Philika Bellamy v. Dr. Joseph Mleczko
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketA-3361-25
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3361-25
PHILIKA BELLAMY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DR. JOSEPH MLECZKO,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted November 4, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026
Before Judges Gilson and Gummer.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County,
Docket No. L-1340-25.
MacNeill O'Neill & Riveles, LLC, attorneys for
appellant (Gary L. Riveles, of counsel; Esad Metjahic,
on the briefs).
Philika Bellamy, self-represented respondent.
PER CURIAM
In this medical-negligence case, defendant Dr. Joseph Mleczko, who is an
anesthesiologist, appeals an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice
after plaintiff Philika Bellamy failed to file an affidavit of merit pursuant to the
Affidavit of Merit statute (AOM statute), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29. Because
the trial court erred in dismissing the case without prejudice instead of with
prejudice, we vacate the order, remand the case, and direct the court to enter an
order dismissing the case with prejudice.
I.
On July 5, 2025, plaintiff, representing herself, filed a complaint against
defendant in the Special Civil Part. In the complaint, she alleged defendant had
administered anesthesia to her during a January 19, 2025 medical procedure that
"did not involve [her] mouth or facial area." The actual date of the procedure
was January 19, 2024. According to plaintiff, after the procedure she discovered
"severe blisters on and around [her] lips," injuries she claimed "resulted in
permanent holes and visible disfigurement." She contended the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applied because "the injuries [we]re inconsistent with the scope of
the procedure." In an August 25, 2025 order, the court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, finding the
Special Civil Part lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's
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professional-malpractice claim.
Plaintiff made the same allegations in a complaint she filed in the Law
Division on September 7, 2025. On October 21, 2025, defendant filed an answer
in which he stated he "practic[ed] medicine in the specialty of [a]nesthesiology"
and demanded plaintiff provide an affidavit of merit pursuant to the AOM
statute.
On December 9, 2025, the trial court held a Ferreira conference. See
Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144, 155 (2003) (requiring
case management conferences in professional-malpractice cases that would
enable "the court [to] address all discovery issues, including whether an affidavit
of merit has been served on defendant" and, "[i]f no affidavit has been served,
. . . [to] remind the parties of their obligations under the statute and case law" ).
At that conference, plaintiff acknowledged she had not yet submitted an affidavit
of merit. She advised the court she had been "in search of an anesthesiologist"
and had contacted one but had not yet heard back from her. The court explained
in detail her obligation to obtain an affidavit of merit from an anesthesiologist,
the timing requirements for that submission, her right to request a sixty-day
extension, and defendant's right to move to dismiss the complaint if she failed
to file an affidavit of merit within the applicable time period.
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The court also addressed her reference in the complaint to the res ipsa
doctrine:
Now I saw in your complaint . . . that you . . . said
something to the effect of the negligence speaks for
itself, or this doesn't happen absent negligence. What
you're talking about there would be what's called a res
ipsa, or a common-knowledge case.
But . . . I can tell you that I handle most of the
medical malpractice cases in Somerset County, and . . .
I would not suggest that [you] rely on that doctrine. I'm
not deciding it, but I would not suggest that you feel
comfortable just saying I don't need an expert because
it's so obviously negligent.
I would strongly urge you to get an expert to
opine, or offer an opinion, at least as far as the affidavit
of merit goes.
Plaintiff confirmed she understood what the court had told her and informed the
court she had been "speaking back and forth with a few experts" and was "just
waiting to see if someone [wa]s willing to take [her] case."
Plaintiff requested the court grant her the available sixty-day extension.
Defense counsel did not object to the request and stated that based on his
calculation, with the extension, the deadline to submit the affidavit of merit was
February 18, 2026. The court granted plaintiff's extension request, provided
plaintiff with the citation to the AOM statute, and informed her:
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[Y]ou can confirm that [date], but now you've heard
directly from the attorney who would be compelled to
file a motion that he's operating with the date of
February 18th, meaning that, again, you have to have
that affidavit of merit served on the defense by
February 18th, and if you don't, even if you have the
best case in the world, it's still going to get thrown out,
because the court cannot extend the [deadline] -- you
can't come back to the court and say I'm really close and
I just need another ten days.
