Marine Revitalization Corp. v. DLNR

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS _____________________________________________ MARINE REVITALIZATION CORPORATION AND ANTHONY PELLEGRINO, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS AN OFFICER OF MARINE REVITALIZATION CORPORATION, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________________ SUPREME COURT NO. 2009-SCC-0016-CIV SUPERIOR COURT NO. 04-0589 ____________________________________ Cite as: 2010 MP 18 Decided December 14, 2010 Edward Buckingham and David Lochabay, Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands for Defendant- Appellant Michael Dotts, Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands for Plaintiffs-Appellees  BEFORE: MIGUEL S. DEMAPAN, Chief Justice; ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO, Associate Justice; HERBERT D. SOLL, Justice Pro Tem DEMAPAN, C.J.: ¶1 Appellant Department of Land and Natural Resources (“DLNR”), appeals the third order in aid of judgment in which the trial court set forth several methods of satisfying a stipulated judgment entered in favor of Appellee Marine Revitalization Corporation (“MRC”). The order awarded MRC tax credits worth over five million dollars, ordered that funds and income held by DLNR be spent to satisfy the judgment, and ordered that money already appropriated for the payment of judgments be transferred to MRC. DLNR contends that any action by a Commonwealth court to directly or indirectly satisfy the judgment in the absence of a specific appropriation for that purpose by the Commonwealth Legislature violates both the Commonwealth’s Constitution and statutes. MRC counters that the government’s refusal to satisfy the judgment constitutes a violation of our Constitution, and that this Court has the authority to ensure that the government complies with the judiciary’s judgments and orders. For the reasons set forth herein we hold: (1) the award of assignable tax credits to MRC to satisfy the judgment was in error; (2) no part of DLNR’s budget or the income it derives from its operation of the Outer Cove Marina can be used to satisfy the judgment; (3) federal funds cannot be garnished to satisfy the judgment; (4) post-judgment interest does not accumulate against the government on either the judgment or on any money already appropriated for the payment of judgments; (5) money already appropriated by the Legislature for the payment of judgments must be paid to MRC; (6) DLNR can be ordered to report to the trial court on a regular basis concerning its efforts to satisfy the judgment; and (7) the trial court can only issue an order of contempt for the government’s failure to comply with the portions of the third order in aid of judgment that are upheld by this Court. Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND this matter to the trial court.1 I ¶2 The facts of this case are relatively straightforward and undisputed. In 1995, the Commonwealth Legislature enacted the Marine Revitalization Corporation Submerged Lands Lease Act (“Public Law 9-46”). Public Law 9-46 authorized a contract between DLNR and MRC for the construction of Outer Cove Marina. The contract provided that MRC would construct the marina for the government, and the government would then lease the marina to MRC for a period 1 DLNR petitioned this Court for a stay of the Third Order in Aid of Judgment, which we granted. MRC subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration. As the full Panel has considered all of the papers filed in this matter, and issued its opinion, we choose to not write separately and address the Motion for Reconsideration.  of fifteen years, during which time MRC would receive fees and profits from its operation. Public Law 9-46 required that all commercial boats utilize the new marina and that the usage fees collected would belong to MRC. Relying on the above contract, MRC executed a promissory note for $700,000 in favor of Mobil Oil Marianas Incorporated to fund a boat fueling station and mini- mart at the Outer Cove Marina. Public Law 9-46 provided for binding arbitration in the event of a dispute, and that the decision of the arbitrators “shall be enforceable in the Commonwealth Courts.” Appellant’s Excerpts of Record (“ER”) at 36. ¶3 After the construction of the marina, MRC claimed that DLNR breached the contract by failing to require commercial boats to use the Outer Cove. