Full Opinion

Y B012 June held Decided 94 as 0680 Hearing Civil 96950 and Esq Saipan Cite Action MP IN 2002 AND vTroy School System Workers COMMONWEALTH THE OF Vo of ublic ANTOS ana 001 Compensation on x Antonio for COURT Counsel 026 2000 No 29 FOR May 7 Commission Appellant PUBLICATION SCHOOL ANTONIO Deceased behalf ISLANDS MARIANA NORTHERN SUPREME Appeal Employer Kathleen Reynaldo 501247 Claimant Santos OPINION Carrier COMMISSION COMPENSATION Appellee SYSTEM SUSANA WORKERS 500052 ORDER Rucker FOR PUBLICATION Appeal No. 2000-026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS ANTONIO A. SANTOS, on behalf of SUSANA A. SANTOS (Deceased - Claimant) Claimant / Appellant, v. PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM, Employer / Appellee, and WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Carrier / Appellee. OPINION AND ORDER Cite as: Santos v. Public School System, 2002 MP 012 Civil Action No. 94-0680 Hearing held June 7, 2001 Decided May 29,2002 Counsel for Antonio A. Santos, Counsel for Workers' Compensation Claimant-Appellant: Commission, Carrier-Appellee: Reynaldo O. Yana, Esq. Kathleen Troy-Rucker, Esq. P.O. Box 500052 P.O. Box 501247 Saipan, MP 96950 Saipan, MP 96950 raising s while status travel particular dictates any day each job vwho from barred was Court Camacho whether NMI administrative stated same JOHN Mariana appeals Islands CNMI with rule by law Retirement manner accord ifII hether Order or cedent have jurisdiction our IV jured uperior MC he 02 990 Fund 36664 In EMAPAN sues ASTRO Any s found parts tructions CCRR proper ath ference claims nying cision ALEXANDRO antos usana ince 4 s ing overage onclusions pertinent provides Constitution Article workers pursuant compensable reverse identical basis as trial court is de agency W the ISSUES PRESENTED AND OF REVIEW 2 T following presented on Justice Chief S 9112 0 novo DTANDARDS of action are set forth in 1 we review compensation to et 9101 APA Act Procedureout ing Administrative agencies employee provided 3102 entitled shall employer her behalf hour seq his remand judicial because Northern Commonwealth wife benefits Antonio Appellant MANGLONA Associate and MIGUEL BEFORE four twenty Our required not standards s BEFORE: MIGUEL S. DEMAPAN, Chief Justice, ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO and JOHN A. MANGLONA, Associate Justices. MANGLONA, Associate Justice: �1 Appellant Antonio A. Santos ("Antonio") appeals a Decision and Order of the Superior Court denying claims for workers' compensation benefits for the death of his wife, Susana A. Santos ("Susana" or "decedent"). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article IV § 3 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands ("CNMI") and 1 CMC § 3102 (a). We reverse and remand with instructions. ISSUES PRESENTI:D AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW The following issues are presented for our review: I. Whether Antonio was barred from raising the issue of whether the decedent's death while traveling on behalf of her employer was compensable because of the "twenty-four hour rule,"! and, if not, II. Whether the decedent's death while traveling on behalf of her employer was compensable because of the "twenty-four hour rule." �3 Camacho v. Northern Marianas Retirement Fund, 1 N.M.I. 364, 366 (1 990) sets forth the proper standard of review for judicial review of agency action.2 Our review of I The "twenty-four hour rule," found in WCCRR § 3.102, provides, in pertinent parts: Any employee who travels within or without the Commonwealth on behalf of his/her employer shall be entitled to compensation as provided by law in the same manner as an employee who is injured on the job in the Commonwealth. The employee's coverage while on travel status is 24 hours each day .... 2In Camacho, we stated: We review the actions of NMI administrative agencies according to the dictates of the Commonwealth Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 1 CMC § § 9 1 0 1 et seq. The standards for judicial review of agency action are set forth in 1 CMC § 9112(t). Since we review agency action on the identical basis as the trial court, we are not required to accord any particular deference to the trial court's conclusions. Our review of the trial court's review of agency action is de novo. Hafadai Chamorro finding err did ER basis Bilingual law Program October hour 6 Extension Hotel Beach misapply supporting resulted PROCEDURAL AND worked M dinner recommended at authorization travel evidence whether PSS dance N993 covered status collapsed she ifconclude are affirm lost consciousness same The 2 1 4chool ecision 7 ssertion 3usana he learlyub briefystem fter xcerpts sue clude anglona ficer ficial hile FACTUAL reject Appellant apply should standard Appellees review