Rosario v. Camacho

LUCIA C. DEL ROSARIO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees v. JUAN B. CAMACHO, Defendant-Appellant RITA B. CAMACHO Plaintiff-Appellant v. JUAN B. CAMACHO, et al., Defendants-Appellees JUDGMENT Appeal Nos. 99-003 & 99-013 (Consolidated) Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the opinion of this Court has been issued and judgment is hereby entered. The trial court's December 24, 1 999 Order after trial of these consolidated actions is AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with further instruction consistent with this Court's opinion. Entered this 1 4th, day of March, 2001. CRISPIN M. KAIPAT  Rfl . car . arr C-1'. 'iii,ii . ,. J . u: .....""'t.!'fJf f �-' £ 10 Pl 1i/ ;·1: t, � .. o' 3� 4t> yz,_ IY•--..��..._ __ FOR PUBLICATION IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS LUCIA C. DEL ROSARIO, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. JUAN B. CAMACHO, Defendant-Appellant RITA B. CAMACHO, Plaintiff-Appellant v. JUAN B. CAMACHO, et al, Defendants-Appellees OPINION Cite as: Rosario v. Camacho, 2001 MP 3 Appeal Nos. 99-003 & 99-0 1 3 (Consolidated) Argued and submitted September 1 5, 2000 For Rita B. Camacho: For Lucia C. Del Rosario. et al.: For JuanB. Camacho: Reynaldo 0. Yana G. Anthony Long Jay H. Sorensen P.O. Box 500052 2nd Floor Lim's Building 4th Floor, Suite A Saipan, MP 96950 PMB 1797, P.O. Box 1 0001 Horiguchi Bldg., Garapan Saipan, MP 96950 P.O. Box 11 84 Antonio M. Atalig Saipan, MP 96950 Caller Box AAA 122 Saipan, MP 96950 Saipan, MP 96950  BEFORE: JOHN A. MANGLONA, Associate Justice, DAVID A. WISEMAN, Special Judge, 1 and VICENTE T. SALAS, Special Judge2 MANGLONA, Associate Justice: INTRODUCTION ifl This is a consolidated appeal and cross-appeal involving a dispute among the twelve children and heirs ofGregorio C. Camacho, in which the parties essentially dispute their respective ownership interests in the decedent's property. Although a probate decree has divided Gregorio's property equally among the siblings, Juan B. Camacho claims to have acquired the interests of five siblings in property located in Garapan. Rita B. Camacho claims to have acquired this same property by virtue of a partida or, alternatively, by quitclaim deeds from four siblings. if2 Several siblings sued Juan for an accounting of the rent proceeds from Juan's use of the Garapan property. They subsequently sued Juan for breach of the settlement agreement disposing of the accounting lawsuit. Rita then sued several of the siblings, including Juan, to establish her ownership interest in the Garapan property, and for an accounting ofrent from Juan's leasing of the property. 3 if3 Juan now appeals the trial court's December 24, 1 999 Order after trial which declared void a deed of gift to him from his siblings, found him liable to his siblings under various tort theories and for breach of a prior settlement agreement, and awarded an accounting and punitive damages to his siblings. Rita appeals the trial court's April 1 2, 1 998 Order denying summary judgment as to her claim that she owned property by virtue of a partida or alternatively by quitclaim deeds; she also appeals the December 24, 1999 Order declaring void her quitclaim deeds. 1 Honorable David A. Wiseman, sitting by designation. 2 Honorable Vicente T. Salas, sitting by designation. On J anuary 26, 200 1 , after oral argument but before this opinion issued, Special Judge Salas' term expired. 3 Juan filed a counterclaim and cross-claim seeking to partition the property. The parties later stipulated that the property would not be partitioned. if4 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, as amended,4 1 CMC § 3102 and 8 CMC § 2206. Whether Rita satisfied the appellate procedural requirements so as to conferjurisdiction on this Court will be discussed below. if5 We AFFmM in part and REVERSE in part, and REMAND with instructions. Specifically, we find that the deed ofgift to Juan is valid, that Rita's quitclaim deeds have no effect on the siblings' ownership interests, and that Juan is only liable to his co-owner siblings for an accounting of the commercial rents he received from renting the Garapan property. