Full Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE DEYANARA MOJICA HICHEZ, Individually ) and as Personal Representative of the Estate of ) RAFAEL MENA PEREZ, her husband, and as ) parent and next friend of their minor children, ) L.M.M., D.M.M., and D.M.M., ) C.A. No. N19C-10-273 ) KMM Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) DELMARVA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, ) PEPCO HOLDINGS, LLC, ASPLUNDH TREE ) EXPERT CO., ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT, ) LLC, VERIZON DELAWARE, LLC, and ) COMCAST OF DELMARVA, LLC, ) ) Defendants. Date Submitted: May 29, 2026 Date Decided: August 14, 2026 Delmarva’s Motion for Summary Judgment – GRANTED in part, DENIED in part Comcast’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DENIED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Francis J. Murphy (argued), Scott M. Himelein (argued), MURPHY & LANDON, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiffs. Lisa C. McLaughlin (argued), PHILLIPS MCLAUGHLIN & HALL, Wilmington Delaware, Attorney for Defendant Delmarva Power & Light Company. Robert M. Greenberg, TYBOUT REDFEARN & PELL, Wilmington, Delaware; Mathew C. Wilson, GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Defendant Verizon Delaware LLC. Ashley M. Scrivner (argued), ZARWIN BAUM DEVITO KAPLAN SCHAER TODDY, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant Comcast of Delmarva LLC. Miller, J. I. INTRODUCTION Rafael Mena Perez was employed by a tree trimming company that was hired by Delmarva Power & Light Company (“Delmarva”) to trim a tree around its electrical lines. The company assigned that task to Mr. Mena Perez. While he was in the tree, he was electrocuted and died. Plaintiffs—Mr. Mena Perez’s estate and loved ones—bring claims against Delmarva, Verizon Delaware LLC (“Verizon”), and Comcast of Delmarva LLC (“Comcast”). The thrust of Plaintiffs’ claims is that Delmarva, Verizon, and Comcast failed to properly maintain their equipment surrounding the area of the tree in a safe manner and those failures caused Mr. Mena Perez’s injuries. Delmarva1 and Comcast2 each moved for summary judgment, asserting they owed no duty to Mr. Mena Perez. Delmarva relies on common law limitations on duties of a landowner to employees of independent contractors hired to work on the property. Delmarva asserts that because Mr. Mena Perez was injured by the very risk inherent in his job (trimming branches near electrical lines), as a landowner, it owed him no duty. But, a landowner owes a duty to warn its business invitees of defective conditions on its property. While Delmarva owed no duty to warn of the defective condition of 1 D.I. 425. 2 D.I. 429. 1 branches near electrical lines—the very hazard Mr. Mena Perez was hired to eliminate—Plaintiffs point to other defective conditions that they argue caused Mr. Mena Perez’s injuries. Plaintiffs point to evidence in the record in support, which raises factual disputes. Accordingly, Delmarva’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this theory is DENIED. Delmarva also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim that Delmarva owed a non-delegable duty. Again, because of Delmarva’s landowner status and Mr. Mena Perez’s employee of an independent contractor status, Delmarva asserts that the law does not support such a duty. On this claim, Delmarva finds success. Under the legal relationship between Delmarva and Mr. Mena Perez, Plaintiffs must point to statutes or regulations that require the use of specific safety precautions while trimming trees near electrical lines. Plaintiffs have failed to do so. Accordingly, Delmarva’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is GRANTED. Comcast argues that it owed no duty to Mr. Mena Perez because it is a “legal stranger” to Mr. Mena Perez. Duty is derived from the relationship between parties. In determining whether a relationship exists such that the law will impose a duty, the court must look to statutory and common law. The Delaware Code regulates cable television companies and incorporates the National Electric Safety Code (the “NESC”). The NESC requires communication cables to be maintained in a safe 2 manner, including the trimming of vegetation around communication lines. Among the purposes for doing so is the protection of persons during the maintenance of overhead electrical lines. Mr. Mena Perez was such a person. Accordingly, Comcast owed a duty to Mr. Mena Perez and its Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3 A. The subject tree and related equipment The tree situated on the property