Heather Bradford V. Costco Wholesale Corporation
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket89153-7
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
HEATHER BRADFORD,
No. 89153-7-I
Appellant,
v. DIVISION ONE
COSTCO WHOLESALE
CORPORATION; and JOHN AND UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JANE DOES 1-10,
Respondents.
CHUNG, J. — Heather Bradford was hit by a furniture box that was sitting atop a
flatbed cart being pulled by an employee at Costco. She sued for negligence. After a
jury returned a verdict finding that neither Costco nor Bradford was negligent, Bradford
moved for new trial, arguing the trial court improperly allowed admission of deposition
testimony of an unavailable expert witness, denied her request to issue a res ipsa
loquitur instruction to the jury, and submitted a confusing special verdict form to the jury.
The trial court denied the motion, and Bradford appeals. We affirm the court’s denial of
a new trial.
BACKGROUND
Heather Bradford went shopping at a Costco in Bellingham on August 4, 2018. A
Costco employee was pulling a flatbed cart with furniture boxes on it. Without noticing
each other, Bradford and the employee walked toward each other, and a box on top of
No. 89153-7-I/2
the furniture hit Bradford in the shoulder. Starting the next day, Bradford began to
experience chronic pain that she alleged resulted from the incident at Costco.
In July 2021, Bradford sued Costco Wholesale for negligence, alleging Costco
“negligently failed to maintain the [p]remises in a reasonably safe condition/manner.”
Costco denied the allegations.
Trial began on October 7, 2025. On the morning of the second day of trial,
Costco informed the court that it was having difficulty reaching its expert, Dr. Michael
Hatzakis, who was “in Greece with his father.” Costco stated it “never thought he would
be called twice” to testify and “the only other option is to designate some of his
deposition.”
Bradford and Costco disagreed about when and how Dr. Hatzakis was notified to
appear at trial. Bradford argued that Dr. Hatzakis “was served with a Notice of
Appearance at trial weeks before the trial” and Costco responded that was not the case
and, instead, Costco “was emailed a subpoena for Dr. Hatzakis.”
The court indicated it was “going to accommodate the fact that this witness is
outside the jurisdiction outside of the country around the world” and ordered Costco to
“continue to work to secure his presence how people would like to have him called.” If
they could not reach Dr. Hatzakis, the court asked the parties to “confer regarding
presentation of the deposition and then present that to me.”
After the lunch break on the second day of trial, the court followed up about
Dr. Hatzakis. Costco replied, “I don’t think we’re going to get him. I selected some
portions of the transcript and e-mailed [Bradford] the designations.” The court confirmed
that Costco’s position was that “the use of the deposition is authorized under CR 32 in
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this circumstance.” Bradford argued that the deposition was inadmissible because it
was a CR 30 deposition taken for “just gathering information only,” as opposed to a
“perpetuation deposition under CR 32.” Costco responded that it “did ask to set up
Dr. Hatzakis’s perpetuation deposition knowing he was going to be gone.”
The court stated it read CR 32 to allow for “introduction of a deposition when
certain circumstances present themselves, including circumstances here that he cannot
be reachable” and that the deposition was “independently admissible outside of the
perpetuation deposition rule” because “[t]his is a different basis by which a deposition
can come in in these circumstances.” Bradford responded that under CR 32(a), if there
is an exception, the deposition “shouldn’t be used except for the impeachment.” The
court found that Costco had “been unable to procure [Dr. Hatzakis’s] physical presence
in court,” but there was “other information available by way of his deposition. So if you
choose to introduce portions of his deposition in lieu of live testimony, I’ll consider that.”
Bradford reiterated her objection, arguing that, reading CR 32 in conjunction with CR
30(b)(8), the perpetuation deposition rule, Dr. Hatzakis’s deposition “doesn’t fall under
the CR 32(a) unavailability exception and it can’t be used at trial as substantive
evidence.” The court made its ruling and noted Bradford’s objections on the record.
