Full Opinion

Ashley Moore v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., et al., No. 371, Sept. Term, 2025. Opinion by Arthur, J. PREMISES LIABILITY—DUTY TO PROTECT INVITEES FROM FORESEEABLE NEGLIGENCE OF OTHER INVITEES A storekeeper may have an obligation to use reasonable care to protect invitees against dangers caused by negligent acts of other invitees if a reasonably prudent person should have anticipated the possible occurrence and the probable results of those acts. Generally, where there is evidence to support an inference that an invitee’s injury arose at least in part from an unsafe condition on the storekeeper’s property, and that the class of harm that occurred was reasonably foreseeable to the storekeeper and could reasonably have been prevented or guarded against, the issues of proximate cause and foreseeability are for the trier of fact to determine. Under the facts of the present case, a customer suffered injuries when another customer failed to stop a vehicle in a parking space and crashed the vehicle into the entrance of a retail pharmacy store. The injured customer offered expert testimony from an engineer, who opined that the parking layout violated standard engineering principles by placing head-in parking spaces directed at the store entrance, without any bollard or other vehicle-stopping barrier. Based on the evidence, a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the store proprietor knew or should have known that the arrangement of the parking spaces and store entrance presented an unreasonable risk of harm to invitees. The store proprietor was not entitled to summary judgment merely because no similar incidents had occurred at the same store or at certain other nearby stores. SUMMARY JUDGMENT—GENUINE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Under that standard, the evidence in the present case generated a genuine dispute about whether a parent corporation operated, managed, or controlled a retail store owned by a subsidiary corporation. The parent corporation performed certain management functions under an agency agreement with the subsidiary corporation. A supervisory employee of the parent corporation testified that the parent corporation’s operation and management of the store included decisions about repairs and maintenance. Although an affidavit from an executive stated that the parent corporation did not directly operate or control the store, the parent corporation did not produce the agency agreement itself to provide the factual basis for that conclusion. The parent corporation failed to show that it was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that it did not operate or control the store. Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case No. C-22-CV-23-000122 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 371 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ ASHLEY MOORE v. CVS PHARMACY INC., ET AL. ______________________________________ Arthur, Shaw, Meredith, Timothy E. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Arthur, J. ______________________________________ Filed: May 29, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. *Albright, J., did not participate in the Court’s 2026.05.29 decision to designate this opinion for '00'04- 15:11:28 publication pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1. Gregory Hilton, Clerk The plaintiff in this case suffered injuries inside a CVS pharmacy store, when a driver failed to stop a vehicle in a parking space and crashed through the glass entrance doors. The plaintiff claimed that the alleged owners and operators of the store created an unsafe condition by keeping parking spaces near the entrance without bollards or other devices to protect store patrons from vehicles. One defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence that it owned or operated the store premises. Another defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence that it received actual or constructive notice of an unsafe condition on the store premises. The Circuit Court for Wicomico County granted both motions. The plaintiff has appealed. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the circuit court erred when it determined that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. BACKGROUND A. Injury to Ms. Moore at the Salisbury CVS Store On the afternoon of December 10, 2019, Ashley Moore was a customer at a CVS pharmacy store located at a shopping center on South Salisbury Boulevard in Salisbury, Maryland. The store is a stand-alone business, not physically connected to other businesses, and is surrounded by its own parking lot. The store has a single entrance with glass sliding doors for all customers entering and exiting the store. An aerial photograph of the store is reproduced below: The entrance doors are located at the lower-right corner of the building, positioned at a 45-degree angle relative to a row of parking spaces facing one side of the building and another row of parking spaces facing the adjacent side of the building. There is no curb or elevation difference between the parking spaces and the walkways provided for customers entering