Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3361-25 PHILIKA BELLAMY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DR. JOSEPH MLECZKO, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Submitted November 4, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026 Before Judges Gilson and Gummer. On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-1340-25. MacNeill O'Neill & Riveles, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Gary L. Riveles, of counsel; Esad Metjahic, on the briefs). Philika Bellamy, self-represented respondent. PER CURIAM In this medical-negligence case, defendant Dr. Joseph Mleczko, who is an anesthesiologist, appeals an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice after plaintiff Philika Bellamy failed to file an affidavit of merit pursuant to the Affidavit of Merit statute (AOM statute), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29. Because the trial court erred in dismissing the case without prejudice instead of with prejudice, we vacate the order, remand the case, and direct the court to enter an order dismissing the case with prejudice. I. On July 5, 2025, plaintiff, representing herself, filed a complaint against defendant in the Special Civil Part. In the complaint, she alleged defendant had administered anesthesia to her during a January 19, 2025 medical procedure that "did not involve [her] mouth or facial area." The actual date of the procedure was January 19, 2024. According to plaintiff, after the procedure she discovered "severe blisters on and around [her] lips," injuries she claimed "resulted in permanent holes and visible disfigurement." She contended the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied because "the injuries [we]re inconsistent with the scope of the procedure." In an August 25, 2025 order, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, finding the Special Civil Part lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's A-3361-25 2 professional-malpractice claim. Plaintiff made the same allegations in a complaint she filed in the Law Division on September 7, 2025. On October 21, 2025, defendant filed an answer in which he stated he "practic[ed] medicine in the specialty of [a]nesthesiology" and demanded plaintiff provide an affidavit of merit pursuant to the AOM statute. On December 9, 2025, the trial court held a Ferreira conference. See Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144, 155 (2003) (requiring case management conferences in professional-malpractice cases that would enable "the court [to] address all discovery issues, including whether an affidavit of merit has been served on defendant" and, "[i]f no affidavit has been served, . . . [to] remind the parties of their obligations under the statute and case law" ). At that conference, plaintiff acknowledged she had not yet submitted an affidavit of merit. She advised the court she had been "in search of an anesthesiologist" and had contacted one but had not yet heard back from her. The court explained in detail her obligation to obtain an affidavit of merit from an anesthesiologist, the timing requirements for that submission, her right to request a sixty-day extension, and defendant's right to move to dismiss the complaint if she failed to file an affidavit of merit within the applicable time period. A-3361-25 3 The court also addressed her reference in the complaint to the res ipsa doctrine: Now I saw in your complaint . . . that you . . . said something to the effect of the negligence speaks for itself, or this doesn't happen absent negligence. What you're talking about there would be what's called a res ipsa, or a common-knowledge case. But . . . I can tell you that I handle most of the medical malpractice cases in Somerset County, and . . . I would not suggest that [you] rely on that doctrine. I'm not deciding it, but I would not suggest that you feel comfortable just saying I don't need an expert because it's so obviously negligent. I would strongly urge you to get an expert to opine, or offer an opinion, at least as far as the affidavit of merit goes. Plaintiff confirmed she understood what the court had told her and informed the court she had been "speaking back and forth with a few experts" and was "just waiting to see if someone [wa]s willing to take [her] case." Plaintiff requested the court grant her the available sixty-day extension. Defense counsel did not object to the request and stated that based on his calculation, with the extension, the deadline to submit the affidavit of merit was February 18, 2026. The court granted plaintiff's extension request, provided plaintiff with the citation to the AOM statute, and informed her: A-3361-25 4 [Y]ou can confirm that [date], but now you've heard directly from the attorney who would be compelled to file a motion that he's operating with the date of February 18th, meaning that, again, you have to have that affidavit of merit served on the defense by February 18th, and if you don't, even if you have the best case in the world, it's still going to get thrown out, because the court cannot extend the [deadline] -- you can't come back to the court and say I'm really close and I just need another ten days. That is the cutoff date, so that's why I have no problem extending it for another 60 days now, to get you some extra time, but don't let it get too close to that date, because if you pass that 120 day mark, then as I said, no matter how good your case is, it's going to get dismissed with prejudice because of failure to comply with the statute. The conference ended after plaintiff told the court she had no questions for the court. The court entered a December 16, 2025 order granting the sixty-day statutory extension and providing that plaintiff had until February 18, 2026, to "file and serve an appropriate [a]ffidavit of [m]erit." On February 19, 2026, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint based on plaintiff's failure to provide an affidavit of merit by the February 18, 2026 deadline. An attorney entered an appearance on plaintiff's behalf and requested an adjournment of the motion, which the court granted. Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for an extension of time to serve an affidavit of merit based on purported extraordinary circumstances. In A-3361-25 5 support of the opposition and cross-motion, plaintiff's counsel submitted a certification in which he stated his office was retained by plaintiff on January 19, 2026, and he had contacted anesthesiologists who advised him they "could not consider the matter for purposes of providing an affidavit of merit because the medical notes and records were incomplete." According to counsel, on February 26, 2026, plaintiff submitted a HIPAA authorization and a record request to the hospital where she had undergone the procedure and received the documents when she requested them in person on March 2, 2026. Plaintiff argued she was not required to submit an affidavit of merit under the common-knowledge or res ipsa doctrines. Alternatively, she contended extraordinary circumstances and equitable principles warranted an extension of time to submit the affidavit or amend the complaint. In opposition to the cross- motion, defendant submitted copies of plaintiff's medical records, including a January 19, 2024 post-procedure note describing the left corner of plaintiff's lower lip as "swollen" and "warm to touch" with "no bleeding" and a January 22, 2024 post-discharge note indicating plaintiff had responded as follows when asked if she had experienced "any problems since discharge": "my left lower lip is swollen and has a blood clot on it. I want to know why this happen[ed] to my lip." A-3361-25 6 After hearing argument, 1 the court placed a decision on the record dismissing the case without prejudice. Finding plaintiff had failed to submit an affidavit of merit by the February 18, 2026 deadline, the court acknowledged "[t]he statute itself is clear" but nevertheless decided the court would "dismiss the . . . complaint without prejudice at this point." Citing Rule 1:1-2, the court determined it could "relax the rules in the interest of justice" and dismiss the case without prejudice. The court held plaintiff, now represented by counsel, could conduct pre-suit discovery and file a new complaint. The court rendered that holding under the mistaken impression that the medical procedure had taken place on January 19, 2025, and that any new complaint would be filed within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The court declined to determine whether the common-knowledge doctrine applied because the parties had not yet conducted discovery. The court denied plaintiff's cross-motion. On March 27, 2026, the court entered an order denying plaintiff's cross- motion and an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff's counsel advised the court in a letter that plaintiff had misstated the date of the procedure in her complaint and that a new complaint would be outside the statute 1 The motion was not heard by the same judge who had conducted the Ferreira conference. A-3361-25 7 of limitations. Counsel asked the court to amend the dismissal order to "toll the statute for a time certain so that a refiling is deemed timely since [plaintiff] filed timely at the outset." The court entered an amended order that day dismissing the complaint without prejudice, granting plaintiff leave to file within 120 days from the service of the order "any amended pleading or [to] take other action permitted by law," and "toll[ing] and preserv[ing]" during that 120-day period "any statute of limitations defense." Nothing in the record indicates the court gave defendant an opportunity to respond or object to plaintiff's counsel's request. Defendant moved for leave to appeal the amended order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. We granted that motion. Plaintiff did not seek leave to cross-appeal the denial of her cross-motion. Defendant argues on appeal the court misapplied the AOM statute by dismissing the complaint without prejudice instead of with prejudice. We agree and, accordingly, vacate the amended March 27, 2026 dismissal order, remand the case, and direct the court to enter an order dismissing the case with prejudice. II. We review de novo a dismissal based on a failure to comply with the AOM statute, in part because it involves a legal determination, specifically "the A-3361-25 8 statutory interpretation issue of whether a cause of action is exempt from the affidavit of merit requirement," and in part because it involves a dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. Cowley v. Virtua Health Sys., 242 N.J. 1, 14-15 (2020). "The submission of an appropriate affidavit of merit is considered an element of the claim." Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216, 228 (2016); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29. The AOM statute requires a plaintiff who alleges medical negligence by a licensed professional to provide the defendant with an affidavit from a medical expert in the professional's field within sixty days of the filing of the defendant's answer. See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. In the affidavit, the plaintiff's medical expert must opine that a reasonable probability exists that the standard of care exercised in the alleged malpractice fell outside the acceptable professional standards. Ibid.; see also Cowley, 242 N.J. at 8. The purpose of the AOM statute is to "identify and eliminate unmeritorious claims against licensed professionals and to permit meritorious claims to proceed efficiently through the litigation process." Meehan, 226 N.J. at 229; see also Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc., 466 N.J. Super. 126, 131 (App. Div. 2021) (explaining that the intent of Legislature was to ensure parties did not waste time or resources on unnecessary litigation), A-3361-25 9 aff'd, 250 N.J. 368 (2022). Thus, pursuant to the statute, "a plaintiff must provide 'each defendant' with an affidavit that indicates the plaintiff's claim has merit." Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551, 559-60 (2001) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27). Underscoring the significance of the affidavit-of-merit requirement, the statute further provides that "[t]he court may grant no more than one additional period, not to exceed [sixty] days, to file the affidavit . . . upon a finding of good cause." N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. "The failure to provide an affidavit [of merit] . . . is 'deemed a failure to state a cause of action.'" Cowley, 242 N.J. at 16 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29). Thus, our Supreme Court "has 'construed the [AOM] statute to require dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance.'" Ibid. (quoting A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337, 346 (2017)). In Ferreira, the Court held "[t]he failure to deliver a proper affidavit within the statutory time period requires a dismissal of the complaint with prejudice." 