Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-25-00249-CV Ronald Oman and Karen Anderson, Appellants v. Wildflower Country Club, Inc. d/b/a Wildflower Country Club and Jeremy Lawson, Appellees FROM THE 169TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY NO. 24DCV346878, THE HONORABLE CARI L. STARRITT-BURNETT, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORAN D U M OPI N I ON After a members’ golf tournament, appellants Ronald Oman and Karen Anderson had several drinks at their country club’s bar, became intoxicated, drove home in a golf cart, and were injured. Contending that they were overserved, they sued appellees Wildflower Country Club, Inc. d/b/a Wildflower Country Club and its bartender Jeremy Lawson (the Club) for compensatory and exemplary damages of over $10 million for claims under the Texas Dram Shop Act, common-law negligence, negligence per se, and gross-negligence. In addition to their overservice claims, Appellants allege that Lawson “knowingly, recklessly, and intentionally” intensified their intoxication by spiking their drinks with drugs other than Oman’s prescribed opiates, and that the country club is vicariously liable for Lawson’s actions because they were taken in the course and scope of his employment. The Club prevailed on a traditional motion for summary judgment based on an executed release and waiver of liability in Appellants’ application for club membership. On appeal, Appellants argue that fact issues exist as to whether that release was enforceable; whether the release applied to them on the date of their alleged overservice; and whether the release barred Anderson’s claims, the gross-negligence claims, and the claims of knowing, reckless, and intentional drugging. Because we conclude that the release is valid and enforceable but that the Club’s summary-judgment motion addressed only the release of Appellants’ negligence-based overservice claims under the Dram Shop Act, we will affirm the trial court’s final judgment in part as to those claims and reverse and remand in part as to the non-overservice-based claims. DISCUSSION 1 Appellants dispute the applicability of this release, which was the subject of the Club’s summary-judgment motion: Appellants argue that fact issues exist as to whether this provision barred their claims. 1 Because the facts of this case are well known to the parties, we include only those necessary for the disposition of this appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 2 We review summary-judgment rulings de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Raoger Corp. v. Myers, 711 S.W.3d 206, 211 n.7 (Tex. 2025). A defendant who moves for traditional summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) must demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 2 Zive v. Sandberg, 644 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. 2022). If the movant carries its summary-judgment burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). When the trial court does not specify the grounds for its ruling, we affirm the summary judgment if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). Here, the Club moved for summary judgment and had the burden of proving its affirmative defense based on the release. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 94 (including release among affirmative defenses). Fair Notice of Release Generally, a release surrenders legal rights or obligations between the parties to an agreement. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993). It operates to extinguish claims or causes of action between the parties and is an absolute bar to any 2 The Texas Supreme Court amended Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a and renumbered its provisions, but “[o]ther than the deadline changes, Rule 166a’s rewrite is not intended to substantively change the law.” 89 Tex. B.J. 286, 289-92 (2026). Because the amendments apply only to summary-judgment motions filed on or after March 1, 2026, and the filing of the Club’s summary-judgment motion preceded the amendments, we refer to the provisions of Rule 166a in effect at the time. See id. at 286. 3 right of action on the released matter. See id. A release is subject to the rules of construction governing contracts. Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990) (citing Loy v. Kuykendall, 347 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Whether a contract is ambiguous and how to interpret unambiguous provisions are questions of law that we review de novo. URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018). A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree about its meaning. Id. When neither party alleges that the release was induced by fraud and the language of the release is unambiguous, interpretation of the release is decided by the court as a question of law. Memorial Med. Ctr. of E. Tex. v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). To effectively release a claim, the releasing instrument must mention the claim to be released. Victoria Bank & Tr. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1991). But it is unnecessary for parties to specifically enumerate all released claims; Texas law permits broad-form releases. See Keck, Mahin & Cate v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tex. 2000). Thus, the parties need not identify every potential cause of action relating to the subject matter of the release for that cause of action to fall within the scope of the release. Id. To be enforceable, a liability release must satisfy two fair notice requirements: (1) conspicuousness and (2) the express-negligence doctrine. Storage & Processors, Inc. v. Reyes, 134 S.W.3d 190, 192 (Tex. 2004). Whether a release complies with the fair-notice requirements is a question of law for the court. Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 509. 1. Conspicuousness The supreme court has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) definition of “conspicuousness” for risk-shifting agreements such as this one that relieve a party of 4 responsibility in advance. See id. at 511 (adopting prior definition). The current UCC definition states (10) “Conspicuous,” with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is “conspicuous” or not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the following: (A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and (B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 1.201(10). Under this definition, a provision is conspicuous when a reasonable person ought to have noticed it. Id.; Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 511. That is, “‘something must appear on the face of the [contract] to attract the attention of a reasonable person when he looks at it.’” Storage & Processors, Inc., 134 S.W.3d at 192 (quoting Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 508). Language may satisfy the conspicuousness requirement by appearing in capital headings, contrasting type, font, or color, or an extremely short document, or by otherwise calling attention to itself. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 1.201(10); Storage & Processors, Inc., 134 S.W.3d at 192; Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 511. Applying these standards here, we conclude that the Club met its burden of establishing as a matter of law that the release of liability in the membership agreement is conspicuous. The summary-judgment evidence shows that the release is in the first full paragraph near the top of the third page in a three-page document. Only a few brief paragraphs separate the release from the signature line, and the release is the only paragraph on that page—and in the entire 5 document—containing a series of capitalized words. These features call attention to the release and distinguish it from the remainder of the agreement, such that a reasonable person ought to have noticed it. Thus, the Club showed as a matter of law that this release complies with the fair notice requirement of conspicuousness. See, e.g., Quintana v. Crossfit Dall., L.L.C., 347 S.W.3d 445, 451 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (concluding release was conspicuous where document consisted of two pages and word “release” was near top of second page in larger type than any other text on that page and was bolded); Sydlik v. REEIII, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (determining release was conspicuous where document consisted of one page with three paragraphs and statement in large, bold, and underlined letters at top identifying it as release and releasing party initialed each paragraph); see also Arthur’s Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., 997 S.W.2d 803, 815 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.) (concluding that indemnity provision was conspicuous where its title, indemnity language, and liability limitation were in capital letters). Having concluded that the Club met its burden as to the fair-notice requirement of conspicuousness, we consider whether it met its burden as to the express-negligence doctrine. See Storage & Processors, Inc., 134 S.W.3d at 192; Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 509. 2. Express-Negligence Doctrine The express-negligence doctrine states that if a party intends to be released from its own future negligence it must state that intent specifically in the four corners of the contract. 3 3 Appellants wrongly fault the Club for “failing” to address the express-negligence doctrine in its summary-judgment motion. Page 6 of the motion addresses the express-negligence doctrine—“a release that releases a party for its own negligence requires it to plainly say so in the four corners of the document”—cites case law and notes similarity between this release and that in Quintana v. Crossfit Dallas, L.L.C., 347 S.W.3d 445, 452 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). 6 Storage & Processors, Inc., 134 S.W.3d at 192. The purpose of “the express negligence rule is to require scriveners to make it clear when the intent of the parties is to exculpate” a party for that party’s own negligence. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Petroleum Pers., Inc., 768 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. 