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND if6 Gregorio C. Camacho died in approximately 1 960. His children and heirs are: Lucia C. Del Rosario, Luise C. Villagomez, Maria C. Santos, Isabel C. Villagomez, Cecilia C. Cruz, Angelina C. Muna, Rosa C. Manglona, Augustine B. Camacho, Dionicio B. Camacho, Martin B. Camacho, Juan B. Camacho, and Rita B. Camacho. Due to the number of parties and name changes over the years through marriage, all parties will be identified by their first names only. if7 The properties in question are Lot Nos. 002 D 21, 002 D 22, 002 D 23 and 002 D 24, located in Garapan. For convenience, the lots will be identified as Lots 2 1 , 22, 23, and 24, respectively, or collectively as "the Garapan property." Another lot, Lot 264, is located in Talofofo and will be referred to as "the Talofofo property." if8 Lucia, Luise, Maria, Isabel, Cecilia, Angelina, Rosa, and Augustine are the plaintiffs in Action 92-0550 on appeal herein, and will be referred to collectively as "Plaintiff-Siblings." a. History of Conveyances if9 Before his death sometime in the 1960s, Gregorio may have conveyed all of his property to his sister, Rufina C. Reyes, with the intent that Rufina convey the property to Gregorio's second youngest child Rita. There is testimony in the record that Gregorio's land may have originally 4 N.M.I. Const. art. IV, § 3 was amended by the passage of Legislative Initiative 10-3, ratified by the voters on November 1 , 1 997 and certified by the Board of Elections on December 13, 1997.  belonged to Rita's grandmother, and that Gregorio hand-wrote a note conveying the land to his sister. Although Rita claims she was not permitted to participate in the probate proceedings to litigate this issue, the record indicates otherwise. Based on the evidence, the trial court concluded no partida had occurred. iJ lO In 1 969, Gregorio's son Juan entered upon the Garapan property, and had moved onto it by 1973 . In 1 979, Juan leased a portion of the property for commercial use. ifl l In 1 983, Juan recorded a "Deed of Gift" signed by his siblings Isabel, Luise, Cecilia, Rosa, and Martin for Lots 23 and 24 ofthe Garapan property. Maria, Lucia, Augustine, Rita, Angelina and Dionicio did not sign the deed. Ramon G. Villagomez, who notarized each sibling's signature, testified he discussed the significance ofthe deed in Chamorro with each sibling, including those who did not sign. The deed itself recites as consideration "the love and affection, which we have and bear unto our brother, Juan B. Camacho, and for his maintenance, support, protection and livelihood." There was testimony at trial that Juan intended to give his siblings his share ofthe Talofofo property ifthey would give him their share ofthe Garapan property, because the exchange was more practical than physically dividing the property. This is not a stated term of the deed, and there is no record that Juan has ever conveyed his interest in the Talofofo property to any of his siblings. ifl2 I n 1 984, the siblings engaged in litigation over Juan's use of the Garapan property. We discuss the details of this litigation below. if1 3 I n September 1986, a "Deed of Gift" was recorded in which Rufina conveyed Lots 21 through 24, among other properties, to Rita. Rosa signed the deed as a witness. ifl 4 I n October 1 986 a hearing was held and in November ofthat year, the Superior Court issued a Decree of Distribution ("probate decree") which, among other things, ordered that the Garapan property be distributed equally among all twelve siblings as tenants in common, "subject to any pre­ recorded conveyances." In re Estate of Camacho, Civ. No. 79-0 1 3 0 (Super. Ct. Nov. 3 , 1 986) (Decree ofDistribution at 3). The Talofofo property was also distributed equally among the siblings as tenants in common. Id. iJ l 5 The trial transcript is unclear as to whether Juan or Rita introduced their respective deeds into evidence during the probate proceedings. The Decree does not mention Juan's or Rita's deeds.  i-J l 6 In 1987, Martin, Rosa, Cecilia and Maria signed quitclaim deeds conveying their interest in Lots 21 through 24, as well as Lot No. 001 D 26, to Rita. Rita testified that these siblings believed the property was intended for Rita. The consideration recited in each deed is: "the sum of TEN DOLLARS ($1 0.00) and [sic] along with other considerations [sic] to them in hand paid by [Rita] ." Each sibling conveyed their respective interest in the property to Rita as tenants in common. i-J l 7 Juan has lived on the Garapan property since 1 973, during which time he has spent approximately $75,000 on improvements to the property and rented it out. No other sibling has expressed a desire to occupy or build on the property. i-J l 8 In 1988 and 1 992, the siblings engaged in further litigation over the Garapan property. We discuss the various lawsuits next. b. Lawsuits Among the Siblings i. Civil Action No. 84-0103 ("Muna action") i1 1 9 I n 1984, Angelina, as the administratrix of Gregorio's estate, sued Juan to recover a share in the rent he received from renting the Garapan property. In December 1 984 the court issued its memorandum opinion, finding in favor of Juan. i-J20 The court found Juan entered upon the Garapan property in 