Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-1184 _____________________________ CYNTHIA LYNN CRAVEN, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee County. Mark E. Feagle, Judge. October 27, 2021 ROWE, C.J. Cynthia Lynn Craven appeals her judgment and sentence for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon causing great bodily harm. She argues that the trial court reversibly erred when it: (1) allowed the State’s for-cause challenge to a prospective juror; (2) permitted the prosecutor to ask improper questions during the trial and make improper statements during closing argument; and (3) denied Craven’s motion to dismiss asserting Stand-Your- Ground immunity. We affirm the second and third issues without comment, and affirm the first issue as explained below. The charges against Craven stemmed from a physical altercation between Craven and Loretta Thomas at the Suwannee River Music Festival. Craven and Thomas knew each other before their encounter at the music festival. After the festival, Craven was sitting in a golf cart in the venue parking lot. Thomas approached Craven and sat down next to her on the golf cart to chat. The two conversed amiably until Thomas brought up an incident from eight years earlier in which Craven allegedly sent nude photographs to Thomas’ then-husband. A verbal altercation ensued, followed by a physical fight. The parties dispute who started the fight. During the fight, Craven broke a beer bottle and with her free hand grabbed Thomas by the throat. Craven struck Thomas in the arm with the broken bottle. Thomas backed up and raised her arms to block Craven. Craven stabbed Thomas with the broken bottle, asking, “You want some of this? You want to try me? You want some of this b - - - -?” Craven’s husband then approached Thomas from behind and grabbed her. He slammed Thomas to the ground, laid on top of her, and said, “You f - - -ing b - - - -, you’ll never hit my wife again.” Craven began striking Thomas in her face. Craven’s husband stopped hitting Thomas when a woman told him to stop. Craven retreated, declaring, “We got to go. She’s bleeding real bad.” Soon after, paramedics life-flighted Thomas to a nearby hospital. Thomas spent four days in the hospital. She lost almost five liters of blood. Plastic surgeons performed several procedures to repair her face, ear, and throat. Some of her facial nerves were severed. She suffered permanent scars on her face, ear, neck, chest, and shoulder. Thomas required two surgeries to repair her vocal cords. Even so, surgeons could not repair one of her vocal cords. Craven, on the other hand, emerged from the altercation relatively unscathed. Although she went to the hospital in an ambulance, she suffered a couple of abrasions and doctors repaired her wounds with a single stitch. The State charged Craven with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon resulting in great bodily harm. Craven moved to dismiss the charge, asserting Stand-Your-Ground immunity. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Craven then petitioned for a writ of prohibition to challenge the trial court’s 2 ruling. This Court denied the petition on the merits. Craven v. State, 285 So. 3d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). The case proceeded to trial. The State presented the testimony of thirteen witnesses, including Thomas. The State also played video recordings showing security footage of the incident. The jury returned a verdict finding Craven guilty as charged. Craven now appeals her judgment and sentence. We address only one of her arguments—that the trial court reversibly erred when it granted the State’s motion to strike prospective juror William Newell for cause based on Newell’s memory problems. We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. State, 258 So. 3d 502, 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). And given the trial court’s superior vantage point in evaluating the competency of a juror, we will not disturb the court’s ruling on a for-cause challenge “if there is competent record support for the trial court’s conclusions.” Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465, 473 (Fla. 2003) (“[T]he trial court’s determination of juror competency will not be overturned absent manifest error.”) (internal citations omitted). We find no abuse of discretion here. During voir dire, Newell made several disclosures, casting doubt on his ability to remember and to perform the duties of a juror: • When asked about whether he had heard about the case, Newell responded, “As far as—I have a lot of—I don’t remember a lot of stuff. So as far as knowledge in the case, I’ve probably heard something about it, but I don’t remember. Something could come up after that I remember. I don’t know.” • When asked about a defendant testifying, Newell stated: “I can tell you on the opposite end of that, I wouldn’t want to testify—I mean, testify a lot of times because of my memory. If you ask me what I done last Friday, I don’t know. If you ask me what I did yesterday, I might could tell you and the day before. But I’m saying, I mean, there’s a reason sometimes for people not to—you could just tear me apart and 3 say, well, you lied. No, I didn’t lie. I was thinking that and then think of something