Full Opinion

Affirmed in Part and Reversed and Remanded in Part and Memorandum Opinion filed September 24, 2026 In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-25-00124-CV BRIAN BECKCOM, Appellant V. TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, Appellee On Appeal from the 85th District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 24-003177-CV-85 MEMORANDUM OPINION Brian Beckcom challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus in which he sought to compel Texas A&M University to release certain documents under the Texas Public Information Act. We conclude the trial court erred and affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. BACKGROUND In 2024, appellant Brian Beckcom submitted two requests for information to Texas A&M University (TAMU) pursuant to the Texas Public Information Act. Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 552. Beckcom first requested information pertaining to diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives in the Corp of Cadets in the years 2023 and 2024. TAMU produced some documents but also notified Beckcom it was withholding others, including “[a] compilation of DEI documents prepared for systemwide compliance efforts” (the “DEI Documents”) under Texas Education Code section 51.971(e)(2) which excepts information from disclosure “if it is collected or produced . . . by a systemwide compliance office for the purpose of reviewing compliance processes at a component institution of higher education of a university system.” TAMU notified Beckcom that several Attorney General letter rulings covered different groups of DEI documents and one letter ruling covered the specific information. TAMU sought an opinion from the Attorney General regarding whether withheld information other than the DEI Documents could be excluded from disclosure. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301. It also noted in its letter to the Attorney General that the DEI Documents were “part of the information at issue in a separate prior university open records request, and this precise information is subject to a prior decision from your office.” TAMU stated that it was required under that prior decision to “withhold the submitted information under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 51.971(e)(2) of the Education Code.” Before the Attorney General issued a ruling, TAMU withdrew its request as to whether the additional information was excepted from disclosure and produced those documents. TAMU did not produce the DEI Documents. Beckcom also sent a request to TAMU seeking documents related to investigations into Squadron 17 of the Corps of Cadets. TAMU produced responsive documents, but also withheld a 46 page document (the “Investigation 2 Documents”). TAMU determined that Beckcom had served as a legal representative for at least one student who had been involved in the Squadron 17 hazing investigation and he had a son who was a member of Squadron 17. This indicated that Beckcom knew the identities of students who were members of Squadron 17 and had knowledge of the underlying facts and conduct allegations. TAMU concluded under the federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) that information in the Investigation Documents “was personally identifiable to specific students and could not be sufficiently de-identified by redaction to allow for production of investigation-related documents.” Accordingly, TAMU withheld the Investigation Documents pursuant to Texas Government Code section 552.114, which excepts student records from disclosure consistent with FERPA. Beckcom filed three proceedings seeking writs of mandamus to compel TAMU to produce documents responsive to his PIA requests. He nonsuited one and consolidated the other two. In an amended petition for writ of mandamus, Beckcom requested that the trial court require TAMU to respond to his requests for “(1) documents related to a March 2024 investigation into Squadron 17 of the Corps of Cadets; and (2) a ‘compilation’ of DEI documents, and any other documents that exist and have not been produced, related to [a] former Commandant[’s] plan to completely restructure the Corps of Cadets freshman experience . . . .” Beckcom also requested that the trial court review the withheld materials in camera to determine the applicability of the alleged privileges. TAMU filed a plea to the jurisdiction, challenging Beckcom’s standing and asserting that it had complied with the PIA requirements. After a hearing, the trial court denied TAMU’s plea to the jurisdiction. It also denied Beckcom’s petition for writ of mandamus and dismissed his claims 3 with prejudice. Beckcom then requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court denied. Beckcom filed this appeal. ANALYSIS In two issues Beckcom asserts that (1) the standard of review applicable to reviewing a summary judgment should apply here, and (2) TAMU failed to establish that the withheld documents were excepted from disclosure. I. Standard of Review Beckcom first claims that we should review the denial of his mandamus petition under the standard of review applicable to reviewing a summary judgment. Although TAMU did not seek summary judgment, Beckcom points to TAMU’s response to his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in which TAMU asserted that the hearing on Beckcom’s mandamus petition was “more akin to a dispositive summary judgment motion versus a ‘trial’” and that the district court’s ruling was “tantamount to the granting of a summary judgment.” However, when we review an appeal from a mandamus action initiated in the trial court, “we review the trial court’s judgment using the same appellate standards applicable to other civil actions.” Starkey v. Stainton, 652 S.W.3d 80, 85 n.10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.). And here, the ultimate questions are whether the information is subject to the PIA and whether an exception to disclosure applies. Both of these are questions of law, which we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Tex. Tribune, 731 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2026, no pet.) (citing City of Garland v. Dall. Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 357 (Tex. 2000)). Further, a “governmental entity must demonstrate that the requested information is not within the scope of the [PIA] or that it falls within one of [PIA’s] specific exceptions to the disclosures requested.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 290, 291 (Tex. 2011)). 4 II. Beckcom’s Request for a Writ of Mandamus The PIA, found in Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code, guarantees access to public information, subject to certain exceptions. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2011). The PIA defines public information as “information that is written, produced, collected, assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business . . . by a governmental body . . . .” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.002(a)(1). But public information is exempt from disclosure if it is “confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Id. § 552.101. “The Legislature has authorized PIA requestors … to ‘file suit for a writ of mandamus compelling a governmental body to make information available.’” Paxton v. Am. Oversight, 716 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.321). Specifically, the PIA provides: A requestor or the attorney general may file suit for a writ of mandamus compelling a governmental body to make information available for public inspection if the governmental body [A] refuses to request an attorney general’s decision . . . or [B] refuses to supply [1] public information or [2] information that the attorney general has determined is public information that is not excepted from disclosure .... Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.321(a). Beckcom sought a writ of mandamus to compel TAMU’s production of the documents under [B][1], asserting that TAMU had withheld the documents “claiming a variety of inapplicable privileges and questionable exceptions.” 1. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Beckon’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus Regarding the DEI Documents. Beckcom first claims that TAMU failed to establish its right to withhold 5 documents that were responsive to his request for information about its DEI initiatives. 1 TAMU claims that the DEI Documents fall under the exception in section 51.971(e)(2) of the Education Code, which excepts information from disclosure that is collected or produced “by a systemwide compliance office for the purpose of reviewing compliance processes at a component institution of higher education of a university system.” Tex. Educ. Code § 51.971. To withhold information, a “governmental entity must demonstrate that the requested information is not within the scope of the [PIA] or that it falls within one of [PIA’s] specific exceptions to the disclosures requested.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 731 S.W.3d at 782 (alterations in original) (quoting Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 290, 291 (Tex. 2011)). TAMU has never claimed that the DEI Documents are not within the scope of the PIA. Accordingly, TAMU had the burden to show the applicability of an exception. See Uvalde Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas Trib., 720 S.W.3d 466, 478 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025, no pet.) (“Because the underlying philosophy is ‘full agency disclosure,’ the government bears the burden of justifying withholding of information or documents.” (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360–61 (1976))). Beckcom claims that the trial court could not rule in TAMU’s favor before conducting an in camera review of the DEI Documents. While “[t]he dividing line between disclosure and restraint must be determined by proof,” Cox Tex. Newspapers, 343 S.W.3d at 119, we do not agree that an in camera inspection is 1 Beckcom also claims that TAMU failed to establish that it requested an Attorney General opinion regarding the DEI Documents. However, Beckcom did not seek mandamus relief on the ground that TAMU refused to request an Attorney General’s decision. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.321(a) (permitting a suit for a writ of mandamus if a governmental body “refuses to request an attorney general’s decision”). Accordingly, we do not address whether TAMU requested or was required to request such a decision. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (“As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that . . . the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion . . . .”). 