Songao v. Commonwealth

Songao v. Commonwealth, 4 N.M.I. 186 (1994) Diego M. Songao, Crisencia Burch, Maria Didonato, and Francisco Songao, heirs of Serafina M. Songao, deceased, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Defendant/Appellee. Appeal No. 93-028 Civil Action No. 90-0165 October 5, 1994 Argued and Subm itted M arch 8, 1994 Counsel for appellants: Eric S. Basse, Saipan (Office of Jam es H. Grizzard). Counsel for appellees: Douglas H. Strand, Assistant Attorney General, Saipan. BEFORE: DELA CRUZ, Chief Justice, VILLAGOM EZ, Justice, and KOSACK, Special Judge. VILLAGOM EZ, Justice: Diego Songao, Crisencia Burch, M aria Didonato, and Francisco Songao (collectively the “Songaos”), appeal a Superior Court decision rem anding a Land Com m ission determ ination of ownership issued in favor of the Com m onwealth governm ent. The trial court concluded, after review, that: (1) the Land Com m ission violated the Songaos’ rights to procedural due process, and (2) the Land Com m ission determination that the Com m onwealth government owned the land at issue was not supported by substantial evidence. The Songaos claim ownership of Lot 3210 in Finagtan, Rota, based on a land exchange between two private individuals. Although the trial court stated that there was “ample testim ony that an exchange did occur between Fintano and Francisco,1 whereby the latter received the Finagtan property,” the court decided that “this evidence should not be used to bolster the claim s of the [Songaos] in the proceedings before this court.” 2 The trial court rem anded the m atter to the Land Com m ission for further evidentiary hearings. ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 The Songaos’ predecessor in interest. 2 Songao v. Commonwealth, Civ. No. 90-0165 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1993) (opinion and orders at 22).  The Songaos present the substantive issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to find the Songaos owners of Lot 3210. W e do not reach this issue, however, because our decision turns on the preliminary procedural question of whether the court erred in remanding the case to the Land Comm ission.3 W hether the trial court may rem and a case to the Land Com m ission under 2 CM C § 4249 is a question of law which we review de novo. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND During the Japanese occupation of Rota, Francisco M aratita, deceased (“Francisco”), owned a parcel of land in Papa’lada, Rota. At the same tim e, Fintano Taisacan, deceased (“Fintano”), owned a lot at Finagtan, presently identified as Lot 3210. Based on a purported exchange of these lots, Francisco’s daughter Serafina M . Songao (“Serafina”) filed a claim of ownership of Lot 3210 with the Land Com m ission. The Land Com m ission issued a prelim inary determ ination of ownership to Lot 3210 in favor of Serafina. The Land Com m ission subsequently reversed that decision and, on October 18, 1989, issued a determ ination of ownership in favor of the Com m onwealth governm ent. On February 15, 1990, the Songaos, as Serafina’s heirs, filed a com plaint to quiet title in Superior Court. The com plaint is an appeal from the Land Com m ission determination pursuant to 2 CM C § 4249, which provides: Any person who . . . claim s an interest . . . and who disagrees with the [Land Com m ission’s] determ ination of ownership . . . may file for a review of the determ ination of ownership by filing a com plaint in the [Superior Court] . . . . The com plaint shall be in the nature of a quiet title suit . . . . The com plaint shall nam e as defendants all those persons known to the plaintiff who claim an interest in the land. A determination of ownership shall be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence found in the record taken as a whole including the record before the Land Com m ission and such additional evidence as shall be adm itted before the [Superior Court]. 4 The trial court reviewed the evidence upon which the Land Com m ission based its determination, as well as two affidavits submitted to the court. From this review, the court found “am ple” evidence that “an exchange did occur between Fintano and Francisco, whereby the latter received the Finagtan property.” 5 However, the court ruled that such evidence “should not be used to bolster the claim s of the Plaintiffs in the proceedings before [the trial] court.” 6 Thus, instead of quieting title in favor of the Songaos, based on the evidence taken as a whole, the trial court vacated the title determination to Lot 3210 and rem anded the matter to the Land Com m ission “with instructions that the Land Com m ission be required to hold another, public, hearing, consistent with [the court’s decision], for an opportunity to build a substantial docum ented record.” 7 The Songaos tim ely appealed the decision to remand the case to the Land Comm ission. They argue that 3 Appellate courts generally deem orders remanding actions to administrative agencies for further proceedings to be interlocutory in nature and not appealable as final decisions. See, e.g., Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1990); 2 Charles H. Koch, Jr., A D M IN ISTRATIVE L AW A ND P RACTICE , § 8.12[1](c) (1985 & Supp. 1994). However, due to the unique nature of the Land Commission Act, this rule is inapplicable. The decision below was a “final judgment” for purposes of vesting appellate jurisdiction over this appeal from an erroneous decision in a quiet title action. 4 2 CMC § 4249. 5 Songao, supra note 2, opinion and orders at 22. 6 Id. 7 Id. at 23.  