Ferreira v. Borja

CLERK OF COURT SUPREME COURT. CNMI FILED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COM..'iONWEALTH OF THE NORTIIERN MARIANA ISLANDS DIANA C. FERREIRA, ) APPEAL NO. 90-047 Plaintiff/Appellant, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 86-796 ) vs. ) ) OPINION ROSALIA MAFNAS BORJA, et al., ) Defendants/Appellees. ) ____) Argued March 12, 1991 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Carlsmith Ball Wichman Murray Case Mukai & Ichiki P. 0. Box 241 CHRB Saipan, MP 96950 Counsel for Defendants/Appellees: Theodore R. Mitchell P. o. Box 2020 Saipan, MP 96950 BEFORE: DELA CRUZ, Chief Justice, BO�A, Justice, and KING, Special Judge. BORJA, Justice: Diana C. Ferreira (hereafter Diana), a person of Northern Mariana Island descent (hereafter NMI descent), filed a quiet title action against defendants Rosalia Mafnas Borja, Isidora Mafnas Salas, and Isabel Mafnas Santos {hereafter Mafnas sisters). The Mafnas sisters were the sellers of three parcels of land to Diana. The lots are described as Lot Nos. 008 B 22, 23, and 24, containing a total area of 21,182 square meters, more or less. The 517 Mafnas s i s te rs f i l ed an answer d eny i ng ownersh i p in D i an a and a f f i rmat iv e l y stat i ng that the a c qu i s it i on of the l and by D i ana v i o l ated A rt i c l e X I I of the NMI Con s t i tut i o n . Both p a rt ie s f i l ed mot i o n s for summary j udgment . The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Mafnas s i sters ho l d i ng that the acqu i s it ion of the l a nd b y D i a na v i o l at ed Art i c l e XII o f the NMI Const itut i on . D i an a appea l s . We a f f i rm the d ec i s ion o f the tr i a l court . FACTS The series of t r a ns ac t i on s at i s s ue in th i s case commenced w i th a 1980 Partnersh ip Agreement (hereafter Agreement) • James and Bobbi Gri zzard (husband and w i fe) (hereafter the Gri zzards) and Frank F . and D i ana c. Ferre i ra (hu sband and w i f e ) (he r e a f t e r the Ferre iras) executed th i s Agreement . The sole purpo se of the p artnersh ip was to purchas e "for s a l e , l ea s e a nd deve l opment the property d e s c r ibed above as part of Lot 008 B 10 II 1 Agreement , Art i c l e One . The Gr i zzards wou l d contribute $41,000 to the p a rtnersh ip . 1 The partnership agre ement dea l s w i th o n l y one p i ec e o f property . However , appel l an t ' s b r i e f , at p a g e 1 4 , acknow ledges that the other two prop e rt i e s were acqu i red us i ng funds from the Grizzards . App e l l ant states a l so that D i a n a used the r e a l estate expert i s e o f Frank in a cqu i ri ng the properti e s . Wh i l e it may be true that she re l ied on Frank's e xp e rt i s e i n the purcha s e o f the propert i e s , there is noth i ng i n the record that i nd icates that Frank's expert i s e w a s part o f the cons iderat i o n accepted by the Maf na s s i sters in conveyi ng thei r i nterest s . Consequ e nt l y, such a fact is i rrel evant as to the i s su e of who furn i shed the cons idera t i on for the purchase o f the prope rt i es . 518 Frank F. Ferreira wou ld contribute "all amounts needed for survey ing , subdividing , l ega l fees , and accounting services to the partnersh ip , such services be ing o f the approx imate amount o f N ine Thousand Dol l ars ( $ 9 , 0 0 0. 00 ) . " Agreement , Article Four . In Articl e Four , a l s o , it is provided that Diana , as a citizen o f Northern Mariana de scent wi l l purchase the property described with the . • . $4 1 , 0 0 0 contributed by [the Grizzards). Upon the purchase of the described rea l property , [Diana) wi l l execute a l ease o f the real property to the partnership , for the maximum peri od o f time a l l owed by l ar;� , being forty (4 0 ) years and to include a " change o f l aw" provision for purchase in fee s impl e absolute should the l aw change with the cons ideration for thi s prov is ion be ing the $4 1 , 0 0 0 paid in hand and the mutual promises conta ined in this agreement . In addit ion , the l ease wi l l conta in a provis ion for the purchase o f improvements put o n the l and b y the lessee . Diana acquired fee titl e but she never granted the partnership the short-term leases required by the Agreement . I nstead , Diana used add itional funds from James Grizzard to acquire two add itional adjacent parce l s , taking fee title in herse l f . The three parc e l s were purchased f o r about one hundred thousand dol l ars ( $ 1 0 0 , 00 0 ) . On March 25 , 1 9 8 8 , in a document entitled , " Quitc l a i m , Rel ease of C l a ims , and Assignment , 11 Nansay Micron es i a , Inc . acquired the Grizzards' interests