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration. In December 2004, the arbitrators unanimously ruled in favor of MRC, finding not only that DLNR failed to require commercial boats to use Outer Cove Marina, but that DLNR also engaged in active competition against MRC by soliciting commercial boaters for its marina at Smiling Cove in direct contravention of Public Law 9-46. The arbitration panel ultimately awarded MRC more than five million dollars. Following the issuance of the arbitration award, the parties stipulated to the entry of a judgment in the trial court. On January 27, 2005, the trial court entered judgment in the amount of $5,919,849.99. Since the issuance of the arbitration award and the entry of judgment, the Legislature has not made an appropriation to satisfy the judgment, and the executive has not submitted proposed legislation to have any money appropriated to satisfy the judgment. ¶4 Following the government’s failure to satisfy the judgment, MRC sought an order in aid of judgment. Marine Revitalization Corp., v. CNMI Dept. of Lands and Natural Resources, Civ. No. 04-0589D (NMI Super. Ct. May 10, 2005) ([Unpublished] Order in Aid of Judgment). The trial court found that DLNR had not made any written request to the Legislature for an appropriation of funds to satisfy the judgment. The court further found evidence indicating that $20,000 was available in an account at the Department of Finance for the payment of judgments. The motion for an order in aid of judgment was granted, and the trial court ordered DLNR to pay the $20,000 “remaining of the amount originally appropriated by the Commonwealth Legislature for the payment of Judgments” to MRC. Appellee’s Excerpts of Record (“ER”) at 7. The trial court also ordered DLNR to pay all income from its operations into the court’s coffers bi-weekly. The government ignored the order and did not challenge it on appeal. ¶5 From May 2005, when the first order issued, until February 2008, extensive settlement talks ensued between the parties. During this period, however, the government did not make any payments in accordance with the first order. In February 2008, the parties held their final  settlement conference. At that time, MRC presented seven detailed proposals for ways that the government could begin to satisfy the judgment. The government rejected all seven proposals. ¶6 The government’s refusal to meet its contractual obligations resulted in MRC’s inability to pay its creditors, including Mobil Oil, which filed separate suits against both the Commonwealth and MRC. See Marine Revitalization Corp. and Anthony Pellegrino v. CNMI Department of Lands and Natural Resources, Civ. No. 04-0589; Mobil Oil Mariana Islands, Inc. v. Marine Revitalization Corp. and Anthony Pellegrino, Civ. No. 02-0566. Recognizing the relationship between Mobil’s suits and the present action, as well as the practical reality that Mobil would not be able to recover from MRC until the Commonwealth paid MRC, the trial court consolidated the litigation for the purpose of facilitating a global resolution. See Mobil Oil Mariana Islands, Inc. v. Marine Revitalization Corp. and Anthony Pellegrino, Civ. No. 02-0566 (Super. Ct. March 15, 2006) (Order on Defendant’s Motion to Consolidate). This consolidation gives rise to Mobil’s status as an interested party in the instant appeal.2 ¶7 After three years of government inaction, in 2008 MRC sought a second order in aid of judgment. The trial court issued the second order in aid of judgment that again mandated the prompt payment of the $20,000 from the original order, plus nine percent interest from May 2005, which was when the first order was issued. See Marine Revitalization Corp. v. CNMI Dept. of Lands and Natural Resources, Civ. No. 04-0589D (NMI Super. Ct. May 21, 2008) ([Unpublished] Order in Aid of Judgment). The second order also allowed MRC to recoup the balance of the judgment through tax credits. The government did not object or appeal the second order in aid of judgment, but instead ignored the court’s directive. Four months later, DLNR acknowledged the second order by filing a motion to quash and/or modify it. MRC opposed the motion and filed a motion for the third order in aid of judgment that is now before the Court. Mobil Oil joined in MRC’s motion for another order in aid of judgment. ¶8 In its third request for an order in aid of judgment, MRC asked the trial court to make the tax credits granted in the second order assignable to third parties. At the hearing on DLNR’s motion to quash the second order and MRC’s motion for a third order in aid of judgment, the government did not dispute the validity of the initial stipulated judgment confirming the arbitration award of approximately six million dollars, or that the entire amount of the judgment, including accrued interest, remained outstanding. Instead, DLNR argued that under the Commonwealth Code, judgments against the government can only be paid by specific 2 In its brief, Mobil states that “Mobil and MRC have entered into a conditional settlement in which MRC has agreed to assign $1.5 million of its judgment against the CNMI to Mobil. Mobil has been discussing with the CNMI how that amount could be paid over time in the form of tax offsets, but no final agreement has been reached.” Response Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Mobil Oil Mariana Islands, Inc. at 2.  