In re The Estate of Malite

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS IN RE THE ESTATE OF REMEDIO MALITE SUPREME COURT NO. 06-0028-GA SUPERIOR COURT NOS. 06-0163, 97-0369 Cite as: 2011 MP 4 Decided March 31, 2011 Stephen J. Nutting, Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for Appellants Joaquin DLG. Torres, Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for Appellee  BEFORE: JOHN A. MANGLONA, Associate Justice; ROBERT J. TORRES, Justice Pro Tem; HERBERT D. SOLL, Justice Pro Tem. MANGLONA, J.: ¶1 This appeal arises from heirship proceedings in which the trial court found that Remedio Malite adopted Jesus Somol through the Carolinian adoption custom known as mwei mwei, thus entitling Somol’s heirs to inherit from Remedio’s estate. The corpus of this estate is derived predominantly from the estate of Remedio Malite’s father – Angel Malite – and heirs to the Angel Malite Estate appeal the trial court’s heirship determination. In response to Appellants’ arguments, we hold that the trial court: (1) considered the correct elements for determining a customary adoption; (2) reached a decision supported by sufficient evidence; (3) correctly placed the burden for proving customary adoption on the party seeking heirship; (4) did not impermissibly exclude material evidence; and (5) did not read or know about a letter addressed to it from Juan Somol – Jesus Somol’s son – and that the mere existence of this letter did not create an appearance of partiality. We find no merit in Appellants’ argument that Judge Juan T. Lizama’s in-court statements reflected pervasive bias or created an appearance of partiality sufficient to invalidate the trial court’s decision. We also hold Appellants never moved to have Judge Lizama disqualified from this case, and that the interests of justice do not require that we vacate the heirship determination based on his subsequent disqualification from the Angel Malite proceedings. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the trial court’s decision declaring the mwei mwei adoption of Jesus Somol by Remedio Malite valid and recognizing Jesus Somol’s estate as an heir to Remedio Malite’s estate. I ¶2 Angel Malite died intestate and a Petition for Letters of Administration was filed on April 8, 1 1997. The petition listed three of Angel Malite’s children – Joaquina Malite, Elias Malite, and Jacoba Malite – all of whom were deceased, as well as numerous grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Angel Malite2 had two other children – Pedro Malite and Remedio Malite3 – who are undisputed heirs, but were not listed in the petition. Pursuant to the Commonwealth Rules of Probate Procedure, a Notice of Hearing and Notice to Creditors was subsequently issued and published.4 1 This was the third attempt to probate the Angel Malite Estate. The first probate – Probate Case No. 11 – was initiated in the late 1960s, but was never finalized. The second probate – Civil Action No. 261 – began in the late 1970s and ended with a judgment that was never executed. 2 Many filed documents refer to Angel “Malite” while others refer to Angel “Maliti.” Both parties use Angel “Malite” in their briefs and so we will do likewise. 3 Remedio Malite died on September 22, 1973. Appellants’ Excerpts of Record (“ER”) at 54. 4 Only one claim was submitted in response and it is not relevant to the instant proceeding. ¶3 On March 13, 2006, the Commonwealth Superior Court approved a civil case settlement in which the Marianas Public Land Authority (the predecessor to the Department of Public Lands) paid the Angel Malite Estate (the “Estate”) $3,450,000 for land originally owned by Angel Malite. Juan Somol (“Juan”) then filed a motion in the Commonwealth Superior Court to include Remedio Malite as an heir to the Estate.5 Therein, Juan, the son of Jesus Somol, asserted that his father was adopted by Remedio through the Carolinian custom of “mwei mwei.” Specifically, he asserted that Remedio adopted Jesus from Carmen Olopai (Remedio’s first cousin), thus entitling Jesus and his heirs to a share of the Estate. ¶4 Jesus C. Tudela, Administrator for the Estate, and his attorney Antonio M. Atalig initially opposed Juan’s mwei mwei heirship claim. On March 23, 2006, Atalig wrote two letters expressing the Administrator’s intent to reject the claim.6 Tudela, through counsel, then filed a “Rejection or Denial of Claim,” which denied Juan’s motion to be included as an heir of Angel Malite and requested an evidentiary hearing on the mwei mwei adoption issue. Prior to this