applicable 992 Record 89 mal before administrative riend eries laim morning benefits BACKGROUND superior the night hearing that Hearing held conference Anformal 4 death Commission due On dead pronounced early In hereinafter assist S of scheduled February workshops history in to 1 9 on had Assistant employee an was submitted for nclusion use oneous December based upon nt substantial Public after arrest 5 2 tonio Workers no workers compensation Edward Tinian colleagues raised under being hosted Compensation this participate medical Administrative WCC cardiac court agency action is vo 3 we with give deference respect health Officer pay At special s the superior court's review of the agency action is de novo. 3 While we give "no special deference to the court's conclusion that the [agency's] was based upon substantial evidence, we are to affirm if we conclude that the court did not err in finding substantial evidence supporting the [agency's] decision, and if the [agency] did not misapply the law." In re Hafadai Beach Hotel Extension, 4 N.M.I. 37,41 (1 993). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND �4 Susana was an employee of the Public School System ("PSS") and worked under the Chamorro Bilingual Program as an Administrative Assistant. She had no medical history with respect to her health. Susana went to Tinian under an official travel authorization on February 9, 1 992, to assist and participate in a series of scheduled workshops. On the night of February 1 1 , 1 992, Susana and her colleagues went to a nightclub after being hosted for dinner at a friend's house.4 After one dance, she collapsed and lost consciousness. In the early morning of February 1 2, 1 992, Susana was pronounced dead due to cardiac arrest. �5 On December 2,1 992, Antonio submitted a claim to the Workers' Compensation Commission (hereinafter "WCC") for workers' compensation death benefits. An informal conference was held, and Administrative Hearing Officer Edward H. Manglona recommended that WCC pay the benefits. At this informal hearing, Antonio raised the issue of whether "employees on travel status are covered on a 24 hour basis[.]" ER 1 4. A formal hearingS was held on October 6, 1 993; this hearing resulted in a decision in 3 We reject Appellant's (Antonio's) assertion that we should apply a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. The Appellees' brief did not include the applicable standards of review. 4 Appellant's Excerpts ofRecord at 23 and 89. 5 The formal hearing was held before the same administrative hearing officer. 6 to 91 in of A 3 G as P 1 implied with belief proceeded when while Santos prove ruling must decedent raising barred first by filed argued time applied decision Regulations Court found original judge briefs from moved He trial attorney judgment entitled regardless under activity impression Tinian on applicable onstante ompensable ase 02 7 992 izama ntonio t ppellant SS overed terpret jury adequate cCart otion ficer hether xplicably n omedy employer traveling behalf record dispositive although ausal overage tipulate whether tipulation ought uan an laiming ummary ounsel7 he ourt connection hour four twenty because her WCCRR for death benefits had actual employee rule argues that itheld unenforceable Case 269 SPN Commission not raised was favor 7 did apply this appeal Thewe denied the duties request Rebecca See repealed hearing agreement judicial Superior but properly before providedd matter 24 errors now failed review us In administrative JL his decipher far attempted establish October issue full each s denial ly applicability between Susana sand below parties wrote vM se CIGNA performance We Rule ed favor of WCC. At each of these hearings, the parties attempted to stipulate that the "twenty-four hour rule," Rule 3.102 of the WCC Rules and Regulations, did not apply.6 �6 Antonio appealed the denial of benefits to the full WCe. The issue of the applicability of WCCRR § 3.102 was not raised in this appeal. The Commission denied the request for death benefits because Antonio had failed to establish a causal connection between Susana's death and the performance of her duties as a PSS employee. �7 Antonio then sought judicial review in the Superior Court. He moved for summary judgment, claiming that WCCRR § 3.102 applied and that he was entitled to the death benefits regardless of the activity at the time of Susana's death, as she was on Tinian at the request of PSS. The trial court denied Antonio's motion, ruling that Antonio was barred from raising the issue of WCCRR § 3.1 02 for the first time on appeal. Antonio timely filed his appeal with this Court. I. Whether Antonio was barred from raising the issue of whether Susana's death while traveling on behalf of her employer was compensable because of the "twenty- four hour rule." �8 Antonio argues that issue of twenty-four hour coverage was raised below and that, but for a "comedy of errors," is properly before us at this time. As far as we can decipher from his briefs, Antonio argues that his counset1 was under the impression that the parties had stipulated that WCCRR § 3.1 02 was applicable to his claim, while the WCC "proceeded with the implied belief that [Santos] must prove that the decedent was covered by the 24-hour rule when [WCC] argued that the decedent's injury was not in the 6 The record before us is inadequate in that, although it is the dispositive issue in this case, inexplicably, the actual agreement between the parties was not provided to us. In his decision, the administrative hearing officer wrote: "The issue stipulated between the parties was the matter of 24 hour coverage. The 24-hour rule found in the WCC Rules and Regulations was repealed because it was held to be unenforceable. See Rebecca G. Constante v. McCart and CIGNA, WCC Case SPN-91-269 (October 26, 1 992)." We interpret this to be the stipulation. 7 Juan T. Lizama, now a Superior Court judge, was the original attorney for Appellant. 1 3E sb at not has was in to D hour we F 2 rule hr that 6 l5 on vK Cany or N thisP early or irst ar will does We usaw rom Such relyhat aipat specially 992 rief rior Ril ommission parties ommonwealth allows reading honest ir purely citing change entered have adduced ofelow urged Antonio until raised course Inc 731 818 case hinges 706 738 and 9th Miv See 996 und irst ince 02 een 990 998 987 8 989 yhe 72 03 64 his hree ew 4 eing therefore Limon clear ifthey would whether Brown her s Superior review Service T sues WCCRR Whether icronesian arianas P arch to is atement frecord Appellantief ipulated pending court doubt while motion January with arisen time when appeal agreeipulation argues theory NMI Idourt existorthern argument thingamacho consider proves discuss xt judgment Underwriters troublesome Insurance disagreement employment appellate generally exceptions Retirement coverage absolutely applicability ecause construction numbered presented regulation unchanged remained actual ought laim ation ummary isputed lleged course of her employment." Appellant's brief at 6-7. This disagreement, therefore, proves that " [c]learly, the 24-hr rule was far from being a non-issue." Id. at 7. �9 WCC argues that the issue of WCCRR § 3.102's alleged applicability to Antonio's claim was not raised until Antonio sought review in the Superior Court. We agree with WCC that the issue of WCCRR § 3.102 was not raised until the January 1998 summary judgment motion in the Superior Court. No honest reading of the record presented to us allows for the construction urged by Antonio.8 �1 0 The appellate court's consideration of issues not raised below has been adduced in a number of cases. See Camacho v. Northern Marianas Retirement Fund, 1 N.M.1. 364, 372 (1 990) (citing CNMI v. Micronesian Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 3 CR 731 , 738 (D.N.M.I. App. Div. 1 989) and Brown v. Civil Service Commission, 81 8 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1 987)); Commonwealth v. Kaipat, 1996 MP 20. An appellate court will generally not discuss an issue not raised below. Limon v. Camacho, 1996 MP 18 �9. Three exceptions to this general rule exist. First, we will consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal when a new theory or issue has arisen because of a change in the law while the appeal is pending. Id. That is not the case here. There has been no change to WCCRR § 3.1 02 since March, 1992.9 �11 Next, we will consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal when the issue is purely one of law that does not rely on any factual record. Id. . Such is not the case here. The applicability of WCCRR § 3.102 to this case hinges on a factual record: 8 Especially troublesome is the statement: "Whether there was a stipulation or not, one thing is clear: if they stipulated, the stipulation would have been whether the 24-hour rule coverage was, or was not, a disputed issue." Appellant's Brief at 6. There is absolutely no doubt that the parties entered into a stipulation. 