Botach v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center CA2/5
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledOctober 29, 2026
DocketB347192
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 10/29/26 Botach v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
JONATHAN BOTACH, B347192
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV01189)
CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL
CENTER,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan Botach, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Gregory G. Lynch,
Caroline E. Chan, and Kristi K. Hedrick for Defendant and
Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Jonathan Botach (Botach),
representing himself, filed a negligence action against defendant
and respondent Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars) alleging he
suffered an infection after a surgery, and then liver ailments
following a second surgery and a course of antibiotics to treat the
infection. When the parties ultimately announced they were
ready for trial, Botach disclosed he did not plan to present any
expert testimony and instead intended to rely on his medical
records and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove professional
negligence and causation. Cedars then moved for nonsuit, the
trial court granted the motion, and we consider whether it was
error to grant that motion and to deny Botach’s subsequent
motion for a new trial.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
Botach alleges he was injured in a motorcycle accident
involving an unknown driver in November 2021. Among other
injuries, “both bones” in his left leg were broken and “fully
exposed.” Botach underwent surgery at Cedars and was
discharged to a rehabilitation center “[a]fter a few days.” Botach
alleges he was not prescribed antibiotics when Cedars discharged
him.1
1
Botach’s briefs imply the topical antibiotic he received upon
his discharge to the rehabilitation facility was the only antibiotic
he received at any time before his wounds became infected.
Medical records attached as exhibits to Botach’s declaration in
support of his new trial motion appear to indicate, however, that
Botach “received Ancef for prophylactic antibiosis immediately
prior to draping” during the initial operation.
2
About a week later, Botach’s leg “began swelling and oozing
blood and pus” but “the rehab center was satisfied with daily
external cleaning of the surgery sutures, ignoring the obvious
signs of interior infection . . . .” Eventually, Botach was “rushed”
back to Cedars, where he underwent another surgery to treat the
infection. He remained in the hospital on “two kinds of
antibiotics.” He alleges the antibiotics damaged his liver and he
required “liver restoring pills” and multiple “blood cleaning
routines” over the next several months. Although his liver has
since “improved,” his diet is limited and he suffers nausea.
Botach alleges that during a follow-up visit in June or July
2021, a doctor recommended another surgery because the metal
rods inserted in his leg during the first surgery “were the wrong
size.” Botach declined “out of sheer fear for his damaged
liver . . . .”
Botach alleges Cedars was negligent in using the wrong-
sized rods in the initial surgery, discharging him without
antibiotics, failing to notice the wrong-sized rods during the
second surgery, and using the “wrong antibiotics” in treating the
infection.
B. Pre-Trial Proceedings
Cedars answered Botach’s complaint and filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court denied. Cedars
thereafter demanded an exchange of expert witness information
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210 and served
3
its own designation of its expert witnesses.2 Botach did not
designate any expert witnesses.3
Cedars’s pre-trial motions in limine included a motion to
preclude Botach from introducing expert testimony based on his
failure to timely designate any expert witnesses. Botach opposed
this motion based on Cedars’s purported failure to disclose its
experts’ opinions and asked the court to “make it clear that [he]
ha[s] the option for rebuttal testimony, or supplementary
testimony, if it [is] deemed necessary for the jury to understand
all the evidence.”
At a hearing on Cedars’s motions in limine, the trial court
asked Botach whether he designated any experts. Botach
responded he had not “ha[d] a chance yet because of [a] family
emergency . . . .” The trial court explained that because Botach
had not designated any experts, “[u]nfortunately, . . . [he would
be] precluded from advancing expert testimony in this case.” The
trial court stated Cedars could “file whatever appropriate motion”
in light of the absence of expert testimony.
C. Nonsuit
The case was called for trial on March 17, 2025, and both
sides announced ready for trial. The trial court asked Botach
whether he had brought or subpoenaed any witnesses. Botach
2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
3
In earlier deposition testimony, Botach stated he did not
plan to have “a professional testifying on my behalf because all
the proof[ ] that I need is in the Cedars medical file . . . .”