178 N.J. at 146-47; see also Meehan, 226 N.J. at 228 (finding the "[f]ailure to submit an appropriate affidavit ordinarily requires dismissal of the complaint with prejudice"). The Court, however, has "recognize[d] equitable exceptions to the statutory [affidavit of merit] requirements 'to temper the draconian results of an inflexible application of the statute,' and has crafted 'mechanisms to draw A-3361-25 10 attention to and facilitate satisfaction of this statutory obligation and its goals.'" Cowley, 242 N.J. at 16 (quoting A.T., 231 N.J. at 346) (internal quotation marks omitted). The common-knowledge exception is one of those mechanisms. Ibid. The common-knowledge exception does not apply when expert opinion is required on the applicable standard of care. Id. at 22. The exception applies only when "an expert is not needed to demonstrate that a defendant professional breached some duty of care '[because] the carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 325 (1985)). "[I]f jurors, using ordinary understanding and experience and without the assistance of an expert, can determine whether a defendant has been negligent, the threshold of merit should be readily apparent from a reading of plaintiff's complaint." Ibid. (quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 395 (2001)). Thus, a plaintiff is relieved of the obligation to submit an affidavit of merit "where the allegations do not require proof of a deviation from a professional standard of care." Triarsi v. BSC Grp. Servs., LLC, 422 N.J. Super. 104, 114 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Syndicate 1245 at Lloyd's v. Walnut Advisory Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 307, 315 (D.N.J. 2010)). See, e.g., Hubbard, 168 N.J. at 396 (finding common-knowledge exception applied when a doctor pulled the wrong A-3361-25 11 tooth from a patient's mouth); Est. of Chin. v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 160 N.J. 454, 470-71 (1999) (applying common-knowledge exception when patient died after someone accidentally connected a gas line instead of a fluid line to the patient); Bender v. Walgreen E. Co., 399 N.J. Super. 584, 591 (App. Div. 2008) (finding common-knowledge exception applied when a pharmacist filled a prescription with different medications other than the drug prescribed). Cases in which the common-knowledge exception applies are "exceptionally rare." Cowley, 242 N.J. at 17. Courts construe the common- knowledge exception "narrowly 'to avoid noncompliance with the [AOM] statute.'" Id. at 18-19 (quoting Hubbard, 168 N.J. at 397). Applying those legal principles to the facts of this case, we conclude plaintiff did not satisfy the standard for the common-knowledge exception. Plaintiff alleged defendant deviated from the standard of care by causing an injury to her lip while administering anesthesia during a medical procedure. Whether causing a lip injury during intubation and the administration of anesthesia constitutes a deviation from an anesthesiologist's standard of care is beyond the common knowledge of jurors and requires an expert witness. "Jurors cannot be allowed to speculate as to whether a procedure conformed to the required professional standards of care." Id. at 21. Without the common- A-3361-25 12 knowledge exception, plaintiff's res ipsa argument is equally unavailing. See Risko v. Ciocca, 356 N.J. Super. 406, 411 (App. Div. 2003) (holding "an affidavit of merit is required in a res ipsa case, unless the 'common[-]knowledge' doctrine is also applicable"). The common-knowledge exception did not apply in this case and, thus, did not relieve plaintiff of her obligation to submit an affidavit of merit under the AOM statute. The court consequently erred in dismissing the complaint without prejudice instead of with prejudice. The court mistakenly relied on Rule 1:1-2 to support its decision to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. That rule authorizes a court to relax only a rule of court; it does not permit a court to disregard Supreme Court precedent or legislative statutory intent. See Prospect Hill Apartments v. Borough of Flemington, 1 N.J. Tax 224, 227 (Tax 1979) (finding "[a] court has no power by virtue of [Rule 1:1-2] to relax or dispense with a statute of limitations passed by the Legislature"). In response to defendant's appeal, plaintiff does not reassert the common- knowledge argument she made to the trial court. Instead, she argues for the first time that she substantially complied with the affidavit-of-merit requirement in the AOM statute. "[O]ur appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a A-3361-25 13 presentation is available." J.K. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 247 N.J. 120, 138 n.6 (2021) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)). Moreover, even if we were inclined to consider plaintiff's argument, the argument is meritless because she did not demonstrate substantial compliance. See H.C. Equities, LP v. Cnty. of Union, 247 N.J. 366, 386 (2021) (finding "[t]he substantial compliance doctrine 'operates to prevent barring legitimate claims due to technical defects'" (quoting Cnty. of Hudson v. Dep't of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 21 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 405 (2001) (describing what a plaintiff must prove to demonstrate substantial compliance). Nor did she demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying her failure to timely submit an affidavit of merit. See Gonzalez v. Ibrahim, 477 N.J. Super. 647, 658 (App. Div. 2024) (describing what does and does not constitute extraordinary circumstances). Because we conclude the court should have dismissed the complaint with prejudice, we do not address the parties' arguments regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations. In sum, we vacate the amended March 27, 2026 dismissal order and remand for entry of an order dismissing the case with prejudice. A-3361-25 14 Vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-3361-25 15