Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE BLANCA E. HERNANDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CITY OF GLENDALE, Defendant/Appellee. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0319 FILED 11-12-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2025-036192 The Honorable Michael D. Gordon, Judge Retired AFFIRMED COUNSEL Browne Law Group, Gilbert By Byron F. Browne, Adam J. Gorski, John J. Daller Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Glendale City Attorney’s Office, Glendale By Michael D. Bailey, Ashley E. Wallace Counsel for Defendant/Appellee HERNANDEZ, et al. v. CITY OF GLENDALE Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined. B A I L E Y, Judge: ¶1 Blanca Hernandez, Arthur Hernandez, and Leopoldo Gomez (“Claimants”) appeal the superior court’s dismissal of their complaint against the City of Glendale. We affirm because Claimants’ notice of claim did not include “a specific amount for which the[ir] claim[s] [could] be settled.” See A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 In March 2025, Claimants served a notice of claim on the City that described an October 2024 vehicle collision allegedly caused by a City police officer. After providing a brief account of the collision, the notice set forth what Claimants asserted their specific “Monetary Damages” were: “Blanca Hernandez: $200,000.00 (Medical, general, & Property Damage),” “Arthur Hernandez: $150,000.00 (Medical & general damages),” and “Leopoldo Gomez: $150,000.00 (Medical & general damages).” ¶3 The City did not reply to the notice of claim, so it was deemed denied after sixty days. See A.R.S. § 12-821.01(E). Claimants later filed a complaint against the City1 seeking damages for the collision. The City moved to dismiss under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), arguing that Claimants’ notice of claim was insufficient under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-821.01. After full briefing on the motion, the superior court found Claimants’ notice of claim did not comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01 because it failed to “communicate a specific settlement amount that, if agreed to by the City, [would] settle the claim” and granted dismissal. 1 The complaint also named as defendants the City police officer involved in the collision and the Glendale Police Department. Claimants later voluntarily dismissed the claims against those defendants with prejudice. 2 HERNANDEZ, et al. v. CITY OF GLENDALE Decision of the Court ¶4 Claimants timely appealed the dismissal. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶5 We review de novo both the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and whether a notice of claim complies with A.R.S. § 12- 821.01. Yahweh v. City of Phoenix, 243 Ariz. 21, 22, ¶ 6 (App. 2017). ¶6 A claimant seeking to sue a public entity such as the City must first serve on the entity a notice of claim that complies with the requirements of A.R.S. § 12-821.01. Id. at 23, ¶ 7. Claimants must strictly comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01’s requirements. City of Mesa v. Ryan, 258 Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 9 (2024). The statute’s purpose is to “permit the public entity to investigate the claim, assess liability, consider settlement before litigation, and budget for possible future litigation.” Id. ¶7 At issue here is the requirement that a notice of claim must “contain a specific amount for which the claim can be settled.” A.R.S. § 12- 821.01(A). We have interpreted this provision to mean that a notice of claim must “present a valid settlement offer to the public entity [the claimant] wishes to sue.” Yahweh, 243 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 8. “An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” Id. (citation omitted). A valid settlement offer gives the public entity “the ability to reach an agreement ending [the] dispute or lawsuit through payment” of a specific, identified amount. Yollin v. City of Glendale, 219 Ariz. 24, 28, ¶ 9 (App. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶8 A notice of claim must identify the amount for which a claimant is willing to settle, not the amount he or she will allege as damages in litigation. See Yahweh, 243 Ariz. at 23, ¶¶ 7-8. “Simply reciting the amount a claimant will demand [in damages] is insufficient to satisfy § 12- 821.01, because such a statement does not express a willingness to accept [that amount] in settlement.” Id. at ¶ 8. That is because a claimant’s alleged damages amount may differ from the amount the claimant would be willing to accept in settlement, as an acceptable settlement amount “is rarely based on questions of liability alone, but includes factors such as the cost of litigation and the anticipated trial verdict.” Id. ¶9 Here, we agree with the superior court that Claimants’ notice “d[id] not communicate a settlement offer.” While the notice provided amounts of “Monetary Damages,” it gave no indication of the amount for 3 HERNANDEZ, et al. v. CITY OF GLENDALE Decision of the Court which Claimants would be willing to settle. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) requires that a notice contain not only a “specific amount,” but a “specific amount for which the claim can be settled.” Contrary to Claimants’ argument, requiring them to expressly communicate a settlement offer does not create a “magic language” requirement that is not imposed by the statute’s plain text. The defect in Claimants’ notice is not that it omitted particular language, but that it included no language that stated Claimants were offering to settle. Because Claimants’ notice did not make an offer to settle, it did not comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), and dismissal was therefore proper. ¶10 Claimants argue that this case resembles Yollin. It does not. In Yollin, the claimant’s notice expressly offered to “release the City of Glendale and their agents and employees from any liability associated with th[e] claim” for $150,000. Yollin, 219 Ariz. at 27, ¶ 2 n.1. The issue in Yollin was whether this offer was negated by other language in the notice which indicated that Yollin was “still incurring medical expenses, wage loss[,] and pain and suffering and was willing to negotiate.” Id. at 28, ¶ 10. We determined the “qualifying” language did not invalidate the settlement amount provided because the claimant still made an unequivocal offer and would have been bound if the City had accepted it. Id. But here, Claimants included no such settlement language in their notice and therefore find no relief from Yollin. ¶11 Claimants’ notice of claim more closely resembles the notice in Yahweh. Yahweh’s notice of claim stated that he was “seeking damages for 1.5 million dollars” in lost earnings but also stated claims for defamation and “violations of the Family Medical Leave Act.” 243 Ariz. at 22, ¶ 3. We held the notice insufficient because “[w]hile [it] stated Yahweh would sue for $1.5 million for loss of projected earnings, it made no mention of the amount of damages he would seek for his Family Medical Leave Act claim.” Id. at 23, ¶ 9. Further, we found “no indication in the [notice] demonstrating a willingness to settle all claims against the City for any stated amount.” Id. In other words, even to the extent Yahweh’s notice identified a specific amount, it provided only the amount of damages he would be seeking at trial. ¶12 Alternatively, Claimants argue that “the only reasonable interpretation of the identified figures is that they represented the amounts for which [Claimants] were willing to settle their claims,” given that two Claimants were still being treated when the notice was submitted and thus the amounts could not be read as the full extent of their medical expenses. But the City was not required to disregard the notice’s explicit text or 4 HERNANDEZ, et al. v. CITY OF GLENDALE Decision of the Court speculate about Claimants’ subjective intent. See Terborg v. Town of Payson, ___ Ariz. ___, ¶¶ 16-17, 596 P.3d 1151, 1155-56 (2026). Because Claimants’ notice provided no amount for which their claims could be settled, the court properly dismissed their complaint for noncompliance with A.R.S. § 12- 821.01(A). ¶13 Because we find Claimants’ notice did not offer a specific amount for which they would settle, we need not address whether the notice provided sufficient facts to support the amount of Claimants’ “Monetary Damages.” CONCLUSION ¶14 We affirm the dismissal of Claimants’ complaint. We deny Claimants’ request for costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -342. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 5