice, both Internet trade organizations—to which, col- lectively, we will hereinafter refer as “CCIA”—brought facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to HB3. The district court concluded that HB3 was likely unconstitutional and preliminarily enjoined Florida from enforcing it. We stayed the injunction pend- ing appeal. Before us, Florida contends (1) that CCIA lacks stand- ing to assert the First Amendment rights of minors, (2) that the dis- trict court should have abstained from deciding the case under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and (3) that HB3 satisfies First Amendment scrutiny. Our analysis proceeds in three parts. First, as threshold mat- ters, we hold that CCIA has standing to challenge HB3 and that Younger abstention doesn’t foreclose its claim. Second, we address the merits of CCIA’s as-applied challenge, and we hold that HB3 likely passes First Amendment muster because it is a content-neu- tral speech regulation that satisfies intermediate scrutiny. Finally, we reject CCIA’s facial challenge to HB3 under the principles artic- ulated in Moody.1 1 CCIA and NetChoice have challenged the constitutionality of similar laws in other states restricting minors’ use of social-media platforms. See, e.g., NetChoice v. Carr, 789 F. Supp. 3d 1200 (N.D. Ga. 2025) (Georgia), appeal dock- eted, No. 25-12436 (11th Cir. July 16, 2025); NetChoice, LLC v. Skrmetti, No. 25- USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 4 of 59 4 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 I A We begin with a primer on HB3. The law defines a “social media platform” as “an online forum, website, or application” (1) that “[a]llows users to upload content or view the content or activity of other users”; (2) on which at least 10% of daily active users under 16 years old spend an average of at least two hours per day; (3) that “[e]mploys algorithms that analyze user data or infor- mation on users to select content for” them; and (4) that “[h]as any of the following addictive features”: “[i]nfinite scrolling,” “[p]ush notifications,” displays of “personal interactive metrics,” “[a]uto- play,” or “[l]ive-streaming.” Fla. Stat. § 501.1736(1)(e). HB3 de- fines each “addictive feature” as follows: • “Infinite scrolling” refers to either (1) the “[c]ontinuous[] loading” of content without the need to open a separate page, or (2) the “[s]eamless” loading of content “with no vis- ible or apparent end or page breaks.” 5660, 2026 WL 2546423, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026) (Tennessee); Comput. & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n v. Paxton, 184 F.4th 420, 437 (5th Cir. 2026) (Texas); NetChoice, LLC v. Yost, 180 F.4th 268 (6th Cir. 2026) (Ohio); NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 152 F.4th 1002 (9th Cir. 2025) (California); NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Fitch, 134 F.4th 799 (5th Cir. 2025) (Mississippi); NetChoice v. Murrill, 812 F. Supp. 3d 594 (M.D. La. 2025) (Louisiana); NetChoice, LLC v. Griffin, No. 5:23-CV-5105, 2025 WL 978607 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2025) (Arkansas); NetChoice, LLC v. Reyes, 748 F. Supp. 3d 1105 (D. Utah 2024) (Utah). USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 5 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 5 • “Push notifications” are “alerts” sent by the platform “to in- form a user about specific activities or events related to the user’s account.” • “Personal interactive metrics” refer to “[d]isplays . . . in- dicat[ing] the number of times other users have clicked a button to indicate their reaction to content or have shared or reposted the content”—think “likes,” “comments,” “re- posts,” “shares,” etc. • “Auto-play” is a feature that enables a video to “play without the user first clicking on the video or on a play button for that video.” • “Live-streaming” is a “function that allows a user or adver- tiser to broadcast live video content in real-time.” Id. § 501.1736(1)(e)(4)(a)–(e). HB3 exempts from its definition of “social media platform” any “online service, website, or application where the exclusive function is e-mail or direct messaging consist- ing of text, photographs, pictures, images, or videos shared only between the sender and the recipients.” Id. HB3 requires covered platforms (1) to prohibit minors under the age of 14 from creating accounts and (2) to prohibit 14- and 15- year-olds from creating accounts without parental consent. Id. § 501.1736(2)(a), (3)(a). If an account holder is under 14, or is 14 to 15 but doesn’t have parental consent, the platform must terminate her account. Id. § 501.1736(2)(b)(1), (3)(b). USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 6 of 59 6 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 B On October 28, 2024, shortly before HB3 took effect, CCIA brought facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to HB3’s pertinent provisions. The next day, CCIA moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent HB3’s enforcement. A flurry of docket activ- ity ensued. (The procedural recitation that follows may seem pretty tedious, but