hearing, a separate hearing involving a petition for partial distribution of Estate funds was held on April 18, 2006. At this hearing Judge Lizama made various comments that Appellants Rosa Maliti, Lourdes Rangamar, Rombert Sinounou and Jimmy Sablan (“Heirs”) argue exhibit sufficient bias and legal error to warrant reversal of the trial court’s ultimate ruling. ¶5 At some time after the April 18 hearing, Tudela reversed his position on Juan’s claim, and on the day that the hearing on the claim was scheduled, approved the claim. The Heirs objected to Tudela’s decision, and hearings to determine whether Jesus Somol was the mwei mwei son of Remedio Malite were held. At those hearings Tudela stated that he approved the heirship claim because his grandmother had told him that Jesus was supposed to be included as an heir. On May 25, 2006, the trial court ruled that Jesus Somol was the mwei mwei adoptee of Remedio Malite, and therefore, Jesus Somol’s estate was 5 The motion asserted that the stipulated settlement agreement failed to include Remedio Malite as an heir of Angel Malite, and thus Jesus Somol – who Juan alleged was Remedio Malite’s adopted son – was not included as one of Angel Matite’s heirs. ER at 29. 6 Atalig’s letter addressed to Appellants’ counsel Stephen Nutting stated: Jesus C. Tudela, Administrator, informed me that he objects to the inclusion of Juan Somol as descendant by adoption or mwei-mwei to Remedio Malite in his pending motion in the estate of Angel Malite. . . . The claim will be rejected by the Estate Administrator. . . . On this issue, my personal knowledge on this since the start of the investigation and preparation for probate in 1995 for Angel Malite to the present, the entire Malite clan never hear [sic] or mention any Somol as an adoptee to Remedio Malite. ER at 35. The second letter, addressed to Joaquin Torres (Juan Somol’s attorney), stated that “Somol was unknown to the Malite clan as a descendent by mwei-mwei or customary adoption” and that “[s]ince you have filed a motion for Somol to be included in the distribution of assets, I suggest that the motion be converted as a claim. I will then file a rejection of the claim.” ER at 36.  entitled to inherit from Remedio Malite’s estate. After the trial court issued an errata order on June 29, 2006, the Heirs filed their second amended notice of appeal.7 ¶6 On June 7, 2006, the Heirs filed a motion to disqualify Judge Lizama from further involvement in proceedings concerning the Angel Malite Estate. The disqualification motion was referred to Judge Wiseman who, after holding a hearing, disqualified Judge Lizama from presiding over further Malite proceedings. While the Judge Lizama disqualification issue was unfolding in Superior Court, the appeal from the mwei mwei adoption ruling was pending before this Court. The Heirs attached their motion seeking Judge Lizama’s disqualification to their opening appellate brief, and attached to their reply brief Judge Wiseman’s order disqualifying Judge Lizama. This prompted Juan to file a motion to strike the attached order from Judge Wiseman and corresponding arguments in the Heirs’ reply brief. This issue – the effect that the order disqualifying Judge Lizama should have on the mwei mwei adoption decision – was discussed briefly during oral argument, and both parties were ordered to file supplemental briefs. ¶7 This Court now confronts two broad tasks. We must examine the merits of this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in declaring Jesus Somol the mwei mwei adoptee of Remedio Malite. We must also determine what impact, if any, Judge Lizama’s disqualification should have on his finding that Remedio Malite adopted Jesus Somol through the mwei mwei adoption custom. II 7 The errata order made only one change: the order – previously captioned as “In re the Estate of Remedio Malite” – was re-captioned as “In re the Estate of Angel Malite.” The court explained that while “the litigation pertains to the Estate of Remedio Malite . . . the ultimate crux of this dispute is whether the Estate of Jesus Somol has an interest in the Estate of Angel Malite.” In re Estate of Angel Malite, Civ. No. 97-0369 (NMI Super. Ct. June 29, 2006) (Errata for Order Confirming the Mwei Mwei Adoption of Jesus Somol and Recognizing the Estate of Jesus Somol as an Heir to the Estate of Remedio Malite (“Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption”) at 1). The Heirs disagree with this characterization. The Heirs filed their original notice of appeal on June 14, 2006. This