in the three parce l s of land, and a l l other rights they had under the Agreement . The consideration paid for al l the Grizzards' i nterests was one m i l l ion one hundred thousand d o l l ars ( $ 1 , 100 , 00 0 ) . On the same day , Nansay Micronesia , Inc . ass igned the interests it acquired from the Grizzards to the 519 Ferreiras. Also on March 25, 1988, Diana entered into an agreement to lease with Nansay for fifty-five years. The consideration for the agreement to lease was the assignment by Nansay Micronesia, Inc. of its interests in the three parcels of land and in the Agreement to the Ferreiras. Concurrently, Diana agreed to convey her fee simple interest in the three parcels of land to Ana Little for $60 ,0 0 0 . ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment in favor of the Mafnas sisters where the record before it presented multiple genuine issues as to material facts, by weighing conflicting evidence of record, resolving material factual disputes without trial and assessing the credibility of deposition evid ence without having heard testimony. 2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in concluding that the Grizzards and Frank Ferreira acquired a constitutionally impermissible interest in NMI land when Diana purchased the land from the Mafnas sisters. 3. Whether, as applied to this case, Article XII of the Constitution of the Northern Mariana Islands violates Diana ' s right to equal protection of the laws as guar anteed her by the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the United states. STANDARD OF REVIEW A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. If there is 520 no genuine issue of material fact , the analysis shifts to whether the substantive law was correctly applied. Commonwealth Ports Authority v. Hakubotan Saipan Enterprises, Inc. , No. 90-005 (N. M. I. Aug. 8, 1991). If an incorrect substantive law was applied , the appellate court should , in its de novo review , determine if the result is correct under a different theory. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp. , 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985); 10 c. Wright , A. Miller , & M. Kane , Federal Practice and Procedure: civ�l 2d § 2716 (1983). The evidence and inferences are viewed in a light most favorabl e to the non-moving party . Cabrera v. Heirs of De Castro , No. 89-018 , 1 N. Mar. I. 102 (June 7 , 1990). ANALYSI S Summary Judgment and Article X I I We will address the first two issues jointly since a discussion of one requires a discussion of the other. Our analysis starts with the pertinent constitutional provision. Article X I I , as amended in 1985 , is as follows: ARTICLE X I I Section 1: Alienation of Land. The acquisition of permanent and long­ term interests in real property within the Commonwealth shall be restricted to persons of Northern Marianas descent. Section 2: Acquisition. The term acquisition used in section 1 includes acquisition by sale , lease , gift , inheritance or other means. Section 3: Permanent and Long-Term Interests in Real Property. 521  The term permanent and long-term interests in real property used in S ection 1 includes freehold interests and leasehold interests of more than fifty-five years including renewal rights • • • • Section 4: Persons of Northern Marianas Descent. A person of Northern Marianas descent is a person who is a citizen or national of the United states and who is of at least one­ quarter Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern Marianas Carolinian blood or a combination thereof or an adopted child or a person of Northern Marianas d escent if adopted while under the age of eighteen years. For purposes of determining Northern Marianas d escent, a person shall be considered to be a full ­ bl ooded Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern Marianas carol inian if that person was born or domiciled in the Northern Mariana Island s by 1950 and was a citizen of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands before the termination of the Trusteeship with respect to the Commonweal th. S ection 5: Corpor ations . ·A corporation shall be considered to be a person of Northern Marianas descent so long as it is incorporated in the Commonwealth, has its principal place of business in the Commonwealth, has directors one-hundred percent of whom are persons of Northern Marianas descent and has voting shares (i.e . common or preferred) one-hundred percent of which are actual l y owned by persons of Northern Marianas descent as defined by S ection 4 . Minors, as defined by applicable laws of the Commonwealth, may not be eligible to become directors of a corporation . No