it’s relevant to the Younger issue before us.) Lawyers filed notices of appearance and withdrawal, as well as pro hac vice motions, on which the district court ruled. Florida filed a motion to dismiss, to which CCIA responded. The state also filed an opposition to CCIA’s preliminary-injunction motion, and CCIA filed a reply in support. In addition, Florida deposed four industry witnesses. See Cleland Dep., Dkt. No. 51-4 (NetChoice’s General Counsel); Schruers Dep., Dkt. No. 51-5 (CCIA’s President and CEO); Boyle Dep., Dkt. No. 51-6 (Snap’s Senior Director of Prod- uct Management); Veitch Dep., Dkt. No. 51-7 (YouTube’s Director of Government Affairs and Public Policy across the Americas). Following a hearing, the district court denied CCIA’s prelim- inary-injunction motion on associational standing grounds. The court held that CCIA had failed to show that any of its members’ asserted injuries were “actual or imminent” and “fairly traceable” to the state because it didn’t allege “that at least one specific mem- ber of [CCIA] [was] likely regulated by the law.” Dist. Ct. Order, Mar. 13, 2025, at 6. The court also granted Florida’s motion to dis- miss CCIA’s complaint. CCIA promptly filed an amended com- plaint that primarily sought to remedy the standing defects that the district court had identified and renewed its preliminary-injunction USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 7 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 7 motion. The court held a scheduling conference and set a briefing schedule. In the meantime, CCIA deposed three of the state’s ex- pert witnesses. See Twenge Dep. 32–34, 53–57, Dkt. No. 63-1 (opin- ing that using social media causes, or at least correlates with, harm- ful outcomes for children); Allen Dep. 12–16, 58–139, Dkt. No. 63- 2 (explaining how age-verification systems function); Alter Dep. 27–54, Dkt. No. 63-3 (describing a theory of how design features of social-media platforms trigger behavioral addiction). On April 21, 2025, before the district court had ruled on CCIA’s renewed preliminary-injunction motion, Florida filed an enforcement action in state court against Snap, a social-media com- pany and member of CCIA’s co-plaintiff NetChoice, alleging viola- tions of HB3. Snap removed the enforcement action to federal dis- trict court. 2 The district court then granted CCIA’s renewed prelimi- nary-injunction motion. As relevant here, the court determined (1) that CCIA had standing, (2) that Younger didn’t require dismissal of CCIA’s suit, and (3) that although HB3 was likely a content-neu- tral speech regulation, it was likely insufficiently tailored to survive 2 Notice of Removal, Off. of the Att’y Gen., State of Fla., Dep’t of Legal Affs. v. Snap Inc., No. 3:25-cv-676 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2025), Dkt. No. 1. On the same day that we heard oral argument in this case, we heard argument in the appeal from the district court’s order declining to remand the enforcement action to state court. See Off. of the Att’y Gen., State of Fla., Dep’t of Legal Affs. v. Snap Inc., No. 25-12814. USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 8 of 59 8 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 intermediate scrutiny. The court thus enjoined Florida from en- forcing the challenged provisions of HB3. We stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal. In our stay order, we agreed with the district court (albeit tentatively) that CCIA had standing, that Younger abstention didn’t apply, and that the statute was likely content neutral. Nevertheless, we con- cluded (again, tentatively) that HB3 was sufficiently tailored to sat- isfy intermediate scrutiny. We therefore granted the stay on the ground that Florida was likely to succeed on the merits. Following oral argument of the appeal of the district court’s preliminary-injunction order, we directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the questions (1) whether CCIA has standing and (2) whether the district court decided CCIA’s as-ap- plied challenge. II Before diving into the merits, we need to address two threshold questions: (1) whether CCIA has standing to pursue its First Amendment challenge, and (2) whether the district court should have abstained from deciding this case under Younger. For reasons we’ll explain, we answer those questions yes and no, re- spectively. USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 9 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 9 A First, standing.3 “Article III standing is a ‘bedrock constitu- tional requirement.’” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024) (quoting United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 675 (2023)). To establish standing, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (i) that she has suffered or likely will suffer an injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would be redressed by the requested judicial relief.” Id. at 380. CCIA asserts standing to vindicate the First Amendment rights of its members—i.e., the social-media platforms. The Su- preme Court has recognized that “an organization may sue to re- dress its members’ injuries” under what is known as “associational standing.” United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. 