1969, built a residence and made various improvements to the property, including constructing a commercial shop building in 1 978 which Juan leased the next year. None of the siblings objected to Juan's use of the property, nor did they demand a share ofthe rental payments. Only by the Muna action, filed five years after initiation of the probate proceedings distributing their father' s estate, did the siblings make any formal claim against Juan. The opinion summarily states "A few years ago five of the siblings ofJuan transferred their interests in the property to [Juan]." Muna v. Camacho, 2 CR 1 0, 12 {Trial Ct. 1984 ). The court concluded that an administratrix could not sue Juan on behalf of Gregorio's heirs, and that each sibling had to sue Juan in his or her individual capacity. Id. at 1 3 . i-J2 l Despite this dismissal for lack of standing, the court then proceeded to address the merits of the complaint by discussing the law of cotenancy and its applicability to Juan's deed. The court  concluded none of the siblings were entitled to rent from Juan for either his residential or commercial use of the property. Id. at 1 4- 1 5 . ii. Civil Action No. 88-0868 ("Action 88-0868") iJ22 In November 1 988, Plaintiff-Siblings sued Juan, Rita, Martin, and Dionicio. By their complaint, Plaintiff-Siblings sought to partition Lots 2 1 through 24 by sale as opposed to physical division. In their complaint, Isabel, Luise, Cecilia, and Rosa admitted they conveyed their interest in Lots 23 and 24 to Juan. They did not claim they were defrauded into signing the deed of gift to Juan. iJ23 After trial of, but before a verdict in Action 88-0868, the parties reached a settlement and asked that the court withhold from rendering a decision. Under the settlement, Juan agreed to sell Lots 21 through 24 and divide the proceeds among the siblings. However, Juan refused to sign the settlement agreement and Plaintiff-Siblings moved to enforce the settlement. In February 1 990 the court issued an Order dismissing the case without prejudice pursuant to the settlement agreement, and requesting that the parties comply with the other terms of the settlement, subject to judicial intervention if necessary. Rosario v. Camacho, Civ. No. 88-0868 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1 990) (Order). s In their briefs, the parties apparently agree that the settlement agreement is as follows: The parties have agreed to authorize the sale or lease for 55 years [sic] the four subject Lots at a pnce of $680.00 per square meter. The parties further agreed that no sale or lease shall be made unless 60 days have expired and no higher offer is made by any prospective purchaser or lessee. Stipulation for Dismissal and Order, Excerpts of Record, App. No. 99-0 1 3 , at 63 . 5 In its Order, the court did not explain why it did not simply order all parties to comply with the settlement agreement. Instead, the court stated in a footnote: The settlement reached herein is somewhat unique in that it calls for the court to dismiss the case and therefore the parties will, hopefully, comply with the other terms of the agreement outside the confines of judicial supervision. This is what the parties agreed to and these terms shall be observed. Should any party fail to live up to the terms of the compromise, recourse to the courts is still available. Rosario v. Camacho, Civ. No. 88-0868 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 1990) (Order at 2). Thus, instead of immediate judicial intervention, the court simply dismissed the case with a warning that it would intervene in the future if the parties did not comply with the settlement agreement.  iii. Civil Action No. 92-0550 ("Action 92-0550")6 iJ24 In May 1 992, Plaintiff-Siblings again filed suit against Juan, alleging that in Action 88-0868, Juan refused to execute the settlement agreement or honor its terms. Specifically, Plaintiff-Siblings claimed Juan had leased Lot 24 but refused to share the lease proceeds with his siblings. Plaintiff­ Siblings sought enforcement of the settlement agreement and damages. In his answer to the complaint, Juan claimed he was unable to find a buyer for Lots 2 1 through 24. iJ25 In January 1 993, the court issued an order denying Plaintiff-Siblings ' motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that since Action 88-0868 was not decided on the merits, it had no issue preclusive effect. The court also found that Plaintiff-Siblings' fifth cause of action for an accounting was precluded by the Muna action, in which Plaintiff-Siblings were adjudged not to be entitled to such accounting. Rosario v. Camacho, Civ. No. 92-03 50 (N.M. I. Super. Ct. Jan. 1 1, 1 993) (Order). iJ26 This action was consolidated with