Full Opinion

RENDERED: OCTOBER 2, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0344-MR CHRIS NELSON APPELLANT APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE ANNIE O’CONNELL, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-001043 CITY OF SHIVELY, KENTUCKY APPELLEE OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: CETRULO, A. JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. JONES, A., JUDGE: Chris Nelson appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment to the City of Shively, Kentucky (“the City”), on claims arising from his employment with the Shively Police Department. The central issue on appeal is whether a police officer who has completed an initial probationary period and is later promoted to a supervisory rank may be subject to a separate probationary period associated with that promotion, such that the officer may be returned to his former rank without a pre-deprivation hearing if the promotion is not successfully completed. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, agreeing that the material facts were undisputed and that the case presented a legal question regarding the interaction between the City’s ordinances, police department policies, and the statutory due process protections afforded to police officers under Kentucky law. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and this appeal followed. Having reviewed the record and being sufficiently advised, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment in favor of the City and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. I. BACKGROUND The underlying facts are not in dispute. Nelson was hired by the City as a patrol officer for the Shively Police Department in 2013, and successfully completed a 12-month probationary period. After nearly eight years as a patrol officer, he was promoted to sergeant in August 2021. Pursuant to standard operating procedures of the City, Nelson was required to complete another 12- month probationary period following his promotion. Nelson did not question or object to the probationary period at the time of his promotion. Prior to the expiration of the probationary period, Nelson was returned to the position of patrol -2- officer due to what the City claimed were numerous instances of poor performance by Nelson in the role of sergeant. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, agreeing that no material facts were in dispute and that the case turned on a question of law. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that Nelson’s promotion to sergeant was subject to a valid probationary period under the City’s ordinances and police department policies. Further, it held that because Nelson was returned to his prior rank during that probationary period, he did not possess a protected property interest in the rank of sergeant and was therefore not entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing. Nelson now appeals. On appeal, he argues that Kentucky law permits a police officer to be subject to only a single probationary period at the time of initial hire, and that any additional probationary period imposed upon promotion without due process is unlawful. He contends that, having completed his initial probationary period, the City’s action in returning him to the rank of patrol officer constituted a demotion requiring notice and a hearing under Kentucky law. According to Nelson, the City’s ordinances and police department policies cannot override the statutory due process protections afforded to police officers once they have completed their initial probationary period. -3- II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This appeal is taken from an order granting summary judgment. We review a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Ky. 2016); Wolfe v. Kimmel, 681 S.W.3d 7, 12 (Ky. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR1 56.03; Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 709 S.W.3d 232, 236–37 (Ky. 2025). Because summary judgment involves no fact-finding, we afford no deference to the circuit court’s legal conclusions. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Greenville Cumberland Presbyterian Church, 706 S.W.3d 35, 43 (Ky. 2024). III. ANALYSIS Nelson contends that his return to the rank of patrol officer constituted a disciplinary demotion for which he was entitled to notice and a hearing under KRS2 15.520, KRS 95.450, and KRS 90.360, and that the City’s ordinance establishing a probationary period upon promotion is invalid because it conflicts with those statutes. He argues that Kentucky law permits only a single probationary period at the time of initial hire, that he acquired the status of “Officer” under KRS 15.520 upon completing that initial probationary period in 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Kentucky Revised Statutes. -4- 2014, and that this status entitled him to due process protections before being demoted from sergeant to patrol officer. According to Nelson, the City’s ordinances and police department policies cannot override the statutory