located around Saulsbury Avenue and Temple Terrance in Wilmington (the “Tree”), grew into and around utility lines, which were fastened to a utility pole on the nearby sidewalk on Saulsbury Avenue (the “Sidewalk Pole”) and another in a residential backyard (the “Backyard Pole”). The utility poles are owned by Verizon. Attached to the poles, at the highest elevation, are Delmarva’s electrical conductor lines, comprised of 12kV tree wire.4 Below, Comcast’s and Verizon’s communication lines are attached. Delmarva is required to maintain the vegetation around its electrical conductors. It engaged Asplundh Tree Expert, LLC (“Asplundh”) to perform such services. Part of Asplundh’s scope of work was to trim the Tree around the electrical 3 The facts are derived from the undisputed facts and exhibits submitted by the parties. Citations in the form of [Name] Rep. refer to expert reports submitted as exhibits by the parties. Citations in the form of [Name] Disclosure refer to expert disclosures submitted as exhibits by the parties. Citations in the form of [Name] Dep. refer to expert and fact witness testimony from a deposition transcript submitted as an exhibit by the parties. 4 The parties do not dispute that Delmarva is a landowner by virtue of its utility easement. 3 and communication lines on August 2, 2018.5 Asplundh employee Mr. Mena Perez was assigned this job.6 The electrical conductor lines running through the Tree created problems in the years leading up to the August 2018 incident. Specifically, a homeowner called Delmarva “two or three times” “[s]o that they could trim” the Tree, after she witnessed arcing and “sparks flying [onto her] roof” as a result of the electrical lines coming into contact with the Tree.7 On one occasion, the arcing was so severe that two branches caught on fire.8 In response to the calls, Delmarva “came out [to trim] twice[.]”9 Verizon’s and Comcast’s lines were passing through and contacting the Tree.10 B. The incident On August 2, 2018, Mr. Mena Perez was a climber, i.e., his task was to climb into the Tree and trim its branches. To get a sense of the job, he and his co-workers looked at the Tree, the area surrounding it, and discussed with their superiors what 5 D.I. 423, Ex. A (“Floyd Rep.”) at 13. Tree wire is the term used for electrical conductors that have a factory installed extruded plastic covering. The purpose of the covering is to reduce service outages, it does not provide sufficient insulation to make a conductor safe to touch. Id. at 7. 6 D.I. 421, Ex. A (“Webber Rep.”) at 8; D.I. 483 (Compendium of Deposition Transcripts Volume IV, part 2 (“Bellafore-Dougherty Dep.”)) at 19–20 (describing the location of the Tree in her backyard). 7 Bellafore-Dougherty Dep. at 28, 43, 50. 8 Id. at 50–51. 9 Id. at 46–47. 10 D.I. 422, Ex. A (“Orosz Rep.”) at 17. 4 needed to be done.11 The crew concluded that the Tree “was a regular tree, just like the ones [Asplundh] did every day,”12 and the surrounding area did not present any greater danger than what the crew typically experienced.13 Thereafter, Mr. Mena Perez climbed into the tree and began to trim. When a climber is in the tree, Asplundh has another employee on the ground (a “spotter”) to observe the climber and keep him safe.14 Roughly 30 to 40 minutes after he started, Mr. Mena Perez requested that his spotter go to a truck—approximately 50 to 100 feet away from the Tree—to retrieve him water.15 The spotter obliged and headed toward the truck.16 Upon arriving at the truck, the spotter heard Mr. Mena Perez scream twice,17 and rushed back to the Tree, finding Mr. Mena Perez hanging in his harness, unresponsive.18 The spotter alerted other crew members, who quickly arrived on the scene.19 The crew lowered 11 D.I. 483 (Compendium of Deposition Transcripts Volume IV, part 1 (“Pena Dep.”)) at 41–44, 86. 12 Id. at 86. 13 Id. 14 D.I. 482 (Compendium of Deposition Transcripts Volume III, part 2 (“Mendoza Figueroa Dep.”)) at 44-49. 15 Pena Dep. at 45. 16 Id. 17 Id. at 45–49 18 Id. at 50; Mendoza Figueroa Dep. at 53. 19 Pena Dep. at 55. 5 Mr. Mena Perez out of the Tree.20 EMS arrived and transported him to a local hospital,21 where he was later pronounced dead.22 An autopsy revealed that electrocution, through contact with Delmarva’s electrical lines, caused his death.23 Mr. Mena Perez had electrical burns on both hands, the upper part of both legs, and the lower part of his left leg.24 The electrical current path indicates that the current flowed through his heart, “causing ventricular fibrillation and ultimately cardiac arrest and death.”25 C. Summary of Plaintiffs’ experts’ relevant opinions Plaintiffs proffer expert reports and testimony from James Orosz, H. Landis Floyd, Joseph Loferski, and Mark Webber, among others. These experts’ opinions relate to the condition of the Tree, the utility lines, and poles.26 1. James Orosz James Orosz, an electrical engineer, states that “[i]t is known … that vegetation in contact with [electrical] lines can conduct fatal levels of electrical current.”27 He explains that it is not the electrical voltage but the electrical current 20 Id. at 56–57. 