the following action for purposes of trial. iv. Civil Action No. 93-0129 ("Action 93-0129") iJ27 InJanuary 1 993, Rita sued Plaintiff-Siblings, Juan, Dionicio, and Martin. She claimed to own Lots 2 1 through 24 and Lot 26, either by partida or by quitclaim deed from at least some of her siblings. Based on this ownership, she sought rent from Juan for leasing Lot 24 without her consent. Additionally, Rita claimed Angelina sold Lot 26 under court order, but never gave Rita the sale proceeds. In his answer, Juan admitted he occupied part of Lot 24, and that he rented a portion of the improvements thereto but did not share this rent with Rita. iJ28 In March 1 993, Juan moved for summary judgment. In his moving papers, he claimed the probate action was res judicata as to the issue of Rita's ownership interest in the lots. Juan also claimed he only used, improved, and rented his proportional share ofthe property, therefore he owed no rent to any of his siblings. Finally, Juan claimed the Muna action was res judicata as to the issue of whether any siblings were entitled to an accounting. In her opposition, Rita countered that she owned the property through a partida performed before the probate action, and true ownership ofthe 6 Several documents in the record are from Action "92-0350". This appears to be a typographical error.  property could only be contested in a quiet title action, not in a probate action. The court granted Juan's summary judgment as to Rita's first cause of action regarding ownership ofthe lots, but denied summary judgment as to the cause of action for an accounting from Juan. The court order provides no detailed reasoning for its ruling. if 29 It is undisputed that Juan built and leased three buildings on the lots in question, and that he did not share any rent with his siblings. if30 In response to Rita' s lawsuit, Juan filed a counterclaim against her and a cross-claim against his remaining siblings, seeking to partition the property. In their answer, Plaintiff-Siblings and Rita claimed the deed was void for failure of consideration and fraud. if3 1 In November 1 996, the parties stipulated and the court ordered that the property in issue would not be partitioned. if32 In December of that year, the court issued its post-trial Order in Actions 92-0550 and 93- 0 1 29. The court first denied Juan's claim for partition based on the November stipulation. The court then denied Rita' s claim of title to all property in question, and ruled that all deeds held by Rita and Juan were void or otherwise unenforceable. Accordingly, the court found each sibling possessed a one-twelfth (I/ 1 2th) interest in the property. The order does not explain or cite facts to support this conclusion. Plaintiff-Siblings were entitled to recover from Juan on their claims of breach of settlement agreement, intentional misrepresentation, conversion, and intentional interference with expectation of economic advantage and opportunity. Plaintiff-Siblings were also entitled to an accounting from Juan of all rental income received from the property at issue. The court denied Plaintiff-Siblings' claim for specific performance of the settlement agreement. Since all siblings owned a I/12th interest in the property, they were all entitled to I/1 2th of the commercial rent received by Juan, less the amount of non-rental income Juan expended in improving the property. Finally, the court awarded Plaintiff-Siblings $27,000 in punitive damages from Juan for intentional misrepresentation, conversion, and intentional interference with Plaintiff-Siblings' expectation and economic opportunity. Rosario v. Camacho, Civ. No. 92-0550 and 93-0 1 29 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 1 998) (Order).  i-J33 On January 20, 1 999, Juan timely appealed the post-trial Order. Rita filed her own notice on February 3, 1 999. Rita appeals not only the post-trial Order, but also the summary judgment Order finding no partida. i-J3 4 Whether Rita timely appealed will be discussed below. ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW i-J3 5 The issues before this Court are: i-J36 I. Whether Rita's appeal must be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Office ofthe A tt '.Y Gen. v. Rivera, 3 N.M.I. 436, 441 (1 993). i-J3 7 II. Whether the decree of distribution is res judicata as to the issue of property ownership. Res judicata is a legal question which we review de novo. Santos v. Santos, 3 N.M. I. 39, 46-47 (1 992). This issue was decided on summary judgment; a trial court's ruling on such a motion is likewise reviewed de novo. Manglona v. Kaipat, 3 N.M.I. 322, 329 (1 992). i-J3 8 III. Whether Juan holds a valid and enforceable deed of gift to the Garapan property. Deed