and exiting the building. Four parking spaces located near the entrance along the right side of the building are accessible parking spaces reserved for persons with physical disabilities. Safety bollards, several feet in height, stand at the front of each of the accessible parking spaces. By contrast, the unreserved parking spaces along the other side of the building have no safety bollards. Each of the unreserved parking spaces has a “wheel stop,” approximately six inches high. According to expert reports in the record, bollards can impede a vehicle 2 moving faster than 20 miles per hour. Wheel stops, however, are not designed to impede a moving vehicle but merely to alert the driver if a vehicle reaches the edge of the parking space. A photograph of the store, showing the blue safety bollards in front of the accessible spaces and the absence of bollards in front of the other spaces, is reproduced below: As Ms. Moore was leaving the Salisbury CVS store, another customer, Maria Belfort, drove a sport-utility vehicle into one of the unreserved parking spaces near the entrance. Ms. Belfort failed to apply the brake pedal to stop the vehicle. The vehicle ran over the wheel stop, crossed the pedestrian walkway, and crashed through the glass entrance doors. The vehicle struck Ms. Moore as she was walking through the entrance doors. She lost consciousness and suffered multiple fractures that required surgery. A photograph of Ms. Belfort’s car, after she had driven it through the doorway of the store, 3 is reproduced below: B. Negligence Claims On September 26, 2022, Ms. Moore filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The first count of the complaint raised a negligence claim against Ms. Belfort, alleging that the crash resulted from her careless operation of her vehicle. Other counts of the complaint raised claims for negligence and premises liability against three companies: a Rhode Island corporation named CVS Pharmacy, Inc.; a Rhode Island limited liability company named CVS 8281 MD, LLC; and a Maryland limited liability company named Clairmont Center, LLC. The complaint alleged that those companies “owned, operated, maintained, and managed” the Salisbury CVS store and “retained exclusive ownership, possession, control, and/or supervision” of the store. The complaint also alleged that those companies failed to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees from injury. According to the complaint, when Ms. Belfort attempted to stop her vehicle at a 4 parking space near the entrance doors, she “pressed the accelerator instead of the brake[.]” The vehicle allegedly “encountered no resistance as it accelerated” toward the entrance “because there were no bollards or other devices” to protect the entrance and the customers using it. The complaint alleged that, if the defendants had installed bollards or similar protective devices in front of the entrance, the crash would not have occurred and Ms. Moore would not have suffered her injuries. The complaint alleged that, during the decade before the incident, many other “incidents of vehicles driving though the front doors” occurred at CVS stores throughout the United States, including in Maryland. The complaint also alleged that the owners and operators of the store understood that “vehicles crashing through storefront entrances” were “a known hazard[]” in the retail industry. The complaint alleged that the store owners and operators knew that the parking spaces near the entrance lacked devices to protect against vehicles crashing into the entrance but failed to protect customers from that danger. The complaint further alleged that, as a result of the crash, Ms. Moore suffered “serious, painful, and permanent physical and emotional injuries[,]” as well as “a substantial disruption to her quality of life.” The complaint alleged that Ms. Moore required extensive medical treatment, suffered a loss of income, and will continue to require medical care in the future. Although the complaint named CVS Pharmacy and CVS 2821 MD as defendants, those defendants did not file responsive pleadings. Rather, a party identifying itself as “Defendant Maryland CVS Pharmacy, LLC, . . . improperly pled as CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 5 and CVS 8281 MD, LLC,” filed an answer in which it denied liability. We shall refer to that defendant as “Maryland CVS.” Maryland CVS identified itself as a Maryland limited liability company and stated that it owns and operates the Salisbury CVS store. In addition to an answer, Maryland CVS filed cross-claims and third-party claims seeking indemnity and contribution from the driver, Ms. Belfort. Clairmont Center and Maryland CVS moved to transfer the action to Wicomico County, where the accident occurred. The court granted the motions and transferred the action to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. During discovery, Ms. Moore designated John D. Boyd, a civil and environmental engineer, as an expert on parking lot design and related matters. Mr. Boyd opined that the layout of the parking lot and entrance at the Salisbury CVS store presented a hazardous condition. According to Mr. Boyd, it