On the third day of trial, Bradford moved to exclude Dr. Hatzakis’s deposition
testimony. Bradford argued that Costco engaged in “gamesmanship,” asserting the
deposition was taken for impeachment purposes and Costco never intended on calling
Dr. Hatzakis to trial. Further, Bradford indicated that the previous spring, Costco had
agreed to accept service on behalf of Dr. Hatzakis. The court asked Bradford to
describe “the unexplored topics in the discovery deposition that you would have
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otherwise wanted to pursue at trial . . . through testimony.” Bradford described
“show[ing] that he examined her right arm instead of her left arm” and showing that
Dr. Hatzakis did not conduct certain examinations correctly, minimizing Bradford’s pain.
The court asked whether those were “topics that were available to be discussed or
were, in fact discussed i[n] [t]he deposition.” Bradford responded, “Not in full but the jury
would get it.”
The court then asked Costco to supplement the record with the circumstances
leading to Dr. Hatzakis’s inability to appear. Costco explained that it “had agreed to
accept a subpoena for Dr. Hatzakis” the previous spring, as Dr. Hatzakis was “willing to
rearrange things to testify” and “was also willing to testify for us even though he had to
go to Greece to see his father.” Costco further explained its unsuccessful efforts to
reach Dr. Hatzakis and stated,
I don’t know what’s happening for him in Greece, and, believe me, I would
rather have his live testimony. It’s also prejudicial to my client to not be
able to ask the examination questions that I would like to ask of him live.
Our only recourse is to fall back on his deposition testimony to get his
opinions into the record.
The court then ruled,
[T]his is appropriate to use portions of the deposition testimony under Civil
Rule 32(a)(3)(e), that portion of the rule allows for extraordinary
circumstances when presented to the court during the course of the trial to
consider the use of deposition in lieu of live testimony. It’s not done lightly.
The court is to consider a preference for live testimony . . . but I’ve also
appreciated the . . . import of the evidence and what I’m finding exclusively
constitute extraordinary circumstances that prevent this witness from
making himself available. There was a plan to have him present via Zoom.
That was discussed and given his location around the world with the
family member, the inability to contact him, I find that’s the sort of
extraordinary circumstance that is envisioned in the court rule, even with
the consideration and preference for live testimony.
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Bradford responded that “[t]here is no evidence that he is there with his father
and I have it on good information and belief that he is on a vacation with a significant
other and he has known about this trial. There is no evidence that he has a sick father.”
The court replied, “That’s supplementing the record,” and explained it was “taking
counsel at her representation as an officer of the court regarding the unavailability of her
witness.” The parties and the court then discussed the logistics of having the deposition
read, and the designated portions were read to the jury.
At the end of trial, the court and parties discussed the proposed jury instructions,
which were based on the Washington Pattern Jury Instructions, 6 Washington Practice:
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil (7th ed. 2019) (WPI). Of relevance to the
negligence claim specifically, Bradford’s proposed instructions included instructions on
the duty owed to a business invitee (WPI 120.06); the duty owed by operator of retail
store to invitee (WPI 120.06.01); the definition of ordinary care (WPI 10.02); res ipsa
loquitur (WPI 22.01); the definition of negligence (WPI 10.01); the definition of proximate
cause (WPI 15.01); that there may be more than one proximate cause (WPI 15.04); the
right to assume others will exercise ordinary care (WPI 12.07); the burden of proof and
elements of a negligence claim (WPI 21.01); and damages (WPI 30.01.01; WPI
30.07.02). Costco and Bradford agreed to strike Bradford’s proposed inclusion of WPI
15.04 regarding more than one proximate cause and to modify part of the instruction on
the measure of damages regarding Bradford’s medical expenses.
Costco objected to Bradford’s proposed inclusion of the res ipsa instruction,
arguing “res ipsa was not plead in the complaint.” The court sustained the objection,
reasoning:
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No. 89153-7-I/6
One, the absence of it being plead on the complaint is meaningful here.
Two, the—yeah, I spent some time with the comments of this particular
instruction and I’m directed to give it in rare and extraordinary
circumstances. I don’t think it applies in this case where the instrumentality
of the injury that hitting of the boxes is one that’s known and discussed
openly available and both parties argue about [that]. I don’t think the jury
needs to be given permissive inference in relation to the instrumentality of
the injury causing, um, condition here, the boxes, the cart.
Next, Costco objected to the inclusion of WPI 120.06.01, the duty owed by an
operator of a retail store, as duplicative of the instruction on the duty owed to a business
invitee, which, it argued, was more specific. Bradford suggested removing the business
invitee instruction instead, as “[t]his is a retail store, that’s the duty” and the business
invitee instruction was “a little bit vague.” Ultimately, the court agreed to give the more
specific instruction relating to the duty owed by an operator of a retail store, WPI
120.06.01.