6 required. “[T]he government must provide evidence supporting its claim that an exception applies,” but this evidence can include the documents to be reviewed in camera or affidavits or declarations “provid[ing] a relatively detailed justification, specifically identif[ying] the reasons why a particular exemption is relevant, and correlat[ing] those claims with the particular part of a withheld document to which they apply.” Uvalde, 720 S.W.3d at 478 (quoting Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 88 (D.D.C. 2009)). “[V]ague assertions” of confidentiality will not support the government’s claim of an exception. Id. (quoting Cox. Tex. Newspapers, 343 S.W.3d at 119). TAMU responds that it properly withheld the documents in reliance on a prior Attorney General ruling which TAMU claims covered the specific DEI information requested by Beckcom. See Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2024-004322. That prior decision stated that the requested DEI information in that case was confidential under section 51.971(e)(2) of the Education Code. Id. at 2. TAMU claims that under Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301(a), its decision to withhold the DEI Documents was based on reasonable reliance on this “previous determination.” But Section 552.301(a) provides that a governmental body must ask for a decision from the attorney general about whether requested information is excepted from disclosure “if there has not been a previous determination about whether the information falls within one of the exceptions.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301(a). This only permits TAMU to rely on a previous determination when declining to ask for an Attorney General decision. This does not answer the question of whether TAMU properly withheld the DEI Documents. As the Texas Supreme Court has explained, the correctness of an Attorney General’s decision is not “unreviewable.” Kallinen v. City of Hous., 462 S.W.3d 25, 27 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). A “trial court has jurisdiction under [Government 7 Code] section 552.321(a) to consider whether requested information is subject to disclosure, irrespective of whether the Attorney General has issued a ruling addressing that question.” Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Integrity Title Co., LLC, 483 S.W.3d 62, 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). Accordingly, whether the information Beckcom requested was public information subject to disclosure was a separate question from whether the Attorney General had determined that the information was excepted from disclosure. TAMU failed to present any evidence to demonstrate the applicability of a confidentiality exception applicable to the DEI Documents. It did not present the documents to be reviewed in camera, nor did it submit affidavits or declarations detailing the documents and how the exemption applied. The absence of specific evidence to support TAMU’s claim of an exemption prevented meaningful judicial review and gave the trial court no basis to conclude that the DEI Documents were wholly confidential. Uvalde, 720 S.W.3d at 479. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Beckcom’s petition for writ of mandamus regarding his claims related to the DEI Documents. 2. The Trial Court Properly Denied Beckcom’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus Regarding the Squadron 17 Investigation Documents. Beckcom next claims that TAMU failed to establish its right to withhold documents responsive to Beckcom’s request about the Squadron 17 investigation because there is a factual dispute about whether the exception applies. TAMU claims that it properly withheld the Investigation Documents because they are “student records” exempted from disclosure under Texas Government Code section 552.114 and that it alone, and not this Court, has authority under FERPA to determine what records are confidential. We agree with TAMU that it has authority to determine whether the requested information is subject to withholding as student records and its decision is not subject to judicial review. 8 Under section 552.114 of the Government Code, information in a “student record” is confidential and excepted from disclosure. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.114(b). “Section 552.114 defines ‘student records’ to mean ‘education records’ as defined by FERPA, effectively incorporating the confidentiality requirements of FERPA.” Tarleton State Univ. v. Found. for Individual Rts. & Expression, No. 15-24-00057-CV, 2025 WL 1322593, at *2 (Tex. App.—15th Dist., May 6, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.114(a)). FERPA, a federal law, also prohibits disclosure of education records subject to certain limited exceptions. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)). “The Texas Supreme Court has held that Section 552.026 of the Texas Government Code recognizes ‘FERPA’s primacy,’ as the PIA ‘does not require the release of information contained in education records of an educational agency or institution, except in conformity with [FERPA].’