is inconsistent with standard design principles to place head-in parking spaces directed at a retail storefront used by pedestrians. Mr. Boyd opined that, to keep pedestrians reasonably safe, the operators of the store either needed to remove three of the unreserved parking spaces located near the entrance or to protect the entrance with barriers such as bollards or landscaping features. Ms. Moore also designated Robert Reiter, a safety consultant, as an expert to testify about standards for the use of protective devices at retail businesses with parking lots. Mr. Reiter maintains a database that compiles public information about vehicle crashes at retail stores. Mr. Reiter opined that the history of vehicle crashes at CVS stores and other retail stores across the country should have alerted CVS entities of the 6 risk of vehicles crashing into storefronts. Mr. Reiter also opined that it was not reasonably safe to place parking spaces facing the entrance to the Salisbury CVS store without bollards or other barriers to protect pedestrians. C. Discovery Disputes When she served the complaint, Ms. Moore also served interrogatories and discovery requests on the three companies named as defendants. Among other things, the interrogatories asked each defendant to identify the entities that owned or leased the store premises, as well as any documents governing the ownership, leasing, control, or management of the store. The interrogatories also asked each defendant to disclose every incident in which a vehicle drove into a CVS store within five years of the accident and to disclose whether the defendant had ever been advised to install devices outside of any CVS store to protect patrons from vehicles. Defendants CVS Pharmacy and CVS 8281 MD did not respond to any discovery requests. Maryland CVS sent responses on its own behalf. Maryland CVS disclosed that it had leased the store premises since May 2011 from Clairmont Center, the owner of the property. Maryland CVS asserted that there had been no prior incidents in which a vehicle drove into the Salisbury CVS store within five years of the accident and that it never received advisements to install protective devices at that store. Maryland CVS objected to many of the interrogatories, asserting that information about any stores other than the Salisbury CVS store was neither relevant nor reasonably likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Ms. Moore moved to compel Maryland CVS to provide more complete responses 7 to her interrogatories, including the interrogatories about prior vehicle crashes and advisements to install safety devices. During a hearing on September 14, 2023, counsel for Maryland CVS asserted that it lacked access to some of the information sought because various “independent entities” own CVS stores throughout the country. Counsel told the court that “this particular CVS” store was part of a geographical “district” with “at least 12 stores[.]” At the conclusion of the hearing, the court partially granted Ms. Moore’s motion to compel. The court ordered Maryland CVS to disclose any incidents involving “a vehicle driving into a CVS store location for a period of five years before the occurrence” in the same “district” as the Salisbury CVS store. The court limited the scope of those compelled disclosures to incidents at a “similarly situated” store, which the court defined as a “stand-alone store with parking around it, not fronting a roadway.” The court also ordered Maryland CVS to disclose whether “any store in the district similarly situated in terms of being a stand-alone store with parking around it” had ever been advised by government authorities to install protective devices outside the store. After the court granted the motion to compel, Maryland CVS disclosed several incidents between 2014 and 2019 of vehicles crashing into CVS stores in the same district as the Salisbury CVS store. Although those disclosures are not part of the record, Maryland CVS asserts that there were “no prior incidents of a vehicle driving into the entrance doors” at any of those stores during that period. One week after the discovery ruling, counsel for Ms. Moore emailed counsel for Maryland CVS to inquire why CVS Pharmacy had failed to provide any discovery 8 responses. Counsel for Maryland CVS asserted that “CVS Pharmacy, Inc. w[ould] not be responding to [Ms. Moore’s] discovery requests” because “CVS Pharmacy, Inc. [was] not a proper defendant in this matter[.]” Shortly after that email exchange, Ms. Moore moved to compel CVS Pharmacy to respond to interrogatories and requests for production of documents that she had served more than 11 months earlier. In its first filing in the action, CVS Pharmacy opposed the motion to compel. The attorneys who represented Maryland CVS also represented CVS Pharmacy. CVS Pharmacy asserted that it was not “a properly named defendant” in the action and stated that it intended to move for summary judgment on that ground. The court marked the motion to compel discovery from CVS Pharmacy as “set for hearing,” but never held any hearing or ruled on that motion. In October 2023, Ms. Moore served notices to take the