21 Id. at 56–58. 22 D.I. 419, Ex. A (“Arden Rep.”) at 2. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Various experts also offer opinion as to Verizon. Because it did not file a motion for summary judgment, the Court focuses on the opinions relating to Delmarva and Comcast. 27 D.I. 422, Ex. A (“Orosz Rep.”) at 5. 6 that causes a person to be electrically shocked.28 Mr. Orosz noted that Mr. Mena Perez had injuries to both hands and both legs, indicating that the electrical current flowed through his body and exited through his legs.29 Mr. Orosz opines that Mr. Mena Perez “made indirect contact” with Delmarva’s electrical line.30 Mr. Orosz further opines that a cause of that indirect contact was Delmarva’s failure to inspect and maintain its electrical lines. Orosz relies on various regulations in support. Based on his review of historical photographs of the area, including of the Tree and relevant electrical and communication lines, Mr. Orosz concludes that Delmarva failed to inspect and perform necessary vegetation management on the Tree for at least six years, which caused Mr. Mena Perez’s electrocution.31 Mr. Orosz opines that Comcast similarly failed to adequately maintain the vegetation around the communication lines, which caused Mr. Mena Perez’s electrocution. Finally, Mr. Orosz opines that the Sidewalk Pole had been in place since 1953 and it had not been properly or timely inspected in the decades prior to the incident.32 The top of the pole was cracked and “had rotting” at its base.33 The Sidewalk Pole had significant bend toward its top, and because of this defect, the Delmarva line 28 Id. at 7. 29 Id. at 5. 30 D.I. 422, Ex. D (“Orosz Dep.”) at 18. 31 Orosz Rep. at 11. 32 D.I. 422, Ex. B (“Orosz Disclosure”) at 60. 33 Id. 7 “attached to the pole was not stable, was more likely to move, sag, and sway[.]”34 The Sidewalk Pole was defective and in need of replacement prior to the incident on August 2, 2018. 2. H. Landis Floyd Mr. Floyd is an electrical engineer with over 45 years of experience in occupational electrical safety management.35 He opines that the utility poles were in a damaged and rotted condition.36 Mr. Floyd further opines that the condition of the Sidewalk Pole (including the detachment of the top part of the pole) and the attachment of Delmarva’s line to that pole, allowed for greater movement and sway of the line, creating an even greater likelihood that Delmarva’s line would come in to contact with the Tree.37 Mr. Floyd further opines on the extent of contact between the Tree and Delmarva’s line. He notes that the evidence shows that the plastic covering on Delmarva’s line had been damaged38 “due to arcing and abrasion[,] indicating [that Delmarva’s line] had [made] multiple contacts with the [T]ree.”39 Mr. Floyd opines this created “a hazardous, life-threatening condition [] that allowed electric current 34 Id. 35 Floyd Rep. at 1, 7. 36 The Sidewalk Pole was installed in 1953 and the Backyard Pole was installed in 1951. D.I. 423, Ex. C (“Floyd Rebuttal Disclosure”) at 6. 37 Floyd Disclosure at 50; Floyd Rebuttal Disclosure at 6. 38 Floyd Rep. at 12. 39 Id. Delmarva’s line “had been in contact with tree limbs[.]” Id. at 15. 8 to travel through the [T]ree to earth[,]” presenting a shock hazard to any person in contact with the Tree.40 As to Comcast, Mr. Floyd opines that “[h]ad … Comcast taken prior actions to prevent” the hazardous conditions as a result of the conditions of the utility poles and Tree—such as replacing the pole or removing the Tree—“the tree limbs would not have been in contact with [Delmarva’s electrical line] and the incident that resulted in [Mr.] Mena Perez’s death would not have occurred.”41 3. Joseph Loferski Joseph Loferski is an expert in wood science and wood engineering. Mr. Loferski opines that on August 2, 2018, the Sidewalk Pole was “old, severely weakened, fractured and decayed in the upper zone and rotted with missing wood at the highly stressed bottom of the pole.”42 Utility poles act as cantilever beams, with the stress on the pole focused on the bottom.43 Mr. Loferski opines that the Backyard Pole was “old, severely weakened, and decayed, and in need of replacement.”44 40 Id. at 13. 