Charbono v. Board of Education

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Charbono v. Board of Education EMMA CHARBONO v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF BRANFORD ET AL. (AC 48188) Moll, Suarez and Seeley, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendants, the town of Branford, the town’s board of education, and three of the town’s employees, with respect to her negligence action arising out of an incident that took place in a public high school gymnasium in which the plaintiff, a high school student, was allegedly struck more than twenty-five times in the head, neck, and back by another student. The plaintiff had alleged in her operative complaint, inter alia, that the lack of supervision in the high school gymnasium violated the board’s policy regarding student supervision and that the defendants’ violation of the policy was a proximate cause of the injuries she sustained. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defendants were entitled to governmental immunity pursu- ant to statute (§ 52-557n). Held: The trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judg- ment on the ground that they were immune from liability pursuant to § 52-557n, as the board policy at issue did not dictate the manner or scope of the supervision that was to be provided, it did not include a requirement that a supervising adult be physically present throughout the entire school related activity, and it did not impose any additional nondiscretionary guidelines from which such a duty could be implied, and, therefore, the policy did not create a ministerial duty of supervision and the defendants’ alleged acts or omissions were discretionary in nature. Argued May 26—officially released October 27, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen- dants’ alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Goodrow, J., granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Elizabeth Knight Adams, for the appellant (plaintiff). Richard C. Buturla, for the appellees (defendants).  Charbono v. Board of Education Opinion SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Emma Charbono, by and through her father, Jason Charbono, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, the town of Branford (town), the town’s Board of Education (board), Lee Panagoulias, Stephanie Byrd, and Hamlet Hernandez,1 in this negligence action arising out of an incident that took place in a public high school gymnasium in which the plaintiff, a high school student, was allegedly struck more than twenty-five times in the head, neck, and back by J, another student.2 On appeal, the plaintiff’s sole claim is that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for sum- mary judgment on the ground that the defendants were entitled to governmental immunity under General Stat- utes § 52-557n.3 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, as alleged in the complaint or as otherwise undisputed in the record and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, and procedural history are relevant to our reso- lution of this appeal. The plaintiff, by and through her father, commenced this action on November 9, 2021. At all relevant times, the plaintiff was a minor and a sophomore student at Branford High School (high school). On April 19, 2022, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint (operative complaint), which set forth two 1 Panagoulias and Byrd were, at all relevant times, the principal and assistant principal of Branford High School, respectively. Hernandez was, at all relevant times, the superintendent of Branford public schools. 2 J is not a party to this action. 3 General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) provides in relevant part: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law. . . .” Although § 52-557n (a) was amended in 2023; see Public Acts 2023, No. 23-83, § 1; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.  Charbono v. Board of Education counts alleging negligence against all defendants4 and a third count seeking indemnification against the town pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465.5 The operative complaint alleged that, beginning on November 1, 2019, J, a female student who allegedly had a history of violence and behavioral issues, began attend- ing the high school. Following certain conduct by J dur- ing a physical education class (gym class), the plaintiff mentioned to another student, A, that she “didn’t like [J’s] attitude or the way [that J had] spoke[n] to [another] student” during gym class. Thereafter, A informed J of the plaintiff’s comments and provided J with the plain- tiff’s cell phone number, and J sent the plaintiff several threatening text messages over the following days. The plaintiff, who was concerned about confronting J, stayed home from school on Monday, November 4. The high school was closed for election day on November 5, and, on November 6, the plaintiff arrived at the high school just before third period. Shortly after the plaintiff arrived at the high school on the morning of November 6, an incident occurred that forms the basis of this action (November 6 inci- dent). Specifically, the plaintiff, who had been warned by a friend that J and some other students planned to do something to the plaintiff, began to receive threat- ening text messages from J. The plaintiff proceeded to 4 The negligence claim in count one of the operative complaint was brought against the board and the individual defendants; the negligence claim in count two, which incorporated the allegations from count one, was brought against the town. 5 General Statutes § 7-465 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any town, city or borough . . . shall pay on behalf of any employee of such municipality . . . all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for infringement of any person’s civil rights or for physical damages to person or property . . . if the employee, at the time of the occurrence, accident, physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge of such duty. . . .”  