due process protections afforded to police officers once they have completed their initial probationary period. The City responds that Nelson was serving in a probationary capacity in the promoted position of sergeant pursuant to its ordinance and departmental policies, and that none of the statutes Nelson relies upon prohibit a probationary period upon promotion or require a hearing before returning a probationary employee to his former rank. The City argues that KRS 90.350(9) authorizes probationary periods for promoted employees, that Nelson had no vested property interest in the rank of sergeant during his probationary period, and that sound public policy supports requiring newly promoted commanding officers to complete a probationary period before obtaining permanent status in that rank. The City further contends that Nelson retained his property interest in his position as patrol officer and was merely returned to that position. Resolution of this appeal turns on the scope and interaction of the statutory scheme governing police employment and discipline and whether the City’s ordinance is consistent with that scheme. -5- A. Principles of Statutory Interpretation When engaging in statutory interpretation, our goal is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature. Mr. Roof of Louisville, LLC v. Estate of Henry, 681 S.W.3d 115, 121 (Ky. 2023); Commonwealth v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47, 49 (Ky. 2002). This directive is codified in KRS 446.080(1), which provides that “[a]ll statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature[.]” We begin with the plain language of the statute. Century Aluminum of Kentucky, GP v. Dep’t of Revenue, 664 S.W.3d 546, 557 (Ky. 2022). If the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the legislature’s intent is derived from the language used, and no further construction is required. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d at 49; Hughes v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., 677 S.W.3d 273, 278 (Ky. 2023). Statutory terms are given their common and ordinary meaning unless they are technical in nature. Maupin v. Tankersley, 540 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Ky. 2018). Statutes must be construed as a whole, with each provision given effect, and courts should avoid interpretations that render any part of a statute meaningless or lead to absurd or unreasonable results. Lewis v. Jackson Energy Coop. Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Ky. 2005); Schoenbachler v. Minyard, 110 S.W.3d 776 (Ky. 2003); Samons v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.3d 425, 429 (Ky. 2013). Related statutes addressing the same subject matter should be read together and -6- harmonized, if possible. Kentucky Bd. of Med. Licensure v. Strauss, 558 S.W.3d 443, 448 (Ky. 2018). The rule well established in Kentucky is that when an ordinance is in direct conflict with a statute upon the same subject, the ordinance must yield. Reed v. Hostetler, 245 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1952). B. Statutory Framework Governing Police Officer Employment and Discipline The statutes governing police officer employment and discipline in Kentucky form a layered framework. We begin with the threshold question of which statutes apply to the Shively Police Department and under what circumstances. 1. General Rule: Civil Service Provisions and Police Departments KRS Chapter 90 is entitled “City Civil Service” and applies to cities of the Home Rule Class, including the City of Shively.3 By default, however, the civil service provisions found in KRS 90.310 to 90.410 do not apply to police and fire departments. KRS 90.300(2) provides: “The provisions of KRS 90.310 to 90.410 are independent of and do not affect the laws governing the police and fire departments, nor their pension funds, as provided in KRS Chapter 95.” Despite this general rule of independence, Kentucky law permits cities to elect to apply civil service provisions to their police and fire departments. 3 The City’s official website indicates it is “[a] Home Rule Agency as defined by KRS 95.450.” https://shivelyky.gov/government/new-ordinances/Audit/Financial Statements & New Ordinances - City Of Shively (last visited Dec. 19, 2025). -7- Shively has exercised this option. City of Shively Ordinance §35.35 provides: “The city has elected to establish and maintain a Civil Service Commission for the Police and Fire Departments and hereby elects to operate the civil service system under the provisions of KRS 90.310 through 90.400.” Accordingly, by virtue of the City’s election, the civil service statutes apply to Shively police officers. These include KRS 90.350 (governing appointments and probationary periods) and KRS 90.360 (governing dismissals, suspensions, and reductions in grade). 