Full Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS NATALIE ATTIANESE, Personal Representative of FOR PUBLICATION the ESTATE OF JUDE ATTIANESE and the November 20, 2026 ESTATE OF ZACHARY ATTIANESE, 10:46 AM Plaintiff-Appellee, v No. 371420 Wayne Circuit Court JOSE ANGEL NOGUERAS and CHALLENGER LC No. 19-015845-NI MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Defendants-Appellants. Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ. LIEVENSE, J. This is a wrongful-death act case arising under MCL 600.2922. Defendants, Jose Angel Nogueras and Challenger Motor Freight, Inc. (“Challenger”), appeal by right the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff, Natalie Attianese, personal representative of the Estates of Jude and Zachary Attianese, her husband and son, in the amount of approximately $68 million (about $78 million including interest). The case arises from an automobile accident: Jude was driving northbound on I-75 with Zachary in the passenger seat when Nogueras, who was driving an 18- wheel tractor trailer for Challenger, rear-ended them going over 50 miles per hour. Following a jury trial only as to damages, the jury awarded plaintiff $12,000,000 each for Jude and Zachary’s preimpact fright and shock, $8,000,000 and $11,000,000, respectively, for their conscious pain and suffering, and millions more for loss of society and companionship. On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing the jury to award damages for preimpact fright and shock; (2) allowing recovery for conscious pain and suffering based on the evidence presented, which included permitting a late change as to plaintiff’s expert witness; (3) allowing evidence and argument regarding liability when defendants were only contesting damages; (4) allowing plaintiff to tell the jury that future damages for loss of society and companionship would be reduced to present value; and (5) refusing to grant a new trial or remittitur when the jury’s verdict was grossly excessive. -1- We agree, in part, and hold that damages for preimpact fright and shock are not allowable under the wrongful death act. We also agree that, while the issue of conscious pain and suffering was properly before the jury, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony from plaintiff’s replacement expert witness under the circumstances. We therefore vacate the jury’s verdict in part as to preimpact fright and shock damages, and remand for a new trial only as to conscious pain and suffering damages. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. THE CAR ACCIDENT AND LAWSUIT The Attianese family is from New Jersey. On the night of the accident, June 15, 2018, Jude and Zachary were traveling to Michigan for a funeral in Sterling Heights. Jude was 56 years old and operated a delivery business. Zachary was a 20-year-old college student and played high-level college baseball. Nogueras worked for Challenger, a Canadian trucking company doing business in Wayne County. Jude and Zachary were stuck in traffic on I-75 north, moving at about three miles per hour because they were in a construction zone. Nogueras was driving his tractor trailer north on I-75 behind Jude and Zachary and undisputedly did not stop as he approached the traffic backup, instead rear-ending the car Jude and Zachary were in going over 50 miles per hour. The first impact by the tractor trailer caused their car to propel forward at over 50 miles per hour and strike the vehicle in front of it, causing a second impact. According to their autopsy reports, the cause of death for both the decedents was internal decapitation and diffuse subarachnoid hemorrhage, which involved a severing of the C-1 and C-2 vertebrae and a “mechanical separation of the skull from the spine,” followed by bleeding from the blood vessels around the brain. The medical experts disagreed at trial whether decapitation occurred after the first or second impact. An eyewitness, Lawrence Chockley, who was first to reach the decedents’ vehicle after the accident, testified that neither Jude nor Zachary were moving, both were unconscious, and he did not see that either was breathing. Police officers dispatched to the scene found the decedents unresponsive. There was no evidence that Nogueras applied the brakes before colliding with the decedents’ vehicle. Nogueras had Parkinson’s disease and was on medication that made him drowsy when the accident happened. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Nogueras and Challenger in November 2019. Following discovery, plaintiff filed an amended complaint in August 2021 that added new factual allegations supporting plaintiff’s claims but alleged the same three counts: vicarious liability against Challenger under MCL 257.4011 (Count I); negligence against Challenger for the hiring, training, and supervision of Nogueras (Count II); and negligence against Nogueras (Count III). In their answer to the amended complaint, defendants admitted Challenger was vicariously liable for the 1 MCL 257.401(1) states “the owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle” if “the motor vehicle is being driven with the owner’s express or implied consent or knowledge.” -2- decedents’ deaths, and that Nogueras was negligent (Counts I and III), but denied that Challenger negligently supervised and trained Nogueras (Count II). B. PRETRIAL MOTIONS In October 2022, defendants moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing (1) plaintiff was not entitled to collect damages for the decedents’ conscious pain and suffering because the evidence showed the decedents died on impact, (2) plaintiff could not collect damages for Zachary’s loss of future earning capacity because he did not work at the time, and (3) plaintiff was not entitled to exemplary damages as a matter of law. The trial court denied defendants’ motion and allowed plaintiff to broadly seek “any damages allowed under [the wrongful death act],” without specifically deciding the exemplary damages issue. In March 2023, the parties filed motions in limine. In their motions, defendants argued that because they admitted liability as to Counts I and III, the trial court should limit the jury from hearing any liability evidence, even though they had not admitted liability as to Count II. Specifically, defendants argued that the jury should not be permitted to hear that Nogueras had Parkinson’s disease and was on three medications that made him drowsy, and the trial court should bar any argument that Nogueras was “reckless,” “careless,” or “killed” or “murdered” the decedents, which would equate to gross negligence. Defendants also sought to preclude evidence to support plaintiff recovering damages for preimpact fright and shock and conscious pain and suffering. Defendants further sought to limit evidence of plaintiff’s loss of society and companionship to not include evidence that the decedents were “good citizens” and “good people . . . out in the community,” arguing damages under this category should be limited to the impact of loss on family members. Plaintiff responded that she should be allowed to introduce evidence of Nogueras’s medical condition because Challenger had not admitted liability for negligently hiring and supervising Nogueras (Count II), and that plaintiff should be permitted to pursue any damages available under the wrongful death act. Following a hearing on the motions, the trial court did not limit argument that would equate Nogueras’s actions with gross negligence because the jury instructions would address such issues. The trial court also held: (1) plaintiff was permitted to introduce evidence of Nogueras having Parkinson’s disease and his medication use because defendants had not admitted liability for negligent hiring and supervision; (2) plaintiff was permitted to introduce evidence supporting damages for preimpact fright and shock because no caselaw prohibited it; (3) whether the decedents experienced conscious pain and suffering was a fact question for the jury so plaintiff could introduce evidence relating to it; and (4) plaintiff could introduce evidence of the decedents’ community involvement “as long as it relate[d] to [plaintiff’s] loss.”2 Before trial, plaintiff waived her argument that she was entitled to damages for loss of wage earning capacity for Zachary. 2 Defendants sought leave to appeal the trial court’s rulings on the motions, but this Court denied relief. Estate of Zachary Attianese v Jose Angel Nogueras, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 6, 2023 (Docket No. 365523). -3- C. JURY TRIAL AND VERDICT One week before trial, on Monday, April 3, 2023, defendants filed a motion for leave to amend their answer to the first amended complaint to admit liability for Count II, on the condition that the trial court ruled that all liability evidence was inadmissible at trial. Specifically, defendants sought to exclude testimony of any witnesses to the accident and any reference to Nogueras’s Parkinson’s disease or Challenger’s hiring and training practices. In an order issued April 6, 2023, the trial court stated “defendants cannot conditionally admit liability in exchange for a promise” that liability evidence would be excluded at trial. The order also clarified that plaintiff waived claims for exemplary damages and lost wages. In a final pretrial order the parties stipulated to on April 6, 2023 (but entered April 11), the parties agreed to litigate Challenger’s negligent hiring and supervision under Count II. Early on the first day of trial, Monday, April 10, 2023, Challenger again said it wanted to admit liability for Count II, and the trial court stated: “I can’t stop you from admitting liability,” but that “[w]e’re going forward with the trial on all the evidence that’s been accumulated so far.” During voir dire, however, the trial court had not allowed Challenger to formally admit Count II, and the record reflects confusion about whether the parties could question prospective jurors about facts pertaining to liability for Count II, like Nogueras’s Parkinson’s disease and whether Challenger should have allowed him to drive. After a conference off the record, the trial court accepted Challenger’s admission of liability for Count II and informed the parties it “might be cutting off six days of testimony” on events leading up to the accident. Plaintiff objected to limiting liability evidence because a final pretrial order had already addressed that issue, and argued the evidence was relevant to damages for preimpact fright and shock and conscious pain and suffering. Plaintiff moved for a mistrial, which the court did not rule on. The first day of trial adjourned at around 4:00 p.m. without an impaneled jury. When court reconvened on April 11, the trial court, relying on Payne v