9 Prior to March, 1992, WCCRR § 3.102 was numbered WCCRR § 3.103; the regulation remained unchanged. Ada rely See record tenet id American Public appellate binding Avila jurisprudence does due have occasion School exception 4260 System Smith applicable Record committed either This involves treat health night On added TinianofPSS resultfore might Appellant below raised admitted found consider review injustice N parties unless ranch ullity 20 ebruary inally aipat rief ablan ngineering xcerpts ice ell 984 ith hy ere hile as hen sue ill adison ficial 938 required this documentary based 43 02 81 89 07 996 Valley 77 87 37nsequently 519 939 mphasis 803 1 917 edrock province Swift stipulations by bound not are established itery Marbury law tohat Railway emphatically that questions say her F 3 injured courts U employee vH Co is Decedent K employer of behalf on traveling 2 facts an w 1 Susana as such determinations factual the evidence B L E0 83 We reason Id had history fell ill Appellee or at see The collapsed later medical decedent 722 plain respect judicial 492 died must made 5 6cking 34 d Although MP 9 present case 5th Circuit 499 cert denied In duty 6 mmonwealth requisite error occurred department re 2 factual detenninations such as: Susana (1 ) was an employee of an employer in the Commonwealth; (2) was traveling on behalf of her employer; and (3) was injured or died must be made. Although the requisite facts were either found by the court or admitted by the parties,10 we will not consider the issue unless it does not rely on any factual record. See id. �12 Finally, we will review an issue not raised below when plain error was committed and an injustice might result unless we consider the issue. ld. We have had occasion to review issues not raised below due to the plain error exception. See Ada v. Sablan, 1 N.M.I. 415, 426-27 n.12 (1 990) ("[The plain error exception is] applicable in this case."); Commonwealth v. Kaipat, 1996 MP 20 �9 In the present case, there is no question that plain error occurred. This error involves the stipulation. A bedrock tenet of American jurisprudence is "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 37, 1 77,2 L.Ed. 60, 1 Cranch 1 37 (1803). Consequently, it is very well established that courts in the 9th Circuit are not bound by stipulations as to questions of law. Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Railway Co. , 243 U.S. 281 , 289, 37 S.Ct. 287, 289, 61 L.Ed. 722 (191 7) ("We treat the stipulation, therefore, as a nullity."); Avila v. INS., 731 F.2d 61 6,620 (9 Cir. 1984) ("A stipulation of law is not binding on an appellate court."); Smith Engineering Co. v. Rice, 1 02 F.2d 492, 499 (9th Cir.1 938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 637, 59 S.Ct. 1 034, 83 L.Ed. 1 51 9 (1939) ("We see no reason why we 10 "The decedent was an employee of the Public School System." Appellant's Excerpts of Record at 24. "The decedent was on an official travel required by her employer based on documentary evidence." Id "The decedent had no medical history with respect to her health." Id. at 25. "On the night of 1 1 February 1992, while on Tinian on behalf of pss . . Decedent fell ill and later collapsed." Appellee's Brief at 2 . (emphasis added). 3 Now The solely Appellee B 6 disagree emphasis administrative LIZAMA formal seen apparent both As WCCRR apply did rule come occurred 14ur review convinces near status Will with Hearing rested going impartial affect added us end case consider must determine twenty four result might repealed unenforceable held agreed unless 18 Limon 1996 MP 9 mindful misunderstanding when Mr MANGLONA revealing regards error then 12 brought decide at him wherein cited explicitly clear While 15 plain Iresources hearing these are now that medical opinion as part of record make Eregarding stipulation Appellant will Record this file is in should look be 4 6justice fficer sisted dependent ne to sue rief xcerpts 02 14 air admitted available all So accept MR felt one by upon not was law ficer applicable decision ittakes exchange 2 TENORIO hour concerning may waive but two An stipulate counsel erroneous other what we think would an bound also like to uM yies sition d cause y fore Patrick do you have closing statements close than O y say everything should make what we think would be an erroneous decision, because the applicable law was not insisted upon by one of the parties."). �14 Our review of the record convinces us that the administrative hearing officer felt bound to accept the stipulation of clOunsei. An exchange that occurred near the end of the formal hearing is revealing: MR. MANGLONA: So all these are now admitted into the record. I would also like to say that everything that is in the file other than that independent medical opinion will be admitted as part of the record of this hearing. Patrick, do you have any closing statements before we close the hearing? MR. TENORIO: Is the 24-hour status going to be an issue on the decision? Will that affect this case? MR. LIZAMA: I think that is not an issue. MR. TENORIO: So, Mr. Hearing Officer, that will not be brought into the decision when you decide on this case? MR. MANGLONA: I will look at all available resources to come up with a fair and impartial decision. Now do you have a closing statement? E.R. 1 1 4 (emphasis added). The hearing officer did not apply WCCRR § 3.102; it is