2. The Police Officer’s Bill of Rights In addition to the civil service statutes, Shively police officers are also subject to KRS 15.520, commonly known as the “Police Officer’s Bill of Rights.” The City participates in the Law Enforcement Foundation Program Fund, as evidenced by Ordinance §35.06. This triggers the applicability of KRS 15.520. See KRS 15.440; Pearce v. University of Louisville, 448 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Ky. 2018). KRS 15.520(2) states its legislative purpose as follows: In order to establish a minimum system of professional conduct for officers of local units of government of this Commonwealth, the following standards are stated as the intention of the General Assembly to deal fairly and establish administrative due process rights in certain disciplinary matters concerning those officers of an employing unit of government that participates in the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program fund -8- administered pursuant to KRS 15.430 and, at the same time, to provide a means for redress by the citizens of the Commonwealth for wrongs allegedly done to them by officers covered by this section. This statute thus creates procedural protections designed to ensure fair treatment of police officers while maintaining accountability to the public. 3. KRS 15.520(9): The Bifurcated Framework for Disciplinary Actions Critically, KRS 15.520 does not apply uniformly to all disciplinary actions. Rather, KRS 15.520(9) creates a bifurcated framework, establishing two distinct categories of discipline with different procedural requirements: The provisions of KRS 90.310 to 90.410, 95.450, and 95.765 shall not apply in any proposed disciplinary action arising from a citizen complaint made under subsection (3) of this section or arising from any allegation of conduct that would constitute a violation of law enforcement procedures under subsection (4) of this section. This section shall not be interpreted or construed to alter or impair any of the substantive rights provided to a city police officer under KRS 90.310 to 90.410, 95.450, and 95.765 for any proposed disciplinary action or other matters not arising under subsections (3) and (4) of this section, including proposed actions involving alleged violations of general employment policies. To the extent that the provisions of this section are inapplicable to any proposed disciplinary action against a city police officer, the provisions of KRS 90.310 to 90.410, 95.450, and 95.765 shall remain in full force and effect. -9- This subsection provides that when disciplinary action arises from (1) a citizen complaint under subsection (3), or (2) an allegation of conduct constituting a violation of law enforcement procedures under subsection (4),4 KRS 15.520 applies exclusively, and the civil service statutes (KRS 90.310 to 90.410) and KRS 95.450 do not apply. Conversely, for disciplinary actions that do not arise from citizen complaints or law enforcement procedure violations—such as violations of “general employment policies”—the civil service statutes do apply, and KRS 15.520 does not govern those matters. Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 41 (Ky. 4 This subsection provides: (a) When an officer is accused of an act or omission that would constitute a violation of law enforcement procedures by any individual within the law enforcement agency employing the officer, including supervisors and elected or appointed officials of the officer’s employing agency, the employing agency shall conform the conduct of any investigation to the provisions of subsection (5) of this section, shall formally charge the officer in accordance with subsection (6) of this section, and shall conduct a hearing in accordance with subsection (7) of this section before any disciplinary action shall be taken against the officer. (b) The provisions of this subsection shall not prevent the employing agency from suspending the officer, with or without pay, during an investigation and pending the final disposition of any formal charges, except that an officer suspended without pay shall be entitled to full back pay and benefits for the regular hours he or she would have worked if no formal charges are brought or the hearing authority finds the officer not guilty of the charges. (c) An employing agency shall not be required to follow the provisions of this section in addressing conduct by the officer that would constitute a violation of the general employment policies of the employing agency. KRS 15.520(4). -10- App. 2021). The statute’s second sentence makes this explicit by preserving the “substantive rights provided to a city police officer under KRS 90.310 to 90.410, 95.450, and 95.765 for any proposed disciplinary action or other matters not arising under subsections (3) and (4).” Id. KRS 15.520(1)(f) defines “law enforcement procedures” as: only those policies, rules, and customs that: 1. Are specific to the conduct of officers in the exercise of law enforcement powers and functions, including, without limitation: use of force, conduct in the course of pursuits, conduct during stops or detentions of citizens, conduct in the course of interacting with, assisting, or questioning of citizens, and investigative conduct; 2. Are carried out in the course of peace officer functions; 