41 Id. at 17–18. 42 D.I. 420, Ex. A (“Loferski Disclosure”) at 30. 43 Id. at 31. 44 Id. at 32. 9 4. Mark Webber Mark Webber is a Master Arborist, a Certified Utility Arborist Specialist, and is tree risk assessment certified.45 Mr. Webber opines that Delmarva and Comcast failed to adequately manage vegetation surrounding their lines.46 That failure, he continues, exposed Mr. Mena Perez to an unnecessary electrical hazard.47 Mr. Webber inspected the Tree during a site visit48 and reviewed 21 aerial and street-view photographs of the Tree and the area surrounding it.49 The photographs span over a decade, from September 2005 through March 2019.50 Mr. Webber opines “that the [T]ree was not actively managed by the defendants Comcast, … [and] Delmarva … for 18-years prior to [Mr. Mena Perez’s] injuries and this is the cause of his injuries.”51 Mr. Webber additionally opines that his “inspection found the [T]ree in a highly deteriorated condition” and that it “contained severely decayed regions” amounting to an “imminent risk [of] failure onto [electrical lines], people, and property.”52 45 Webber Rep. at 7. 46 Id. at 54. 47 Id. at 3. 48 Id. at 40. 49 Id. at 11–30. 50 Id. 51 Id. at 58. 52 Id. at 40. 10 III. THE PARTIES CONTENTIONS Delmarva does not dispute its obligation to maintain vegetation around its electrical lines. It contends that because it hired Asplundh to perform tree trimming services and Mr. Mena Perez was injured and died from the very risk of performing that work, Plaintiffs cannot recover and thus, it is entitled to summary judgment on Count II. Delmarva also moves for summary judgment on Count VI, which asserts that Delmarva owed Mr. Mena Perez a non-delegable duty. Delmarva contends that this is so because Delmarva owed no duty to Mr. Mena Perez as he does not fall within the protections of Section 409 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Plaintiffs respond that, unlike the asbestos cases Delmarva relies on, Mr. Mena Perez did not create the hazard that injured him. Further, Delmarva knew this electrical line created a hazard by repeatedly coming into contact with the Tree and for years Delmarva failed to properly inspect the poles and the wires or warn Mr. Mena Perez of the dangers, thus, creating issues of fact, precluding summary judgment. Comcast contends that it owed no legal duty to Mr. Mena Perez and its equipment did not cause Mr. Mena Perez’s injuries. Therefore, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 11 Plaintiffs respond that the Delaware Code imposes a legal duty on Comcast, via its franchise, to comply with the NESC, which requires Comcast to engage in vegetation management. Because it did not do so, Plaintiffs contend they have raised factual disputes, making summary judgment impermissible. IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD A motion for summary judgment may only be granted when no genuine issue of material facts exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.53 The motion will be denied “if there is a material fact in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire into the facts to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances.”54 The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.55 If that burden is met, “the burden shifts to [the] non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact.”56 The court must view the facts and evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences thereof, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.57 53 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); see, e.g., Jiggy Puzzles, LLC v. Steelhead Acquisition EE, Inc., 2026 WL 465112, at *4 (Del. Super. Feb. 18, 2026). 54 Radulski v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2020 WL 8676027, at *3 (Del. Super. Oct. 28, 2020) (cleaned up). 55 Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979). 56 Id. at 681. 57 Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995). 