1989). Language that specifically refers to “any negligent act of [the released party]” may be sufficient to define the parties’ intent. Id.; Quintana, 347 S.W.3d at 450. The release in this case stated I ASSUME ALL RISKS associated with accessing the Club facilities and the facilities of any participating network clubs, including, but not limited to, dining and event rooms, recreational amenities and outdoor areas, grounds, parking areas, equipment, golf balls or clubs, and golf carts. I ALSO HEREBY FULLY RELEASE AND DISCHARGE THE CLUB, ITS PARENT, AFFILIATED AND SUCCESSOR COMPANIES, AND ALL OF THEIR RESPECTIVE EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, SHAREHOLDERS, MEMBERS, MANAGERS, AFFILIATES AND ASSIGNS (THE “RELEASED PARTIES”) FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITIES, INJURIES, LOSSES, DAMAGES OR CLAIMS ARISING FROM MY OR MY FAMILY’S USE OF THE CLUB FACILITIES, INCLUDING ANY SUCH CLAIMS CAUSED BY THE RELEASED PARTY’S OWN NEGLIGENCE. This release language is similar to the one in Quintana that satisfied the express-negligence doctrine: I hereby waive, release, remise and discharge CrossFit Plano and its agents, officers, principals and employees and volunteers, of any and all liability, claims, demands, actions or rights of action, or damages of any kind related to, arising from, or in any way connected with, my participation [in] CrossFit Plano fitness programs/classes, including those allegedly attributed to the negligent acts or omissions of the above mentioned parties. 347 S.W.3d at 451. And it is similar to the release upheld in Sydlik: I do hereby waive, release and forever discharge Curves International Inc., Curves for Women®, and their officers, agents, employees, representatives, executors, and 7 all others (Curves® representatives) from any and all responsibilities, or liabilities, from injuries or damages ar[is]ing out of or connected with my attendance at Curves for Women®, my participation in all activities, my use of equipment or machinery, or any act or omission, including negligence by Curves® representatives. 195 S.W.3d at 331-32. The language in this release specifically refers to the released parties’ negligence and sufficiently defines the parties’ intent to exculpate the identified “RELEASED PARTIES” by releasing them from their own future negligence. See Storage & Processors, Inc., 134 S.W.3d at 192; Atlantic Richfield Co., 768 S.W.2d at 726. Thus, this release satisfied the express-negligence doctrine, the second and final component of the fair-notice requirements. The Club’s summary-judgment evidence established, as a matter of law, that this release of liability met both fair-notice requirements and is enforceable. Because the Club met its burden of showing its entitlement to summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of release, the burden shifted to Appellants to show that a genuine issue of material fact precluded summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Roper v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 03-11-00887- CV, 2013 WL 6465637, at *4 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 27, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that factual dispute precludes summary judgment only if disputed issue is “genuine” issue of material fact). A material fact issue is “genuine” only if a reasonable factfinder could resolve the fact issue in favor of the nonmovant. Roper, 2013 WL 6465637, at *4 n.4. When the evidence simply shows that some metaphysical doubt as to the fact exists, or when the evidence is not significantly probative, the material fact issue is not “genuine.” Id. Alleged Fact Issues Appellants argue that summary judgment was improper because fact issues existed as to whether they were club members, whether their membership application was approved, 8 whether Anderson was married to Oman when the application was made, whether Oman had authority to sign the application for her, and whether the release applicable to the club facilities encompasses the country club’s bar. None of these alleged fact issues are genuine. See id.; cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). The Club’s summary-judgment evidence includes this application information for Appellants, which contains Oman’s representation that he and “Karen Anderson” were married, as well as his listing of their marriage date and his identification of “Mrs.” Anderson as his spouse: Directly above the application’s signature line, Oman certified that he and his spouse had a marriage license or its equivalent and that he was authorized to sign on her behalf as a user on the membership. In conjunction with the date of marriage, Oman used Anderson’s personal identifying information, including her name and date of birth, 4 and further affirmed that the information he was providing to the country club therein was “true and correct”: 4 The statute prohibiting the fraudulent use or possession of the identifying information of another person without their consent defines “[i]dentifying information” as “information that alone or in conjunction with other information identifies a person, including a person’s: . . . name and date of birth . . . .” Tex. Penal Code § 32.51(a)(1)(A). 