That is the cutoff date, so that's why I have no problem
extending it for another 60 days now, to get you some
extra time, but don't let it get too close to that date,
because if you pass that 120 day mark, then as I said,
no matter how good your case is, it's going to get
dismissed with prejudice because of failure to comply
with the statute.
The conference ended after plaintiff told the court she had no questions for the
court. The court entered a December 16, 2025 order granting the sixty-day
statutory extension and providing that plaintiff had until February 18, 2026, to
"file and serve an appropriate [a]ffidavit of [m]erit."
On February 19, 2026, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint based
on plaintiff's failure to provide an affidavit of merit by the February 18, 2026
deadline. An attorney entered an appearance on plaintiff's behalf and requested
an adjournment of the motion, which the court granted.
Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for an extension of time to
serve an affidavit of merit based on purported extraordinary circumstances. In
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support of the opposition and cross-motion, plaintiff's counsel submitted a
certification in which he stated his office was retained by plaintiff on January
19, 2026, and he had contacted anesthesiologists who advised him they "could
not consider the matter for purposes of providing an affidavit of merit because
the medical notes and records were incomplete." According to counsel, on
February 26, 2026, plaintiff submitted a HIPAA authorization and a record
request to the hospital where she had undergone the procedure and received the
documents when she requested them in person on March 2, 2026.
Plaintiff argued she was not required to submit an affidavit of merit under
the common-knowledge or res ipsa doctrines. Alternatively, she contended
extraordinary circumstances and equitable principles warranted an extension of
time to submit the affidavit or amend the complaint. In opposition to the cross-
motion, defendant submitted copies of plaintiff's medical records, including a
January 19, 2024 post-procedure note describing the left corner of plaintiff's
lower lip as "swollen" and "warm to touch" with "no bleeding" and a January
22, 2024 post-discharge note indicating plaintiff had responded as follows when
asked if she had experienced "any problems since discharge": "my left lower
lip is swollen and has a blood clot on it. I want to know why this happen[ed] to
my lip."
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After hearing argument, 1 the court placed a decision on the record
dismissing the case without prejudice. Finding plaintiff had failed to submit an
affidavit of merit by the February 18, 2026 deadline, the court acknowledged
"[t]he statute itself is clear" but nevertheless decided the court would "dismiss
the . . . complaint without prejudice at this point." Citing Rule 1:1-2, the court
determined it could "relax the rules in the interest of justice" and dismiss the
case without prejudice. The court held plaintiff, now represented by counsel,
could conduct pre-suit discovery and file a new complaint. The court rendered
that holding under the mistaken impression that the medical procedure had taken
place on January 19, 2025, and that any new complaint would be filed within
the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The court declined to determine
whether the common-knowledge doctrine applied because the parties had not
yet conducted discovery. The court denied plaintiff's cross-motion.
On March 27, 2026, the court entered an order denying plaintiff's cross-
motion and an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff's
counsel advised the court in a letter that plaintiff had misstated the date of the
procedure in her complaint and that a new complaint would be outside the statute
1
The motion was not heard by the same judge who had conducted the Ferreira
conference.
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of limitations. Counsel asked the court to amend the dismissal order to "toll the
statute for a time certain so that a refiling is deemed timely since [plaintiff] filed
timely at the outset." The court entered an amended order that day dismissing
the complaint without prejudice, granting plaintiff leave to file within 120 days
from the service of the order "any amended pleading or [to] take other action
permitted by law," and "toll[ing] and preserv[ing]" during that 120-day period
"any statute of limitations defense." Nothing in the record indicates the court
gave defendant an opportunity to respond or object to plaintiff's counsel's
request.