appropriations by the Legislature and that no such appropriation had been made. The government first pointed to 7 CMC § 2251(b), which waives sovereign immunity for any suit “founded upon any law of this jurisdiction . . . or upon any express or implied contract with the Commonwealth government.” The government then relied on 7 CMC § 2254, which provides “[j]udgments rendered pursuant to this article shall be paid from such funds as may be appropriated by the Commonwealth Legislature for that purpose.” In essence, the government argued that it could not satisfy the arbitration award and the stipulated judgment because the Legislature failed to make the necessary appropriation. For reasons discussed more fully below, the trial court disagreed, finding 7 CMC § 2254 inapplicable because the original stipulated judgment was “rendered pursuant to” Public Law 9-46 rather than the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in 7 CMC § 2251(b). ¶9 In February 2009, the trial court granted MRC’s motion for a third order in aid of judgment, and it affirmed and incorporated the earlier orders as well as MRC’s request to make the tax credits assignable. The order provides in pertinent part: 1. The $20,000 ordered paid to Plaintiff’s [sic] on May 10, 2005, shall be paid to Plaintiff’s counsel on or before April 1, 2009, with an accumulated interest at the rate of 9% from May 10, 2005 to the date of payment; 2. DLNR shall pay all income biweekly of DLNR received from its operations at the marina at Outer Cover [sic] in Saipan including, but not limited to the boat slip rental fees, to cover Plaintiff’s costs on executing this judgment into the court; 3. DLNR shall report to the Court by April 30, 2009, on what efforts have been made to obtain an appropriation of funds by the legislature to pay the judgment and to report to the Court on what has been collected out of the operation of the DLNR; 4. Plaintiffs, as well as all CNMI corporations in which Plaintiff’s [sic] Marine Revitalization Corporation or Anthony Pellegrino is the sole shareholder, are hereby authorized to use Plaintiffs’ portion of the judgment ($5,646,679.00 plus 9% interest from January 27, 2005) as a dollar-for-dollar offset (the “Tax Offset”) against the CNMI Gross Revenue Tax . . . . 5. Plaintiffs may assign for consideration all or a portion of its Stipulated Judgment, entered on January 23, 2005, to any third persons or entities. The amount assigned shall be taken by the assignee(s) as a dollar-for- dollar offset against CNMI Gross Revenue Tax . . . . 6. [discussing the procedure for using the assignable tax credits].  7. In the event the Order is not complied with, Plaintiffs are authorized to seek further relief, including but not limited to an order garnishing federal funds, appropriating portions of DLNR’s budget, and obtaining a finding of contempt from the Court. Appellant’s ER at 5-7. DLNR appeals the third order in aid of judgment, which we have jurisdiction over pursuant to 1 CMC § 3102. II ¶ 10 The facts in this appeal present a very troubling scenario. The Commonwealth government entered into a contract, which by its own terms was enforceable in the Commonwealth Courts, then breached that agreement and has now failed to fulfill its contractual obligations by repeatedly ignoring a multi-million dollar judgment. Perhaps most troubling is the fact that the government does not dispute the validity of the judgment or of the debt; rather, the Attorney General is put in the unenviable position of arguing that the separation of powers doctrine allows the government to simply ignore a valid judgment to which it stipulated because the Legislature failed to appropriate money for that judgment. ¶ 11 DLNR argues that the trial court’s order violated the Commonwealth Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine by indirectly appropriating public funds without the approval of the Legislature. The government also argues that pursuant to Commonwealth statutory law, judgments against the government cannot be paid unless the Legislature makes an appropriation for the payment of the specific judgment in question. MRC responds that the government’s repeated refusals to act on the trial court’s orders itself violates the separation of powers doctrine; that is, the executive and legislative branches cannot completely ignore a directive of the judiciary—a co-equal branch of government. We review de novo constitutional and statutory questions. N. Marianas College v. Civil Service Comm. II, 2007 MP 8 ¶ 2. A. Constitutional Issues ¶ 12 The Commonwealth Constitution provides for a tripartite system of government. Article II sets forth the powers of the Legislature, Article III sets forth the powers of the Executive, and Article IV sets forth the powers of the Judiciary. This organization, distributing the powers among the coordinate branches of government, gives rise to the separation of powers doctrine. Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1148 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the separation of powers doctrine is implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the state constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government). The separation of powers principle operates in a broad manner to confine legislative powers to the legislature, executive powers to the executive, and those powers which are judicial in character to the judiciary. VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223, 235 (Kan. 1973). Simply stated,  the doctrine forbids one branch of government from exercising the powers properly belonging to another branch. Admin. Office of Ill. Cts. v. State and Mun. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local 726, 657 N.E.2d 972, 981 (Ill. 1995). ¶ 13 Both parties argue that the trial court’s third order in aid of judgment should either be upheld or invalidated on separation of powers grounds. The government relies on Articles II and X of the Commonwealth Constitution, which collectively bestow upon the Legislature control over the power to expend public funds. Article II, section 5 of the Commonwealth Constitution grants the Legislature the power of the purse, providing that “[a]ppropriation and revenue bills may be introduced only in the house of representatives.” NMI Const. art. II, § 5(a). Likewise, Article X, which governs taxation and public finance, provides that “[a] tax may not be levied and an appropriation of public money may not be made, directly or indirectly, except for a public purpose. The legislature shall provide the definition of public purpose.” NMI Const. art. X. Together, these provisions imbue the Commonwealth Legislature with exclusive control over the direct or indirect expenditure of public funds. The government also relies on the separation of powers principle that: [A] judgment against the state . . . merely liquidates and establishes the claim against the state, and that, in the absence of an express statute so providing, such judgment cannot be collected by execution against the state or its property, or by any of the ordinary processes of law provided for the enforcement of judgments; it remains for the state, after such judgment, to provide for the payment thereof in such manner as it sees fit . . ., and the judgment creditor can obtain payment in no other way than that provided. Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Chambers, 145 P. 1025, 1026 (Cal. 1915). ¶ 14 For its part, MRC argues that the government’s failure to comply with the trial court’s order encroaches upon the province of the judiciary, which generally includes the authority to hear and determine justiciable controversies. This includes the authority to enforce valid judgments, Del Papa v. Steffen, 915 P.2d 245, 250-51 (Nev. 1996), and that the trial court in this case had the inherent power to enforce a valid judgment. Specifically, MRC directs this Court to Article IV, section 2 of the Commonwealth Constitution, which provides that “[t]he Superior Court shall have all inherent powers, including the power to issue all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its duties and jurisdiction under the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth.” We must determine how these constitutional provisions interact with each other, and how that interaction affects the third order in aid of judgment. ¶ 15 The United States Supreme Court recognizes that if a state consents to be sued that its waiver of sovereign immunity does not allow its courts to force it to make an appropriation to satisfy a judgment in the absence of such consent; such a scheme does not run afoul of any  section of the U.S. Constitution. Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1896). In Baltzer, the Court recognized the principle that: When a judgment has been rendered, the liability of the State has been judicially ascertained, but there the power of the court ends. The State is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not. The obligations of the contract have been finally determined, but the claimant has still only the faith and credit of the State to rely on its fulfillment. Id. at 243 (citing R.R. Co. v. Tenn., 101 U.S. 337, 340 (1880)). The Court further stated that a state “may refuse to pay, that is, may refuse to make the necessary appropriation, and the courts are powerless to compel them to do so.” Id. In Baltzer, the plaintiff sued the state of North Carolina after it amended its constitution to forbid the payment of any debt or bond incurred during 1868, which was the year when the state ratified its new constitution and regained admission to the Union. After the amendment’s ratification, the plaintiff sued for interest the states owed him on his bonds. Finding that North Carolina consented to the suit, the Court nevertheless recognized that this consent did not extend to the enforcement of a judgment against the state, and that this did not run afoul of the Contracts Clause or any other section of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 245-46. Thus, there is not a U.S. Constitutional rule requiring a state to honor judgments against it, and this includes situations where the state has breached one of its contracts. ¶ 16 MRC, however, cites federal case law for the proposition that the Commonwealth Courts can enforce judgments against the Commonwealth government. Both the trial court and MRC in this appeal rely on Camacho v. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Civ No. 05- 0043 (D.N.M.I. 2008). In Camacho, the Commonwealth government took the plaintiff’s real property for the purposes of paving and widening a road. The plaintiff filed suit seeking just compensation under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and subsequently obtained a judgment in his favor. The government, however, failed to satisfy the award. The plaintiff then sought a writ of execution or an order in aid of judgment to force the government to satisfy the judgment. The government argued that under Commonwealth law the plaintiff had no way of enforcing the judgment absent an appropriation by the Commonwealth Legislature. The District Court disagreed and granted the order. Without any supporting authority, the District Court reasoned that the Legislature’s failure “to fulfill its constitutional mandate does not, cannot, and will not prevent the court from taking all necessary steps to ensure that its judgments are enforceable. A court that cannot enforce its judgments must forever close its doors, as it will have become nothing more than an historical curiosity.” Appellee’s ER 6 at 44. ¶ 17 The District Court in Camacho does not cite any supporting authority for its order. As MRC points out in its brief, however, federal courts often order state governments to satisfy  federal judgments even in the face of state statutes requiring legislative appropriation. For example, federal courts routinely force states to pay costs in federal civil rights actions, Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1980), and order municipalities to levy taxes to remedy racial discrimination in public schools. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988). ¶ 18 These federal cases, however, are inapplicable for two very significant reasons. First, they all arise in federal court, which is not a co-equal branch of state government subject to the same separations of powers issues that bind this Court. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they all involve federal constitutional issues—namely, the Takings Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process Clause—or are brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act. Since federal law supersedes conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause, federal courts hold that where a state violation of federal law results in a judgment against the state, the federal courts possess the authority to enforce those judgments. The facts of this case, however, do not implicate any federal constitutional issues. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1982), “[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, a court, in enforcing federal law, may order state officials to take actions despite contravening state laws.” In this case MRC is in a Commonwealth Court and fails to raise any federal Constitutional issues. Thus, the Supremacy Clause is not applicable and the federal cases cited by the trial court and by MRC do not provide a valid basis upon which this Court can permissibly uphold the lower court’s order. ¶ 19 Turning to the state courts that have addressed this issue, those courts are in almost unanimous agreement that they cannot compel the legislature to appropriate funds either directly or indirectly to satisfy a judgment. Smith v. State of North Carolina, 222 S.E.2d 412 (N.C. 1976), stands for the proposition that while the court is empowered to declare the rights as between a judgment creditor and the government, it cannot enforce the judgment absent legislative appropriation. In that case, a doctor received an appointment as superintendent of a state hospital for a term of six years pursuant to statute, but his state employer discharged him without cause and without a hearing. Following his termination, the doctor sought severance pay from the governor and the budget commission—pay that the doctor was statutorily entitled to receive. After the governor and budget commission failed to take action, the doctor filed suit to compel the government to pay him $250,000 in severance. ¶ 20 In Smith, the court first determined that a valid contract existed between the doctor and the government. 222 S.E.2d at 417. The court then framed the issue as follows: “[h]aving determined that a contract existed between plaintiff and the State, the question is whether the state is immune from an action for damages for the alleged breach of that contract.” Id. The court began with the rule that  [t]he rights and responsibilities of a state under an ordinary business contract are, with few exceptions, the same as those of individuals. Although it cannot be sued without its consent, the state, when making a contract with an individual, is liable for a breach of its agreement in like manner as an individual contractor. Id. Notwithstanding the above proposition, the court then went on to say that “there is an[] . . . essential and far-reaching difference between the contracts of citizens and those of sovereigns, not, indeed, as to the meaning and effect of the contract itself, but as to the capacity of the sovereign to defeat the enforcement of its contract.” Id. at 418. The court stated that the difference exists in the fact that “[t]he legislature has the ability to avoid payment of the obligations of the state by a failure or refusal to make the necessary appropriation . . . . Unless there is an appropriation, courts have no power to enforce a contract of a state, even though they do not doubt its