12 V. ANALYSIS “In order to be held liable in negligence, a defendant must have been under a legal obligation—a duty—to protect the plaintiff from the risk of harm which caused his injuries.”58 Pressing different legal theories, both Delmarva and Comcast argue that they were under no such obligation to Mr. Mena Perez. And with no duty owed, Plaintiffs’ claims against them cannot survive, they contend. The Court addresses each in turn. A. Delmarva’s motion Delmarva’s motion relies, in large part, on the relationship between Delmarva, Asplundh, and Mr. Mena Perez. The record shows that Delmarva hired Asplundh to perform vegetation management on the Tree. There is no dispute that Asplundh was an independent contractor and it employed Mr. Mena Perez. In asserting that a duty exists, Plaintiffs first rely on Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts—referred to as the safe workplace doctrine. Delaware has adopted Section 343,59 which states: A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused by his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will discover or realize the 58 Fritz v. Yeager, 790 A.2d 469, 471 (Del. 2002) (citing Bryant v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 1995 WL 653987, *2 (Del. Super. 1995)). 59 DiOssi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361, 1366 (Del. 1988). 13 danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.60 Outside of a Section 343 analysis, Plaintiffs bring Count VI (non-delegable duty) against Delmarva and point to a number of statutes and regulations they say require Delmarva to maintain the safety of others and its equipment. Plaintiffs argue that Delmarva’s failure to comply with the statutes and regulations supports their theory of liability. Delmarva argues that the claim cannot survive even if the Court finds a duty based on Section 343. Under either of Plaintiffs’ theories, Delaware common law has limited the liability of landowners when employees of independent contractors are hired to work on the landowner’s property. Delmarva invokes those limitations here. 1. Delmarva owed a duty to keep its premises safe and to warn of defective conditions. Delmarva’s argument can be distilled down to one simple theory: Mr. Mena Perez’s injuries were the result of the very work he was hired to perform. In general, “an owner or general contractor does not have a duty to protect an independent contractor’s employees from the hazards of completing the contract.”61 But, Delaware has long recognized that employees of independent contractors, as business invitees, are owed a duty by landowners to have the premises on which they 60 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343. 61 In re Asbestos Litig. (Wenke), 2007 WL 1651964, at *6 (Del. Super. May 31, 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 14 work kept in a reasonably safe condition and to be warned of latent defects of which the landowner knows or has reason to know.62 It logically follows then, that “the possessor of land has no duty to warn an independent contractor of ordinary dangers incident to the type of work in which he is engaged and performing on the property.”63 “This limitation is based on the reality that ‘the contractor possesses superior knowledge of the dangers inherent in the work’ it was hired to perform.”64 Indeed, Delaware courts have routinely dismissed cases in which an independent contractor and landowner were equally knowledgeable of the defective conditions existing on the property because, the independent contractor was hired to rectify the condition65 or where, by the nature of their work, the independent contractor created the defective condition.66 But it is also true that “a possessor of land may still be liable for breaching its duty to independent contractors as business invitees, provided that the possessor and subcontractor are: (1) not equally knowledgeable of the hazardous condition …; and 62 Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apartments. Inc., 318 A.2d 619, 622 (Del. Super. 1974) (first citing Fahey v. Sayer, 106 A.2d 513 (Del. 1954), and then citing Vorous v. Cochran, 249 A.2d 746, 747 (Del. Super. 1969)). 63 Vorous, 249 A.2d at 747 (citing White v. United States, 97 F.Supp. 12, 14 (N.D. Cal. S.D. 1951)). 64 Ramsey v. Georgia S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 189 A.3d 1255, 1275 (Del. 2018) (quoting Wenke, 2007 WL 1651964, at *6). 65 Vorous, 249 A.2d at 747. 66 Wooleyhan II, 2006 WL 1214980, at *3 (Del. Apr. 12, 2006) (TABLE); Seeney, 318 A.2d at 619; see also O’Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 503 A.2d 661 (Del. Super. 1985). That reasoning is further supported by the general proposition that “if a danger is so apparent that the invitee can reasonably be expected to notice and protect against, the condition itself constitutes an adequate warning.” Niblett v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 158 A.2d 580, 582 (Del. Super. 1960). 