3. Are not general employment policies; and 4. May exist in either written form or in the form of unwritten standards, practices, or protocols generally accepted and applied in the law enforcement profession[.] In contrast, KRS 15.520(1)(d) defines “general employment policies” as: [T]he rules, regulations, policies, and procedures commonly applicable to the general workforce or civilian employees that are not unique to law enforcement activities or the exercise of peace officer authority, regardless of whether those rules, regulations, policies, and procedures exist or appear in a departmental manual or handbook that is solely applicable to a law enforcement department or agency within the unit of government employing the officer[.] -11- 4. KRS 95.450: Discipline of Police and Fire Department Members KRS 95.450 also governs disciplinary actions against police officers in certain cities. Shively is included in the Department for Local Government registry referenced in KRS 95.450(9), and therefore, this statute applies to Shively police officers. The statute provides, in relevant part: Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section no member of the police or fire department in cities listed on the registry pursuant to subsection (9) of this section or an urban-county government shall be reprimanded in writing, dismissed, suspended, or reduced in grade or pay for any reason except inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination, or violation of law or of the rules adopted by the legislative body, and only after charges are preferred and a hearing conducted as provided in this section. KRS 95.450(2). Significantly, KRS 95.450 contains its own relationship provision to KRS 15.520: “This section shall only apply to a member of the police department when the provisions of KRS 15.520 do not apply.” KRS 95.450(1)(b). Thus, KRS 95.450 operates as a backstop: it applies when KRS 15.520 does not. 5. Summary of the Statutory Framework In summary, multiple statutes potentially apply to disciplinary actions against Shively police officers: -12- • KRS 15.520 applies to disciplinary actions arising from citizen complaints or violations of law enforcement procedures; • KRS 90.310 to 90.410 (including KRS 90.350 and 90.360) apply to other disciplinary actions not covered by KRS 15.520, by virtue of Shively’s election to adopt civil service for its police department; and • KRS 95.450 applies when KRS 15.520 does not apply. Which statutes govern a particular disciplinary action depends on the nature of the conduct giving rise to the discipline. This framework is critical to resolving the present case. C. Interpretation of KRS 15.520 Having established the statutory framework, we turn to the interpretation of KRS 15.520’s key provisions. KRS 15.520(1)(h) defines “Officer” as: [A] person employed as a full-time peace officer by a unit of government that receives funds under KRS 15.410 to 15.510, except a state officer listed in KRS 15.420(2)(a)2.b. to f. and n., who has completed any officially established initial probationary period of employment lasting no longer than twelve (12) months not including, unless otherwise specified by the employing agency, any time the officer was employed and completing the basic training required by KRS 15.404. Id. (emphasis added). The critical term in this definition is “initial.” -13- We give statutory terms their common and ordinary meaning. Maupin, 540 S.W.3d at 359. “Initial” is defined as: “of or relating to the beginning” and “placed at the beginning: first.” Initial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/initial (last visited Aug. 7, 2026). The plain meaning of “initial” signifies a one-time event at the beginning of employment, not a recurring condition. The legislature’s choice of this word indicates that a police officer completes one probationary period at the outset of employment, and thereafter possesses the rights afforded to “Officers” under KRS 15.520. Had the legislature intended for officers to be subject to multiple probationary periods—such as upon each promotion—it could have used different language, such as “each applicable probationary period” or “who is not currently in probationary status.” It did not. The statute asks a backward-looking question: Has this person “completed” an “initial probationary period”? If the answer is yes, the person is an “Officer” entitled to the protections of KRS 15.520. The legislature’s use of the term “initial probationary period” in defining “Officer” reflects a deliberate policy choice. Once a police officer has demonstrated basic competence and fitness by successfully completing the initial probationary period, that officer acquires a professional status that warrants procedural protections. This makes sense for several reasons. -14- First, “Officer” under KRS 15.520 is best understood as a professional status, not a rank. Like a licensed attorney, a certified teacher, or a board-certified physician, an “Officer” is someone who has met certain threshold qualifications and is entitled to certain protections. The