Charbono v. Board of Education the high school’s locker area to put her belongings away when she was approached by J, A, and two other students who cornered the plaintiff at her locker. J then made loud and aggressive remarks that caused the plaintiff to believe she was at risk of imminent physical harm. The plaintiff, trying to avoid a physical altercation, left the locker area and began looking for an adult in the hallways while J, accompanied by the three other students, followed the plaintiff and continued to make verbal threats. The plaintiff, however, was unable to find a teacher or other school employee.6 Believing that a gym class for students with disabilities was in session, the plaintiff ran toward and entered the gymnasium seek- ing the help of a teacher or paraprofessional to avoid the imminent altercation. Although students were already in the gymnasium, the teacher and paraprofessional were not present. At that time, J pushed the plaintiff to the ground and began striking her while one student recorded the incident on the plaintiff’s cell phone and another recorded it on her own cell phone. J punched the plaintiff “over twenty-five times in the head, neck, and upper back while [the plaintiff] tried to block the punches with her arms and hands.” This attack continued for around fifteen to twenty seconds until the gym teacher entered the gymnasium and “intervened to separate the students and stop the attack.” The plaintiff alleged in the operative complaint, inter alia, that the lack of supervision in the high school gym- nasium violated the board’s policy number 3516 (policy 6 The operative complaint also alleges that the plaintiff was assaulted verbally in the locker area, a common area, and in the hallways of the school, where she alleged adult supervision was required. She further alleged that, during a verbal assault in the common area, she “noticed two teachers, who were talking in the hallway and were in close enough proximity to the . . . verbal assault that they would have heard the inci- dent and [could have] intervened, particularly given [the plaintiff’s] efforts to raise her voice. They did not acknowledge the impending assault and failed to take any action to protect [the plaintiff].” The plaintiff, however, could not recall the teachers’ names at her deposi- tion. On appeal, the plaintiff does not challenge the trial court’s finding that adult supervision of the hallway was a discretionary act.  Charbono v. Board of Education 3516).7 In particular, she alleged that the defendants were negligent “[i]n that they failed to supervise and ensure the safety of students as required by school poli- cies, procedures, handbooks, and regulations, includ- ing but not limited to [policy 3516] . . . when they had no discretion to leave such areas unsupervised . . . .”8 She further alleged that the defendants’ violation of policy 3516 was a proximate cause of the injuries she sus- tained, which included a concussion, pain and suffering, emotional distress, post-traumatic stress disorder, and ongoing headaches, as well as anxiety and panic attacks. On June 21, 2022, the defendants filed an answer and special defenses and asserted, by way of their third and fifth special defenses, that the plaintiff’s claims were 7 The plaintiff’s operative complaint contains references to policy “2516.” The parties acknowledged the typographical error in their sum- mary judgment memoranda and agree that policy 3516 is the applicable provision. The relevant portion of policy 3516 provides: “Supervision of Students: All school-related activities shall be supervised by adults to enforce safety rules and prevent injuries. At least one adult trained in first aid, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and infection control shall always be available when students are present on school grounds to respond to injuries and medical emergencies. All adults supervising playgrounds, athletic fields, gymnasiums, science classrooms, industrial arts class- rooms and cafeterias shall have easy access to appropriate first aid supplies. Supervising adults shall be informed of any relevant medical guidance on file with the school concerning limits on the participation of individual students in physical activity. Such information will be treated with strict confidentiality.” 8 Despite this allegation, the plaintiff focused solely on policy 3516 in her opposition to summary judgment and, in particular, the provision of that policy concerning the supervision of students. See footnote 7 of this opinion. Similarly, on appeal, the plaintiff’s arguments pertain solely to the provision of policy 3516 governing the supervision of students. At oral argument before this court, however, the plaintiff directed this court’s attention to several other provisions in policy 3516, namely, the subsections titled “Goal,” “Safety and Hazard Assessments,” and “Staff Training.” Because the plaintiff did not raise any claim concern- ing those provisions before the trial court or in her appellate briefs and referenced those provisions for the first time at oral argument before this court, we decline to consider her arguments relating to those pro- visions. See Belton v. Dragoi, 228 Conn. App. 510, 521 n.6, 325 A.3d 938 (2024) (“[w]e will not consider an argument raised for the first time . . . at oral argument”).  