15 (2) the subcontractor or its employees did not create the hazardous condition.”67 Provided that “the independent contractor employee is ‘injured as a result of the work (and negligence) of others including, arguably, the landowner[.]’”68 Delmarva’s argument relies on the jurisprudential developments of asbestos litigation in Delaware. To differentiate between types of plaintiffs, the Delaware Supreme Court in In re Asbestos Litigation (Wooleyhan II)69 separated them into two groups—later known as Group A and Group B plaintiffs. The distinction drawn between the two groups depended upon the nature of the work they performed on the landowner’s premises.70 Group A consisted of “employees of independent contractors who did not work directly with asbestos (such as painters or other tradesmen), but allege[d] they were exposed to asbestos on the defendants’ premises while working along side of other contractors who were working directly with asbestos ….”71 Group B plaintiffs were “employees of independent contractors who worked directly with asbestos while on the defendants’ premises, such as asbestos installers or asbestos insulators ….”72 The Wooleyhan II court declined to extend Section 343 liability to landowners in the Group B context. In the court’s words: 67 Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weiner, 2014 WL 4247724, at *5 (Del. Super. July 15, 2014). 68 Ramsey, 189 A.3d at 1275 (quoting Wenke, 2007 WL 1651964, at *10). 69 2006 WL 1214980 (Del. 2006) (TABLE). 70 Id. at *1. 71 Wenke, 2007 WL 1651964, at *1 (identifying Group A plaintiffs). 72 Id. (identifying Group B plaintiffs). 16 If the independent contractor, through its work, causes the condition that might otherwise give rise to landowner liability under § 343 of the Restatement, employees of that independent contractor have no basis to claim that the landowner is liable for injuries resulting from that condition. In short, to extend landowner liability under § 343 for conditions caused by the independent contractor whose employees seek recovery for their injuries from the landowner, finds no support in the law of Delaware or the policies underlying § 343. Accordingly, the employees of an independent contractor may not invoke § 343 of the Restatement to establish landowner liability for injuries caused by conditions created by their independent contractor-employer.73 As to Group A plaintiffs, the Wooleyhan II court recognized that Section 343 “offered a viable basis upon which a landowner could be held liable to the employee of an independent contractor for failing to provide a safe work place[.]”74 Taking the classifications of Group A and Group B plaintiffs together, to proceed under Section 343, the employee of an independent contractor must be injured by the negligence of “others,” but employees working for the same independent contractor are not “others” and thus cannot seek recovery against the landowner on that basis. As succinctly stated by then-Judge Slights “Wooleyhan II adopted Section 343 in the asbestos context….”75 Thus, Wooleyhan II and its Group A and Group B framework is an acknowledgment of what the Delaware common law already makes clear: a landowner is not liable for the injuries of an employee of an independent contractor resulting from a defective condition on the landowner’s property if the 73 Wooleyhan II, 2006 WL 1214980, at *3 (emphasis added). 74 In re Asbestos Litig. (Helm), 2007 WL 1651968, at * 17 (Del. Super. May 31, 2007). 75 Id. at *18. 17 independent contractor was knowledgeable of the defective condition or if the independent contractor (including through its employees) caused the defective condition. Wooleyhan II, and its progeny, provide helpful guidance here. a. Plaintiffs may pursue the claim that Delmarva negligently maintained its premises. Delmarva argues that Mr. Mena Perez is a Group B plaintiff, thus he cannot assert a claim under Section 343. As an initial matter, Delmarva contends that Mr. Mena Perez must be a Group B plaintiff because he was not injured by employees of another independent contractor like Group A plaintiffs in Wooleyhan II. But as subsequent decisions have made clear, the inquiry does not turn on whether the employees of independent contractors were injured by other independent contractors; the gating question is whether the employee-plaintiff was injured by a defective condition created by his employer. A later asbestos case, In re Asbestos Litigation (Rath), highlights that difference.76 In Rath, plaintiff was a career union carpenter. For nearly thirty years, he was repeatedly hired by the same independent contractor to erect and disassemble scaffolding in chemical and energy facilities throughout Delaware.77 That independent contractor also hired other employees with whom plaintiff worked. Among those other employees were those whose work necessarily involved 76 In re Asbestos Litig. (Rath), 2019 WL 1772493 (Del. Super. Apr. 18, 2019). 