Songao v. Commonwealth, 4 N.M.I. 186 (1994) the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to enable entry of judgment in their favor. W e hold that the trial court erred by failing to enter judgm ent in favor of one of the parties, and should not have rem anded the case to the Land Com m ission. ANALYSIS W here a statute establishes an adm inistrative adjudicatory schem e, we look to that statute to determ ine the scope, if any, of judicial review of the agency’s actions.8 Here, the Land Comm ission Act of 1983 (“Act”) 9 creates the Land Comm ission, charges it with the task of registering all land in the Comm onwealth, and provides for judicial review of the Land Com m ission’s land ow nership determinations. Two CM C § 4249 of the Act governs this appeal. That provision mandates that the Superior Court uphold a determ ination of ownership which it finds to be supported by substantial evidence “in the record taken as a whole.” 10 The record “as a whole” comprises “the record before the Land Comm ission and such additional evidence as shall be adm itted before” the court.11 In the present case, the Superior Court reviewed the evidence on which the Land Com m ission based its decision, as well as additional evidence consisting of two affidavits. The court found that the Land Com m ission based its determ ination of ownership for Lot 3210 on “insufficient” relevant evidence.12 The Act does not expressly preclude the trial court from remanding to the Land Comm ission where, as here, the record taken as a whole does not support the Land Com m ission determ ination. The authority to rem and in such instances has been deem ed an inherent part of a court’s power under other statutory schem es providing for judicial review of agency action.13 In this case, however, the Act specifically provides that appeals of Land Com m ission determinations m ust be brought as quiet title actions, and directs the trial court to review the whole record, including any additional evidence that the court decides to adm it. From our analysis of this language and the rest of the Act’s text 14 and legislative history which follows, we conclude that the legislature intended: (1) 2 CM C § 4249 of the Act to provide for trial de novo of a Land Comm ission determ ination which has been appealed, and (2) where an ownership determ ination is not supported by substantial evidence, to authorize the court to reverse and enter judgm ent, based on the “record taken as a whole.” I. The Text of the Land Commission Act 8 1 CMC § 9112(c). See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 735, 105 S. Ct. 1598, 1602, 84 L. Ed. 2d 643, 651 (1985) (“We begin . . . with the language of the statute”). 9 PL 3-79 (1983) (codified at 2 CMC § 4211 et seq.). 10 2 CMC § 4249. 11 Id. (emphasis added). 12 Songao, supra note 2, opinion and orders at 22. 13 See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 1973) (discussing the judicial review provision of the federal Administrative Procedure Act); accord Seo v. United States Dept. of Labor, 523 F.2d 10, 13- 14 (9th Cir. 1975). 14 Commonwealth Ports Auth. v. Hakubotan Saipan Enters., Inc., 2 N.M.I. 212, 224 (1991) (legislative intent is to be discerned by analyzing the statute as a whole, not just an isolated phrase) (citing Office of the Attorney General v. Cubol, 3 CR 64, 73 (D.N.M.I. App. Div. 1987)).  Two CM C § 4249 of the Act specifies that “[t]he com plaint shall be in the nature of a quiet title suit.” 15 The section requires the plaintiff to nam e as defendants “all those persons known . . . who claim an interest in the land,” 16 not sim ply the adverse party or parties from the administrative proceeding. Additionally, the section specifies that the trial court should apply the procedures it utilizes “for processing and disposing of civil litigation.” 17 W e interpret this text to direct the trial court to conduct a trial de novo in appeals from Land Com m ission determinations, reverse a determination where it is not backed by substantial evidence (just as the court is to affirm determ inations supported by substantial evidence), and quiet title to the land in question, rather than rem and the m atter to the Land Com m ission. The legislative history of the Act confirm s our conclusion. II. Legislative History In construing legislation a court may, if necessary, consult legislative history.18 Standing com m ittee reports in particular, while not decisive, are highly persuasive indicia of legislative intent.19 The m ost persuasive evidence, however, com es from conference com m ittee reports, which represent “the final statem ent of term s agreed to by both houses” 20 of a legislature. The Land Com m ission Act originated as House Bill 94 (“H.R. 94" or “bill”) in the Third Com m onwealth Legislature.21 As passed initially by the House of Representatives, section 18 of H.R. 94 22 included the following provision: “A determ ination of ownership shall be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence found in the record taken as a whole.” 23 H.R. 94 then moved to the Senate. The Attorney General’s office subm itted a letter, which the Senate Standing Com m ittee on Judiciary, Governm ent & Law attached to its final report.24 The letter states, in part: Section 18 provides that adm inistrative determ inations of ownership shall be upheld by the courts if factual determ inations are supported by “substantial evidence.” It is obviously the intent of the draftsmen to confine judicial review to the adm inistrative record made below by the 15 2 CMC § 4249. A quiet title action is defined as “[a] proceeding to establish the plaintiff’s title to land by bringing into court an adverse claimant and there compelling [the adverse claimant] either to establish his [or her] claim or be forever after estopped from asserting it.” B LACK ’S L AW D ICTION ARY 1249 (6th ed. 1990). As suggested by this definition, decisions in such actions are final and binding on the parties or their privies. 