4
said he had not, and he confirmed he had no experts that would
testify concerning his claim.
Cedars’s attorney told the trial court Cedars intended to
move for nonsuit after Botach gave his opening statement. The
trial court explained this was “essentially what [it] was doing
while [it] was asking [Botach] the questions,” explaining that “to
the extent [Botach] hasn’t brought any witnesses to offer any
opinions on causation and the medical standard of care, [the trial
court] would entertain that motion for a nonsuit.”
Botach then asserted he “ha[d] witnesses”: Cedars’s
experts. Botach suggested Cedars’s experts would be “[his]
witnesses” because “[t]he medical file speaks for itself, and they
will have to acknowledge and admit what is in [his] 5,000 pages
of medical file. . . . In cross-exam, they will look at the documents
and tell [the court] that [he] was damaged in a major way, in a
very negligent way. No other way of looking at the facts.”
The trial court asked Botach whether he had subpoenaed
Cedars’s experts, and he said he had not. Botach said he would
“subpoena them today,” and the trial court asked, “what would
the defense experts testify to?” Botach conceded he had not
deposed the defense experts but he asserted they would testify
“[t]hat there was a damage, there was a cause, and there was a
direct link between what the hospital has done and the cause—
effect of a damage, that the medical file speaks for
itself. . . .” The trial court interjected, “Hold on. Do you believe
that their experts will testify that the hospital failed to meet the
standard of care regarding your medical procedures?” Botach
answered, “Absolutely.” Asked for his offer of proof, Botach
pointed to “[t]he medical file.” Unsurprisingly, Cedars’s attorney
represented the experts would “testify that there was full
5
compliance with the standard of care, and that no negligent act
caused injury, damage, loss, or harm to [Botach].”
The trial court told Botach that, “[i]n order for [him] to
proceed, [he would] have to offer expert testimony, evidence, that
the conduct of the doctors at Cedars-Sinai fell below the
professional standard of care.” Botach said he disagreed and
asserted expert testimony is only necessary where “there [is] any
doubt about the negligence and about what has
happened . . . . The medical file speaks for itself.” When the trial
court suggested the medical file did not, in fact, speak for itself,
Botach argued Cedars’s trial brief admitted he was “a healthy
person” when he entered the hospital and “half dead” when he
came out. He argued it was “crazy” that Cedars did not prescribe
an antibiotic when he was first discharged and “dirt” was left
inside his wound.
When the trial court again asked Botach whether he had “a
doctor [or] an expert[ ] to indicate that [this] treatment fell below
the standard of care,” Botach named one of the treating
physicians designated by Cedars. When the trial court explained
Botach did not know what Cedars’s witnesses would say because
he had not deposed them, Botach responded “they cannot lie” and
again argued negligence and causation were self-evident from his
medical record. The trial court explained, “No one is saying that
something did not happen to you as a result of your visit at
Cedars. What you haven’t shown is to say that what happened to
you was based on any negligence, which you have to establish
through expert testimony. The fact that you had an
incident . . . is not indicative that Cedars should be liable for
malpractice.”
6
After a recess, Cedars moved for nonsuit. Botach argued he
was unfairly surprised by that motion. The trial court pointed
out Cedars previously argued Botach could not prove his case
without expert testimony. Botach replied that the “big
difference” was that “they said that [he did not] have [his] own
experts.” The trial court responded, “That’s what you need to
prove your case, sir.” Botach said, “I got experts, three of them.”
The trial court again asked Botach whether he had “any
deposition testimony that indicates that any expert has said that
the conduct fell below the standard of care[.]” Botach
acknowledged there were no depositions and again argued his
medical record “speaks for itself.”