9 As support for their contention that there was a fact issue about whether Anderson consented or authorized Oman to apply for their country club membership and whether they were married on or before the application date—i.e., that the personal identifying information Oman provided to the country club about himself and Anderson was false and/or fraudulently used—Appellants rely only on their attorney’s argument, which is not evidence. See Pine Forest Invs. Grp., LLC v. County of Bastrop, Tex., No. 03-16-00789-CV, 2018 WL 3077972, at *5 n.9 (Tex. App.—Austin June 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that counsel’s argument in motion is not evidence); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(7) (requiring verification of denial that written instrument was executed with person’s authority); cf. Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex. 1978) (“In the absence of evidence showing authority,” spousal relationship does not give contracting authority). 5 No authority is provided for Appellants’ assertion that there is a fact issue about whether the club facilities referenced in the release excluded the bar within those facilities. Such an interpretation is contrary to the broad definition of “Club facilities” in the release paragraph, which refers to “the Club facilities and the facilities of any participating network clubs, including, 5 Nor is there any evidence that during the nearly year and a half that the country club afforded membership benefits to Appellants, Anderson notified them that Oman lacked her consent or authorization to use her personal identifying information to enroll her as a club member. 10 but not limited to, dining and event rooms, recreational amenities and outdoor areas, grounds, [and] parking areas.” That interpretation is also contrary to the common meaning of “facility” as “a place, especially including buildings, where a particular activity happens.” https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/facility (last visited Oct. 13, 2026). And that interpretation is contrary to Appellants’ statements about the incident to police. In the unobjected-to evidence from a Temple Police Department incident sheet, 6 Oman discussed the location of the events, stating “[H]e and his wife, Karen Anderson, were at the country club,” “consumed several alcoholic beverages while they were sitting near the bar,” and afterward “he and Anderson drove their golf cart from the Country Club Clubhouse” to their residence. 7 No reasonable factfinder could determine from the summary-judgment evidence in this record that the meaning of club facilities in the release excluded a bar inside a club building or clubhouse. See Roper, 2013 WL 6465637, at *4 n.4. Appellants’ contention that there are fact issues about their club-member status is also unfounded. A membership processing checklist in evidence shows a “Member Number” and “Join Date,” and that the application was “APPROVED”: 6 For the first time on appeal, Appellants contend that this police record is hearsay. Unobjected-to hearsay is probative evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 802 (inadmissible, unobjected-to hearsay is not denied probative value because it is hearsay); Texas Com. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. New, 3 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Tex. 1999) (“unobjected-to hearsay is, as a matter of law, probative evidence”). 7Oman’s statement to police about the location where he and his wife consumed several alcoholic beverages is consistent with Jeremy Lawson’s statement that Appellants were both very intoxicated, and he helped Oman “down the stairs on the back side of the Clubhouse and helped him to his golf cart.” Police documented that Oman had a blood-alcohol content of .26, and Anderson had a blood-alcohol content of .18. 11 And the police-incident sheet notes that on the date in question, Oman had an account at the club. In response to the Club’s motion, Appellants provided no affidavits or other summary-judgment evidence contesting the above information. 8 Thus, the summary-judgment evidence before the trial court at the time of the hearing showed that Appellants were club members; that their membership application was approved; that they had a join date, an assigned member number, and a current club account; that they consumed several drinks in the bar and became intoxicated after a members’ golf tournament 9; that they were married to each other; that Oman had authority to sign for Anderson; and that all the information Oman provided to the Club 8 None of the exhibits to Appellants’ response—a demand letter, an unauthenticated screenshot, an incomplete police-incident sheet, and an unauthenticated page on medications— involve arguments about the release, and they are immaterial to analysis of these appellate issues. 9 Appellants’ live pleading states, “After a members[’] golf tournament, Mr. Oman, his wife, and several friends were in the bar area of the club in the evening of November 4, 2023. Admittedly they all had several drinks in the bar.” Such “[a]ssertions of fact, not plead in the alternative, in the live pleadings of a party are regarded as formal judicial admissions.” Houston First Am. Sav. v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. 1983). And “judicial admissions in an opposing party’s pleadings may be used as evidence to support a summary-judgment motion.” Weekley Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 646 S.W.3d 821, 828 (Tex. 2022). 