document did not include the trial court’s order confirming the mwei mwei adoption, and so on June 29, 2006, the Heirs filed an amended notice of appeal incorporating the proper order. Thus, the document filed following the errata order is the second amended notice of appeal. We note that we have jurisdiction to review the mwei mwei adoption order regardless of whether it is captioned under the Angel Malite or Remedio Malite case heading. If the Somol heirship determination is captioned under the Remedio Malite case, then the trial court’s decision, issued on May 25, 2006, is a final judgment and reviewable by this Court. See NMI Const. art. IV, § 3 (“The Commonwealth supreme court shall hear appeals from final judgments and orders of the Commonwealth superior court.”); see generally Commonwealth v. Kumagai, 2006 MP 20. Alternatively, if it is considered part of the Angel Malite case then, since this case is still ongoing, it would be akin to an interlocutory order. “[U]nder Commonwealth law, in the absence of an applicable statutory or common law exception, an appeal must generally await the entry of a final judgment (i.e., a judgment that fully disposes of all claims asserted in an action.).” Camacho v. Demapan, 2010 MP 3 ¶ 23 (Slip Opinion, March 16, 2010) (citation omitted). The order confirming the mwei mwei adoption of Jesus Somol would be subject to an “applicable statutory exception” – 8 CMC § 2206 of the Northern Mariana Islands Probate Law, which states that “[a]n appeal may be taken from an order . . . determining heirship or the persons to whom distribution should be made or trust property should pass. . . .” Our jurisdiction to review the Somol heirship determination would thus be grounded in 8 CMC § 2206. Ultimately, the source of our jurisdiction does not impact disposition of this appeal. ¶8 In support of their contention that the trial court improperly declared Jesus Somol the mwei mwei son of Remedio Malite, the Heirs argue that the trial court: (1) applied the wrong legal standard for determining a customary adoption; (2) reached a decision unsupported by sufficient evidence; (3) created an heirship “presumption” and thereby impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the Heirs to rebut the mwei mwei heirship claim; (4) erred by not admitting material evidence and resisting offers of proof; and (5) failed to disclose the existence of a letter addressed to Judge Lizama from Juan. Finally, they argue that errors asserted in arguments one through five create an appearance of partiality sufficient to invalidate the trial court’s decision. Each of these issues will be examined in turn. A. The Probate Court Applied the Correct Mwei Mwei Adoption Standard ¶9 The Heirs argue that the trial court either ignored or misunderstood the mwei mwei adoption elements, and thereby applied an improper legal standard for determining customary adoption. Juan responds that the judge applied the proper standard and considered relevant elements. Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Locke, 572 F.3d 610, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2009). ¶ 10 In order to determine the elements of mwei mwei adoption it is instructive to look to previous adoption cases. In In re Estate of Rofag, 2 NMI 18, 21 (1991), Rofag, who never married and had no natural children, took his niece, Magdalena, into his household and raised her. After Rofag and Magdalena died, Magdalena’s children claimed their mother had been adopted through Carolinian custom and was entitled to inherit from Rofag’s estate. Id. at 22-23. The trial court “found by preponderance of the evidence that Rofag adopted Magdalena by custom” and we affirmed. Id. at 23, 29. In Rofag, we noted that three expert witnesses had testified concerning mwei mwei adoption, and we included the following definition: “Mwei-Mwei” is a Carolinian customary method of adopting children. Normally, the child to be adopted is a baby, but there is evidence that a child who is nine, ten, or eleven years old could be customarily adopted, depending upon the circumstances. The adoption takes place between relatives, initiated by the women and normally a married couple, as opposed to a single person, adopt the child. (There is also evidence that single persons have adopted children by custom.) Customarily, the adopting parents propose to adopt a child and the natural parents must give their consent. Once the child is adopted under this custom, he/she is treated and considered as a natural child for all purposes. Id. at 23 