Full Opinion

Case: 26-1515 Document: 29 Page: 1 Filed: 11/12/2026 NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ ASHLEY WESTON, Petitioner v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent ______________________ 2026-1515 ______________________ Petition for review of a decision of the Bureau of Justice Assistance in PSOB Claim No. 2016-159. ______________________ Decided: November 12, 2026 ______________________ ASHLEY WESTON, Irmo, SC, pro se. NEREIDA GUADALUPE LOPEZ FAVELA, Commercial Liti- gation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also repre- sented by GEOFFREY M. LONG, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE. ______________________ Case: 26-1515 Document: 29 Page: 2 Filed: 11/12/2026 2 WESTON v. DOJ Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and REYNA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Ashley Weston, the daughter of deceased firefighter Tyron Weston, appeals from the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s (“BJA’s,” or “Bureau’s”) denial of her claim for monetary benefits under the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act of 1976 (“PSOB Act”), 34 U.S.C. § 10281. We affirm. BACKGROUND Mr. Weston was a long-serving firefighter with the Co- lumbia, South Carolina Fire Department (“CFD”). See S.A. 96. 1 On July 3, 2015, he reported to work, performed his normal duties around the station, then, along with his fellow firefighters went to a nearby training center where they walked around a one-mile track and lifted weights. S.A. 8. Soon afterwards, Mr. Weston felt unwell and lay down to rest at the station. Id. He emerged slurring his words and had no function on the left side of his face. Id. Mr. Weston took an ambulance to the hospital where initial testing presented signs of a stroke. Id. After multiple hos- pital visits, he died of “Hypertensive and Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Disease” on July 26, 2015—just over three weeks after his final report for duty. Id. On August 12, 2015, Ms. Weston filed a claim for death benefits under the PSOB Act. Id. at 7. The PSOB Office denied her claim because it found that the record failed to establish that Mr. Weston “died as a direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained under the PSOB Act . . . or that his death was covered by the presumption established by 34 U.S.C. § 10281(k) regarding deaths re- sulting from heart attack, stroke, or vascular rupture.” Id. 1 “S.A.” refers to the Supplemental Appendix, filed at ECF 20-2. Case: 26-1515 Document: 29 Page: 3 Filed: 11/12/2026 WESTON v. DOJ 3 Ms. Weston appealed to a hearing officer at the BJA and, in May 2021, the hearing officer denied Ms. Weston’s claim. Id. The hearing officer determined that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the necessary finding that Mr. Weston was formally taking part in a man- datory or rated structured activity that was within an offi- cial training or fitness program of CFD. Id. at 13. Ms. Weston further appealed to the BJA Director. S.A. 2. The Director denied Ms. Weston’s claim and adopted the substance of the Hearing Officer’s decision as her own. Id. at 2–3. Ms. Weston now appeals to this court. We have juris- diction under 34 U.S.C. § 10287. DISCUSSION The PSOB Act and the Bureau’s implementing regula- tions provide that if “a public safety officer has died as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty,” the Bureau will pay a death benefit to the surviving family of the officer. 34 U.S.C. § 10281(a). The Bureau decided here that Mr. Weston did not die in the line of duty. Our review of a denial of a claim for death benefits by the BJA “is limited to three inquiries: (1) whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements and provisions of implementing regulations; (2) whether there has been any arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the government officials involved; and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the decision denying the claim.” Amber-Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see Li v. Dep’t of Just., 947 F.3d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ad- equate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). Only the third requirement is at issue here. We conclude that substantial Case: 26-1515 Document: 29 Page: 4 Filed: 11/12/2026 4 WESTON v. DOJ evidence supports the BJA’s determination that Mr. Wes- ton did not die “in the line of duty.” Here, because the BJA assumed that Mr. Weston died of a stroke, see S.A. 13, Ms. Weston argues that Mr. Weston died in the “line of duty.” See 38 U.S.C. § 10281 (k) (estab- lishing presumption that when an officer dies from a stroke, the death is in the line of duty). The “line of duty” includes “training exercises,” id. § 10281(k), which the BJA has defined as an “official training (or -fitness) program of his public safety agency.” 28 C.F.R. § 32.13. She argues that her father’s walk around the track and his weight-lift- ing constituted “official training” because the leadership of the CFD required Mr. Weston to exercise the morning he suffered his stroke. See Appellant’s Inf. Br. at 2 On the record before us, Ms. Weston has not carried her burden to show lack of substantial evidence supporting the BJA’s determination. The BJA’s determination complied with the relevant statutory and regulatory framework and is supported by substantial evidence. While the matter is not totally free of doubt, the fact is that the CFD did not have a department-wide mandatory fitness policy, S.A. 13, and there was not an official train- ing program within the meaning of the regulation. It is not the province of this Court to override the BJA’s fact deter- mination. See Greeley v. United States, 50 F.3d 1009, 1010–11 (Fed. Cir. 1995). CONCLUSION We have considered Ms. Weston’s remaining argu- ments but find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED COSTS No costs.