544, 552 (1996). It’s a “form of third-party standing” that arguably “relax[es] both the injury and redressability requirements for Article III standing.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 398– 99 (Thomas, J., concurring). Under associational-standing principles, an organization may sue on its members’ behalf when (1) “its members would oth- erwise have standing to sue in their own right,” (2) “the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose,” and (3) “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 3 “We review the legal question of standing de novo.” Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1351 (11th Cir. 2005). USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 10 of 59 10 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Brown Grp., 517 U.S. at 553 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). 1 To satisfy the associational-standing test’s first requirement, at least one of CCIA’s members must itself meet the three Arti- cle III standing elements: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) re- dressability. See id. An “injury in fact” is “an invasion of a legally protected in- terest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or im- minent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation modified). In the pre-enforce- ment-challenge context, a “plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact re- quirement where he alleges an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but pro- scribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (citation modified). In this circuit, “[t]he injury requirement is most loosely applied—particularly in terms of how directly the injury must result from the challenged government action—where [F]irst [A]mendment rights are involved, because of the fear that free speech will be chilled even before the law, regulation, or policy is enforced.” Speech First, Inc. v. Cartwright, 32 F.4th 1110, 1120 (11th Cir. 2022). A First Amendment plaintiff has standing if “the operation or enforcement of the government policy would cause a USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 11 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 11 reasonable would-be speaker to self-censor—even where the pol- icy falls short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. (citation modified). “The fundamental question under our precedent . . . is whether the challenged policy ‘objectively chills’ protected expression.” Id. At least a handful of CCIA’s members satisfy the injury-in- fact requirement. The alleged conduct in which Snap, YouTube, and Meta engage—and intend to continue to engage—is “arguably affected with a constitutional interest” that is “proscribed by” HB3. Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 159. CCIA contends that its mem- ber platforms are likely to suffer First Amendment injuries because HB3 will hinder their ability to communicate with their users through “curated compilations of third-party speech,” Supp. Br. of Appellees at 3–4, and features such as “[p]ush notifications” and “personal interactive metrics,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 36, 49. “[C]om- piling and curating others’ speech” is an “expressive activity” pro- tected by the First Amendment. Moody, 603 U.S. at 731. The Moody Court concluded, based on the record in that case, that Facebook’s and YouTube’s decisions about “which third-party content those feeds will display, or how the display will be ordered and orga- nized,” are “expressive choices” meriting First Amendment protec- tion. Id. at 740. The same reasoning applies here. CCIA has alleged that Snap, YouTube, and Meta (through Facebook and Instagram) curate content “that they think will be particularly relevant to” their users and choose that content for “a particular user based in part on the content that the user has interacted with in the past.” Am. Compl. ¶ 48; see also id. ¶¶ 22, 35. Therefore, by restricting USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 12 of 59 12 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 some users’ ability to create accounts, HB3 would limit the plat- forms’ ability to engage in the expressive activity of delivering cu- rated content to those users. Moreover, at least some of CCIA’s members face a “credible threat of prosecution.” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 159 (cita- tion omitted). We’ve said that “when a plaintiff challenges a law soon after it was enacted and the state vigorously defends the law in court, we can infer a credible threat of prosecution exists.” Shen v. Comm’r, Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 158 F.4th 1227, 1242 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). That’s what happened here: The state has been nothing if not vigorous. And the record shows that Snap and YouTube, for example, meet HB3’s coverage criteria. The enforcement of HB3 would not only objectively chill these platforms from delivering curated content to the younger us- ers HB3 covers, see Speech First, Inc., 32 F.4th at 1120, but would also pressure them into instituting “significant and costly compli- ance measures” to implement age-verification and parental-verifi- cation systems. Am. Compl. ¶ 21 (Snap); id. ¶ 34 (YouTube); id. ¶ 47 (Meta). Cf. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988) (holding that the plaintiffs met the injury-in-fact require- ment because, “if their interpretation of the statute is correct, [they] will have to take significant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal prosecution”). CCIA has thus shown that at least one of its members is likely to suffer an injury in fact. The remaining requirements for Article III standing—causa- tion and redressability—are clearly satisfied by at least one CCIA USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 13 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 13 member. The “defendant’s conduct”—here, Florida’s enactment of HB3—is the cause of the platform members’ First Amendment injuries, and relief in the form of an injunction prohibiting HB3’s enforcement would doubtlessly redress them. Accordingly, CCIA has met the first prong of the associa- tional-standing test by showing that at least one of its members has Article III standing. 2 As for the second prong of the associational-standing test, we agree with the district court—and Florida doesn’t contest—that the interests that CCIA “aims to protect are germane to [its] pur- poses.” Brown Grp., 517 U.S. at 553. 3 CCIA also satisfies the third and final prong—namely, that its claim can be resolved and requested relief can be granted with- out the participation of its individual members. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. at 553. The Supreme Court has called the individual-partici- pation element a “judicially self-imposed limit” that aims to serve “administrative convenience and efficiency.” Id. at 555–57. Unlike the first two prongs, which are “constitutional necessit[ies],” this third prong is “prudential.” Id. at 555–56. Meeting it rebuts the “background presumption” that a litigant (here, CCIA) may not as- sert the rights of absent third parties (here, its member platforms). Id. at 557. USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 14 of 59 14 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 In similar circumstances, a number of other courts have held that CCIA’s co-plaintiff, NetChoice, satisfies the associational- standing test’s individual-participation prong. NetChoice L.L.C. v. Fitch, 134 F.4th 799, 805 (5th Cir. 2025) (“NetChoice’s ‘claims can be proven by evidence from representative injured members’ and ‘the participation of [certain] individual members does not thwart associational standing.’”); CCIA v. Paxton, 747 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1030 (W.D. Tex. 2024), aff’d in relevant part, 184 F.4th 420, 445 (5th Cir. 2026); NetChoice v. Murrill, 812 F. Supp. 3d 594, 629–31 (M.D. La. 2025); NetChoice, LLC v. Reyes, 748 F. Supp. 3d 1105, 1118–19 (D. Utah 2024); NetChoice, LLC v. Griffin, No. 5:23-CV-5105, 2023 WL 5660155, at *10 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 31, 2023). We agree with them. The state argues that CCIA doesn’t have associational stand- ing because, on the merits, its First Amendment claim requires “nu- merous factual determinations about individual platforms.” Supp Br. of Appellant at 6. For support, it cites Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321 (1980), and Georgia Cemetery Ass’n v. Cox, 353 F.3d 1319, 1322 (11th Cir. 2003). But both cases are distinguishable. In Harris, a pro-choice division of a religious organization asserted that fed- eral abortion-funding restrictions violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. 448 U.S. at 321. The Supreme Court held that the group couldn’t proceed under an associational-standing theory because adjudicating the free-exercise issues would neces- sarily entail an inquiry into whether and to what extent the re- strictions operated coercively on particular members. Id. In Cox, a cemetery association brought a Takings Clause challenge to a law capping fees for the transfer of burial rights. 353 F.3d at 1322. We USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 15 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 15 held that the group couldn’t assert associational standing because resolving its takings claim required the participation of its mem- bers. “[T]he economic impact,” we reasoned, “will vary depending upon the economic circumstances of” particular cemeteries. Id. Generally, whether a violation occurred in the regulatory-takings context requires an individualized inquiry into whether each af- fected party was denied the compensation it was due. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (characterizing regulatory-takings jurisprudence as entailing “‘es- sentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,’ designed to allow ‘careful exam- ination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances’” (citation omitted)). This case is different. While free-exercise and takings claims require consideration of the law’s effects on individual parties, CCIA’s free-speech claim, which it brings on behalf of its member platforms, turns on whether HB3 implicates the First Amendment, whether it is content based or content neutral, and whether it is appropriately tailored to the asserted state interest—inquiries that don’t depend on fact-intensive determinations regarding the mem- ber platforms. Nor does CCIA’s requested remedy require the in- dividual members’ participation—for the simple reason that it seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, rather than damages. See Brown Grp., 517 U.S. at 553–54 (“If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actu- ally injured.” (citation modified)). USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 16 of 59 16 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 The state separately argues that First Amendment “claim[s] related to algorithmic speech” are “fact intensive” and therefore will “surely vary from platform to platform.” Supp. Br. of Appel- lant at 10 (quoting NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta, 152 F.4th 1002, 1014 (9th Cir. 2025)). Not necessarily. To be sure, in Bonta, on which the state relies, the Ninth Circuit held that a challenge brought by NetChoice required the participation of individual member plat- forms. But the law and the challenge there don’t resemble those here. In Bonta, NetChoice sued to enjoin the enforcement of a law that restricted minors’ access to “personalized feeds” generated by the platforms’ content-recommendation algorithms. 152 F.4th at 1010, 1014. Based on NetChoice’s acknowledgment that “each of its members” and their algorithms were “unique,” the Ninth Cir- cuit concluded that the law would implicate the First Amendment only with respect to platforms whose algorithms were “expres- sive.” Id. at 1014. The determination whether each platform’s al- gorithm was expressive, the court concluded, was “fact intensive” and required individual members’ participation. Id. HB3 is very different; its restrictions are tethered not to each platform’s unique algorithmic design but to so-called addictive features that are pre- sent across platforms. We are satisfied that CCIA has satisfied the third and final prong of associational standing. * * * USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 17 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 17 For these reasons, we hold that CCIA has associational standing and may bring this action on behalf of its members. 4 B We next address whether Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), required the district court to abstain from ruling on CCIA’s 4 In both its complaint and its initial brief on appeal, CCIA separately con- tended that it also has third-party standing to vindicate the First Amendment rights of its members’ users. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 50 (“CCIA and NetChoice have standing to assert . . . the First Amendment rights of their members’ cur- rent and prospective users.”); id. ¶¶ 7, 8 (same); Br. of Appellees at 43 (arguing that CCIA and NetChoice have “‘prudential standing’ to assert the First Amendment rights of their members’ users”). In its supplemental brief, though, CCIA seems to have retreated from its original, standing-based posi- tion, and now it says instead that its contentions regarding users’ rights were meant only to supplement the merits inquiry. See Supp. Br. of Appellees at 15 (calling the assertion of prudential standing a “misunderstanding”); id. (“Plain- tiffs invoke users’ rights not to get into court or expand their universe of claims, but because users are a necessary component of the requisite First Amendment inquiry[.]”). In any event, CCIA’s assertion of third-party stand- ing to pursue its members’ users’ rights runs more to its facial overbreadth claim than its as-applied claim. But for reasons we explain in Part IV, we con- clude that, at least on the record as it currently exists, CCIA hasn’t made the showing necessary to proceed with any facial challenge. If CCIA wishes to continue to assert the rights of its members’ users in connection with a facial overbreadth challenge, the district court may address those issues then. One more standing-related loose end: CCIA separately asserts third- party standing to pursue its members’ users’ rights on jus tertii grounds, which could apply to its as-applied claim. We needn’t address this argument because we find that CCIA has associational standing. USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 18 of 59 18 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 preliminary-injunction motion in light of Florida’s state-court en- forcement action against Snap, a member of NetChoice.5 “[A]bstaining from the ‘exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.’” New Ga. Project, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Ga., 106 F.4th 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Colo. River Water Con- servation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)). Accord- ingly, only the “clearest of