status does not change based on the officer’s current rank or position within the department. Second, disciplinary actions against police officers create permanent records that have consequences far beyond the immediate employment decision. A finding that an officer violated department policies—particularly policies governing law enforcement procedures such as interaction with crime victims and investigative conduct—becomes part of that officer’s permanent employment record. Such findings can affect future employment opportunities with other law enforcement agencies, impact professional reputation within the law enforcement community, affect pension eligibility, influence certification or licensing decisions by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council, and potentially be used against the officer in civil litigation or criminal proceedings. Because of these far-reaching consequences, KRS 15.520 ensures that officers have an opportunity to contest the factual findings and legal conclusions underlying disciplinary actions before such findings become permanent. The hearing requirements serve not only to protect the officer’s immediate employment -15- interests but also to ensure the accuracy and fairness of determinations that will follow the officer throughout his or her career. It is undisputed that Nelson was hired as a patrol officer in October 2013 and completed a 12-month probationary period in October 2014. He is therefore an “Officer” within the meaning of KRS 15.520(1)(h). KRS 15.520(1)(c) defines “Disciplinary action” as: “termination, demotion, a decrease in pay or grade, suspension without pay, and a written reprimand[.]” (Emphasis added.) Nelson’s return to the rank of patrol officer after having been elevated to the rank of sergeant constitutes a “demotion”—a decrease in grade. The City characterizes this action as “reinstatement to his former rank” or a determination that Nelson did not complete his probationary period as sergeant. But substance controls over form. The objective effect of the City’s action was to reduce Nelson from a higher rank (sergeant) to a lower rank (patrol officer). This is a demotion under the plain language of the statute, regardless of how the City chooses to characterize it. KRS 15.520(7) establishes the procedural requirements when disciplinary action is taken against an officer. Subsection (7)(h) provides: Unless waived by the charged officer in writing, a hearing shall be conducted by the officer’s appointing authority to determine whether there is substantial evidence to prove the charges and to determine what, if -16- any, disciplinary action shall be taken if substantial evidence does exist. Id. The statute uses the mandatory term “shall,” indicating that a hearing is required, not discretionary. The statute further specifies the minimum due process rights that must be afforded, including at least twelve days’ written notice, the right to counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence. KRS 15.520(7)(a)-(g). D. Application of KRS 15.520(9) to Nelson’s Demotion Having interpreted the key provisions of KRS 15.520, we must determine which statutory framework applies to Nelson’s demotion under the bifurcated structure established by KRS 15.520(9). According to the City, Nelson was returned to patrol officer status due to substantial performance deficiencies during his probationary sergeant period, including unacceptable ratings in multiple critical areas (attendance, attitude, judgment, decision-making, and knowledge), a failure to properly supervise that compromised a homicide crime scene, and policy violations stemming from an Internal Affairs investigation where he used profane language toward an assault victim, acted unprofessionally, failed to investigate properly, and did not file a required report. -17- KRS 15.520(1)(f) defines “law enforcement procedures” to include policies that “[a]re specific to the conduct of officers in the exercise of law enforcement powers and functions, including, without limitation: use of force, conduct in the course of pursuits, conduct during stops or detentions of citizens, conduct in the course of interacting with, assisting, or questioning of citizens, and investigative conduct[.]” KRS 15.520(1)(f)1. (emphasis added). The conduct identified in the Internal Affairs investigation—using profane language toward a crime victim, acting unprofessionally toward a victim, failing to investigate to identify suspects, and failing to write an incident report— involves core law enforcement functions. These are not matters of general workplace conduct applicable to all City employees. They are specific to the exercise of peace officer authority and law enforcement responsibilities, and fall squarely within KRS 15.520(1)(f)’s definition of “law enforcement procedures.” The alleged violations concern how Nelson, as a peace officer, interacted with a citizen who reported an assault and how he conducted (or failed to conduct) the investigation of that reported crime. These are matters “carried out in the course of peace officer functions” and are not “general employment policies.” See KRS 15.520(1)(f)2.