n.3. Notably, the Rofag Court did not discuss how to apply this definition, but instead simply affirmed the lower court decision after finding “substantial evidence supporting [the trial court’s] finding that Magdalena had been adopted by Rofag.” Id. at 31-32. ¶ 11 We revisited the mwei mwei issue in Estate of Amires, 1997 MP 8, wherein two individuals asserted they were the mwei mwei children of the decedent. The trial court ruled that neither were mwei mwei adoptees because both “were brought into [d]ecedent’s household as older children. Further, they were not related to [the decedent] by blood.” Id. ¶ 17 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court erred in finding that adoption at a young age and a blood relationship between the child and adopting parent were required to support a mwei mwei adoption finding. Id. ¶ 21. However, after looking at other evidence the Court upheld the trial court’s decision, finding that the court’s ultimate ruling was supported by sufficient evidence. ¶ 12 Neither Rofag nor Amires establish fixed elements that must be satisfied to justify a mwei mwei finding. Instead, they provide a list of non-exclusive factors to guide lower courts when evaluating mwei mwei adoption claims. These factors are: (1) age at the time of adoption; (2) whether the adoption occurs between relatives; (3) whether the adoption is initiated by women; (4) whether the adopting parent is married; and (5) whether the natural parent consented to the adoption. Lower courts have repeatedly considered these factors when reviewing customary adoption claims. See In re Estate of Kaipat, Civ. No. 90-0840 (NMI Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2006) (finding that undisputed testimony supported mwei mwei adoption claim); In re Estate of Teregeyo I and II, Civ. No. 91-298 and No. 91-299 (NMI Super. Ct. March 14, 1995) (holding that claimants failed to show that any of the elements discussed in Rofag existed). ¶ 13 Unlike the courts in Kaipat and Teregeyo, which expressly referenced Rofag and the factors set forth therein, the trial court in this case did not cite Rofag in its analysis.8 While lower courts would be well-advised to lay out these factors in a more explicit fashion, we conclude that the proper Rofag factors were considered. The trial court fashioned its legal analysis by examining the evidence in light of Melvin Faisao’s expert testimony, which in many instances echoed the Rofag factors. For example, the court order states that “mwei mwei . . . usually occurs while a child is still breast feeding” and the court stressed the “undisputed fact that Remedio took Jesus to the outer islands at a young age.”9 Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 10. Additionally, the court acknowledged that “single parent adoption is rare (particularly when the adopting parent has no means of support) . . . [but] it does occur.” Id. In making these statements it is evident that the court considered the appropriate factors. 8 The only reference to Rofag is the court’s statements that it would apply the “preponderance of the evidence standard” and that mwei mwei adoption “may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” In re Estate of Remedio Malite, Civ. No. 06-0163 (NMI Super. Ct. May 25, 2006) (Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 2) (citing Rofag, 2 NMI 20). 9 The State of Yap and the State of Chuuk form part of the Federated States of Micronesia and contain “outer islands” relevant to this case. Specifically, the trial court found that Remedio and Jesus lived on Satawal and Pulusuk. Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 3. Satawal is part of the Yap outer islands and Pulusuk is part of the Chuuk outer islands. ¶ 14 The court also referenced additional customary adoption factors not discussed in Rofag, including: (1) the entire community is made aware of a mwei mwei adoption; (2) it is rare for the natural parent to reclaim a mwei mwei adoptee; and (3) it is rare for a parent to give up her only child for adoption although this may be done to protect the clan from bad luck10 if a parent’s children have previously died. While these additional factors were not discussed in Rofag, neither Rofag nor its progeny establish an exhaustive list of mwei mwei adoption factors. The trial court was therefore at liberty to consider these additional factors – established through expert witness testimony – along with the Rofag factors to determine whether a mwei mwei adoption occurred. A trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances when making a mwei mwei adoption determination, and it is clear from the record that the lower court’s analysis satisfied this standard. ¶ 15 The heirs stress that the trial court failed to adequately recognize that Carolinian custom differentiates between children adopted under the mwei mwei custom and those raised under the fa’am custom. This latter form of guardianship, which is akin to a foster parent, does not entitle a child to inherit from the adopting parents. The Heirs argue that the distinguishing characteristic between these two types of guardianship is that mwei mwei adoption requires “the existence of an agreement or a dialogue between the adoptive parent(s) and the natural parents to adopt the child.” Appeal of Superior Court’s Order Dated 5/25/06 (“Appellants’ Opening Br.”) at 10. The Heirs argue that this element must be considered, and that the trial court failed to consider it is supported from the fact that “no evidence was introduced which showed that there was ever a dialogue between Remedio and Jesus’ parents, nor was there evidence to determine whether Jesus came to live [sic] Remedio (if in fact this occurred) as a mwei mwei infant or as a . . . faam adolescent.” Id. ¶ 16 While this Court has never discussed how fa’am adoption differs from mwei mwei adoption, we acknowledge Faisao’s expert testimony that an agreement or dialogue concerning the adoption is a critical distinguishing factor. However, contrary to the Heirs’ assertion, we find that the trial court did consider the fa’am versus mwei mwei distinction. Specifically, the court referenced Faisao’s testimony that “it would be uncommon for a guardian to take a fa’am child to live off-island” and concluded that the fact that Remedio took Jesus to the “outer islands . . . is one of the most conclusive facts in this case. It is unlikely that Jesus would have been fa’am under such circumstances.” Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 10, 14. In essence, the court used the move to the outer islands as circumstantial evidence that the parties must have discussed and consented to the adoption. While court analysis of testimony conveying a conversation between Carmen Olopai and Remedio Malite would make it more clear that this 10 The term “vwiischka’ar” was used to refer to the need to protect the clan from bad luck. Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 10.  factor was considered, such analysis is not required. Remedio and Carmen have long since deceased, and direct testimony of a conversation between these two women would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. In such circumstances, analysis of circumstantial evidence – such as taking a child away from Saipan – is sufficient to convince us that the court considered this important factor. For the above reasons, we hold the trial court considered the proper elements for determining whether Jesus Somol was the mwei mwei child of Remedio Malite. B. There is Sufficient Evidence to Support the Trial Court’s Order ¶ 17 We next examine the Heirs’ argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that a mwei mwei adoption occurred. The standard of review when examining sufficiency of the evidence is whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, is sufficient to support the conclusion of the fact-finder. Manglona v. Kaipat, 3 NMI 323, 329 (1992). ¶ 18 The trial court found witness testimony critical to its decision and it is therefore helpful to preface our analysis with a brief review of the relevant witnesses who testified at trial.11 Juan’s witnesses included Carmen Olopai Taitano and Concepcion Igisomar (daughters of Juan Olopai), Bibiana Lemau12 (who lived in Satawal with Jesus and Remedio), Maria Elameto (Jesus Somol’s goddaughter), Leonisa Somol13 (Jesus Somol’s daughter and Juan Somol’s brother), Dionesia Saralu14 (who met Remedio and Jesus in 1954 and testified that Carmen Olopai was her auntie), and Rita Salepeo Saures (who testified that Jesus did not inherit from his natural mother). The Heirs attempted to rebut Juan’s heirship claim with testimony from Jesus C. Tudela (former administrator for the Angel Malite Estate), Frances Camacho Keremius15 (who allegedly lived across the street from Jesus Somol from 1960 to 1975), Jose Litulumar (Juan and Leonisa Somol’s cousin), Victoria I. Kapileo (who knew Remedio Malite, but is apparently not 11 The Heirs have included over 100 pages of trial testimony in their submitted excerpts of records, yet inexplicably have not included any headings, table