apparent, then, that he felt that WCCRR § 3.102 was not available to him because of the II stipulation. �15 While it is clear that plain error occurred, we must also determine that "an injustice might result unless we consider the issue." Limon, 1996 MP 1 8 �9. We are mindful of Appellee's position that "Any misunderstanding regarding the stipulation concerning the 24 hour rule rested solely with Appellant." Appellee's Brief at 6. We 12 disagree. As will be seen, both parties were in error in regards to the stipulation. II The hearing officer explicitly cited the stipulation wherein the parties agreed that the "twenty-four hour rule" in WCCRR § 3.102 was "repealed because it was held to be unenforceable." Appellant's Excerpts of Record at 26. 12 One party may waive an issue, but it takes two to stipulate. way case Ifuch proceeded change would origin travel 9303 unjust performance exact while accident uphold L unreasonable possible Id whether 7oubt tribunal whenever Again operating automobile before who are required were record laboring understanding employed outside country category cannot accorded us ouralysis id7fficer ase IGNA om 01 4 5 02 03 onstante arapan juries aymer terest jured adequate cCart agnitude anifestly day ficer remains tipulation found considers January entirety renumbered udgment ought hall isappears ure hould pecial ubjected eemed aundromat 8MC order RR is m of applicable prior to v d for her relying that part Rules See the Hearing law by Administrator The Rebecca an It 1992 3 269 91 SPN WCC C G also enforceable at in March O6 4 apparently Any assertion fact snot d claimant In compensation hearing Wee Manglona employees covered heading Administrative being Not went far exception applies J3 basisir advance this work jwhat provided Regs Regulations repealed was hour 24 itheld implicated 9078efore Non on employers resident rule because unenforceable statement taken conception ober sies ing �16 Any assertion that "the 24 hour rule" in WCCRR § 3.102 "was repealed because it was held to be unenforceable" is a misstatement of the applicable law.13 �17 In Constante, the claimant, a non-resident worker, was injured in an automobile accident while on her way to a Laundromat in Garapan prior to heading to work. Rebecca G. Constante v. McCart and CIGNA, WCC Case SPN-91-269 at 4 (October 26, 1992). Constante sought compensation for her injuries, "apparently relying on Rule ,, 3.101. 14 Id. WCCRR § 3.10215 was not implicated in Constante. In fact, the hearing officer went so far as to say, "The: exception applies to employees who are required to travel in the performance of a job in order to advance the employers' interest. Not being a 'traveling employee', the claimant cannot and should not be subjected to the special rules accorded to that category of employees." Id. at 7. �1 8 Any doubt as to whether the 24-hour rule found in WCCRR § 3.1 03 was repealed disappears when one considers that WCCRR § 3.101 was repealed in its entirety on January 16, 1 992, id. at 2, and WCCRR § 3.1 03 was, in its entirety, renumbered WCCRR § 3.1 02 in March, 1992. It remains an enforceable part of the WCC Rules and Regulations today. See WCC Rules and Regs., 1 4 Com. Reg. 9078 (Mar. 1 5, 1 992). Therefore, because the parties to the stipulation and the hearing officer were operating 13 Again, because of the inadequate record before us, we cannot be sure of the exact stipulation of the parties. It is possible that the hearing officer was laboring under a misconception as to what the applicable law was. We note that Administrative Hearing Officer Manglona was also the hearing officer in Constante. See Rebecca G. Constante v. McCart and CIGNA, WCC Case SPN-91-269 (October 26, 1992). If such were the case, our analysis would not change. It would be manifestly unjust to uphold a judgment when the tribunal proceeded under a mistaken understanding of the law of this magnitude. 14 Rule 3.101 provided: "Non-resident worker employees shall be covered on a 24 hour basis whenever employed outside their country of origin, except as provided in 4 CMC 9303(d), or as deemed unreasonable by the Administrator." 