Defendant moved for leave to appeal the amended order dismissing the
complaint without prejudice. We granted that motion. Plaintiff did not seek
leave to cross-appeal the denial of her cross-motion. Defendant argues on
appeal the court misapplied the AOM statute by dismissing the complaint
without prejudice instead of with prejudice. We agree and, accordingly, vacate
the amended March 27, 2026 dismissal order, remand the case, and direct the
court to enter an order dismissing the case with prejudice.
II.
We review de novo a dismissal based on a failure to comply with the AOM
statute, in part because it involves a legal determination, specifically "the
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statutory interpretation issue of whether a cause of action is exempt from the
affidavit of merit requirement," and in part because it involves a dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim. Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys., 242 N.J. 1,
14-15 (2020). "The submission of an appropriate affidavit of merit is considered
an element of the claim." Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216, 228 (2016); see
also N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29.
The AOM statute requires a plaintiff who alleges medical negligence by a
licensed professional to provide the defendant with an affidavit from a medical
expert in the professional's field within sixty days of the filing of the defendant's
answer. See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. In the affidavit, the plaintiff's medical expert
must opine that a reasonable probability exists that the standard of care exercised
in the alleged malpractice fell outside the acceptable professional standards.
Ibid.; see also Cowley, 242 N.J. at 8.
The purpose of the AOM statute is to "identify and eliminate
unmeritorious claims against licensed professionals and to permit meritorious
claims to proceed efficiently through the litigation process." Meehan, 226 N.J.
at 229; see also Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc., 466
N.J. Super. 126, 131 (App. Div. 2021) (explaining that the intent of Legislature
was to ensure parties did not waste time or resources on unnecessary litigation),
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aff'd, 250 N.J. 368 (2022). Thus, pursuant to the statute, "a plaintiff must
provide 'each defendant' with an affidavit that indicates the plaintiff's claim has
merit." Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551, 559-60 (2001) (quoting N.J.S.A.
2A:53A-27). Underscoring the significance of the affidavit-of-merit
requirement, the statute further provides that "[t]he court may grant no more
than one additional period, not to exceed [sixty] days, to file the affidavit . . .
upon a finding of good cause." N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.
"The failure to provide an affidavit [of merit] . . . is 'deemed a failure to
state a cause of action.'" Cowley, 242 N.J. at 16 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29).
Thus, our Supreme Court "has 'construed the [AOM] statute to require dismissal
with prejudice for noncompliance.'" Ibid. (quoting A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337,
346 (2017)). In Ferreira, the Court held "[t]he failure to deliver a proper
affidavit within the statutory time period requires a dismissal of the complaint
with prejudice." 178 N.J. at 146-47; see also Meehan, 226 N.J. at 228 (finding
the "[f]ailure to submit an appropriate affidavit ordinarily requires dismissal of
the complaint with prejudice").
The Court, however, has "recognize[d] equitable exceptions to the
statutory [affidavit of merit] requirements 'to temper the draconian results of an
inflexible application of the statute,' and has crafted 'mechanisms to draw
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attention to and facilitate satisfaction of this statutory obligation and its goals.'"
Cowley, 242 N.J. at 16 (quoting A.T., 231 N.J. at 346) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The common-knowledge exception is one of those mechanisms. Ibid.
The common-knowledge exception does not apply when expert opinion is
required on the applicable standard of care. Id. at 22. The exception applies
only when "an expert is not needed to demonstrate that a defendant professional
breached some duty of care '[because] the carelessness of the defendant is
readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence.'" Id. at 17 (quoting
Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985)). "[I]f jurors, using ordinary
understanding and experience and without the assistance of an expert, can
determine whether a defendant has been negligent, the threshold of merit should
be readily apparent from a reading of plaintiff's complaint." Ibid. (quoting
Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 395 (2001)).