of contents, or any other form of organization that would permit this Court to easily navigate the trial testimony or determine which witness is testifying. They even fail to differentiate between hearings held on different dates, and in some instances one page of witness testimony is sandwiched between testimonies from two other witnesses, with no indication that a new witness is testifying. These deficiencies are all the more inexcusable given that large portions of testimony have been omitted, and so in many instances the Court is left to guess (or refer to briefs or trial court documents) to try to determine which witness is testifying. Effective advocacy requires assembling the record in a more thoughtful manner. 12 While some court documents refer to this witness as “Viviana Lemau,” because the trial court’s order refers to her as “Bibiana Lemau” we will do likewise. 13 While some court documents refer to this witness as “Leonicia Somol,” because the trial court’s order refers to her as “Leonisa Somol” we will do likewise. 14 While some court documents refer to this witness as “Dionisia Saures Saralu,” because the trial court’s order refers to her as “Dionesia Saralu” we will do likewise. 15 While some court documents refer to this witness as “Frances Camacho Keremes,” because the trial court’s order refers to her as “Frances Camacho Keremius” we will do likewise.  related to either the Somol/Olopai or Malite clans), Lourdes Rangamar (who testified that Remedio Malite was her auntie) and Rosa Malite (one of Remedio Malite’s nieces and the oldest female relative in the Malite family). Melvin Faisao, an expert on Carolinian customs, also testified at trial. ¶ 19 To briefly summarize, the Heirs’ witnesses – many but not all of whom are related to the Malite family – testified that Remedio never lived with the Somol family, that Jesus and Remedio were never seen together, and that Remedio never spoke about Jesus or about having any children. In contrast, the vast majority of Juan’s witnesses are from the Somol/Olopai family and testified that Jesus grew up with Remedio and that Remedio lived with the Somol family for extended periods of time. As the trial court succinctly stated, “[w]hile it appeared at trial that everyone in the Olopai family knew that Jesus Somol had been adopted by Remedio Malite, no one in the Malite family had ever heard of the adoption.” Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 2. Given this conflicting testimony, the court framed the issue before it as needing to “weigh the competing hearsay of the Olopai and Somol family against that of the Malite heirs and witnesses.” Id. The court ultimately ruled in Juan’s favor. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Juan, we find that there is sufficient evidence to support this conclusion. ¶ 20 To review the mwei mwei adoption finding we will first consider the age at which the child is adopted. “Normally, the child to be adopted is a baby, but there is evidence that a child who is nine, ten, or eleven years old could be customarily adopted, depending upon the circumstances.” Rofag, 2 NMI 18 at 23 n.3. Bibiana Lemau, who lived in the same village as Remedio and Jesus on Satawal, testified that when she first saw Remedio and Jesus, Jesus was a “small boy.” ER at 125. She also provided circumstantial evidence of Jesus’ young age by testifying that she saw Remedio and Jesus eat together from the same bowl and that Remedio took care of Jesus when he was a boy. ER at 126. Additionally, Carmen Olopai Taitano testified that her father had told her that Remedio adopted Jesus when he was “still small.” ER at 114. This evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to Juan (the prevailing party), supports the trial court’s conclusion that “Remedio took Jesus to the outer islands at a young age[,]” and the implication that Jesus was adopted at a young age. Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 14. ¶ 21 The second factor we consider is whether the adoption occurs between relatives, and the third factor is whether the adoption is initiated by women. Rofag, 2 NMI 18 at 23 n.3. Carmen Olopai and Remedio Malite appear to be first cousins. ER at 31. It is undisputed that Carmen Olopai and Remedio Malite are women. While the trial court did not expressly address these two factors, they do not appear to be in dispute and support the trial court’s conclusion. ¶ 22 The fourth factor to consider is whether the adopting parent is married. Juan concedes that Remedio was not married when she adopted Jesus. The trial court found that although “single parent adoption is rare (particularly when the adopting parent has no means of support), it does occur.” Order  Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 10. Ultimately, the court considered other factors more important to this specific case; however, to the extent that this factor is relevant, it weighs against a mwei mwei finding. ¶ 23 The fifth relevant factor for a court to consider is whether the entire community is made aware of the mwei mwei adoption. Faisao testified that a mwei mwei adoption is not kept secret; thus, the community has knowledge of the adoption. See ER at 155. The trial court considered this factor, stating that “there is a great deal of testimony that Jesus’ birth mother discussed the mwei mwei with her family and with community members.” Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 14. The record supports this conclusion. Concepcion Olopai Igisomar testified that Remedio treated Jesus in public as her son. ER at 131. Maria Elameto testified that when she occupied a hospital bed next to Carmen Olopai in November 1969, Carmen told her that Jesus was her son, but that she had given him to Remedio. ER at 138. Rita Salepeo Saures testified that Carmen told her that she had given Jesus to Remedio. ER at 139. Similarly, Carmen Olopai Taitano testified that it was her understanding that Carmen gave Jesus to Remedio to adopt. ER at 114. While the Heirs’ witnesses, including Lourdes Rangamar and Victoria Kapileo, testified that they had never heard Remedio say she adopted Jesus, the trial court is entrusted with weighing competing evidence and we will not second-guess these determinations absent an abuse of discretion. See Rofag, 2 NMI at 31 (“We will accord particular weight to a trial judge’s assessment of conflicting and ambiguous evidence.”) ¶ 24 The sixth relevant factor is whether the natural parent reclaimed the adoptee. The trial court impliedly acknowledged this factor, referencing Faisao’s testimony that it is “extremely rare for the natural parents of a mwei mwei adoptee to reclaim the adoptee” whereas “[f]a’am children normally go back to the natural parents after some time.” Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 9-10. While the trial court did not expressly apply the testimony to this factor, there is no evidence in the record that Carmen ever “reclaimed” Jesus. ¶ 25 The seventh factor is whether the adoptee is the natural parent’s only child. Jesus was Carmen Olopai’s only living child at the time of the alleged adoption. The trial court found that because Carmen Olopai had already lost three children, the “family’s belief in vwiischka’ar . . . could explain why Remedio was entrusted with Jesus.” Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 15. As it is undisputed that Carmen’s previous children had died, and given Faisao’s testimony that this could justify a parent giving up her only child, there is sufficient support for the trial court’s statement. Moreover, it is clear from the trial court’s order that it did not consider this factor dispositive in reaching its ultimate ruling. ¶ 26 The final factor to consider is whether the natural parent consented to the adoption. The Heirs argue that there is no direct evidence of a conversation in which Carmen consented to Remedio adopting  Jesus. Citing Faisao’s testimony that the natural and adoptive parents discuss a mwei mwei adoption,16 they argue that absent such evidence Jesus is at most a fa’am adoptee. This Court in Rofag stated that a natural parent must consent to their child’s adoption, but we have never examined what acts are sufficient to constitute consent. ¶ 27 No direct evidence was presented at trial concerning any conversation between Carmen and Remedio. Instead, relying on Faisao’s testimony, the court stated that the “undisputed fact that Remedio took Jesus to the outer islands at a young age and lived with him throughout this time is one of the most conclusive facts in this case. It is unlikely that Jesus would have been fa’am under such circumstances.” Order Confirming Mwei Mwei Adoption at 14. Juan argues that this move away from Saipan, combined with the fact that no one is alleging that Jesus was kidnapped, provides sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude that Carmen and Remedio discussed the adoption. ¶ 28 Testimony recounting a specific conversation between the natural and adoptive parents is not required to prove that a mwei mwei adoption occurred. While such direct