12 was true and correct. Given this evidence, Appellants failed to show that summary judgment was precluded based on a genuine issue of material fact about the release’s validity and enforceability. Overservice Claims Next, Appellants argue that this release, even if valid and enforceable, does not bar their overservice claims for gross negligence. This presumes that those are stand-alone claims. “[N]egligence and gross negligence are not separable causes of action but are inextricably intertwined.” AEP Tex. Cent. Co. v. Arredondo, 612 S.W.3d 289, 299 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 390 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzalez, J., concurring)); Pecan Valley Mental Health Mental Retardation Region Operating as Pecan Valley Ctrs. for Behav. & Develop. Healthcare v. Doe, 678 S.W.3d 577, 594 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied) (“Gross negligence is not an independent cause of action; rather, ordinary negligence and gross negligence are ‘inextricably intertwined’—gross negligence is contingent upon an affirmative finding of ordinary negligence.”); Trevino v. Lightning Laydown, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. App.— Austin 1990, writ denied) (noting that “one’s conduct cannot be grossly negligent without being negligent” and that “[t]he difference between these two forms of negligence is one of degree rather than kind”). The Club contends here, as it did below, that Texas law does not recognize common-law negligence and gross-negligence claims for overservice independent of the Dram Shop Act, and that it was entitled to dismissal of all Appellants’ dramshop liability claims against Wildflower Country Club and negligence-based claims for overservice against Lawson based on the valid and enforceable release. We agree. The Dram Shop Act allows liability claims against alcoholic-beverage providers for damages resulting from the provision of alcohol to “obviously intoxicated” persons (overservice). 13 See Tex. Alco. Bev. Code § 2.02(b); Raoger Corp., 711 S.W.3d at 209. Section 2.03 of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code specifies that the Act is the exclusive means for recovery against a provider of alcohol and is in lieu of any common-law claims against the provider: The liability of providers under this chapter for the actions of their employees, customers, members, or guests who are or become intoxicated is in lieu of common law or other statutory law warranties and duties of providers of alcoholic beverages [and that] this chapter provides the exclusive cause of action for providing an alcoholic beverage to a person 18 years of age or older. Tex. Alco. Bev. Code § 2.03(a); F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2007). “Section 2.03 simply means that the Dram Shop Act provides the exclusive remedy against an alcohol provider for damages caused by an intoxicated patron at least 18 years of age— i.e., common law remedies are no longer available.” F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P., 237 S.W.3d at 686; see Steak & Ale of Tex., Inc. v. Borneman, 62 S.W.3d 898, 910 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (noting that statutory cause of action under Dram Shop Act is “to the exclusion of all other common law causes of action”); see also Southland Corp. v. Lewis, 940 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1997) (“Lewis’ negligence and negligence per se claims are clearly barred by the exclusive remedy provision of chapter 2 of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code.”). A gross-negligence determination is relevant only to the assessment of exemplary damages. Trevino, 782 S.W.2d at 950. Exemplary damages are unrecoverable for an overservice claim under the Dram Shop Act. See Steak & Ale of Tex., Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 910 (noting that “[a]llowing recovery of exemplary damages based on a finding of gross negligence would be inconsistent with the plain language and intent of the Dram Shop Act”). Absent an award of actual damages, there is no recovery of exemplary damages. Nabours v. Longview Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 700 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1985). 14 Thus, Appellants’ reliance on their common law gross-negligence claims as a stand-alone basis for recovery for overservice against the Club—independent of the release of their negligence-based overservice claims and their statutory claims for overservice under the Dram Shop Act—is legally unsupported and does not entitle them to reversal of the summary judgment on their overservice claims. 10 10 For the first time on appeal, Appellants raise an issue challenging the release as against public policy. That new issue is not preserved for appellate review and provides no basis for reversal of the summary judgment because Appellants failed to expressly raise it in their summary-judgment response. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); State Bd. of Ins. v. Westland Film Indus., 705 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (“[I]ssues not expressly presented to the trial court may not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal of a summary judgment.”); Khan v. Chaudhry, No. 09-14-00479-CV, 2016 WL 1158734, at *2 (Tex. App.