validity.” Id. ¶ 21 The court then quotes a number of cases all making similar proclamations: that although the courts cannot force the legislature to fulfill its contractual obligations, the government nonetheless has a duty to its citizenry of faithful performance. Id. at 419-22. Quoting Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Department of Agriculture, 314 P.2d 278, 280 (Colo. 1957), the court states: To hold that the state may enter into a contract by which the other party is compelled to expend large sums in acquiring material, machinery and personnel to enable it to perform its obligation, and then arbitrarily repudiate the contract relegating the injured party to the doubtful remedy of appealing to the legislature for justice in the form of a bill for relief, would be to sanction the highest type of governmental tyranny. Id. at 421 ¶ 22 After wading through a litany of cases admonishing the government to fulfill its contractual obligations, the court then states: [i]n the event plaintiff is successful in establishing his claim against the State, he cannot, of course, obtain execution to enforce the judgment . . . . The judiciary will have performed its function to the limit of its constitutional powers. Satisfaction will depend upon the manner in which the General Assembly discharges its constitutional duties. Id. at 424. Finally, the court states that “[w]e do not apprehend that this decision will result in any unseemly conflict between the legislative and judicial branches of the government . . . . Past performance convinces us that when the State has entered into a contract, the officials who made it intended that the State would keep its part of the bargain.” Id. ¶ 23 As the above discussion indicates, Smith is not directly on point. Unlike the present case, in Smith no valid judgment existed. The question in that case was whether the employee could sue the government. It did not involve a request for the court to enforce an already existing  uncontested judgment. Id. at 424 (“Today we decide only that plaintiff is not to be denied his day in court because his contract was with the State.”). Furthermore, the case was premised on the assumption that the government would comply with its contractual obligations—an assumption already proven untrue in this case. ¶ 24 In Newman Marchive Partnership, Inc., v. City of Shreveport, 979 So.2d 1262, 1265 (La. 2008), which is closer factually to the case now before us, and does not premise its holding on hopeful notions that the government will do what it says it will do, the Louisiana Supreme Court held, without apology, that it is constitutionally prohibited from invading the province of the legislature and forcing the state to pay its debts when it refuses. In that case, a construction company contracted with the City of Shreveport to renovate a stadium. The company brought suit for breach of contract and received a sizable judgment in the trial court. After the City failed to pay the judgment, the company brought an action to compel payment. The trial court issued a writ of mandamus, compelling the City to satisfy the judgment, and the City appealed. The issue on appeal was “whether the judicial branch may . . . compel a political subdivision of the state to pay a judgment rendered against it” when no appropriation has been made to satisfy the judgment. Id. at 1264. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that it could not. ¶ 25 In Newman, the court began with the state constitutional and statutory provisions concerning suits against the government and the payment of judgments. Id. at 1265. The court first pointed out that the constitution waives sovereign immunity for certain claims sounding in contract and tort. Id. The court then cited a statutory provision, which provides that “[a]ny judgment rendered in any suit filed against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision . . . shall be exigible, payable, and paid only out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the legislature . . . .” Id. at 1266 (citation omitted). Given the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, the court held that while “the judicial branch is empowered to render judgments against the state . . . the constitution does not provide the judiciary with the ability to execute those judgments.” Id. at 1265. The court further recognized that: Admittedly, [the constitutional and statutory provisions] create[] a frustrating dichotomy for the state’s judgment creditors . . . . Still, the combined effect of [these provisions] is clear. Judgments against a political subdivision of the State may only be paid out of funds appropriated for that purpose . . . and under no circumstance shall public property or public funds . . . be subject to seizure. Id. at 1266 (quotations and citations omitted). ¶ 26 In Amantia v. Cantwell, 213 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1965), government employees sought a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to differential pay pursuant to statute, and also sought a writ of mandamus to compel the state treasurer to make provision for the payment. The  