justifications merits abstention.” Id. (quoting Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1140 (11th Cir. 2013)). In Younger, the Supreme Court recognized a “lim- ited exception to the usual rule.” Id. Under Younger, a federal court must abstain if (1) “there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding,” (2) “the state proceeding impli- cates important state interests,” and (3) “there is an adequate op- portunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional chal- lenges.” Id. at 1242 (citation modified) (quoting Middlesex Cnty. Eth- ics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). The question before us involves the first requirement—whether Flor- ida’s enforcement action against Snap was “ongoing” in the rele- vant sense. Id. Perhaps counterintuitively, a state proceeding is deemed to be “ongoing” for Younger purposes “even if it’s not actually pending when the federal suit is filed—provided that it’s instituted . . . ‘be- fore any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place 5 “We review a Younger abstention decision for an abuse of discretion.” Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 19 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 19 in federal court.’” Id. at 1243 (quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975)) (emphasis in original). That means that if the fed- eral suit is still in an “embryonic stage” and “no contested matter has been decided” by the federal court by the time the state brings its enforcement action, the latter will be treated as if it were “ongo- ing”—meaning that the federal court must abstain from further lit- igation. Tokyo Gwinnett v. Gwinnett Cnty., 940 F.3d 1254, 1268 (11th Cir. 2019). Whether “proceedings of substance on the merits” have oc- curred in a federal suit entails a “fact-specific assessment of the cir- cumstances.” Id. at 1272. That assessment depends on “the time that the district court has spent considering the case, any motions ruled on, any discovery, the number of conferences [or hearings] held, and any change in the parties’ position as a result of the fed- eral litigation.” Id. “[T]he filing of motions” is also relevant, “even if the district court did not rule” on them. Id. And even “significant and substantial procedural steps” can qualify as “proceedings of substance on the merits” sufficient to preclude abstention. Id. at 1271–72. Florida brought its enforcement action against Snap nearly six months after CCIA initially filed its lawsuit, and during that span, “proceedings of substance on the merits” undoubtedly oc- curred in federal court. Let’s recap: (1) Florida moved to dismiss CCIA’s action, and (2) CCIA responded; (3) Florida filed an opposi- tion to CCIA’s preliminary-injunction motion, and (4) CCIA re- USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 20 of 59 20 Opinion of the Court 25-11881 plied; (5) the district court held a hearing on CCIA’s motion, a sub- stantial portion of which was dedicated to a discussion of the merits of CCIA’s claim, see Prelim. Inj. Hr’g Tr. 21–41, 68–92, 101–114, 123–135, Dkt. No. 71; (6) the court then denied CCIA’s motion (al- beit on standing grounds); (7) CCIA filed an amended complaint and (8) renewed its preliminary-injunction motion; and (9) the dis- trict court convened a status conference and (10) issued a briefing schedule. Along the way, (11) the parties conducted limited discovery, including several depositions, all of which bore on the merits to some extent. In particular, the state deposed four industry wit- nesses, see Cleland Dep., Dkt. No. 51-4 (testifying about NetChoice’s members, their business practices, and their age-veri- fication systems); Schruers Dep., Dkt. No. 51-5 (testifying about CCIA’s members, their business practices, and their parental con- trols); Boyle Dep., Dkt. No. 51-6 (testifying about Snapchat’s fea- tures and parental controls); Veitch Dep., Dkt. No. 51-7 (testifying about YouTube’s features and age-based policies and systems). So too, CCIA deposed three of Florida’s expert witnesses, see Twenge Dep. 32–34, 53–57, Dkt. No. 63-1 (testifying about how social-me- dia features trigger harmful behavior in children); Allen Dep. 12– 16, 58–139, Dkt. No. 63-2 (testifying about how age-verification sys- tems function); Alter Dep. 27–54, Dkt. No. 63-3 (testifying about research on behavioral addiction and features of digital platforms that make them difficult to resist). USCA11 Case: 25-11881 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 10/14/2026 Page: 21 of 59 25-11881 Opinion of the Court 21 To recount this history, we think, is to answer the Younger question: By the time Florida brought its enforcement action against Snap, CCIA’s federal case had passed the “embryonic stage.” Tokyo Gwinnett, 940 F.3d at 1268. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abstain under Younger. III On, then, to the merits. 6 As already explained, CCIA pre- sented, and the district court addressed, both facial and as-applied challenges to HB3.7 We will consider CCIA’s as-applied challenge 6 “We review the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for ab