Charbono v. Board of Education barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity under § 52-557n9 and the common law. On July 21, 2022, the plaintiff replied to the defendants’ answer and denied every allegation contained in their special defenses. On January 30, 2024, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to all counts of the operative complaint, asserting in their supporting memorandum of law that the undisputed facts demonstrated that the defendants were immune from liability as a matter of law. Specifically, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the undisputed facts showed that the defendants were never made aware, at any time prior to the November 6 incident, of an imminent altercation between the plain- tiff and J. The defendants further contended that the supervision of high school students is a discretionary government function as a matter of law, which bars any claims of negligence under the doctrine of governmental immunity. In support of their motion for summary judg- ment, the defendants appended affidavits of Panagoulias and Byrd, the principal and assistant principal of the high school. Both Panagoulias and Byrd averred that no employee of the board was made aware of the impending physical altercation, that, following the November 6 incident, they investigated the incident, and that Byrd participated in creating a safety plan with the plaintiff. As further support for their motion for summary judg- ment, the defendants also submitted, inter alia, portions of the plaintiff’s deposition transcript, screenshots of text messages between J and the plaintiff in the days preceding the November 6 incident, a copy of a TikTok video recording of the November 6 incident, a handwrit- ten statement by the plaintiff recounting her experience and the events leading to the November 6 incident, and a copy of policy 3516.10 The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In her supporting memo- randum of law, the plaintiff argued that the defendants 9 See footnote 3 of this opinion. 10 See footnote 7 of this opinion.  Charbono v. Board of Education were not shielded by governmental immunity because policy 3516 creates a ministerial duty to supervise all school related activities, which does not involve the exercise of discretion on the part of school employees. She contended that, although the language of policy 3516 may leave the manner of supervision to the defendants’ discretion in certain situations, the policy imposes a nondiscretionary duty on the defendants to have an adult present to supervise all school related activities, including a gym class, in order to “enforce safety rules and prevent injuries.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) The plaintiff further argued that the additional first aid and medical guidance requirements in policy 3516 for adults supervising school related activities in gymnasiums imply that the adults must be present to ensure appropriate performance of their obligations under those requirements. On October 28, 2024, the trial court, Goodrow, J., issued a memorandum of decision granting the defen- dants’ motion for summary judgment. In its memoran- dum of decision, the court concluded that, although policy 3516 requires adult supervision of students during school related activities, it is a “general policy without any details regarding the extent or manner of supervi- sion” and, therefore, it does not create a ministerial duty.11 From the judgment rendered thereon, this appeal followed. On appeal, the plaintiff claims the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of its determination that the language of policy 3516 creates a discretionary duty that entitled the defendants to immunity under § 52-557n. Although the plaintiff concedes, as she did before the trial court, 11 The court also held that, to the extent that the plaintiff claimed that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity applied; see, e.g., Doe v. Madison, 340 Conn. 1, 33–37, 262 A.3d 752 (2021); the claim failed because the evidence presented did not establish that any imminent harm would have been apparent to the defendants. The plaintiff does not challenge that determination in this appeal.  Charbono v. Board of Education that the manner in which an adult carries out the duty to supervise under policy 3516 may be discretionary, she nevertheless maintains that the policy required, “at a minimum, that a properly trained teacher or other adult . . . be present to actually supervise all school related activities in the gymnasium.” (Emphasis in original.) By arguing that the policy was violated because “there was no supervision at all”; (emphasis in original); the plaintiff, in effect, asserts that the policy requires the constant, nondiscretionary physical presence of a super- vising adult at all school related activities. This minis- terial requirement, she argues, was violated because there was no adult present in the gymnasium during the gym class when the assault occurred.12 According to the plaintiff, she “ran to the gymnasium because she knew a teacher and paraprofessional had to be present in a special education gym class, where she frequently volunteered.” The defendants counter that this court and our Supreme Court have held that the supervision of students is a discretionary function as a matter of law. The defendants also argue that the mandatory language “shall be supervised” in policy 3516, on its own, does not 12 We note that the defendants, in their appellate brief, assert that the gym class had not yet started at the time the plaintiff was assaulted, thereby suggesting that any alleged duty to supervise the school related activity under policy 3516 had not yet been triggered. In support of their assertion, the defendants point to an affidavit of Panagoulias, which had been submitted in support of their motion for summary judgment, in which Panagoulias averred that there was “a physical altercation in the gymnasium prior to the start of class on November 6, 2019.” The defendants also rely on deposition testimony of the plaintiff that she was not sure what time the gym class was supposed to start and that “[t]here should have been a gym class going on at [the time of the assault].” In her reply brief, the plaintiff disputes the assertion that gym class had not yet begun and argues: “To the extent that the defendants suggest that their obligation to supervise the gymnasium had not yet been triggered, that assertion presents a genuine issue of material fact inappropriate for resolution on plenary review of the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment.” We need not determine whether this alleged dis- puted issue of fact renders summary judgment inappropriate. Even if we were to assume that the gym class already had begun at the time of the plaintiff’s assault and, thus, that the gym teacher was not in the gymnasium during class time, the plaintiff’s claim of a violation of policy 3516 fails for the reasons set forth in this opinion.  