deposition of a corporate designee for CVS Pharmacy. The proposed topics included the ownership and management of CVS stores, contracts between CVS Pharmacy and other defendants, policies for accidents and injuries, policies for construction and maintenance of CVS stores, and prior incidents of vehicles driving into the entrance doors of CVS stores. Opposing counsel refused to produce a corporate designee for CVS Pharmacy. Instead, counsel identified “District Leader Dennis Pawlewicz” as the corporate designee for Maryland CVS and objected to the scope of many proposed topics. During the deposition, Mr. Pawlewicz identified his employer as “CVS Health,” which he understood to be synonymous with “CVS Pharmacy, Incorporated[.]” Mr. 9 Pawlewicz testified, to the best of his knowledge, that his employer “owns, operates and manages all of its retail pharmacy store locations,” including the Salisbury CVS store. Although he lacked direct knowledge of what entity owned the Salisbury CVS store, Mr. Pawlewicz testified that he understood that the store is “a CVS corporate store that is owned by” his employer. Mr. Pawlewicz stated that he had never heard of “Maryland CVS Pharmacy, LLC[,]” until the deposition. Mr. Pawlewicz testified that, in his role as district leader, he oversees 18 CVS stores in Delaware and four in Maryland. He had no knowledge of other incidents in which a vehicle crashed into the entrance of the Salisbury CVS store or another CVS store within that district. He stated that his employer’s policies require store managers to report any incidents involving damage to store buildings or injuries to customers. Mr. Pawlewicz said that store managers use a centralized “service channel database” to make any requests for repairs or maintenance at a CVS store. This service channel database, he said, “covers a broad variety of things[,]” including “[l]ighting, plumbing, electricity, . . . carpeting[,]” and “[j]ust anything inside and outside th[e] four walls that are not functioning properly.” D. Motions for Summary Judgment On October 12, 2023, the defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgment: one on behalf of Clairmont Center; one on behalf of both CVS Pharmacy and CVS 2821 MD; and one on behalf of Maryland CVS. In its motion, Clairmont Center acknowledged that it owned the shopping center on South Salisbury Boulevard but asserted that it did not operate, maintain, or control the 10 CVS store or parking area. In support of its assertions, Clairmont Center produced a copy of a ground lease agreement dated May 17, 2011. Under that agreement, Clairmont Center leased the property to Maryland CVS for the purpose of building and operating a CVS store on the property. As a term of their agreement, Maryland CVS promised to “keep and maintain . . . all buildings, curbs, landscaping, parking and driveway areas, and other improvements” on the premises. In its motion, CVS Pharmacy contended that the evidence conclusively established that it “did not own, operate, control, or maintain” the Salisbury CVS store and, therefore, did not owe any duty to Ms. Moore. CVS Pharmacy asserted that it was merely the “parent corporation” of Maryland CVS and that Maryland CVS “owns, operates, manages, and controls” the Salisbury CVS store. As the only document in support of its motion, CVS Pharmacy relied on the ground lease agreement between Clairmont Center and Maryland CVS. In its own motion, Maryland CVS admitted that it leases the store premises from Clairmont Center and that it operates and maintains the Salisbury CVS store. Maryland CVS asserted that the information produced during discovery showed that there were no incidents of a vehicle crashing into the entrance of the Salisbury CVS store or another CVS store in the same district within five years of the accident. Maryland CVS further asserted that there was no evidence that any store in the same district received advisements to install safety devices to protect against vehicles entering a store. In light of that information, Maryland CVS contended that it did not have actual or constructive knowledge or notice of a dangerous condition created by the parking spaces 11 near the store entrance. After the filing of the summary judgment motions, Ms. Moore filed an “Amended Complaint by Interlineation.” According to Ms. Moore, the purpose of the amendment was to correct a “misnomer” used to identify one defendant. The amended complaint replaced the name “CVS 2821 MD, LLC,” with the name “Maryland CVS Pharmacy, LLC.” Otherwise, the allegations remained unchanged from the original complaint. Soon after filing the amended complaint, Ms. Moore filed a stipulation voluntarily dismissing her claims against Clairmont Center. Ms. Moore opposed the summary judgment motions made by CVS Pharmacy and Maryland CVS. Ms. Moore argued that the deposition testimony from Mr. Pawlewicz, an employee of CVS Pharmacy, was sufficient evidence to establish that CVS Pharmacy owned, operated, managed, or controlled the Salisbury CVS store. Citing reports from her expert witnesses, Ms. Moore asserted that there was a long history of vehicle crashes at other CVS stores throughout the