— Beaumont Mar. 24, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rejecting party’s attempt to add new appellate issue that parties’ contracts “were void as illegal or against public policy”); Charbonnet v. Shami, No. 04-12-00711-CV, 2013 WL 2645720, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 12, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The Charbonnets’ response did not, however, present any argument regarding the possible public policy in Texas prohibiting an advance waiver of liability for gross negligence. Thus, this argument was not preserved for our review.”); see also Los Arboles Tulum, L.P. v. Matula Family, L.P., No. 03-23-00488-CV, 2025 WL 2485159, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2025, pet. denied) (concluding that party who failed to raise argument that “could have been raised, and should have been raised, in response to [opponent’s] summary-judgment motion” had “waived the argument for appellate review,” and that we “may not consider it as grounds for reversal”); Last v. Quail Valley Country Club, L.P., No. 01-08-00759-CV, 2010 WL 1253782, at *2, *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that Lasts—who challenged trial court’s judgment on validity and enforceability of pre-injury release barring their Dram Shop Act claims against private club for allegedly overserving operator of mechanical bull ride and overserving Robert Last before his bull ride—failed to adequately present and support their issue contending that release was against public policy). “Requiring parties to raise complaints at trial conserves judicial resources by giving trial courts an opportunity to correct an error before an appeal proceeds.” In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex. 2003). Circumventing preservation requirements by relying on the “discredited doctrine” of fundamental error has been done only rarely, “when the record shows on its face that the court lacked jurisdiction” and when reviewing “certain types of error in juvenile-delinquency cases.” Id. Neither of those circumstances are present here. We refrain from applying the fundamental-error doctrine to an area of the law where it has not been applied. Goodson v. Castellanos, 214 S.W.3d 741, 750 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied). 15 Non-Overservice Claims Appellants’ non-overservice claims are based on their drugging allegations. Appellants allege that Lawson “knowingly, recklessly, and intentionally” intensified their intoxication by spiking their drinks with drugs other than Oman’s prescribed opiates. The complete, unobjected-to police-incident sheet states that the final analysis of Appellants’ blood tests showed “no evidence of them being drugged” and a forensic nurse determined the same. 11 But the police incident sheet also states that Oman’s initial blood-analysis results were presumptively positive for opiates and amphetamines, when Oman reported using only prescription opiates. 12 Oman’s initial blood-analysis results create a fact issue precluding summary judgment on the pleaded drugging allegations against Lawson, and Appellants allege that because the drugging was done in the course and scope of Lawson’s employment, the country club is vicariously liable for it. The Club’s traditional motion for summary judgment does not address these non-overservice claims. Thus, the trial court erred by granting more relief than the motion requested when rendering final judgment in favor of the Club. See G &H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011) (stating general rule that granting summary judgment on claim unaddressed in summary-judgment motion is reversible error). In such circumstances, we “treat 11 The complete police-incident sheet is proper summary-judgment evidence because it was filed before the hearing with the Club’s objections to Appellants’ summary-judgment evidence and it was incorporated by reference into the Club’s reply. See Tex. R. Evid. 106 (“If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may introduce, at that time, any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.”); Met Water Vista Ridge, LP v. Blue Water Sys., LP, 717 S.W.3d 901, 911 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (“Proper summary judgment evidence includes all evidence on file with the trial court at the time of the summary judgment hearing.”). 12 Anderson’s blood-analysis never showed drugs in her system. 16 the summary judgment as any other final judgment, considering all matters raised and reversing only those portions of the judgment based on harmful error.” Id. at 298. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s final judgment in part as to Ronald Oman’s and Karen Anderson’s overservice claims against Wildflower Country Club and Jeremy Lawson, reverse the final judgment in part as to Ronald Oman’s and Karen Anderson’s non-overservice claims against Wildflower Country Club and Jeremy Lawson, and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. __________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ellis Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Remanded in Part Filed: October 16, 2026 17