different the next day. I don’t know.” • Newell was asked whether he believed “that the closer in time [he is] to an event the more accurate [his] recollection of it may be?” Newell responded: “Well, I’m really—I’m really bad with names and stuff. You know, the Judge, I don’t remember his name. It don’t get in there and stick in there. I’ll see you today and I might know you tomorrow and I might know you. I might have known somebody five to ten years and ain’t seen them in four years and see them in the store and I don’t even remember knowing them.” Defense counsel clarified, “[b]ut if you leave this room in two minutes and someone says what have you been doing this morning, you may be able to say you were in court?” And he said, “[y]eah, I’ll remember I was in jury duty.” But he won’t remember the date if someone asks him the same question three weeks from now. However, he will remember being here. Following Newell’s admissions about his poor memory, the State moved to excuse him for cause. The trial court granted the motion over the defense’s objection. Craven argues the trial court erred when it granted the for-cause challenge because Newell’s memory issues did not provide grounds to support the strike. The State’s for-cause challenge to Newell was grounded in section 913.03, Florida Statutes (2020). The statute specifies several grounds to support a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror. One ground to support striking a prospective juror for cause, and the ground relevant to this appeal, is when “[t]he juror is of unsound mind or has a bodily defect that renders him or her incapable of performing the duties of a juror . . . .” § 913.03(2), Fla. Stat.; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.300(c) (“If, after the examination of any prospective juror, the court is of the opinion that the juror is not qualified to serve as a trial juror, the court shall excuse the juror from the trial of the cause.”). We observe at the outset that Craven does not argue that a prospective juror with a memory problem could never be “of unsound mind” or that a memory problem would not qualify as a “bodily defect” rendering the juror incapable of performing the 4 duties of a juror. Quite the opposite. At oral argument, counsel conceded that there is a point that a prospective juror’s memory problem would render them incapable of performing the duties of a juror. And thus we do not consider whether a juror with memory problems can be of “unsound mind” or whether such problems qualify as a “bodily defect” within the meaning of section 913.03. See Rosier v. State, 276 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (en banc) (“An appellate court is ‘not at liberty to address issues that were not raised by the parties.’” (quoting Anheuser-Busch Co., Inc. v. Staples, 125 So. 3d 309, 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013))); see also Bainter v. League of Women Voters of Fla., 150 So. 3d 1115, 1126 (Fla. 2014) (explaining that due process principles suggest that appellate courts “ought not consider arguments outside the scope of the briefing process”) (citation omitted). Our analysis focuses exclusively on the argument Craven did raise on appeal—that no competent evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Newell’s memory problems rose to the level of mental incapacity or that they were significant enough to render him unable to perform the duties of a juror. Craven argues that when Newell brought up his memory problems, he was “speaking colloquially like people do when [they say]—I can’t remember what I said yesterday.” We disagree. The record reflects that Newell disclosed significant memory deficits supporting the trial court’s ruling that Newell could not perform the duties of a juror. The jury being selected for Craven’s trial would need to sit for a four-day trial, hear the testimony of sixteen witnesses, and review documentary evidence including the surveillance of the fight between Craven and the victim. Newell made multiple statements supporting a finding that he could not perform the duties of a juror because of his significant memory problems. For example, Newell stated that “if you ask me what I done last Friday, I don’t know. If you ask me what I did yesterday, I might could tell you and the day before.” And he admitted that it would be difficult for him to later recall in the afternoon what he had done that morning in the courtroom. These statements provide competent record evidence to support the trial court’s ruling on the State’s for-cause challenge to Newell. For this reason, and given the great deference owed to a trial court’s ruling on a challenge to a prospective juror, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. 5 See Bell v. State, 965 So. 2d 48, 77 (Fla. 2007) (holding that trial judge did not commit manifest error in excusing a prospective juror for cause who seemed confused about several questions and reported trouble with his memory because he suffered a stroke). We thus affirm Craven’s judgment and sentence. AFFIRMED. ROBERTS and JAY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Henry M. Coxe III, Allan F. Brooke II, and John G. Woodlee of Bedell, Dittmar, DeVault, Pillans & Coxe, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 6