-3. -18- Because Nelson’s demotion arose, at least in part, from an allegation of conduct constituting a violation of law enforcement procedures under KRS 15.520(4), the first sentence of KRS 15.520(9) applies: The provisions of KRS 90.310 to 90.410, 95.450, and 95.765 shall not apply in any proposed disciplinary action arising from a citizen complaint made under subsection (3) of this section or arising from any allegation of conduct that would constitute a violation of law enforcement procedures under subsection (4) of this section. The statute is unambiguous: When a disciplinary action arises from a violation of law enforcement procedures, the civil service statutes (KRS 90.310 to 90.410, which include KRS 90.350) and KRS 95.450 “shall not apply.” Only KRS 15.520 governs such disciplinary actions. This has critical implications for the City’s defense. The City relies heavily on KRS 90.350(9) to justify its imposition of a probationary period upon Nelson’s promotion to sergeant. But KRS 90.350 is within the range of statutes— KRS 90.310 to 90.410—that KRS 15.520(9) expressly excludes from application when the disciplinary action arises from violations of law enforcement procedures. Because the Internal Affairs investigation found that Nelson violated department policies governing interaction with crime victims and investigative conduct—matters that constitute “law enforcement procedures” under KRS 15.520(1)(f)—and because Nelson’s demotion was based at least in part on these -19- findings, KRS 90.350 does not apply to this disciplinary action. Consequently, the City cannot invoke KRS 90.350(9) to establish a probationary period that eliminates Nelson’s hearing rights under KRS 15.520. E. The City’s Ordinance and Policy Cannot Override KRS 15.520 It is well established in Kentucky that when an ordinance is in direct conflict with a statute upon the same subject, the ordinance must yield. Reed, 245 S.W.2d at 953. A city ordinance or policy cannot override state statutory requirements. Shively Police Department Policy 400.50 provides: Policy The probationary period shall be an essential part of the staffing process and shall be utilized for the most effective adjustment of new employees and for the retention only of those employees whose performance meets the required standards of performance and professionalism. As prescribed by K.R.S. 90.350(90), the probationary period shall be twelve (12) months, after which regular appointments shall be given to all probationary employees who are deemed to be satisfactory by the respective appointing authority. Probationary period for newly promoted staff The probationary period for newly promoted command positions, such as sergeants, shall also be (12) twelve months. -20- If at any time during the probationary period, the Chief of Police determines that the services of an employee are unsatisfactory, the employee may be separated from his position with or without reasons for the separation. Policy 400.50 seeks to eliminate the hearing requirement established by state statute. This it cannot do. To the extent that Policy 400.50 purports to authorize demotion of an “Officer” without a hearing in circumstances where KRS 15.520 applies, the policy is invalid and unenforceable. F. The City’s Arguments The City raises several arguments in defense of the circuit court’s judgment. We address each in turn. The City argues that Nelson had a vested property interest in his position as patrol officer, which he retained upon demotion, but had no such interest in the rank of sergeant during his probationary period. The City relies on cases such as Louisville Professional Fire Fighters Association v. City of Louisville, 508 S.W.2d 42 (Ky. 1974), which held that a firefighter’s promotion was “based not upon right, but upon privilege[,]” and therefore the city could demote him without violating his rights. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the analysis is misplaced. This case does not present a constitutional due process question requiring us to determine whether Nelson possessed a “property interest” that would trigger Fourteenth Amendment protections. Rather, this is a case of statutory interpretation. The question is not -21- whether the federal or state constitution requires a hearing, but whether KRS 15.520 requires a hearing. The statute itself creates the procedural right to a hearing for “Officers” facing “disciplinary action.” We need not engage in a separate property interest analysis when the statute expressly confers the right. Second, Louisville Professional Fire Fighters was decided in 1974, six years before the enactment of KRS 15.520 in 1980. It reflects the common law rule that existed prior to the statute. But the General Assembly, by enacting KRS 15.520, changed that common law rule. The legislature created statutory due process protections for police officers, establishing “administrative due process rights” and a “minimum system of professional conduct.” KRS 