The court then reviewed Costco’s additional proposed instructions. Bradford
objected to Costco’s proposed inclusion of a contributory negligence instruction, and the
court overruled the objection. The court then moved to discussion of Costco’s proposed
special verdict form. The special verdict form included four questions: first, whether
Bradford or Costco were negligent; second, whether “such negligence was a proximate
cause of injury to the plaintiff;” third, damages; and fourth, what percentage of the
damage “is attributable to each party whose negligence was found by you in Question 2
to have been a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.” The form also instructed
the jury: “If you answered ‘no’ to Question 1 as to Costco, sign this verdict form. If you
answered ‘yes’ to Question 1 as to Costco, answer Question 2.”
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The court asked Bradford, “[G]iven that I’m instructing the jury on contributory
negligence, do you have any objection to the special verdict form as proposed by
Costco here[?]” Bradford responded,
I do. It was confusing to me when I read through it. I have no problem
adding the contributory negligence part. I would like to make it a bit
simpler in my form, was defendant Costco negligent. It should have an
instruction under there. Was Heather Bradford negligent? Yes or no, and
then an instruction so it’s just a clear – this is confusing.
Were any of the following negligent and so if I said no to Heather and yes,
if you answered no to question one as Costco, sign this form. If you
answered yes to answer one as to Costco, it’s just confusing. It would be
confusing to read and I would hate for, you know, just a misreading of the
instruction. . . I would ask that question one, you answer it. Here’s the
direction. Question two, here is the answer. Go to the next one. And I
would add in mine, I would put in the plaintiff and then it could follow along
as to the proximate cause and then if you find, I am not opposed to
question four, the question four would be if you find then they can divvy it
out and then sign it.
The court disagreed, ruling:
I think the categories are appropriate and addresses all the questions that
we need the jury to address.
To the extent either party thinks it’s confusing or needing explanation,
either party could argue that the verdict form is filled out. While that is
appropriate in closing argument and the lawyers can walk with the jury
through this in order to make it less confusing to the which that it is I’m
reviewing it and I don’t find it particularly confusing. I’ll give the special
verdict form as proposed by Costco.
Bradford did not submit an alternative proposed special verdict form to the court.
The jury returned a verdict answering “No” to Question 1 with respect to both
Bradford and Costco. Upon receipt of the initial verdict, the court “polled each individual
juror regarding the verdict’s sufficiency.” The tally “revealed that the verdict was not
supported by the number of jurors required under RCW 4.44.380.” The court then
instructed the jury to re-read the jury instructions and continue deliberations. Just over
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an hour later, the jury returned a second verdict that “answered the Special Verdict
questions in the same manner as the first, finding neither party to have been negligent,”
and “when polled, was supported by ten individual jurors.” The court accepted the
verdict and entered judgment on behalf of Costco.
Bradford moved for a new trial under CR 59(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), (8), and (9).
First, she argued that the court submitted “confusing jury instructions” to the jury,
particularly about “the correct ordinary reasonable person standard in the same or
similar circumstances for each of the parties.” She asserted that “[t]he abrupt shift in
votes with twenty minutes suggests compromise or confusion rather than lawful
application of negligence instructions” and the confusion was further evident because
“[t]he jury’s final verdict is irreconcilable with undisputed evidence . . . and under
CR 59(a)(7) is contrary to the evidence.” Specifically, she argued, “[w]hat was confusing
and not properly considered by the jury was the reasonable person standard for Costco,
is that of an ordinary reasonably prudent employee; and the plaintiff’s was that of an
ordinary reasonably prudent shopper.” Therefore, she argued, a new trial was
warranted under CR 59(a)(5) and (8). In addition, she argued the special verdict form
was confusing, as evidenced by the fact that “[t]he jury’s first verdict did not comply with
the court’s legal instructions” and “[w]hen polled several jurors voiced confusion, and at
least one juror raised their hand admitting confusion.” Further, Bradford argued that
Costco committed misconduct by making “factually inaccurate statements to the court
regarding circumstances surrounding” Dr. Hatzakis, and, thus, a new trial was
warranted under CR 59(a)(2).