Gill, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 5, 2002 (Docket No. 224873), addressed the scope of liability evidence it would permit at trial considering defendants’ admission of Count II, effectively limiting the admissibility of such evidence: The only lawful reason for liability evidence to be admitted would be at this point to garner sympathy and inflame the jury. The Court can’t prohibit defendant from admitting liability. I can’t force them to contest an[] issue which they’re now conceding. The jury will not understand why they need to hear this evidence. . . . Under Michigan Civil Jury Instruction 17.01 it is reversible error to submit any issue which has been admitted. And, therefore, the liability issues in this case are wholly irrelevant. . . . In the interest of justice and judicial economy we are proceeding to a trial on injuries and damages. That includes conscious pain and suffering [and] pre-accident shock and fright. So they will know about the accident. They won’t know about the liability of the company in hiring, retaining and supervising. [We’ve got] to show whatever panel we pick the accident and how it occurred. And then they’re going to decide the damages based on the evidence. -4- Plaintiff objected, arguing that before defendants admitted Count II, the trial court ruled at the motion stage that it would not prohibit liability evidence, and defendants’ late admission as to liability prejudiced plaintiff’s ability to try the case. Citing Cogo v Moore, 119 Mich App 747; 327 NW2d 345 (1982), plaintiff also argued she should be allowed to introduce evidence of how Nogueras ended up asleep behind the wheel because knowing the cause of the accident had a damaging effect on plaintiff and was relevant to her damages claim for loss of society and companionship. Defendants disagreed, relying on the jury instruction, M Civ JI 17.01. The trial court maintained that evidence of liability was no longer admissible, but clarified to plaintiff’s counsel, “you can give the same opening you were going to give [with] all the evidence.” The trial court then granted plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial and stated it would allow trial to restart the following Monday, April 17, with a new venire “because the case changed significantly,” and it permitted the facts of the accident to come in, then stated, “but there’s no need to waste the jury’s time with liability[] exclusive witnesses.” Plaintiff’s counsel requested that trial restart the next day, April 12, because plaintiff and some witnesses were in Michigan from out of state. The trial court agreed, and the parties selected and impaneled a new jury the next day, on April 12. Defendants filed a second amended answer that evening admitting liability as to all counts. Opening statements occurred on April 13. Trial testimony spanned April 17, 18, and 19. The jury heard from expert and lay witnesses on preimpact fright and shock and conscious pain and suffering, and heard testimony from plaintiff and Ashley Attianese and Sabrina Attianese, Jude’s daughters and Zachary’s sisters, on loss of society and companionship. The trial was contentious at times, with counsel for both parties vigorously objecting to witness testimony, including about plaintiff’s expert witness, who was replaced by another witness very late due to the changed trial schedule. During trial on April 17, the court estimated that because of Challenger’s admission of liability on Count II, the jury did not hear around 70% of the testimony originally scheduled. On April 20, the jury heard closing arguments and jury instructions, deliberated for two hours, and reached a verdict. The jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded her damages as follows: VERDICT Jude (father) Zachary (son) Pre-accident fright/shock $12 million $12 million Mental anguish and $8 million $11 million conscious pain and suffering between injury and death Loss of society and $9 million plus 5% interest $9 million plus 5% interest companionship from June 15, 2018 to trial Loss of society and Through 2039: $3.2 million Through 2076: $19.6 million companionship from April total total 23, 2023 to future -5- The court later adjusted future damages to present cash value, calculated accrued interest, and entered a judgment of $78,517,580.94, with $71,234,146.96 for past noneconomic damages and $7,283,433.98 for future noneconomic damages. D. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR REMITTITUR Defendants sought a new trial or remittitur, arguing that the verdict was excessive and that the evidence presented was improper and inflamed the jury, as well as raising several other issues they raise on appeal. During oral argument on the motion, the parties acknowledged that the issue of what damages are recoverable under the wrongful death act was pending before the Michigan Supreme Court and potentially would alter then-existing law. The court denied that motion and entered a final order on June 17, 2024. Defendants appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court decided the referenced case, Daher v Prime Healthcare Servs-Garden City, LLC, 515 Mich 254, 261; 29 NW3d 136 (2024), approximately a month later, on July 30, 2024. II. PREIMPACT FRIGHT AND SHOCK DAMAGES First, defendants argue that the trial court erred when it permitted plaintiff to seek damages for the decedents’ preimpact