Charbono v. Board of Education create a ministerial duty when the remaining language merely states general responsibilities while leaving the time and manner in which those responsibilities are to be fulfilled to the discretion of the supervising adult. We conclude that the plain language of policy 3516 requires the exercise of discretion regarding the supervision of students during school related activities and, therefore, the court correctly rendered summary judgment on the ground that the defendants were entitled to governmen- tal immunity under § 52-557n. We begin by setting forth the standard of review gov- erning an appeal from the granting of a motion for sum- mary judgment. “Practice Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seek- ing summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and [if the movant satisfies that burden] the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . [I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for sum- mary judgment. . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist. . . . Our review of the decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is plenary. . . . We therefore must decide whether the court’s conclusions were legally and logically correct and find support in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sequeiro v. Torrington, 238 Conn. App. 96, 99–100, 355 A.3d 86 (2026).  Charbono v. Board of Education We next turn to the well settled law of municipal tort liability. “The [common-law] doctrines that determine the tort liability of municipal employees are well estab- lished. . . . Generally, a municipal employee is liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts, but has a qualified immunity in the performance of governmental acts. . . . Governmental acts are performed wholly for the direct benefit of the public and are supervisory or discretionary in nature. . . . The hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment. . . . In contrast, [a ministerial act] refers to a duty which is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion. . . . “Municipal officials are immunized from liability for negligence arising out of their discretionary acts in part because of the danger that a more expansive exposure to liability would cramp the exercise of official discretion beyond the limits desirable in our society. . . . Discretion- ary act immunity reflects a value judgment that—despite injury to a member of the public—the broader interest in having government officers and employees free to exer- cise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from impos- ing liability for that injury. . . . In contrast, municipal officers are not immune from liability for negligence arising out of their ministerial acts, defined as acts to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion. . . . This is because society has no analogous interest in permitting municipal officers to exercise judgment in the performance of ministerial acts. . . . “The tort liability of a municipality has been codified in § 52-557n. Section 52-557n (a) (1) provides that [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or  Charbono v. Board of Education official duties. . . . Section 52-557n (a) (2) (B) extends, however, the same discretionary act immunity that applies to municipal officials to the municipalities them- selves by providing that they will not be liable for dam- ages caused by negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official func- tion of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 100–101. To demonstrate the existence of a ministerial duty of a municipality and its agents, “[o]ur courts consis- tently have held that . . . a plaintiff ordinarily must point to some statute, city charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule, policy, or other directive that, by its clear language, compels a municipal employee to act in a prescribed manner, without the exercise of judgment or discretion.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Madison, 340 Conn. 1, 31–32, 262 A.3d 752 (2021); see id., 32 (“[D]escriptions of gen- eral practices or expectations that guide an employee’s exercise of discretion do not create a ministerial duty. . . . Specificity is required in all aspects of the directive.” (Citation omitted.)). “Furthermore . . . evidence of a policy that merely states general responsibilities without provisions that mandate the time or manner in which those responsibilities are to be executed, leaving such details to the discretion and judgment of the municipal employees, is insufficient to show that the act is ministe- rial. . . . Therefore, if there is no directive setting forth the manner in which a municipal official is to perform the act, then the act is not ministerial and is therefore discretionary in nature.” (Citation omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Kusy v. Norwich, 192 Conn. App. 171, 177–78, 217 A.3d 31, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 931, 218 A.3d 71 (2019). “[T]he issue of whether a statute, regulation or other provision of law creates a ministerial duty ordinarily presents a question of law to be decided by the court . . . [and is] subject to plenary review on  Charbono v. Board of Education appeal.”13 (Footnote omitted.) Ventura v. East Haven, 330 Conn. 613, 636–37, 199 A.3d 1 (2019). In Strycharz v. Cady, 323 Conn. 548, 148 A.3d 1011 (2016), our