country and that the incident was reasonably foreseeable. In a reply in support of its motion, CVS Pharmacy argued that the claims against it were an improper attempt “to pierce the corporate veil” and to hold it liable for the alleged negligence of Maryland CVS. CVS Pharmacy also asserted that “Mr. Pawlewicz was deposed, over objections, on topics on which he does not have the requisite knowledge or understanding[.]”1 CVS Pharmacy asserted that, contrary to the testimony 1 Of course, Mr. Pawlewicz was Maryland CVS’s designee under Maryland Rule 2-412(d). Consequently, Maryland CVS had an obligation to prepare him to give 12 of Mr. Pawlewicz, it does not own or operate the Salisbury CVS store. Along with its reply, CVS Pharmacy provided an affidavit from Thomas Moffatt, a vice president for CVS Pharmacy, who also serves as president of Maryland CVS. Mr. Moffatt asserted that Maryland CVS directly owns and operates CVS stores in Maryland and that CVS Pharmacy does not directly own or operate any stores in Maryland. Mr. Moffatt further stated that Maryland CVS “entered into an agency agreement” with CVS Pharmacy, under which CVS Pharmacy “provide[s] certain services” to Maryland CVS and “act[s] on its behalf in things like field management, human resources, payroll processing, tax compliance and processing, and other similar administrative and management functions.” E. Grant of Summary Judgment and Entry of Final Judgment After considering arguments at a hearing on November 29, 2023, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of CVS Pharmacy and Maryland CVS. Addressing the motion made by CVS Pharmacy, the court stated: “I don’t think there have been sufficient facts pled or alleged that would entitle the Plaintiff in this case to have a cause of action against CVS Pharmacy, Inc.” Stating that “there was sufficient evidence in the record as it relates to [Maryland CVS] being on the lease, having sufficient control, and exercising that control over the property,” the court concluded that CVS Pharmacy was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claims against it. Addressing the motion made by Maryland CVS, the court concluded that there complete and responsive testimony on all topics listed in the notice of deposition, unless it obtained a protective order. 13 was no evidence to establish that Maryland CVS had notice of an unsafe condition at the Salisbury CVS store. The court reasoned: “At this store, there were no prior accidents to put the store owner on notice or for it to be reasonably foreseeable that they needed to take further action to prevent or guard against the negligence of this third party.” The court stated that it was “not convinced” that there was evidence showing that Maryland CVS was “on notice” that it needed to take further action or that the need to take further action was reasonably foreseeable to Maryland CVS. After the court memorialized its summary judgment ruling, Ms. Moore moved for reconsideration. Ms. Moore noted that, because CVS Pharmacy refused to respond to any discovery requests, she “never had the opportunity to conduct any discovery on the nature and extent of [CVS Pharmacy’s] operational and managerial control over the subject store.” Ms. Moore asserted that, even without full discovery, the testimony from Mr. Pawlewicz and the affidavit from Mr. Moffatt created a genuine factual dispute over whether CVS Pharmacy operates or manages the Salisbury CVS store as an agent for Maryland CVS. Citing the expert report from Mr. Reiter, Ms. Moore asserted that there had been many prior incidents of vehicles crashing into storefronts at CVS stores throughout the United States. Ms. Moore argued that “[CVS Pharmacy] as agent, and therefore [Maryland CVS] as principal,” had knowledge or notice of the risk of vehicles crashing into one of its stores. On February 6, 2024, the circuit court denied the motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling. Ms. Moore filed a notice of appeal one day after the entry of that order. Afterwards, Ms. Moore filed a stipulation in which she voluntarily agreed to 14 dismiss without prejudice her claims against Ms. Belfort, the driver who had crashed the vehicle into the Salisbury CVS store. In an unreported opinion, this Court concluded that Ms. Moore’s notice of appeal was premature because the circuit court had not entered a final judgment disposing of all claims against all parties. Ashley Moore v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., et al., No. 2339, Sept. Term 2023 (filed Feb. 6, 2025). We reasoned that, at the time when Ms. Moore noted her appeal, her claims against Ms. Belfort were still pending, as were Maryland CVS’s cross- claims. We remanded the case under Md. Rule 8-602(g)(1)(B), for the circuit court to decide whether to direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all parties. After the remand, the parties jointly moved for an order directing the entry of final judgment as to fewer than all parties under Md. Rule 2-602(b). On April 17, 2025, the circuit court entered an order expressly finding that there was no just reason for delay and directing the entry of final judgment as to defendants Maryland CVS and CVS Pharmacy. Ms. Moore noted this timely appeal.2 DISCUSSION In this appeal, Ms. Moore seeks reversal of the order granting summary judgment in favor of CVS Pharmacy and Maryland CVS. This Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment without deference to the circuit court. See, e.g., Jabbi v. Adventist 2 In the circumstances of this case, the court did not abuse its discretion in directing the entry of final judgment against Maryland CVS and CVS Pharmacy. See Barclay v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 278 n.6 (2012); Zilichickhis v. Montgomery County, 223 Md. App. 158, 174 (2015). 