trusts or voting by proxy by persons not of Northern Marianas descent may be permitted . Beneficial title shall not be severed from legal title . S ection 6: Enforcement . Any transaction mad e in violation of section 1 shall be void ab initio . Whenever a corporation ceases to be qualified under S ection 5, a permanent or long-term interest 522  in land in the Commonwealth acquired by the Corporation after the effective date of this amendment shall be immediately forfeited without right of redemption to the government of the Commonwealth • • • • Commonwealth Code, vol. 1, pp. B-334 & B-335. For a person to succeed in a cause of action alleging a violation of Article X I I , certain material facts have to be clearly present and undisputed. These facts are� 1. An acquisition of NMI land; 2. The acquisition is a permanent and long-term interest; 3. The acquisition was made by a person who is not of NM I descent. To determine if the above necessary facts exist in this case, we must answer the question of whether the long-term and permanent interest acquired by Diana from the Mafnas sisters in Lot Nos. 008 B 22, 23, and 24 was, as a matter of law, a constitutionally impermissible acquisition by the Grizzards. The following facts appear from the record: 1. Diana is a person of NMI descent; 2. The partnership of the Grizzards, Frank Ferreira and Diana is not recognized in the constitution as a person capable of owning a permanent and long-term interest in Commonwealth real property; 3. The Grizzards and Frank Ferreira are not persons of NMI descent; 4. Diana acquired in her name the properties from the Mafnas sisters with funds provided entirely by the Grizzards; and 523  5. The properties were acquired in furtherance of a partnership agreement between the Griz zards and the Ferreiras , dated October 2 1 , 1980. The above facts are undisputed material facts. These undisputed material facts are sufficient for purposes of a summary judgment proceeding involving a claim that Article XII of the ID1I Constitution was violated. The disputed genuine issues of material fact that Diana claims with regard to "control 11 over an agent are not relevant. The issue of control was discussed by the trial court in its agency analysis. As we discuss later , common l aw principles of trust are dispositive. The other disputed issue of material fact raised by Diana deals with the claim of ownership to the properties. Again , as we will note later , Diana cannot raise a genuine issue of fact by refuting in her deposition what is stated in the Agreement. As we stated earlier , where there is no genuine issue of material fact , the analysis then shifts to whether the correct substantive law was applied , bearing in mind that the evidence and inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cabrera v. Heirs of De Castro , supra. The trial court , in its grant of summary judgment , concluded that Diana's acquisition of Lot Nos. 008 B 22 , 23 , and 24 from the Mafnas sisters 11violated Article XII, Section 1 of the Constitution and is void ab initio under Section 6 thereof." Ferreira v. Borja , C.A. No. 86-796 , "Order Re Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary 524 Judgment" at 28 (Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1988). We initially examine this conclusion in view of the substantive law applied by the trial court. commonwealth Ports Authority v. Hakubotan Saipan Enterprises, Inc., supra. If the incorrect substantive law was applied, we then must determine if the result is correct under a different theory of law. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., supra; 10 c. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2716 (1983). The trial court applied principles of agency in arriving at its conclusion. Whether Diana is in fact an agent of the Grizzards and Frank is not dispositive. What is dispositive is whether Diana's acquisition of the properties, using funds provided entirely by the Grizzards, resulted in the acquisition by persons not of NMI descent of an impermissible interest in Commonwealth real property. The issue is whether the acquisition by Diana resulted in the acquisition by the Grizzards and Frank Ferreira of an equitable fee interest in Commonwealth real property and, therefore, the transaction violates Article XII. The trial court erroneously applied agency principles in reaching its judgment. It is the law of trust that govern since only through trust principles may one acting as an agent acquire a fee interest. But although the substantive law applied was incorrect, the judgment is correct. The result we reach in applying principles of trust is the same as the trial court 1 s result in applying principles of agency. 