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The trial court denied the motion. As to the jury instructions, the trial court held
there was no basis under CR 59(a)(8) to vacate the jury’s verdict because “the jury was
given Washington Pattern Jury Instructions . . . on the question of ‘duty’ ” which were
“not objected to by either party.” Further, the trial court ruled that “[t]he fact that the jury
reached its verdict soon after the matter was re-submitted to them is not alone a
sufficient basis [to] vacate the verdict and order a new trial” because “the jury had been
deliberating for a full day by the time they were asked to re-read the instructions and
returned to deliberations,” it was “not unreasonable to assume that they were well
familiarized with the law and the facts presented,” and “[t]he verdict ultimately returned
by the jury is supported by the evidence.” Thus, “[t]he timing of the verdict does not
provide a basis to vacate the jury’s verdict under CR 59(a)(2) or other provision of CR
59(a).”
As to the special verdict form, the trial court noted that while Bradford objected to
it on the basis of confusion, “no additional or different questions were demanded,” and it
“accurately informed the jury of each question raised by the pleadings that needed to be
answered.”
Finally, as to the admission of Dr. Hatzakis’s deposition testimony, the trial court
ruled that the testimony did not prejudice Bradford because it “was limited to issues of
damages and causation” and “the jury did not reach these issues in its verdict.” Thus,
there was no basis to vacate the verdict under CR 59(a)(2) or other provision of CR 59.
Bradford timely appeals.
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DISCUSSION
On appeal, Bradford again asserts a new trial was warranted, but limits her
arguments to CR 59(a)(8), asserting the trial court committed legal error by admitting
Dr. Hatzakis’s deposition “in lieu of live testimony . . . where the deposition was not
taken for perpetuation purposes and Respondent failed to establish unavailability under
Wash. CR 32,” “refusing to allow [Bradford] to proceed under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur;” and “submitting a special verdict form that, while not a misstatement of the
law, was structured and presented in a manner that was misleading and confusing to
the jury and prevented a proper determination of negligence.”1 We disagree.
“We review a trial court’s grant of a new trial for abuse of discretion unless that
grant is based on an error or law.” Teter v. Deck, 174 Wn.2d 207, 215, 274 P.3d 336
(2012). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or
based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” Id. at 215. “ ‘A discretionary
decision is based on untenable grounds or made for untenable reasons if it rests on
facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard.’ ”
McCoy v. Kent Nursery, Inc., 163 Wn. App. 744, 758, 260 P.3d 967 (2011) (emphasis
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Quismundo, 164 Wn.2d
499, 504, 192 P.3d 342 (2008)). “If the trial court’s ruling is based on an erroneous view
of the law or involves application of an incorrect legal analysis it necessarily abuses its
discretion.” Dix v. ICT Grp., Inc., 160 Wn.2d 826, 833, 161 P.3d 1016 (2007). “We
1 On appeal, Bradford also argues for the first time that the trial court committed reversible error
by allowing a jury instruction on the duty of seeing (WPI 12.06) over her objection. As this issue was not
raised in Bradford’s motion for new trial below, we decline to consider it here.
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review alleged errors of law de novo.” Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc.,
179 Wn.2d 84, 90, 312 P.3d 620 (2013).
I. Admission of Dr. Hatzakis’s Testimony
Under CR 59(a), a verdict may be vacated for certain causes “materially affecting
the substantial rights” of the moving party. One such cause is an “[e]rror in law occurring
at the trial and objected to at the time by the party” moving for new trial. CR 59(a)(8).
Here, the trial court allowed Dr. Hatzakis’s deposition testimony to be read at trial
under CR 32(a)(3)(e), which provides, in relevant part as follows:
The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds . . . that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and
with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
Bradford argues that the trial court committed legal error in admitting
Dr. Hatzakis’s testimony because “the record affirmatively demonstrates that Costco
knew its expert might not be available, discussed conducting a perpetuation deposition,
and even contemplated filing a motion to secure that testimony, yet failed to take any
such steps.” According to Bradford, the trial court thus “relieved Costco of its burden to
demonstrate diligence and effectively rewrote CR 32’s requirements.”