15 Healthcare, Inc., 264 Md. App. 659, 667 (2025) (citing Oglesby v. Baltimore School Assocs., 484 Md. 296, 327 (2023)). As a general rule, “‘absent exceptional circumstances, Maryland appellate courts will only consider the grounds upon which the [trial] court granted summary judgment[.]” Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. Pifer, 478 Md. 645, 682 (2022) (quoting State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317, 373 (2021)). Appellate review requires “‘the same analysis that a trial court should make’” when deciding a motion for summary judgment. Jabbi v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc., 264 Md. App. at 668 (quoting District of Columbia v. Singleton, 425 Md. 398, 406-07 (2012)). A moving party is entitled to summary judgment “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2-501(f). In making this determination, the court must consider the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party. Oglesby v. Baltimore Sch. Assocs., 484 Md. at 327. “‘[I]f those facts are susceptible to inferences supporting the position of the party opposing summary judgment, then a grant of summary judgment is improper.’” RDC Melanie Drive, LLC v. Eppard, 474 Md. 547, 564 (2021) (quoting Ashton v. Brown, 399 Md. 70, 79 (1995)). In her appellate brief, Ms. Moore contends that the record established genuine disputes of material fact concerning whether the defendants had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition at the Salisbury CVS store and whether CVS Pharmacy operated or controlled the store. Ms. Moore presents the following two questions: 16 1. Did the circuit court err by granting summary judgment to [CVS Pharmacy] finding that Ms. Moore was not “entitle[d] . . . to have a cause of action against CVS Pharmacy, Inc.”? 2. Did the circuit court err by granting [Maryland CVS]’s motion for summary judgment and finding that the Incident was not foreseeable to [Maryland CVS]? In their appellate brief, Maryland CVS and CVS Pharmacy argue that the summary judgment rulings should be affirmed. They contend the circuit court did not err when it granted summary judgment on the ground that Maryland CVS lacked notice of an unsafe condition at the Salisbury CVS store. They also contend that CVS Pharmacy is entitled to summary judgment on the ground that it does not own or operate the Salisbury CVS store, as well as on the ground of absence of notice. Because the issue of whether the defendants had actual or constructive knowledge or notice of a dangerous condition potentially affects the claims against both defendants, this opinion will address that issue before it considers whether CVS Pharmacy might be held liable for injuries to invitees at the Salisbury CVS store. I. Knowledge or Notice of Dangerous Condition In the present action, Ms. Moore raised negligence and premises liability claims against Maryland CVS and CVS Pharmacy. “In a negligence action, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving: ‘1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, 2) that the defendant breached that duty, 3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and 4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of that duty.’” Steamfitters Local Union No. 602 v. Erie Ins. Exch., 469 Md. 704, 727 (2020) (quoting Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith, 446 Md. 611, 631 (2016)). Because premises 17 liability is based on principles of negligence, a claim for premises liability requires proof of the same four elements required for any negligence claim. See Macias v. Summit Mgmt., Inc., 243 Md. App. 294, 316 (2019). The duty owed by the possessor or owner of property to a person injured on the property depends on the status of the injured person at the time of the incident. See Macias v. Summit Mgmt., Inc., 243 Md. App. at 316. “‘The highest duty is that owed to an invitee; it is the duty to use reasonable and ordinary care to keep [the] premises safe for the invitee and to protect [the invitee] from injury caused by an unreasonable risk which the invitee, by exercising ordinary care for [the invitee’s] own safety will not discover.’” Davis v. Regency Lane, LLC, 249 Md. App. 187, 207 (2021) (quoting Richardson v. Nwadiuko, 184 Md. App. 481, 489 (2009)) (further citation and quotation marks omitted). Customers invited to a retail store are entitled to assume that store proprietors will exercise reasonable care to inspect the premises for any unsafe conditions and to protect or warn customers against unsafe conditions. See Maans v. Giant of Maryland, L.L.C., 161 Md. App. 620, 627 (2005). Although “[s]torekeepers are not insurers of their customers’ safety,” they may be liable if a customer’s injury results from a failure to exercise ordinary care. Giant Food, Inc. v. Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 636 (1994). A storekeeper has an obligation to use reasonable care to protect its invitees “‘not only against dangers which may arise from some defect or unsafe condition of the physical property . . . but against dangers which may be caused by negligent acts of [the storekeeper’s] employees, or even of customers,’” as long as a reasonably prudent person 18 “‘should have anticipated the possible occurrence and the probable results of such acts.’” Id. at 636-37 (quoting Eyerly v. Baker, 168 Md. 599, 607 (1935)). Here, there is no dispute that Ms. Moore was a business invitee when she suffered injuries inside the Salisbury CVS store. Nor is there any dispute that Maryland CVS leased the store premises from Clairmont Center. When a commercial tenant leases store premises from a landowner, the tenant assumes the “position of owner and occupier of the leased premises” and, therefore, owes a duty of care to persons invited onto the premises. See Ford v. Edmondson Vill. Shopping Ctr. Holdings, LLC, 251 Md. App. 335, 349-50 (2021). The customers that a commercial tenant invites to a store “ordinarily occupy the status of business invitees” of that tenant. Id. at 350. Accordingly, Maryland CVS owed Ms. Moore a duty “‘to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition’” and would be “‘liable for injuries sustained in consequence of a failure to do so.’” Maans v. Giant of Maryland, L.L.C., 161 Md. App. at 627 (quoting Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117 (1955)). In general, to prove a negligence claim against a store proprietor, the invitee must show that the proprietor either “‘created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive knowledge of its existence’ prior to the invitee’s injury.” Maans v. Giant of Maryland, L.L.C., 161 Md. App. at 628 (quoting Lexington Market Auth. v. Zappala, 233 Md. 444, 446 (1964)). “‘It is not necessary that there be proof that the [proprietor] had actual knowledge of the conditions creating the peril; it is enough if it appears that [the proprietor] could have discovered them by the exercise of ordinary care[.]’” Deering Woods Condo. Ass’n v. Spoon, 377 Md. 250, 264 (2003) (quoting Moore v. American 19 Stores Co., 169 Md. 541, 551 (1936)). The invitee may prove the requisite knowledge through evidence that the proprietor had “actual or constructive notice” of a dangerous condition on the premises. See Macias v. Summit Mgmt., Inc., 243 Md. App. at 336. “[N]otice is usually not an issue” in cases where the store proprietor or its employees “are alleged to have created the dangerous condition.” Keene v. Arlan’s Dep’t Store of Baltimore, Inc., 35 Md. App. 250, 256 (1977). The issue of notice “generally arises when the dangerous condition is created by a third party.” Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 115 Md. App. 381, 394 (1997). “Usually, in [those] cases, the plaintiff claims that the defendant has breached its duty to inspect for dangers created by third parties,” such as other store patrons. Id. The store proprietor may be liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition created by another store patron if it gained actual or constructive knowledge of the condition with “‘sufficient time . . . to discover, cure, or clean up’” that condition. Joseph v. Bozzuto Mgmt. Co., 173 Md. App. 305, 347 (2007) (quoting Rehn v. Westfield America, 153 Md. App. 586, 593 (2003)). On the other hand, a restaurant proprietor is not liable for injuries suffered when a customer slips on a beverage spilled by another customer, unless there is evidence that the proprietor had actual or constructive notice of the spill and also had sufficient opportunity to clean it up. See Rehn v. Westfield America, 153 Md. App. at 598. The present case does not neatly fit into the category of cases in which the issue of notice to a store proprietor usually arises. Ms. Moore alleges that her injuries resulted from the combination of Ms. Belfort’s negligent driving and from the failure, on the part 20 of the owners and operators of the store, to protect invitees from this allegedly foreseeable type of driver error. Ms. Moore claims that the store owners and operators created an unsafe condition by keeping parking spaces directed at the entrance without bollards or other measures to protect against vehicles. Without question, Maryland CVS had sufficient knowledge and notice of the layout of its parking spaces and store entrance, as well as the absence of protective barriers. The relevant focus, therefore, is whether the evidence supports a conclusion that Maryland CVS knew or should have known that the existing layout presented a hazardous condition. As a preliminary matter, Maryland CVS contests whether Ms. Moore may proceed on a theory that the parking lot was defectively designed. Maryland CVS claims that counsel for Ms. Moore