interpretation is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Pangelinan v. Itaman, App. No. 95-0 1 3 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 1 0, 1 996) (Opinion at 2). i-J39 IV. Whether Plaintiff-Siblings are entitled to rent from Juan. This is a legal question which we review de novo. Santos, 3 N.M.I. at 46-47. i-J40 V. Whether Juan breached the settlement agreement in action 88-0868. Mixed questions of law and fact are generally reviewed de novo, although the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Santos v. Santos, App. No. 98-029 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 1 0, 2000) (Opinion at 2). i-J4 l VI. Whether Juan' s conduct was tortious and, consequently, whether Plaintiff­ Siblings are entitled to punitive damages. This also appears to be a mixed question subject to de novo review, except for the trial court's findings of fact, which are reviewed for clear error. Id. We review a trial court's grant of punitive damages for abuse of discretion. Pangelinan v. Itaman, 4 N.M.I. 1 1 4, 1 1 7 (1 994). i-J42 VII. Whether Rita presented any meritorious ownership claims to the property. As to Rita's claim of ownership by virtue of a partida, a trial court's application and interpretation of the customary law of partida is reviewed de novo. In re Estate oj Seman, 4 N.M.I. 129, 130 (1994). The trial court's findings of fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard, and this Court will not reverse such findings unless it is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. Santos v. Santos, App. No. 98-029 at 2. This issue was also decided on summary judgment, and the trial court' s ruling on such a motion is likewise reviewed de novo. Manglona v. Kaipat, 3 N.M.I. at 329. The  validity of the quitclaim deeds is a question of law reviewed de novo. Pangelinan v. Itaman, App. No. 95-0 1 3 at 2. 7 ANALYSIS I. Rita's Appeal Is Not Fatally Defective i\43 Plaintiff-Siblings raise the issue that Rita did not timely appeal the order as it applied to Siblings, and that this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the appeal with respect to Siblings. i\44 An appellant must file a notice of appeal in the Superior Court within 3 0 days of entry of the appealable judgment or order. Com. R. App. P. 4(a)(I ). If a party timely files such notice, any other party has 1 4 days after the first notice was filed to file its own notice of appeal, if the extra time extends the 30-day limit. Com. R. App. P. 4(a)(3). The court in Lucky Dev. Co., Ltd v. Tokai U.S.A., Inc., 2 N.M.I. 450 ( 1 992), explained the reason for the 1 4-day rule: The 1 4 day requirement in Rule 4(a)(3) makes sense only ifit is interpreted as giving a party a minimum of 1 4 days in w hich to file an appeal if another party has already filed an appeal and the first appeal was filed during the last 1 4 days of the original 3 0 day period. There are times when a party decides t o file a notice of appeal at the last minute of the 30 day period. If such occurs, the other parties should have the opportunity to file an appeal. We interpret Rule 4(a)(I) & (3 ) as stating that every party has a minimum of30 days to file an appeal. Once a party has filed a timely notice of appeal, all other parties have either the balance of30 days, or 1 4 days, whichever is greater. Id. at 456. The court further commented "Our rules of procedure 'should never be used as a game of skill' . . . . We should avoid interpretations of our rules 'which would defy common sense [or] lead to absurd results. "' Id. at 456-57 (noting appellant's interpretation of rule could result in one party strategically cutting off another party's right of appeal). i\45 Here, the Order from which Rita appeals was issued on December 24, 1 998. Juan first filed a timely notice of appeal on January 2 1 , 1 999. Rita filed her notice of appeal on February 3, 1 999, less than 14 days after Juan filed his notice but more than 30 days after the Order was entered. i\46 Plaintiff-Siblings contend that Rule 4(a)(3) does not apply to Rita' s appeal as to them, because the notice of appeal constituted a cross-appeal with respect to the only pending appeal, filed by Juan. Plaintiff-Siblings cite no case law to support their position. Plaintiff-Siblings' reasoning implies that, 7 Standards of review for any sub-issues will be set forth within the discussion of each sub-issue.  after the first notice of appeal is filed, any subsequent notice of appeal only constitutes a cross-appeal. The language of Rule 4(a)(3 ) does not specifically limit subsequent appeals in this manner. 