Supreme Court concluded that the board of education policy at issue clearly created a ministerial duty for the principal to assign teachers to supervisory posts but that the act of ensuring whether teachers were present at their posts was discretionary in the absence of clear directives stating otherwise. Id., 569. Specifi- cally, the court, in addressing the question of whether the general supervision of public school employees by school administrators is a discretionary or ministerial function, concluded that the administrators’ “duty to ensure that school staff members adequately discharged their assignments [is] discretionary because it [is] encom- passed within their general responsibility to manage and supervise school employees.” Id. In addition, “our case law has implicitly determined that the supervision of public school children is generally considered a discretion- ary act.” Lewis v. Newtown, 191 Conn. App. 213, 231, 214 A.3d 405, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 919, 216 A.3d 650 (2019); see also Martinez v. New Haven, 328 Conn. 1, 8–9, 176 A.3d 531 (2018) (analyzing general super- vision of students through discretionary framework); Heigl v. Board of Education, 218 Conn. 1, 8, 587 A.2d 423 (1991) (“Neither the General Statutes nor our deci- sional law has ever stated that a board of education has a specific duty to supervise high school students. Even if such a duty exists, actions pursuant to such a duty are discretionary if they are performed wholly for the direct benefit of the public . . . [as opposed to] affect[ing] an individual in a manner different in kind from the way it 13 We reject the plaintiff’s contention that a determination of whether a municipal duty or action is discretionary or ministerial is a question of fact for the jury. Our Supreme Court has made clear that, in the absence of a disputed fact that is material to the applicability of the governmental immunity defense, the issue of whether a provision creates a ministerial duty is a question of law properly for the court to decide. See Ventura v. East Haven, 330 Conn. 613, 636 n.11, 199 A.3d 1 (2019). For the reasons that we explain in this opinion, we conclude that the present case does not require the resolution of any such disputed factual issues.  Charbono v. Board of Education affects the public at large,” in which situation the statute would impose a duty to the individual. (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); Costa v. Board of Education, 175 Conn. App. 402, 408, 167 A.3d 1152 (school’s student supervision policy was discretionary due to absence of “clear directive that negated the need for the [school] defendants to exercise judgment and discretion”), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 961, 172 A.3d 801 (2017). We next set forth the relevant language of policy 3516, which provides: “Supervision of Students: All school- related activities shall be supervised by adults to enforce safety rules and prevent injuries. At least one adult trained in first aid, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and infection control shall always be available when students are present on school grounds to respond to injuries and medical emergencies. All adults supervising playgrounds, athletic fields, gymnasiums, science classrooms, indus- trial arts classrooms and cafeterias shall have easy access to appropriate first aid supplies. Supervising adults shall be informed of any relevant medical guidance on file with the school concerning limits on the participa- tion of individual students in physical activity. Such information will be treated with strict confidentiality.” In the present case, the plaintiff claims that the lan- guage of policy 3516 creates a ministerial duty on the part of school officials. In support of her claim, the plaintiff raises a number of arguments. First, she appears to argue that the use of the word “shall” in the policy renders the duty ministerial. Next, the plaintiff clarifies that her claim on appeal is not “that the supervision in the gymnasium where the assault occurred was insufficient.” Rather, her argument is that policy 3516 was violated because “there was no supervision at all . . . .” (Emphasis omitted.) As she explains: “The issues on appeal do not concern how the defendants supervised students. Rather, this case involves their complete failure to provide any supervision in the gymnasium at a time and place that supervision was required by [policy 3516].” Finally, the  Charbono v. Board of Education plaintiff asserts that policy 3516 obligates the defendants to provide the constant physical presence of an adult dur- ing all school related activities, and, therefore, the policy was violated when the gym teacher was absent from the gymnasium during the gym class, allowing the incident to occur for nearly twenty seconds before the teacher entered the gymnasium. The plaintiff further points to the provisions for easy access to first aid supplies and medical guidance, arguing that these additional provi- sions constitute “specialized supervision” and “specific conditions” that further necessitate an adult’s physical presence.14 In sum, she argues that the language “[a]ll school-related activities shall be supervised” necessarily implies that the supervision must be constant, physical, and undivided. We conclude that the plaintiff’s argu- ments fail, as the use of the word “shall” in the policy does not render the duty ministerial, policy 3516 does not include provisions beyond the general supervision requirement, and the plaintiff’s reading of policy 3516 would create an unworkable result contrary to the public interest undergirding municipal immunity for ministe- rial acts. To the extent that the plaintiff claims that the use of the word “shall” in policy 3516 renders the duty to supervise ministerial, we find such a claim unavailing. As this court stated in Mills v. Solution, LLC, 138 Conn. App. 40, 50 A.3d 381, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 928, 55 A.3d 570 (2012), “[w]e disagree with the plaintiff that 14 The plaintiff’s contention that policy 3516 requires “specialized and continuous” supervision in the gymnasium is not supported by the plain language of the policy, which simply provides that “[a]ll school-related activities shall be supervised by adults to enforce safety rules and prevent injuries. . . .” With respect to the supervision of “playgrounds, athletic fields, gymnasiums, science classrooms, industrial arts classrooms and cafeterias,” policy 3516 provides only that the supervising adults “shall have easy access to appropriate first aid supplies” and “shall be informed of any relevant medical guidance on file with the school concerning limits on the participation of individual students in physical activity.” We do not agree that this language mandates enhanced or continuous supervi- sion of “playgrounds, athletic fields, gymnasiums, science classrooms, industrial arts classrooms and cafeterias”; rather, it recognizes that first aid materials should be readily available in those areas of a school.  Charbono v. Board of Education the word ‘shall’ is sufficient to convert what is otherwise a discretionary act into a ministerial duty where the text of the statute leaves to the discretion of the [municipal] official how to perform the function and whether to per- form the function at all. Although the word ‘shall’ can connote a mandatory command, the language of the stat- ute, read as a whole, involves discretionary acts.” Id., 51; see also Coley v. Hartford, 312 Conn. 150, 169, 95 A.3d 480 (2014) (“[T]he word ‘shall’ does not necessarily give rise to a ministerial duty . . . when the policy language, read in its entirety, clearly relies upon . . . discretion in deciding how to perform the allegedly ministerial act . . . . ‘The mere fact that a statute uses the word “shall” in prescribing the function of a government entity or officer should not be assumed to render the function necessarily obligatory in the sense of removing the discretionary nature of the function.’ ”); DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162 Conn. App. 216, 226, 131 A.3d 771 (2016) (ordinance requiring that town’s parks “shall be maintained” did not create ministerial duty notwithstanding “the use of the imperative shall” because, “[i]n order for a duty to be considered ministerial, it must be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion” and ordinance did not prescribe any par- ticular manner of performance (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)). In sum, the use of the word “shall” is not dispositive of a ministerial duty if the underlying responsibility requires discretion and judgment in its execution. This court previously has noted that a policy that “merely states general responsibilities without provi- sions that mandate the time or manner in which those responsibilities are to be executed, leaving such details to the discretion and judgment of the municipal employ- ees, is insufficient to show that the act is ministerial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kusy v. Norwich, supra, 192 Conn. App. 177; see also Northrup v. Wit- kowski, 175 Conn. App. 223, 238, 167 A.3d 443 (2017) (“although there is language in [the relevant town ordi- nance] that require[d] the streets commission to maintain  Charbono v. Board of Education and repair the town’s storm water sewer system, the ordinance contain[ed] no provisions that mandate[d] the time or manner in which those responsibilities [were] to be executed, leaving such details to the discretion and judgment of the municipal employees”), aff’d, 332 Conn. 158, 210 A.3d 29 (2019). Here, policy 3516 sets forth a general responsibility to provide supervision of school related activities without mandating the time or manner in which that responsibility is to be executed. Particularly relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s claims regarding the lack of constant—or any—super- vision is our decision in Costa v. Board of Education, supra, 175 Conn. App. 402. In Costa, a public school student sustained injuries during a pickup basketball game that took place at a school sponsored senior class picnic. Id., 404. The school had a written policy that provided that school sponsored activities “must be well- planned and organized and must provide for the adequate supervision and welfare of participating students at all times.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 405. In Costa, although the school principal, several teachers and a school nurse provided general supervision for the picnic, “no school personnel were present at or supervising the basketball court at the time the injury occurred.” Id. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the town, the board of education and the school principal on the ground of governmental immunity. Id., 404. In affirming the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of those defendants, this court held that the “defendants’ duty to supervise the picnic was discretionary in nature . . . .” Id., 409. As this court explained: “[T]he [trial] court properly determined that the defendants’ alleged negligent acts or omissions were discretionary in nature and not min- isterial acts. . . . [T]here is a difference between laws that impose general duties on officials and those that mandate a particular response to specific conditions. . . . Although the plaintiffs suggest that the defendants’ duty to supervise students during school sanctioned events . . .  Charbono v. Board of Education was ministerial rather than discretionary in nature, the plaintiffs rely upon general safety guidelines and school board policies that, while requiring adequate supervision of students, fail to prescribe the precise nature or scope of such supervision or the manner in which it should be carried out. In other words, the plaintiffs have cited no clear directive that