525  An appellate court has an obligation to determine if the judgment or order of a trial court is correct even if the wrong ground or reasoning was used. In re the Estate of Dela Cruz, No. 90-023, slip op. at 13, n.10 (N.M.I. Feb. 7, 1991); Ross v. Co mmunications satellite Corp., supra; Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 839 (1982). In Restatement (Second} of Trusts § 440 (1959), it is stated that, nhfhere a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom the purchase price is paid, except as stated in §§ 441, 442, and 444." See also Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas, No. 89 -003, slip op. at 21 (N.M.I. July 5, 1991). Is Diana a trustee for the Grizzards under a resulting trust theory? The answer is yes. Disregarding the exceptions for the moment, what we have here is a transfer of three parcels of land to Diana with the entire purchase price being paid by the Grizzards. This creates a resulting trust under Section 440 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts in favor of the one paying the purchase price. When Diana acquired the lots from the Mafnas sisters, Diana held bare legal title to the properties, and the Grizzards held equitable title. "The trustee of a resulting trust holds only the naked legal title for the benefit of the person furnishing the consideration who holds the equitable interest.11 Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas, supra, 526 · · at 22. (Citation and footnote omitted.) In Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas, supra, we held that If a resulting trust in real property in the Commonwealth has arisen in favor of a person who is not of Northern Marianas descent, it is subject to being declared invalid in a judicial proceeding if the equitable interest held for them in trust violates Article XII. Id. at 34. (Footnote omitted.) The most crucial evidence against Diana is the partnership. agreement. This document not only establishes that Diana was never meant to be the fee simple absolute owner of the properties, but also dispels any exception to a resulting trust. The undisputed facts show that the partnership among the four was formed to buy and sell or lease property. Each partner had a role. Diana was to purchase and hold title. The Grizzards were to provide the purchase money. Frank was to provide real estate expertise. Each performed their respective partnership roles. The question is whether Diana possesses both legal and equitable titles to the properties, or whether she is holding title in trust for the benefit of all the four partners. If the latter, did the three partners not of NMI descent acquire an equitable fee simple interest in the_ properties? If so, such violates Article XII. The Agreement clearly shows that Diana was to hold title to the properties for the benefit of the partnership. Agreement, Articles One and Four. There are three provisions in the Agreement 527 that conclusively.show that Diana was holding title for the benefit of the partnership. The first provision is in Article Four. It states that any lease agreement to the partnership must include a "change of law" provision. The article defines "change of law11 as meaning that the partnership (i.e., Diana , Frank, and the Griz zards collectively) will purchase the land in fee simple absolute should the law change with no additional consideration. Second, Article Four also states that Diana, or whoever is the lessor at the end of the lease period, must purchase the improvements placed on the land by the partnership, or whoever is the lessee then. And third, Article Five (3) provides that if Diana withdraws from the partnership for any reason, she must convey her right, title and interest in the land to a person of NMI descent, to be designated by the partnership . These provisions establish an intent that Diana would obtain fee simple title, but subject to the partnership restrictions. She must convey her fee simple interest if 1) there is a change in the law, or 2) she decides to withdraw from the partnership. The consid�ration for her interest in the event of a change in law is the "mutual promises contained in this agreement . " The consideration to be paid for her interest in the event she withdraws from the partnership "are the mutual promises contained in this agreement and one dollar ($ 1.00) to be paid in hand." She is restricted in what she may do with her title to the properties. And if none of the two conveyance possibilities arise, she must 528 purchase the improvements placed on the premises by the.lessee at the end of the lease term. Diana, James