fright and shock because such damages are not available under the wrongful death act. We agree. A. RELEVANT TESTIMONY ON PREIMPACT FRIGHT AND SHOCK Over defendants’ objections, plaintiff introduced testimony seeking to prove the decedents experienced fright and shock before the first impact by the tractor trailer. Chockley, who was driving in the same traffic and direction as the decedents, testified that he saw the tractor trailer approaching in his rearview mirror, describing “something very tall coming up behind me, very quickly, quickly enough that I didn’t think it was gonna be able to stop before it impacted the group of cars.” Chockley also heard the approaching tractor trailer even though his windows were rolled up and the radio was playing, meaning he knew the crash was going to happen before it occurred. Trooper Daniel Tyler, who investigated the accident and took a statement from Chockley, testified it was more likely than not that if Chockley heard and saw the tractor trailer approaching, the decedents would have also heard and seen it approaching because their vehicle was last in the line of stopped traffic. Trooper Jordan Enders, a detective for the Michigan State Police, testified that the average driver would see from their rearview mirror and hear a tractor trailer traveling over 50 miles per hour at night because the tractor trailer’s lights would be on, the lights sit higher up than other vehicles, and a driver and passenger would hear its loud engine in standstill traffic. Finally, when asked whether the decedents would have experienced “unthinkable emotional suffering” if they saw the tractor trailer approaching, Dr. Ljubisa Dragovic, defendants’ medical expert, answered “If they were aware of that, but I have no evidence they were aware of that.” -6- Based on the testimony, the jury awarded $24 million to plaintiff for the preimpact fright and shock that Jude and Zachary experienced ($12 million for each) before being rear-ended. B. DAMAGES FOR PREIMPACT FRIGHT AND SHOCK ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNDER THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACT At the time, the trial court’s decision to let plaintiff seek damages for preimpact fright and shock was reasonable, but it is no longer under Daher, 515 Mich at 261, which our Supreme Court issued about a month after the trial court’s final order denying post-judgment motions. “Whether a particular kind of damages is recoverable for a given cause of action is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Id. The proper interpretation of statutory language is also reviewed de novo. Id. When interpreting statutory language, we begin with the plain language of the statute. Jesperson v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 499 Mich 29, 34; 878 NW2d 799 (2016). “We must give effect to the Legislature’s intent, and the best indicator of the Legislature’s intent is the words used.” Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 436; 818 NW2d 279 (2012). “Additionally, when determining this intent we must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute.” Jesperson, 499 Mich at 34 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Unambiguous statutes are enforced as written. Madugula v Taub, 496 Mich 685, 696; 853 NW2d 75 (2014). Before 1939, “Michigan maintained two separate and distinct causes of action where a death was involved—survival actions and wrongful death actions.” Hardy v Maxheimer, 429 Mich 422, 433; 416 NW2d 299 (1987). If the death from the “wrongful act” was instantaneous, the cause of action was under the “wrongful death” act, whereas if there was a period of survival, the cause of action would be maintained under the “survival act.” Id. (citation omitted). But in 1939 the Legislature did away with the “confusion in the application of these two statutes” because they “spawned numerous suits over what ‘instantaneous death’ meant.” Id. (citation omitted). Now, the wrongful death act, MCL 600.2922, “provides the exclusive remedy under which a plaintiff may seek damages for a wrongfully caused death.” Jenkins v Patel, 471 Mich 158, 164; 684 NW2d 346 (2004). “The statute itself makes no distinction between deaths which occur instantaneously or noninstantaneously.” Hardy, 429 Mich at 433. Damages allowable under the wrongful death act are set forth in MCL 600.2922(6): [T]he court or jury may award damages as the court or jury shall consider fair and equitable, under all the circumstances including reasonable medical, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses for which the estate is liable; [and] reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by the deceased during the period intervening between the time of the injury and death . . . . (Emphasis added.) Before this Court’s and our Supreme Court’s opinions in Daher, two cases from this Court guided our interpretation of allowable damages under MCL 600.2922(6): Thorn v Mercy Mem Hosp Corp, 281 Mich App 644; 761 NW2d 414 (2008), overruled by Daher, 515 Mich at 282, and Denney v Kent Co Rd Comm’n, 317 Mich App 727; 896 NW2d 808 (2016), overruled by Daher, 515 Mich at 282. -7- In Thorn, 281 Mich App at 651, this Court held that damages need not be specifically listed in MCL 600.2922(6) to be recoverable, explaining the statute “should be construed as merely providing specific examples of the types of damages available, and not an exhaustive list.” Relying on Thorn, this Court in Denney, 317 Mich App at 731, explained that “[t]he word ‘including’ in MCL 600.2922(6) ‘indicates an intent by the Legislature to permit the award of any type of damages, economic and noneconomic, deemed justified by the facts of the particular case.’ ” Thus, at the time of trial in this case, categories of damages like “preimpact fright and shock” that are not specifically enumerated in MCL 600.2922(6) were potentially recoverable depending on the facts of the case. Daher changed that. In Daher, the plaintiffs, parents of the deceased minor, brought a wrongful death action against a hospital and medical providers alleging medical malpractice that led to their son’s death. Id. at 259-260. The plaintiffs sought damages, including for the decedent’s lost future earnings. Id. at 260. The defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that such damages were not recoverable under the wrongful death act and that the plaintiffs’ claims were speculative. Id. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed. Id. Our Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court, concluding the wrongful death act does not allow for the recovery of any categories of damages not listed in MCL 600.2922(6): Given the extensive statutory history of the survival act and the WDA and the caselaw interpreting them, we are not persuaded that, by inserting the word ‘including’ into the statute . . . the Legislature intended to convert what had long been an exhaustive list into an open-ended list of damages types left entirely to the discretion of the jury. [Daher, 515 Mich at 278-279.] The Court noted that the 1939 amendments to the wrongful death act limited damages to those specifically enumerated in the wrongful death act. Id. at 266-267. The Court then held that the legislative history and text of the 1971 amendments to the wrongful death act did not allow for lost future earnings because it was not listed in the statute. Id. at 268-271. The Court expressly overruled Denney and Thorn and emphasized that the 1971 amendments’ addition of the word “including”3 did not convert the list of recoverable damages into a nonexhaustive list. Id. at 279. The Court concluded that the legislative intent was clear in maintaining an exclusive list of recoverable damages under the wrongful death act. Id. Here, plaintiff argued below that the wrongful death act allowed preimpact fright and shock damages because the types of damages listed in the statute were nonexclusive. That argument is now foreclosed by Daher. Thus, given that plaintiff argued at trial for a separate category of 3 The Daher Court acknowledged that “ ‘including’ is a term of enlargement, not limitation,” citing NACG Leasing v Dep’t of Treasury, 495 Mich 26, 31; 843 NW2d 891 (2014), but also that “[w]hen used in the text of a statute, the word ‘includes’ can be used as a term of enlargement or of limitation, and the word in and of itself is not determinative of how it is intended to be used.” Frame v Nehls, 452 Mich 171, 178-179; 550 NW2d 739 (1996). Daher, 515 Mich at 278-279. -8- damages for preimpact fright and shock, and the jury awarded damages for that category, that portion of the verdict must be vacated under Daher. Now on appeal, acknowledging Daher, plaintiff argues in the alternative that the preimpact fright and shock were the first instances of “injury” that the decedents suffered, the injury began when the decedents first anticipated they were going to be hit by the tractor trailer, and thus, preimpact fright and shock falls within the category of damages for “pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by the deceased during the period intervening between the time of the injury and death” under MCL 600.2922(6). We disagree with plaintiff’s arguments, and, applying Daher, we hold that preimpact fright and shock damages are not recoverable damages under the wrongful death act. One problem with plaintiff’s argument is that, even if it is possible that the decedents’ conscious pain and suffering “between the time of the injury and death” under MCL 600.2922(6) began before the impact such that what occurred prior to the crash can support damages under that category, that was not how plaintiff litigated the case below. Plaintiff sought, and the trial court correctly approved, a verdict form that permitted the jury to award conscious pain and suffering from between injury and death. If preimpact fright and shock were included in conscious pain and suffering, as plaintiff now argues, there would be no need for the verdict form to include separate questions about preimpact fright and shock. But it did, and under Daher there was no basis in the statute for doing so. Another problem with plaintiff’s argument that she can recover for preimpact fright and shock in this manner is that it presupposes that the decedents’ “injury,” a prerequisite for recovering damages for conscious pain and suffering, began preimpact. Plaintiff’s post-Daher argument on appeal is that the decedents’ “injury” under the wrongful death act necessarily began preimpact, when “fright and shock” occurred, because caselaw and the model jury instructions permit recovery for damages for, for example, mental anguish and fright and shock, as components of pain and suffering. See M Civ JI 50.01 and 50.02. Given that we are remanding this case for retrial on conscious pain and suffering between injury and death, as we will discuss in Section III, it is necessary to address plaintiff’s argument that she can recover for what happened pre-impact as part of the decedents’ conscious pain and suffering between “injury and death.” Injury is undefined by the wrongful death act. “Undefined terms are presumed to have their ordinary meaning, unless they have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, in which case we accord them that meaning.” Daher, 515 Mich at 262 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Also, absent a statutory definition, we look to the dictionary to determine its plain meaning. Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 510; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). “Injury” is a noun that means “hurt, damage or loss sustained,” “an act that damages or hurts.”4 That definition, combined with the full text of the wrongful death act, indicates what the Legislature meant by injury. MCL 600.2921 (emphasis added) states: “Actions on claims for 4 Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, injury <https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/injury> (accessed October 19, 2026). -9- injuries which result in death shall not be prosecuted after the death of the injured person except pursuant to” section 2922. Thus, when determining when an “injury” occurs under the wrongful death act, we must be mindful of whether the “injuries [] result in death.” Indeed, in Karpinski v Saint John Hosp-Macomb Ctr Corp, 238 Mich App 539, 544; 606 NW2d 45 (1999), this Court interpreted the word “injury” as it applied to the venue provision in the wrongful death act, i.e., where the original injury occurred, and held that the “Legislature did not consider the ‘death’ and the ‘injuries resulting in death’ to be synonymous,” and instead interpreted the word “injury” to refer to the “injury resulting in death, rather than the death itself.” Id. There is also caselaw defining injury, and the parties cite caselaw from both the wrongful death context and otherwise to do so. The problem, of course, is that all wrongful death act cases arose pre-Daher, when parties were permitted to seek categories of damages beyond the categories listed in the statute, but they remain instructive. Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4; 179 NW2d 390 (1970), a non-wrongful death act case plaintiff cites to argue that “fright and shock” is recoverable, helps define when an “injury” occurs. In that case, our Supreme Court acknowledged that emotional distress or mental shock is recoverable but predicated that finding on a “definite and objective physical injury” having occurred. Id. at 12-13. Daley further held that the “absence of any physical impact” did not matter but did require “physical consequences” to the plaintiff first. Id. One wrongful death act case, Hardy, also helps us define “injury” under the act. Hardy concerned whether the savings provision in MCL 600.5852 applied to wrongful death actions. In Hardy it was undisputed that two young boys died as a result of drowning when the canoe they rented capsized. Hardy, 429 Mich at 425-427. Our Supreme Court explained that, since “under the wrongful death act a cause of action accrues at the time of infliction of the fatal injury, rather than the time of death . . . , then even where the death is immediate, the act and injury causing death still must logically precede the death itself and thus the action accrues prior to and survives death.” Id. at 440 (emphasis added). Under MCL 600.2921, if the cause of action accrues at the time of infliction of the fatal injury, then “injury” is that which results in death. Hardy went on to conclude that because the Legislature no longer distinguished between instantaneous and noninstantaneous death after the 1939 amendments to the wrongful death act, it did not need to consider whether drowning is instantaneous as a matter of law. Id. at 441. This conclusion is consistent with wrongful death act cases that have found that “a cause of action accrues at the time of infliction of the fatal injury,” id. at 440, which implies that what occurs before the fatal injury is not part of the “injury.” Thus, applying Hardy and Daley, plaintiff is correct that an injury “does not require impact,” but it does require some physical manifestation of the effect, or physical consequences, of defendant’s actions for an “injury” to exist. See also Goldman v Detroit United R, 200 Mich 543, 545; 166 NW 1007 (1918) (“[T]he law does not recognize fright alone, unaccompanied by -10- any physical injury, as a basis for damages.”). And in this case, there was no evidence of any physical consequences to either decedent until impact.5 Plaintiff’s reliance on the model jury instructions to define “injury” because they permit recovery for mental anguish and fright and shock as components of pain and suffering also is unpersuasive. M Civ JI 50.02 states that, “[i]f the facts justify it, the jury may be instructed to consider shame and mortification, mental pain, and anxiety which plaintiff suffered by reason of the injuries sustained.