15.520(2). Pre- statutory common law cases do not control when the legislature has subsequently enacted a statute addressing the same subject matter. The City’s next argument is that KRS 90.350(9) authorizes probationary periods for promoted employees. However, the statutory language belies this assertion. This subsection provides: The appointing authority may provide that all appointments for initial permanent employment may be probationary appointments for a period of not more than twelve (12) months, after which probationary period regular appointments shall be given to all probationary employees who are deemed to be satisfactory by the respective appointing authority. -22- Id. (emphasis added). As previously explained, use of the term “initial” suggests that an employee should not be subjected to successive probationary terms. Moreover, even assuming KRS 90.350(9) would otherwise authorize a probationary period upon promotion, the statute does not apply here because of KRS 15.520(9). As explained above, KRS 15.520(9) provides that “the provisions of KRS 90.310 to 90.410 . . . shall not apply in any proposed disciplinary action arising from . . . any allegation of conduct that would constitute a violation of law enforcement procedures.” Because Nelson’s demotion arose, at least in part, from an Internal Affairs investigation that concluded he violated law enforcement procedures, KRS 90.350 is excluded from application by operation of KRS 15.520(9). Moreover, even if KRS 90.350(9) did apply, the statute does not say that promoted employees may be demoted without a hearing. It refers only to an initial probation of not more than twelve months. The statute does not specify the consequences of that probationary period or create an exception to the hearing requirements found in other statutes. When multiple statutes address the same subject matter, they must be read together and harmonized. Kentucky Bd. of Med. Licensure, 558 S.W.3d at 448. Reading KRS 90.350(9) together with KRS 15.520 (and, in cases where KRS 15.520 does not apply, with KRS 90.360 and KRS 95.450), the statutes can be harmonized as follows: Promoted employees may be -23- evaluated during a probationary period, but if they are to be demoted—a form of disciplinary action—a hearing is still required under the applicable statute. The City cites Bunch v. Personnel Board Commonwealth of Kentucky, 719 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. App. 1986), arguing that the case supports probationary periods when an employee takes on a different job with different responsibilities. The City’s reliance on Bunch is misplaced. In that case, a state park employee who had been working full-time hours as a part-time employee was formally reclassified as a full-time employee and placed on a new probationary period. This Court acknowledged that “the probationary period is necessary in order to gauge a new employee’s ability to adequately perform a job” and that this rationale holds true “when a new employee is hired or a present employee is transferred to perform a different job than he had done previously[.]” Id. at 9-10. However—and critically—this Court rejected the second probationary period as invalid. We held that because the employee had already been performing the same duties for years, and because the statute authorized only a probationary period for “initial permanent employment,” the second probationary period was arbitrary and capricious. Id. The case stands for the proposition that a probationary period is valid only if authorized by statute, and that an employer cannot impose additional probationary periods beyond what the statute permits. -24- Applying Bunch to this case supports Nelson’s position, not the City’s. KRS 15.520(1)(h) defines “Officer” based on completion of an “initial probationary period”—singular, at the beginning of employment. Nothing in the statute authorizes additional probationary periods upon promotion. And as explained above, KRS 90.350(9)—the statute the City relies upon—does not apply here because of KRS 15.520(9)’s exclusion. The City also relies on Throneberry v. City of Audubon Park, No. 2007-CA-001033-MR, 2008 WL 4530917 (Ky. App. Oct. 10, 2008). That case involved an officer who had been employed part-time and was then hired full- time—a new hiring for full-time employment. The probationary period was properly characterized as part of his initial full-time employment. Here, by contrast, Nelson was hired as a full-time patrol officer in 2013, completed his initial probationary period in 2014, and was promoted within that same full-time employment in 2021. His promotion to sergeant was not a new hiring; it was an advancement within his existing full-time employment. Throneberry does not address the question presented here. We do not dispute that sergeant is a different position with different responsibilities. The question, however, is not whether a probationary evaluation makes practical sense, but whether the statute authorizes demotion without a hearing during such a probationary period. Policy arguments, however persuasi