77 Id. at *1. 18 asbestos.78 Plaintiff brought suit against the chemical and energy facilities; defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that they did not owe a duty.79 The Rath court agreed with defendants, reasoning that the independent contractor that employed plaintiff also employed all other independent contractors that worked alongside him, including other tradesmen whose work involved asbestos.80 Thus, plaintiff’s claims “fail[ed] because he allege[ed] exposure as a result of his own employer’s work with asbestos[,]” not the negligence of others, such as the landowner.81 The Rath court then proceeded to analyze plaintiff’s allegations of defendants’ negligence in maintaining their facilities, outside the work performed by his employer. Plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to maintain pipe covering and insulation, exposing him to asbestos.82 The court found the argument without merit, not because defendants could not be held liable for their own negligence, but because plaintiff failed to produce facts that he was exposed to asbestos through the pipe covering and insulation.83 Outside of the asbestos context, but still within the confines of Section 343, Delaware caselaw makes clear what Rath suggests—a landowner negligently 78 Id. 79 Id. 80 Id. at *10. 81 Id. (emphasis added). 82 Id. 83 Id. at *10–11. 19 maintaining its property or failing to warn of defective conditions is a viable path to Section 343 liability for employees of independent contractors.84 That is, merely because Mr. Mena Perez was not injured by the work of a different independent contractor does not defeat Plaintiffs’ claim as Plaintiffs assert that Delmarva itself was negligent. To support that allegation, Plaintiffs point to Delmarva’s knowledge that the Tree had previously contacted its electrical lines causing sparks and arcing, its failure to conduct vegetation management of the Tree, its failure to inspect the poles holding its lines, and a failure to inspect the lines themselves. Doing so, according to Plaintiffs, would have revealed the defective conditions that later caused Mr. Mena Perez’s injuries. Evidence of those defective conditions, unlike in Rath, is supported by photographs, testimony, and expert opinions.85 b. Mr. Mena Perez’s injuries did not solely result from the dangers inherent in his work. Delmarva’s primary contention is that Mr. Mena Perez’s injuries were a result of the work he was hired to perform. As discussed, the duties owed to independent contractors, as business invitees, “are not imposed upon the possessor of land where the contractor and the possessor are equally knowledgeable of the defective 84 See Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4247724, at *5; see also Morris v. Hitchens, 1993 WL 138690, at *2–3 (Del. Super. Mar. 18, 1993). 85 Delmarva also points to Urena v. Capano Homes, Inc., 901 A.2d 145 (Del. Super. 2006). That case has no application here because it did not involve allegations of the landowner negligently maintaining its premises or failing to warn its business invitees of defective conditions. 20 conditions existing on the property[.]”86 And, as a result of their superior knowledge of the dangers inherent in their work, independent contractor employees have no cause of action under Section 343 if they are injured by the very hazards of the work they were contracted to perform.87 Delmarva argues that it hired Asplundh because of its expertise in trimming trees surrounding power lines. Asplundh, through this expertise, understands then that there is an inherent danger in its work given its proximity to electrical lines— electrocution. Plaintiffs do not contest Delmarva’s characterization of Asplundh as an expert in vegetation management around electrical lines, instead they argue that Asplundh’s expertise does not absolve Delmarva of its duty to warn of other latent defects about which Delmarva knew or should have known. Put another way, Plaintiffs point to other defects beyond just the overgrowth of the Tree (the defect Asplundh was hired to rectify) that they argue constituted hazardous defective conditions. This differs from what the Wooleyhan II court confronted. There, Group B plaintiffs could not pursue recovery because they worked “directly with asbestos”—asbestos exposure was the nature of their job. Vorous v. Cochran provides further guidance. In Vorous, landowners hired a tree surgeon to “trim and top” two trees that were decayed and damaged. While 86 Seeney, 318 A.2d at 623. 