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the inclusion of “fright and shock” as a recoverable type of damages in M Civ JI 50.02 presupposes that an “injury” has already occurred, because the instruction only applies as a list of damages options to include when fashioning M Civ JI 50.01 to a particular case. It does not define when the injury occurs.6 Ultimately, it was error under Daher to include a separate damages category in the verdict form for preimpact fright and shock because the plain language of the wrongful death act does not contemplate damages for anything experienced before “injury,” that is, before any physical manifestation of the effect of defendants’ actions that results in death. Finally, defendants argue that “merely excising” the jury award for preimpact fright and shock under Daher is not a sufficient remedy because evidence supporting that theory of relief “permeated” the trial, was the basis for other court rulings, and impacted the jury’s verdict on other issues. We need not address this argument in light of our decisions on defendants’ other arguments on appeal. We vacate the portion of the jury’s verdict awarding damages for preimpact fright and shock. III. CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING Next, defendants contest certain trial court decisions that led to the jury awarding damages for conscious pain and suffering. They argue that the court abused its discretion when it permitted plaintiff’s replacement expert witness, Dr. Kenneth Mankowski, to testify regarding conscious pain and suffering, and that it erred in denying their motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and by permitting the jury to award damages for conscious pain and suffering because there was no admissible evidence to support it. We agree in part and hold that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Dr. Mankowski to testify under the circumstances but 5 Our analysis focuses on the facts of this case, but we are mindful that, at times, a plaintiff may be able to show physical consequences of a defendant’s actions that play a role in or result in death before any contact or impact occurs. 6 This Court has already recognized that fright and shock are appropriate considerations in determining damages for conscious pain and suffering between the time of injury and death. See Taylor v Michigan Power Co, 45 Mich App 453, 457; 206 NW2d 815 (1973). While damages for fright and shock may be recoverable in tort depending on the case, in the wrongful death context they can only be as part of—and not separate from—the conscious pain and suffering damages “between the time of the injury and death.” -11- disagree that it was error to submit the question to the jury, and therefore we remand for a new trial as to conscious pain and suffering. A. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff initially noticed two experts to testify at trial. Dr. Mankowski, a neurologist, was noticed as an expert witness regarding Parkinson’s disease, which related to plaintiff’s claim that Challenger negligently hired/supervised Nogueras, and plaintiff provided expert disclosures. Dr. Lawrence Shields, also a neurologist, was noticed to testify that the decedents experienced conscious pain and suffering, and plaintiff provided expert disclosures as to him. Defendants’ decision during voir dire to admit liability on negligent hiring/supervision meant that Dr. Mankowski’s testimony was not needed, but it also shortened the trial schedule in other ways, and plaintiff notified defendants and the court on Wednesday, April 12, 2023, that Dr. Shields would not be able to testify earlier than planned, potentially as early as on April 17. Thus, plaintiff announced a plan to call Dr. Mankowski in lieu of Dr. Shields on April 17 to testify about how and why the decedents experienced conscious pain and suffering. Defendants objected to Dr. Mankowski testifying on this topic, and consideration of this issue requires a review of the discovery and pretrial motions stages of this case as to expert witnesses. In August 2022, in response to defendants’ interrogatories, plaintiff informed defendants that Dr. Shields’s anticipated testimony would conclude, based on his knowledge, training, and experience as a neurologist, and the investigation of the crash and decedents’ autopsy reports, that “each [decedent] endured a period of conscious pain and suffering after the crash at issue and prior to their deaths.” In Dr. Shields’s later affidavit, he opined the autopsy reports did not reveal that the decedents died immediately and that neither lost consciousness as a result of the injuries, including internal decapitation, and that the decedents “would have experienced a period of awareness and consciousness where they would have experienced significant pain and suffering as well as fear of impending death.” Later, during a hearing on the motions in limine, defendants objected to Dr. Shields testifying at trial, arguing they had not yet received an expert report from Dr. Shields, and that the affidavit plaintiff provided for Dr. Shields only stated that the decedents experienced conscious pain and suffering, but did not explain how or how long, or what medical source Dr. Shields’s opinion was based on. Plaintiff responded that discovery was now closed, and defendants never deposed Dr. Shields. Plaintiff’s counsel further explained that during an early attempt at mediating the case, plaintiff shared with defendants a video of Dr. Shields explaining his opinions, so they were aware of Dr. Shields’s opinions and the medical reasons for t