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. GateHouse Media Tex. Holdings II, Inc., 711 S.W.3d 655, (Tex. 2024)). This Court recently addressed whether a court may review a university’s determination as to whether information was subject to FERPA. Id. at *3. We concluded that “neither this Court, nor the trial court, nor the Attorney General is the proper entity to interpret FERPA and its application to the educational institution’s records—it is the educational institution that must make FERPA determinations.” Id. at *3. (quoting B.W.B. v. Eanes Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 03-16- 00710-CV, 2018 WL 454783, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 10, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (brackets omitted)). We explained that FERPA gives educational institutions the authority to determine what information in their records is confidential under FERPA. Id. Any dispute regarding FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions is outside a court’s authority because “Congress expressly authorized 9 the Secretary of Education to ‘deal with violations’ of [FERPA] and required the Secretary to ‘establish or designate [a] review board’ for investigating and adjudicating such violations.” Id. at 4 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287, 289 (2002) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f)–(g))). No private cause of action exists to remedy a FERPA violation. Id. Rather, the Secretary may terminate funding to an institution that has failed to comply with FERPA. Id. Accordingly, “no applicable state or federal law allows judicial review of the University’s FERPA determinations to redact certain information or withhold the information in full.” Id. at *4 (citation modified). In support of its position in the trial court, TAMU submitted an affidavit from the Director of TAMU’s Office of Open Records. She stated that TAMU had determined that Beckcom served as a legal representative of at least one student involved in the hazing investigation and “TAMU reasonably believed in good faith that [Beckcom] knows the identities of the students to whom the Squadron 17 investigation documents relate.” Accordingly, TAMU determined under FERPA that the requested information was personally identifiable to specific students and could not be sufficiently redacted. As a result, TAMU withheld the Investigation Documents under section 552.114. TAMU’s determination that the withheld information is confidential under FERPA is not subject to judicial review. See id. Beckcom claims this case is distinguishable from Tarleton State because the plaintiff in that case failed to present any evidence to contradict an affidavit submitted by the University stating that it had determined that the records were student records and that the party requesting the information would be able to identify the students to whom the records related. See id. at *4. To the contrary, in this case, Beckcom claims he provided his own affidavit controverting the affidavit 10 of the Director of the Office of Open Records.2 We do not find this distinction of consequence. As we noted in Tarleton State, “[b]ecause courts cannot resolve disputes as to the University’s determinations on what information is subject to FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions, the University can withhold or redact FERPA information without judicial review” and the University was not required to raise a fact issue to defeat the requestor’s motion for summary judgment. Id. (emphasis added). We similarly cannot resolve any purported factual dispute here related to TAMU’s determination that the withheld Investigation Documents were subject to FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions. Beckcom also claims this case is distinguishable from Tarleton State because the affidavit submitted by the Office of Open Records Director did not state that it was made “with guidance from counsel” as did the affidavit submitted by Tarleton State in support of its FERPA claims. However, the Tarleton State opinion does not mention this affidavit phrase or rest any holding upon it. Beckcom asserts that B.W.B., 2018 WL 454783, on which this Court heavily relied in Tarleton State, supports his position. Beckcom claims that in B.W.B. the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court properly granted the educational institution’s motion for summary judgment regarding documents it withheld under a PIA request only after reviewing a privilege log and documents provided for in camera review, whereas TAMU did not provide any similar evidence here. Beckcom misunderstands the court’s holding in B.W.B. The educational institution did provide a privilege log and documents for in cameral review, but the court only addressed those when analyzing whether the documents were excepted under the separate litigation exception. B.W.B., 2018 WL 454783, at 2 Beckcom submitted a declaration stating that he had not acted as a legal representative during the hearings. Rather, he had attended his son’s hearings as an advisor. 11 *7. As for whether the documents should have been released under FERPA, the court did not mention the privilege log or in camera documents. Rather, the court recognized that it could not interpret FERPA “and its application” to the records— only the educational institution may make such a determination. Id. at *8. The court concluded that “no applicable state or federal law allows judicial review of [the educational institution’s] FERPA determinations.” Id. at *9. These conclusions also apply here regardless of whether TAMU submitted the documents for in camera inspection. The trial court properly denied Beckcom’s petition for writ of mandamus regarding the Investigation Documents. We overrule Beckcom’s second issue. CONCLUSION We affirm the portion of the trial court’s judgment denying appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus regarding his request for documents related to the investigation into Squadron 17 of the Corps of Cadets. We reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment denying appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus regarding his request for DEI documents. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. /s/ April Farris April Farris Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. 12