The trial court asked Botach if he was willing to stipulate
to a bench trial. Botach indicated he was. The trial court asked
Cedars’s attorney for his position on proceeding with a bench
trial, and the attorney reiterated “[w]e made a motion to the
court.”
The trial court asked Botach whether he was presently able
to point to portions of his medical record showing “that the
standard of care was negligent.” Botach said this was “going to
take a little time.” He indicated he had “about a 20-
page . . . document . . . and you can see it. You will see pictures of
my leg. [¶] I mean, just look at it. Look how it looks now.”
Botach emphasized different doctors’ shocked reactions to his
infection. The trial court asked Botach to share the documents
he wanted the court to look at. Botach emphasized his medical
file was 5,000 pages; said he “[did not] have it printed, it is in the
computer”; and offered to give the court “100 pages” “today,”
which would show “they really damaged [him] . . . .” After that
exchange, the trial court granted Cedars’s motion for nonsuit.
7
D. Proceedings Following Order Granting Nonsuit
Cedars filed a proposed judgment of nonsuit. Botach
opposed the proposed judgment and indicated he would be filing a
motion for a new trial.
In the new trial motion, Botach argued section 581c,
subdivision (a) precludes nonsuit before a plaintiff has completed
an opening statement. He further argued (both in the motion
and in an attached declaration) that no expert testimony was
needed to establish negligence because the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur (“the thing speaks for itself”) applied. He suggested
Cedars’s negligence was self-evident because (1) Cedars
prescribed only an antibiotic lotion when he was discharged
following his initial surgery and (2) his healthy liver became
inflamed after Cedars treated his infection with broad spectrum
antibiotics.
The trial court entered judgment of nonsuit for Cedars and
held a hearing on Botach’s new trial motion a few weeks later.
Botach presented his res ipsa loquitur argument and the trial
court disagreed, explaining that “this type of case requires expert
testimony.” With respect to Botach’s argument that he was
entitled to make his opening statement before the trial court
granted Cedars’s motion for nonsuit, the trial court reasoned “the
questions that [it] asked and the answers [Botach] provided
sufficed . . . .” The court accordingly denied the new trial motion.
II. DISCUSSION
Although a motion for nonsuit made before a plaintiff has
completed an opening statement is premature under section 581c,
subdivision (a), reversal is not warranted if the opportunity to
8
make an opening statement would not have made a difference.
(Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 107,
114.) That is the case here. Botach had no expert testimony to
present that his medical treatment fell below the applicable
standard of care (i.e., was negligent), and his only response to the
well-established principle that expert testimony is required is an
assertion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. It doesn’t,
and we shall accordingly affirm the judgment of nonsuit and the
order denying Botach’s motion for a new trial.
A. Granting Cedars’s Motion for Nonsuit Prematurely
Does Not Warrant Reversal
Section 581c, subdivision (a) provides that “[o]nly after, and
not before, the plaintiff has completed his or her opening
statement, or after the presentation of his or her evidence in a
trial by jury, the defendant, without waiving his or her right to
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move
for a judgment of nonsuit.” “[T]he granting of a nonsuit before
opening statement is not reversible error[, however,] if it is clear
the plaintiff could not have prevailed even if he had presented his
opening statement. [Citation.]” (Ritschel, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th
at 114; see also Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [“No judgment shall be
set aside, or new trial granted, . . . unless . . . the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”].)
Here, the trial court granted the motion for nonsuit only
after an extended colloquy in which the trial court requested and
received a preview—effectively an opening statement—of how
Botach planned to establish his treatment fell below the
applicable standard of care. From that preview, it was obvious
Botach had no expert evidence that Cedars’s treatment fell below
9
the standard of care. And our Supreme Court has explained “on
numerous occasions” that such evidence is ordinarily
indispensable. (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical
Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001 [“‘“The standard of care against
which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter
peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic
issue in a malpractice action and can only be proved by their
testimony [citations], unless the conduct required by the
particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the
layman.” [Citations]’”]; see also Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 601, 606-607.) An exception, of course, is where the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. (Flowers, supra, at 1001.)