8 ir47 Moreover, Rita's appeal is meaningless unless taken against all parties, because a successful appeal would necessarily affect the rights of all parties to the property at issue herein. Juan' s notice of appeal may have affected or even prompted Rita's decision to appeal. According to Lucky Development, Rita was entitled to wait until the last minute to make her decision to appeal any part of the Order as it applied to any of the parties. Under Rule 4(a)(3), that last minute was extended past the 3 0-day period so Rita could consider the effect ofJuan's appeal in making her own decision to appeal. To deprive her of these extra 1 4 days would be to defy common sense and lead to an absurd result. II. The Decree of Distribution Is Not Res Judicata as to the Issue of Property Ownership A. Effect of Probate Proceeding on Land Ownership ir4s We must next determine whether the doctrine of res judicata bars either Juan's or Rita' s ownership claims based on their respective deeds. Rita appeals the summary judgment Order and post-trial Order because she claims Gregorio conveyed his interest in the Garapan property while he was alive. If the property was not part of Gregorio's estate, then the probate court had no jurisdiction over it. Consequently, Rita was not barred from suing Juan for ownership of the property, notwithstanding the probate decree. Plaintiff-Siblings respond that since Rita did not appeal the final distribution of Gregorio's estate, the decree of distribution is now res judicata, because the doctrine applies to probate proceedings. ir49 The general rule is: [W]hen a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound "not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for 8 Indeed, Com. R. App. P. 3(c) expressly provides that an appeal need not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal. In compliance with Rule 3(c), Rita attached a copy of the Order she was appealing to her notice of appeal. The Order specified all parties in its caption, and adjudicated the rights of all parties with respect to each other. Thus, Rita's intent that her appeal apply to all parties affected by the Order was clear, and her notice was adequate.  that purpose." The judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent fraud or some other factor invalidating the judgment. Santos v. Santos, 3 N.M. I. at 48 (1 992) (internal citation omitted). iJ50 A recent Commonwealth case has already held that a probate court's decree of distribution does not necessarily adjudicate a third party' s interest in a decedent's property. In Piteg v. Piteg, App. No. 98-002 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1 8, 2000) (Opinion), three siblings signed a deed relinquishing their interest in their mother' s property to their brother Antonio. Antonio remained silent as to this deed, despite the fact several family members subsequently leased the property, received rent payments, and later amended the lease. Antonio then petitioned for final distribution of his mother's estate, including this property. At no time did he mention the deed his siblings had signed. Eight years later, Antonio filed suit to quiet title based on the deed. The trial court found Antonio' s suit barred by res judicata. The court further found Antonio had waived his right to enforce the deed, and was estopped from doing so by his silence during the probate proceeding and in leasing the property with other family members, who relied on this conduct in believing Antonio would never enforce the deed. Id. at 2-3 . iJ5 l On appeal, this Court clarified that a probate court identifies heirs and distributes what interest the decedent had in the property, but does not determine ownership in cases where title is contested. Id. at 4. While a decree of distribution is conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees, or devisees insofar as they claim in such capacities, the decree does not determine the validity of the deceased' s interest in the property; it merely determines the succession or testamentary disposition of such title as the decedent may have had. Id. Because Antonio based his claim of title on a contract with his siblings and not with the estate, this Court determined the probate court could not have addressed the ownership issue during the probate proceedings. Id. Accordingly, the issue was not addressed and decided so as to be res judicata. Id. iJ52 Plaintiff-Siblings rely on Santos v. Santos, 3 N.M.I. 3 9 (1 992) to support their contention that res judicata applies to probate proceedings. Santos is distinguishable because in that case, there was no third party claim of ownership. In Santos, plaintiff essentially made a belated collateral attack on a probate court's determination ofwhat property to include in decedent' s estate. Because the probate  court would have necessarily determined the decedent's