But the trial court here did not indicate that Costco had no burden to demonstrate
diligence. Rather, the court applied CR 32 and made a factual finding that Costco had
planned “to have [Dr. Hatzakis] present via Zoom,” but was unable to contact him “given
his location around the world with the family member.” The court did not misstate the
law, but made the requisite finding under CR 32 that “such exceptional circumstances
exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
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importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be used.”
Further, Bradford fails to establish that the admission of Dr. Hatzakis’s deposition
testimony warranted a new trial. Under CR 59(a)(8), an error in law must materially
affect the substantial rights of the party to warrant the vacation of the jury’s verdict.
Here, Dr. Hatzakis’s deposition testimony addressed the issues of causation and
damages. The portions read to the jury included Dr. Hatzakis’s professional
qualifications, his examinations of Bradford, including an independent medical exam
and MRI, his review of Bradford’s medical records, his diagnoses, his opinion as to the
causation of Bradford’s physical conditions, the resolution of Bradford’s physical
conditions “related to this incident,” and his assessment of any additional treatment
Bradford required. He did not opine as to any circumstances precipitating the incident at
Costco.
The jury did not reach causation and damages in its verdict, as it determined
neither Costco nor Bradford were negligent. As directed by the special verdict form
instructions, it answered no further questions, including Question 2 (proximate cause)
and 3 (amount of damages). Thus, reading Dr. Hatzakis’s deposition testimony at trial
did not prejudice Bradford, as it addressed topics that the jury did not reach.
Bradford nevertheless argues that “[g]iven the importance of expert testimony in
this case, there is at least a reasonable probability that the improper admission of
deposition testimony affected the outcome.” Without more, this assertion is insufficient
to demonstrate a material effect on Bradford’s substantial rights. The trial court did not
err in denying Bradford’s motion for a new trial under CR 59(a)(8).
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II. Res Ipsa Loquitur Instruction
Bradford also challenges the court’s denial of her proposed inclusion of WPI
22.01, the res ipsa loquitur instruction. A trial court’s “ ‘refusal to give a requested
instruction is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.’ ” Ramey v. Knorr, 130 Wn. App.
672, 688, 124 P.3d 314 (2005) (quoting Stiley v. Block, 130 Wn.2d 486, 498, 925 P.2d
194 (1996)). “ ‘Jury instructions are sufficient when they allow counsel to argue their
theory of the case, are not misleading, and when read as a whole properly inform the
trier of fact of the applicable law.’ ” Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174
Wn.2d 851, 860, 281 P.3d 289 (2012) (quoting Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 130 Wn.2d
726, 732, 927 P.2d 240 (1996)). “If any of these elements are absent, the instruction is
erroneous.” Id. “Where there is substantial evidence to support a theory, a trial court
must instruct the jury on that theory.” Ramey, 130 Wn. App. at 688.
“Res ipsa loquitur means ‘the thing speaks for itself.’ ” Curtis v. Lein, 169 Wn.2d
884, 889, 239 P.3d 1078 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 243 (5th ed.1984)). Res
ipsa loquitur is not a cause of action; it is an evidentiary doctrine that
spares the plaintiff the requirement of proving specific acts of negligence
in cases where [1] a plaintiff asserts that he or she suffered injury, [2] the
cause of which cannot be fully explained, and [3] the injury is of a type that
would not ordinarily result if the defendant were not negligent.
Pacheco v. Ames, 149 Wn.2d 431, 436, 69 P.3d 324 (2003). “If any of the three
elements of res ipsa loquitur is missing, a presumption of negligence is unwarranted.”
Nguyen v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn. App. 155, 172, 317 P.3d 518 (2014). “Generally, [the
doctrine] ‘provides nothing more than a permissive inference’ of negligence.” Curtis, 169
Wn.2d at 889 (quoting Zukowsky v. Brown, 79 Wn.2d 586, 600, 488 P.2d 269 (1971)).
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“It is ‘ordinarily sparingly applied, in peculiar and exceptional cases, and only where the
facts and the demands of justice make its application essential.’ ” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Tinder v. Nordstrom, Inc., 84 Wn. App. 787, 792, 929 P.2d
1209 (1997)). “Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to a particular case
is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Ripley v. Lanzer, 152 Wn. App. 296,
308, 215 P.3d 1020 (2009).