Thus, the premature grant of Cedars’s motion for nonsuit cannot
have been prejudicial unless Botach’s opening statement might
have raised some realistic prospect that res ipsa loquitur applied
in his case.4
There is no possibility of that. Res ipsa loquitur “applies
when the nature of an accident compels the conclusion it
probably resulted from the defendant’s negligence. [Citation.]
Or, as our Supreme Court has explained it, ‘certain kinds of
accidents are so likely to have been caused by the defendant’s
negligence that one may fairly say “the thing speaks for itself.”’
(Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820,
825[ ].) The doctrine has three requirements: (1) the accident
was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur absent someone’s
negligence; (2) the instrumentality of harm was within the
4
Botach does not argue he would have asserted additional
facts or theories if given the opportunity to make an opening
statement.
10
defendant’s exclusive control; (3) the plaintiff did not voluntarily
contribute to the harm. [Citation.]” (Howard v. Accor
Management US, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 130, 137-138.)
In this court, Botach argues no expert testimony was
needed to establish Cedars did not meet the standard of care
because two propositions are purportedly matters of common
knowledge and observation: (1) his first surgery would not have
resulted in an infection if due care had been exercised and (2) the
administration of antibiotics following his second surgery would
not have resulted in liver damage if due care had been exercised.5
In both instances, Botach asks us to speculate on trade-offs: in
the first case, the risk of infection versus the risk of side-effects
from an oral antibiotic; in the second case, the risk of his
infection worsening or returning versus the risk of side-effects
from the broad spectrum antibiotics. Indeed, Botach’s theories of
negligence with respect to his infection and liver damage—too
little antibiotics followed by too much antibiotics—underscore the
fine balancing involved in this type of care and the risk of adverse
outcomes even in the absence of negligence. These circumstances
are not remotely analogous to “[t]he classic example . . . [of] the
X-ray revealing a scalpel left in the patient’s body following
surgery.”6 (Flowers, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 1001.)
5
Botach does not discuss or rely on Cedars’s alleged use of
the wrong sized hardware in his opening brief.
6
Botach’s reply brief points to debris removed from his
wounds during the second surgery to draw an analogy to “[t]he
classic example” of items left behind in surgery. (Flowers, supra,
8 Cal.4th at 1001.) He quotes a portion of his medical record
stating “free bony fragments as well as some bone graft” were
removed during the second surgery. The analogy is inapt. It is
11
Because the specific antibiotics to be used following a major
leg surgery and in treating a subsequent infection are beyond the
common knowledge of a layperson, the premature grant of
nonsuit is not reversible error.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Botach’s
Motion for a New Trial
Botach contends his motion for a new trial should have
been granted based on an irregularity in the proceedings,
surprise, or an error in law. (§ 657, subds. (1), (3), (7).) The new
trial contentions rehash Botach’s position that it was reversible
error to grant Cedars’s motion for nonsuit prior to his making an
opening statement and his contention that no expert testimony
was needed to establish the applicable standard of care. The
contentions fail for the same reasons we have already given.
Insofar as Botach contends he was unfairly surprised by Cedars’s
motion for nonsuit coming before he made his opening statement
(assuming for the sake of argument he was in fact surprised by
the motion for nonsuit in light of the previous motion in limine
concerning expert testimony), there is no reason to believe this
“materially affect[ed] [his] substantial rights.” (§ 657.) Botach
had indicated he was ready for trial, and his opening statement
would not have remedied the fatal lack of expert testimony.
not within common knowledge and experience to say whether the
presence of such fragments or graft is unusual following the type
of surgery Botach underwent immediately after his accident.
12
DISPOSITION
The judgment and the order denying Botach’s motion for a
new trial are affirmed. Cedars is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
KUMAR, J.*
*
Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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