Thus, a plaintiff is relieved of the obligation to submit an affidavit of merit
"where the allegations do not require proof of a deviation from a professional
standard of care." Triarsi v. BSC Grp. Servs., LLC, 422 N.J. Super. 104, 114
(App. Div. 2011) (quoting Syndicate 1245 at Lloyd's v. Walnut Advisory Corp.,
721 F. Supp. 2d 307, 315 (D.N.J. 2010)). See, e.g., Hubbard, 168 N.J. at 396
(finding common-knowledge exception applied when a doctor pulled the wrong
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tooth from a patient's mouth); Est. of Chin. v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 160 N.J.
454, 470-71 (1999) (applying common-knowledge exception when patient died
after someone accidentally connected a gas line instead of a fluid line to the
patient); Bender v. Walgreen E. Co., 399 N.J. Super. 584, 591 (App. Div. 2008)
(finding common-knowledge exception applied when a pharmacist filled a
prescription with different medications other than the drug prescribed).
Cases in which the common-knowledge exception applies are
"exceptionally rare." Cowley, 242 N.J. at 17. Courts construe the common-
knowledge exception "narrowly 'to avoid noncompliance with the [AOM]
statute.'" Id. at 18-19 (quoting Hubbard, 168 N.J. at 397).
Applying those legal principles to the facts of this case, we conclude
plaintiff did not satisfy the standard for the common-knowledge exception.
Plaintiff alleged defendant deviated from the standard of care by causing an
injury to her lip while administering anesthesia during a medical procedure.
Whether causing a lip injury during intubation and the administration of
anesthesia constitutes a deviation from an anesthesiologist's standard of care is
beyond the common knowledge of jurors and requires an expert witness. "Jurors
cannot be allowed to speculate as to whether a procedure conformed to the
required professional standards of care." Id. at 21. Without the common-
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knowledge exception, plaintiff's res ipsa argument is equally unavailing. See
Risko v. Ciocca, 356 N.J. Super. 406, 411 (App. Div. 2003) (holding "an
affidavit of merit is required in a res ipsa case, unless the 'common[-]knowledge'
doctrine is also applicable").
The common-knowledge exception did not apply in this case and, thus,
did not relieve plaintiff of her obligation to submit an affidavit of merit under
the AOM statute. The court consequently erred in dismissing the complaint
without prejudice instead of with prejudice. The court mistakenly relied on Rule
1:1-2 to support its decision to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. That
rule authorizes a court to relax only a rule of court; it does not permit a court to
disregard Supreme Court precedent or legislative statutory intent. See Prospect
Hill Apartments v. Borough of Flemington, 1 N.J. Tax 224, 227 (Tax 1979)
(finding "[a] court has no power by virtue of [Rule 1:1-2] to relax or dispense
with a statute of limitations passed by the Legislature").
In response to defendant's appeal, plaintiff does not reassert the common-
knowledge argument she made to the trial court. Instead, she argues for the first
time that she substantially complied with the affidavit-of-merit requirement in
the AOM statute. "[O]ur appellate courts will decline to consider questions or
issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a
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presentation is available." J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 138 n.6
(2021) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)). Moreover, even if
we were inclined to consider plaintiff's argument, the argument is meritless
because she did not demonstrate substantial compliance. See H.C. Equities, LP
v. Cnty. of Union, 247 N.J. 366, 386 (2021) (finding "[t]he substantial
compliance doctrine 'operates to prevent barring legitimate claims due to
technical defects'" (quoting Cnty. of Hudson v. Dep't of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 21
(2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168
N.J. 398, 405 (2001) (describing what a plaintiff must prove to demonstrate
substantial compliance). Nor did she demonstrate extraordinary circumstances
justifying her failure to timely submit an affidavit of merit. See Gonzalez v.
Ibrahim, 477 N.J. Super. 647, 658 (App. Div. 2024) (describing what does and
does not constitute extraordinary circumstances).
Because we conclude the court should have dismissed the complaint with
prejudice, we do not address the parties' arguments regarding the tolling of the
statute of limitations.
In sum, we vacate the amended March 27, 2026 dismissal order and
remand for entry of an order dismissing the case with prejudice.
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Vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
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