evidence of consent will generally make it easier for the plaintiff to prove a mwei mwei adoption, circumstantial evidence may also be relied upon. Requiring otherwise would be imprudent given that in the Commonwealth, estate probates are oftentimes delayed for decades, such that both the natural and adoptive parents – those participating in the required conversation – have long-since deceased. In the present case, the move to the outer islands is particularly compelling, and constitutes sufficient evidence to satisfy proof of consent. ¶ 29 The Heirs caution us that upholding the mwei mwei adoption absent express testimony about a conversation between the natural and adoptive parents encourages fraudulent heirship claims based on hearsay testimony. We strive to preserve and protect local culture and customs and are confident today’s ruling will not undermine these priorities. While we find the circumstantial evidence in this case sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion, the proffered testimony is unusual and particularly compelling. Cases will rarely involve a child being taken so far away from Saipan and his or her natural parents at a young age. This significant fact distinguishes this case from others in which the child remains on Saipan, and ensures that this decision does not open the floodgates to fraudulent claims. ¶ 30 In light of the above analysis, we hold there is sufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that a mwei mwei adoption occurred. In particular, there is testimony that Remedio took Jesus to the outer islands at a young age and that Carmen told members of her community about the adoption. 16 Faisao gave the following testimony: Mr. Nutting: Okay. So is there a dialogue that takes place then between the parents who are giving up the child and the adoptive parents? Faisao: Usually, the [sic] would happen, or else the child would be --- the receiving parents would be considered a kidnapper. ER at 152. Faisao also testified that “dialogue has to spread out amongst the extended family.” ER at 155.  Additionally, the move to the outer islands itself is sufficient circumstantial evidence of an agreement between Remedio and Carmen and justifies the trial court’s conclusion that Jesus was not a fa’am adoptee. We acknowledge the Heirs’ argument that it would be unusual for a mother to let an unmarried woman adopt her only child. However, as our previous cases make clear, a court must review the factors on a case-by-case basis, and no single factor is dispositive. While considerable testimony supports the Heirs’ argument, we hold that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Juan, is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion. We are not left with a “definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a mistake.” Rofag, 2 NMI at 31. C. Whether the Trial Court Improperly Shifted the Burden of Proof by Establishing a “Presumption” of Heirship ¶ 31 The Heirs next argue that the trial court’s in-court statements reveal a fundamental misconception about the legal standard for deciding a mwei mwei adoption claim. They argue that the court created a presumption in favor of heirship, and, as a result of this erroneous presumption, improperly placed the burden of proof on the Heirs and resolved all contentious issues in Juan’s favor. Juan responds that the court referenced the correct legal standard in both its in-court statements and written order. ¶ 32 In In re Estate of Rofag, 2 NMI at 30, the Supreme Court held a preponderance of the evidence standard is applied in customary adoption cases. While the Rofag opinion does not explicitly state that it is the party raising the adoption claim (i.e., the claimant) who bears this burden, this conclusion necessarily follows from the opinion. Specifically, we concluded that this standard is “consistent with legislative intent in establishing claims of customary adoption” and that adopting a higher standard would “restrict judicial recognition of customary adoption.” Id. at 29. This concern would only materialize if the burden is placed on the claiming party. The Commonwealth Superior Court has previously applied this standard. See, e.g., Estate of Teregeyo, supra ¶ 12 (citing Rofag and applying preponderance of evidence standard in customary adoption case). ¶ 33 The Heirs assert that two in-court statements show the trial court believed there was a presumption in favor of finding mwei mwei adoption, and thereby improperly placed the burden on the Heirs to prove that an adoption