87 Ramsey, 189 A.3d at 1275; Vorous, 249 A.2d at 747. 21 climbing one of the trees, the tree surgeon put a support rope around one of its dead limbs, the limb snapped causing the tree surgeon to fall and sustain injuries. The tree surgeon brought a claim against the landowners, asserting they breached their duty to keep him safe from defective conditions on their property. The court disagreed. Reasoning that “the independent contractor’s agreement to remove or repair the defective condition precludes his recovery from the possessor for injuries sustained as a result of the defective condition on the theory that he assumed the risk by virtue of his employment contract.”88 And because the landowners “hired the [tree surgeon] for the express purpose of removing the decayed or dead appendages of two trees on their property, which constituted a dangerous condition … [t]he [tree surgeon] was thus adequately warned of the defective condition.”89 The principle underlying both Vorous and Group B plaintiff’s claims in Wooleyhan II is that the independent contractor who undertakes to work with a defective condition on a landowner’s property, who is injured by that same defective condition, cannot hold a landowner liable for that injury. That makes sense given an independent contractor’s expertise, which a landowner can expect the independent contractor to utilize to safely encounter or maneuver around the defective condition. But that logic does not apply where an independent contractor, 88 Vorous, 249 A.2d at 747. 89 Id. 22 who undertook to remedy a defective condition, is injured by other defective conditions of which the landowner failed to notify the independent contractor. A landowner cannot escape liability based on a theory of independent contractor omniscience. And one who is not knowledgeable about a defective condition cannot be expected to utilize his expertise to safely encounter it. Here, Asplundh was hired to trim overgrowth of the Tree near electrical lines. Asplundh was undoubtedly aware of that defective condition and the risks it posed. But nothing in the record suggests that Asplundh/Mr. Mena Perez was aware of the numerous other conditions Plaintiffs argue were a cause of Mr. Mena Perez’s injuries. While Delmarva stresses that electrical shock is a danger inherent in the work of vegetation management near electrical lines, Delmarva’s argument ignores the rationale behind the limitation on liability: “that ‘the contractor possesses superior knowledge of the dangers inherent in the work’ it was hired to perform.”90 Asplundh workers, including Mr. Mena Perez, knew that it was going to confront and rectify tree overgrowth around electrical lines. That is the work they were hired to perform. That work, however, does not necessarily mean confrontation with defective electrical lines or defective utility poles creating hazardous conditions in the same manner that asbestos exposure is inherent in the work of an asbestos insulator or removing dead tree limbs is inherent in the work of a tree surgeon. 90 Ramsey, 189 A.3d at 1275 (quoting Wenke, 2007 WL 1651964, at *6) (emphasis added). 23 If Delmarva informed Asplundh of these defects before Mr. Mena Perez began his work, Delmarva’s argument that it is entitled to rely on Asplundh’s expertise may have merit and that might require the result Delmarva seeks. But Delmarva did not inform Asplundh of those defects and the evidence in the record supports a finding that those defects caused Mr. Mena Perez’s injuries.91 2. Plaintiffs’ reliance upon statutes and regulations does not support a non-delegable duty claim. Turning next to Delmarva’s attack on Count VI, which relies on a number of statutes and regulations to assert that Delmarva’s failure to comply with them supports liability. Plaintiffs argue that these statutes and regulations form the basis of a non-delegable duty. The Court, as explained above, has already found a duty at law exists as to Delmarva. And as Delmarva recognizes, “the litany of statutes, 91 In its reply brief Delmarva raises for the first time the argument that even if Mr. Mena Perez is a Group A plaintiff, Plaintiffs’ claim independently fails under a test adopted in Helm—a Delaware asbestos litigation case, relying on a California asbestos litigation case, Kinsman v. Unocal Corporation, 123 P.3d 931 (Cal. 2005). That test triggers six distinct inquiries, Delmarva points to three: “Did the independent contractor, or should it have known, that the particular materials on the