own property interests so as to properly distribute the estate, plaintiff's silence during the probate proceeding, despite knowledge of facts relevant to this inquiry, barred his subsequent lawsuit. if 53 Here, Piteg compels our conclusion that the probate decree cannot be res judicata as to Juan's or Rita' s ownership interests in the Garapan property based on their respective deeds. Piteg involved a probate proceeding in which the court determined heirs but not ownership. Here, the probate decree for Gregorio' s estate recognizes its limitations by specifying that it is "subject to any pre­ recorded conveyances. In Piteg, appellant did not expressly disclaim an interest in the property; he merely remained silent and had no duty to speak. Similarly, here, both Rita and Juan were silent during the probate proceedings, and neither expressly disclaimed any interest in the Garapan property. According to Piteg, this silence does not preclude Rita from raising the partida issue now. B. Laches or Waiver if54 Juan contends Rita's failure to make a claim to the property during the probate proceeding precludes her from making such a claim now, according to the doctrine oflaches. Rita claims she was not allowed to participate in the probate proceeding to raise this issue, despite evidence to the contrary. if55 We find neither doctrine applies here. The elements oflaches are ( 1 ) plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from when she knew or reasonably should have known of her claim against the defendant, and (2) the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of the defendant. Rios v. Marianas Pub. Land Corp. , 3 N.M. I. 5 12, 524 ( 1 993). Laches presents a mixed question of law and fact, and is therefore reviewed de nova. In re Estate of Deleon Guerrero, 3 N.M.I. 253, 264 n. 1 1 ( 1 992). if56 Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right, with knowledge ofits existence and intent to relinquish it. Mere silence does not constitute a waiver unless there is an obligation to speak. Piteg, App. No. 98-002 at 5. Waiver or estoppel is generally a question offact, and becomes a question oflaw only when the undisputed facts could reasonably compel only one inference. Platt Pac., Inc. v. Andelson, 862 P.2d 1 58, 1 66 (Cal. 1 993).  i-J 57 InPiteg, under facts similar to those in this case, the court found no waiver. Piteg, App. No. 98-002 at 5-6. Moreover, even though it expressed concern that Antonio did not introduce the deed during the probate proceedings, it held Antonio's conduct did not rise to the level of fraud. Id. i-J 5 8 Here, neither Juan nor Rita served as administrator fo r the estate so as to give rise to any fiduciary duty, nor did they have any greater duty to their siblings to produce any deed which the siblings themselves signed. Because Piteg does not require Juan or Rita to come forward with their claims, we find the doctrine oflaches similarly inapplicable. i-J5 9 Because we hold that the decree of distribution is not res judicata as to any claims of ownership made by the siblings in their own right, we must next review the trial court's rulings regarding Juan's and Rita's claims to the property. ill. The Deed of Gift to Juan Is Valid and Enforceable A. Issue Properly Before the Court i-J 60 The parties agree that at one time, the issue of the validity ofJuan' s deed of gift was properly before the court. Juan presents his argument, that this issue was withdrawn before trial, without citing any legal authority. Plaintiff-Siblings do not respond. We need not address an issue in the absence of cited authority regarding an argument raised on appeal. Roberto v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 N.M.I. 295, 297-98 ( 1 995) . B. Deed Validity 1. The Muna Decision i-J 6 1 Juan first argues the Superior Court's judgment i n the Muna action, which granted judgment in his favor, precludes re-litigation ofthis issue. In Muna, Plaintiff-Siblings unsuccessfully sought the same reliefthey now seek, a share in the proceeds Juan received from renting the property, based on their respective ownership interests. Plaintiff-Siblings respond that the Muna action was decided on the grounds that Angelina could not sue on behalf of her siblings, and that each sibling had to sue in his or her individual capacity. As any discussion of ownership interest was unnecessary to the outcome of that action, Plaintiff-Siblings contend such discussion is merely dicta. if62 Res judicata consists of two preclusion concepts. Issue preclusion, also called collateral estoppel, refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has been already litigated and decided. Claim preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation of a ma