Here, the trial court correctly determined that a res ipsa instruction was not
appropriate. 2 Both parties presented evidence and testimony at trial regarding how the
incident occurred. Bradford summarized the relevant evidence in her motion for a new
trial as follows:
The employee used common sense in loading the flatbed and put a wide
tabletop on the top of the load so that customers would not trip over the
box if it was placed on the bottom. The employee testified that he decided
to pull the flatbed instead of push going against its own safety rules for
carts . . . because he could not see directly in front of the cart and he was
afraid a child might run out in front of the cart. The employee testified that
he was watching the other side of the aisle and did not see the plaintiff,
but that her back was turned.
Where the cause of an incident can be fully explained by the evidence, a res ipsa
instruction is not required. See Pacheco, 149 Wn.2d at 439-40 (“[A] jury instruction
invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable where there is evidence that is
completely explanatory of how an accident occurred.”) (emphasis omitted). For
example, in Nguyen, the plaintiff was driving a rented U-Haul truck downhill in the
curbside lane when “the top right front corner of the truck’s cargo box struck an
2 Although the trial court reached the correct conclusion, it improperly suggested that “the
absence of [res ipsa loquitur] being plead on the complaint is meaningful here.” As res ipsa loquitur is an
evidentiary doctrine, not a cause of action, Pacheco, 149 Wn.2d at 436, it need not be pleaded in an
initiating complaint.
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overhanging tree branch.” 179 Wn. App. at 159. Due to the impact, “the truck drove up
onto the curb . . . [and] travelled about 40 feet on the planting strip, its right rear bumper
nicking another tree before returning to the roadway.” Id. at 159-60. After a bench trial,
the trial court found “no act or omission of the City of Seattle or its employees or agents
was a cause in fact of the accident” and “the manner in which [the Seattle Department
of Transportation] maintains Seattle’s street trees does not represent a failure of
ordinary care.” Id. at 162.
The plaintiff asserted a res ipsa loquitur presumption of negligence on appeal. Id.
at 172. He claimed the doctrine applied “because the tree was destroyed shortly after
the accident and he had no opportunity to inspect it for discoverable defects.” Id. at 173.
We rejected the argument because “the court found that the truck’s cargo box overhung
the planting strip and hit the tree trunk without negligence by either party.” Id. Thus, the
cause of the accident was fully explained by the evidence and, consequently, this was
not the kind of “ ‘peculiar and exceptional case[ ] . . . where the facts and the demands
of justice make [res ipsa loquitur’s] application essential.’ ” Id. (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Curtis, 169 Wn.2d at 889).
Here, as in Nguyen, there was evidence that was “completely explanatory of how
the accident occurred.” See Pacheco, 149 Wn.2d at 439-40. As in Nguyen, this was not
a “peculiar and exceptional case” where a permissive inference of negligence was
necessary. Thus, the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur.
III. Special Verdict Form
On appeal, Bradford assigns error to the court’s use of a “defective verdict form.”
We review special verdict forms under the same standard we review jury instructions.
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Capers v. Bon Marche, Div. of Allied Stores, 91 Wn. App. 138, 142, 955 P.2d 822
(1998). Jury instructions “are considered in their entirety and are sufficient if they: (1)
permit each party to argue his theory of the case; (2) are not misleading; and (3) when
read as a whole, properly inform the trier of fact of the applicable law.” Id. “Essentially,
when read as a whole with the general charge, the special verdict must adequately
present the contested issues to the jury in an unclouded, fair manner.” Id.
Bradford’s only argument on appeal is that “[t]he form provided a binary
framework for answering negligence but did not include any language addressing
inference-based liability or res ipsa loquitur.” As discussed above, the trial court
appropriately declined to include a res ipsa instruction. And, as the trial court explained
below, the verdict form “accurately informed the jury of each question raised by the
pleadings that needed to be answered” and was consistent with the requirements of
CR 49(a).
Further, Bradford did not propose alternative language for the special verdict
form. “If a party is not satisfied with an instruction, it must propose a correct instruction.
If a party fails to propose a correct instruction, it cannot complain about the court’s
failure to give it.” Crittenden v. Fibreboard Corp., 58 Wn. App. 649, 655, 794 P.2d 554
(1990). As the trial court noted below, while the special verdict form was “objected to by
the Plaintiff on the basis of confusion, no additional or different questions were
demanded.”
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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