16 2 CMC § 4249. 17 Id. 18 A court may look to legislative history for guidance where the enacted text may reasonably be read in two ways, or where no single path of meaning clearly appears. 2A Norman J. Singer, S TATU TES AN D S TATUTORY C O N STRU CTIO N § 48.01 (5th ed. 1992); see also Camacho v. Northern Marianas Retirement Fund, 1 N.M.I. 362, 369 n.5 (1990). 19 Singer, supra note 18, § 48.06. 20 Id. § 48.08. 21 The bill was first introduced, but never acted upon, during the Second Commonwealth Legislature. H.R. Report No. 119 at 2, 3d N.M.I. Legis. (1983). 22 Later codified as amended as 2 CMC § 4249. 23 H.R. Report No. 94 § 18, 3d N.M.I. Legis. (1983). 24 See Sen. Report No. 240, 3d N.M.I. Legis. (1983).  Songao v. Commonwealth, 4 N.M.I. 186 (1994) land registration team s. We would suggest that the Committee underline this notation by inserting the following phrase . . . between “. . . land” and “A determination . . .”: “Judicial review shall be confined to the administrative record.” 25 Tellingly, rather than adding the language suggested by the Attorney General’s office, the Senate inserted a phrase to m ake the relevant sentence of H.R. 94 § 18, read as follows: “A determination of ownership shall be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence found in the record taken as a whole[,] including the record before the Land Commission and such additional evidence as shall be admitted before the Commonwealth Trial Court.” 26 The House conference com m ittee which subsequently considered the bill accepted the Senate’s am endm ent to section 18. The legislature then passed H.R. 94, as am ended. The Governor signed it into law in 1983 as the Land Com m ission Act. Unfortunately, we have no explanation for the Senate’s addition of the language “including the record before the Land Comm ission and such additional evidence as shall be adm itted before the Comm onwealth Trial Court” because a typhoon destroyed the Senate records from the Third Com m onwealth Legislature. Nevertheless, the surviving House records establish that the Senate introduced the am endm ent, and that it did so with knowledge of the Attorney General’s previously quoted letter.27 The acceptance of the Senate’s amendm ent to the bill verifies the legislature’s intent to provide for trial de novo of appeals from Land Com m ission determinations.28 In sum m ary, although 2 CM C § 4249 of the Act does not expressly say so, the trial court is em powered to determine de novo whether a Land Com m ission determination of ownership should stand. As a procedural m atter, the court should begin by exam ining the adm inistrative record to establish whether substantial evidence supports the Land Com m ission’s determ ination. If substantial evidence supports the agency’s otherwise proper decision, the court should affirm . If the adm inistrative record is deficient and the court is consequently unable to determ ine whether the Land Com m ission’s determination should stand, the court should permit the parties to subm it additional evidence. Thereafter, the court may affirm or reverse the Land Com m ission’s determ ination, depending on whether the agency record, as supplem ented, warrants affirmance or reversal. 25 Letter from W illiam S. Mount, Commonwealth Assistant Attorney General & Chief of Civil Division, to Ignacio K. Quichocho, Chairman, Commonwealth Senate Committee on Judiciary, Government & Law at 2 (May 17, 1983) (appended to S. Rep. No. 240) (emphasis added). 26 H.R. Report No. 94 § 18, 3d N.M.I. Legis. (1983) (emphasis in original). 27 Cf. S IN GER , supra note 18, § 48.10 (noting that in determining legislative intent, federal courts consider statements of interested parties at congressional committee hearings to be helpful because records of the hearings are printed and distributed to members of Congress, and it is assumed, therefore, that the legislators “had knowledge of [the witnesses’] statements and of the evils described”). 28 Cf. id. § 48.10 (“If the legislature adopts an amendment urged by a witness, it may be assumed that the intent voiced was adopted by the legislature,” especially if the witness’s proposed amendment is incorporated into a standing committee report). The Coastal Resources Management Act of 1983, PL 3-47 (1983) (codified as amended at 2 CMC § 1501 et seq.) (“CRM Act”), serves as a useful point of comparison here. This statute, like the Land Commission Act enacted the same year, provides for judicial review of decisions of the agency in question. The CRM Act, however, specifies that “[t]he standard for judicial review [of Coastal Resources Management Appeals Board decisions] is whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record made before the Board, taken as a whole; the facts in question are not subject to trial de novo.” 2 CMC § 1541(b) (emphasis added).  CONCLUSION Under the Act, an appeal from a Land Comm ission determ ination of ownership takes the form of a quiet title action. In adjudicating such actions, the court considers all issues de novo and adm its additional evidence it deem s relevant. The court then adjudicates the m atter accordingly, based on the record taken as a whole. W e VACATE the Superior Court’s order and REM AND for the trial court to quiet title to Lot 3210 based on the evidence found in the record taken as a whole, including such additional evidence as the court m ay adm it.