court granted declaratory relief, stating that “it is clear to us that petitioners are entitled to the pay they seek, and we so hold.” Id. at 254. The court denied, however, the employees’ request to compel payment, stating: What this court cannot do, however, is direct that the money be paid to the petitioners or compel respondents to request an appropriation. The power to appropriate money rests with the Legislature. While we recognize petitioners’ moral and legal right to the differential pay they seek, this court cannot secure it for them by way of a directive. We can and do declare that the money is due them. Whether or not petitioners receive the money to which they are clearly entitled rests exclusively with the Legislature. Id. ¶ 27 Similarly, in Magnetti v. University of Maryland, 909 A.2d 1101, 1106 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), the appellate court held that even where a statute exists providing that a governmental entity may sue or be sued, “obtaining a money judgment requires a two-part showing: first, that specific legislative authority for suits has been given, and second, that funds have been appropriated for the purpose of satisfying a money judgment.” In Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 219 A.2d 512, 513 (N.J. 1966), the court held that it “could not enforce a judgment if it gave one. No money may be drawn from the State treasury but for appropriations made by law. . . . The judiciary could not order the Legislature to appropriate money, or the Governor to approve an appropriation if one were made.” See N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Serv. v. D.C. and M.C., 571 A.2d 1295, 1301 (N.J. 1990) (stating that “[n]o money may be drawn from the State treasury but for appropriations made by law” unless the constitution mandates the disbursement); see also Soto v. Nebraska, 693 N.W.2d 491, 498 (Neb. 2005) (holding that a statute that requires legislative review and appropriation of workers’ compensation claims in excess of $50,000 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine). ¶ 28 Turning our gaze further into the past, we find that the rule that courts may not enforce judgments against the state, because such an action would amount to an appropriation of funds in violation of the separation of power doctrine, has long existed. In Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Commission, 70 P.2d 857, 862 (Utah 1937), the court recognized that while its judgment was valid, the state “may refuse to respond in damages and leave a claimant without any remedy, as it may refuse to pay its bonds.” Nevertheless, “the obligation remains. No legislative fiat can destroy or impair that.” Id. In State v. Woodruff, 150 So. 760, 766 (Miss. 1933), the court explained that: A judgment or decree against the state for the payment of money, although entered by its highest court, is not enforceable except by a legislative appropriation. If the case is clear, and there is no available defense to the liability, the court should enter the judgment, although it may be that at the time  being it will meet with legislative disobedience. But in order to render such disobedience inexcusable, and therefore improbable, any such judgment should go to the legislature as an unreserved and solemn recommendation by the court that the liability is fair and free from serious doubt, and that there are no valid defenses known to the law or recognized in equity which the court has failed to discern and to apply. In Carr v. State, 26 N.E. 778, 779 (Ind. 1891), the court explained that “[c]reditors who accept the obligations of a State are bound to know that they cannot enforce their claims by an action against the State directly . . . . Whether an appropriation shall or shall not be made is purely a legislative question.” See Herrick v. E.G. Gallet, 204 P. 477, 478 (Idaho 1922) (“The mere declaration that certain charges against the state must be paid out of the state treasury does not necessarily make an appropriation . . . . [N]o money may lawfully be paid from the treasury except pursuant to and in accordance with an act of the legislature expressly appropriating it to the specific purpose for which it is paid.”); Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 341, 349 (1858) (“[T]he Courts have no means, and no power to avoid the effect of non-action. . . . Therefore, when the Legislature fails to make an appropriation, we cannot remedy that evil.”) (emphasis added).3 ¶ 29 Despite all of the above authority, MRC contends that at least one court holds that it can enforce a judgment against the state, and therefore, we should follow that court’s decision in order to vindicate our constitutionally bestowed right to enforce our judgments. In AFSCME/Iowa Council v. State, 484 N.W.2d 390 (Iowa 1992), unions representing public employees brought an action to enforce an arbitration award granting wage increases to government employees. The question, as framed by the court, was “[c]an the government be made to perform in accordance with its contracts, or is the other party, by reason of constitutional and statutory rules intended to prote