1 5 The former WCCRR § 3.103. would arises automatically Whether II arising status N 2 standing workers statutorily unless we rule entitled runs afoul employment place scope Parking Authority this outside does any PSS Yonkers which in situations for employer 0 91 ase laimant onstruction onsider hapter ontemplate ommitted reate ompensable ompensation 7onsequently onclusively eads cWCCRR 36arose activities related prove engaged from her76 illness ifdisability butly assertion permissible pursuing itnecessary was might result because twenty four hour not presumes died Susana benefits death Cor Therefore system employee by sustained while and that stating argues Antonio 19 Worker plain designed is next 7 behalf traveling 18 urged Finally advanced 4 9303 2 16 For error law sue ompensation MC ity relevant of under on payable justice vshall jury tent Jites 6 se correct these ommonwealth presumption irrebuttable Malacarne propositions delineated tooverage under an incorrect understanding of the relevant law, plain error was committed and an injustice might result unless we consider the issue. II. Whether Susana's death while traveling on behalf of her employer was compensable because of the "twenty-four hour rule." A. WCCRR § 3.102 does not create an irrebuttable presumption that any injury sustained by an employee while on travel status is automatically compensable under the Commonwealth's workers' compensation system. �19 Antonio argues that WCCRR § 3.1 02 conclusively presumes that an injury sustained by an employee while on travel status arises out of and in the course of her employment. Therefore, it is not necessary for the claimant to prove that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. 16 Consequently, Antonio is entitled to workers' compensation death benefits because Susana died while traveling on behalf of PSS. �20 WCC argues that WCCRR � 3.102 does not conclusively presume that an injury sustained by an employee while on travel status arises out of and in the course of her employment.17 WCC next argues that the construction urged by Antonio runs afoul of the intent of workers' compensation system, stating: "Worker's compensation is not designed to contemplate coverage or benefits for situations in which an employee is ,, pursuing, or engaged in, activities not related to employment. 18 Finally, WCC argues that the construction advanced by Antonio would place WCCRR § 3.1 02 outside the scope of statutorily permissible coverage delineated in 4 CMC § 9303(a).19 16 For these propositions, Antonio cites WCCRR § 3.102 and 4 CMC § 9303(a). 17 For these propositions, WCC cites WCCRR § 3.102 and 4 CMC � 9303(a). 18 WCC cites Malacarne v. City of Yonkers Parking Authority, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 402, 406 (1976) for this assertion. 194 CMC § 9303(a) reads: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in case of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury or illness arising out of and in the course of employment." any performing Thus his due This payment rule 3 with render M other same to N manner 4 seq reads which 8117 at 20 words neither not do conclusive Courts An tend prove salary system this carry receives out was had who act while When authorizing could create would Estate be RR part It must vrelated treated uniform method are used performance occurs as have that We 21 we 23 by under of Code the in is nor and The ontain jury cluding urged or whenjured agree creases claim Faisao plain Rules WCC on job 1examinations appointments conducting Compensation added Workers 265 Act lieve norio gulate ce certainly 2 sue raveling 60 shall 995 Civil 8116 et 9101MC orkers blush first At 22 ed compensation Our standing emphasis classification evaluation training advanced promotions prepare Commission removals reading statutes Procedure employee sustained presumption compensable meaning considered Commonwealth itdefined Service construing phrases reasonable covering matters provisions working automatically irrebuttable Administrative regulations Pursuant pertinent personnel suspensions programs ratings generally superfluous translates leadonio separations Regulations position disregard construction ,-r21 We agree with WCC that WCCRR § 3.102 does not create an irrebuttable presumption that any injury sustained by a traveling employee is automatically compensable under the Commonwealth's workers' compensation statutes. At first blush, a plain reading of the rule would lead a reasonable person to believe that WCCRR creates the conclusive presumption urged by Antonio. This is due to the phrase "on the job." It must be noted that the phrase "on the job" is neither defined in the Workers' Compensation Rules and Regulations; nor is it defined in the Commonwealth Code,20 nor have we considered the issue. When construing statutes, we use the plain meaning of words. Estate of Faisao v. Tenorio, 4 N.M.I. 260, 265 (1995). Our understanding of the plain meaning of "on the job" translates to "at work, while working." Thus, one could read \VCCRR § 3.1 02 as authorizing payment to a traveling employee in the same manner as an employee who is injured at work, while working; certainly a compensable claim. The construction advanced by WCC would tend to render the phrase "on the job" superfluous. An employee who had to prove that his injury was job related would be treated "in the same manner as an employee who was injured in the Commonwealth" and