Grizzard, and Frank Ferreira disputed, in their depositions, that Diana was to obtain anything less than a fee simple absolute interest. However, these refutations do not prohibit a court from granting summary judgment. See United states v. Kasuboski, 834 F. 2d 1345 (7th Cir. 1987). A party cannot circumvent summary judgment by later refuting what he or she initially admitted. This is not a situation where a party to the Agreement is attempting to clarify or explain an ambiguous provision in the Agreement. What we have is a situation where parties to the Agreement are attempting to dispute what is clearly and unambiguously stated in the Agreement. This cannot, and should not, be allowed. Otherwise, the rule for summary judgment would be meaningless. In Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas, supra, at 34, n. 45, we noted that, "a trust may be rebutted by clear evidence that the money used to purchase the property was a valid gift, loan, or payment to discharge a debt or other obligation. " In this case, we have no such clear evidence. Article Four of the Agreement shows that Diana was not to obtain title as a gift or loan, or to discharge a debt or other obligation. She acquired title because she was a person of NMI descent. She acquired title with covenants that she will relinquish her title upon the happening of certain events. 529 And if those specific events did not occur, her title was encumbered with the obligation to purchase any improvements placed on the premises by any lessee. The exceptions to a resulting trust, as cited in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 440 , do not apply. These exceptions arise if the payor: (1) manifests an intention that no trust should arise (§ 441), (2) purchases the property in the name of a relative "or other natural object of bounty" (§ 442), or (3) purchases the property to accomplish an illegal purpose (§ 444). Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas, supra, at 23 . There is no manifestation of an intention that no trust should arise. The Agreement makes it clear that a trust was contemplated. Agreement, Articles Four and Five. Diana is to purchase the property and then lease it to th e partnership with a provision that if the law changes, the partnership obtains fee simple title at no additional consideration. She must purchase the improvements, if there is no change in the law, at the end of the lease term. Finally, she must transfer her interest if she ever d ecides to leave the partnership. It is clear that Diana's co-partners (who are not of NMI descent) h ave, through Diana's deed, acquired an equitable interest of indeterminate duration. This is not a situation where the non-NMI descent would be obtaining a constitutionally permissible interest. If the NMI descent was purchasing land with money totally provided by a non-NMI descent but it is clear that the intent in the transaction was that the 530 non-NMI descent would only obtain a 55 year lease, or less, and the fee interest would be in the NMI descent, then the constitutional 2 prohibition would not be violated. The Grizzards did not provide the funds for the purchase of the properties in the name of a relative or other natural object of bounty. Diana is not a relative of the Grizzards. · There is nothing in the record establishing that she is a natural object of their bounty. Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas, supra, at 23-24 , discussed the third exception, i. e., a purchase to accomplish an illegal purpose. At first blush, it appears that this exception may be applicable in this case. If the partnership agreement was entered into to accomplish an illegal purpose, there can be no resulting trust under § 444. However, in analyzing Article XII, this Court has concluded in the Aldan-Pierce case that a violation of Article XII does not 2 This hypothetical was also not the situation in the Aldan­ Pierce case. We stated in Aldan-Pierce that 11the record in this case indicates that Fennell and McMahon intended to retain an equitable interest of indeterminate duration. 11 Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas, supra, at 28 . We disagree with the dissent's interpretation regarding footnote 37 in Aldan-Pierce. See, infra, pp. 22-23. Footnote 37 was inserted under the discussion of a resulting trust being rebutted in part. Aldan-Pierce was arguing that, since Fennell and McMahon disclaimed any intention to take more than a leasehold for fifty-five years, the resulting trust is rebutted. Footnote 37 was inserted to show that the exception noted in Comment f of § 441 of the Restatement {Second) of Trusts does not apply in the Commonwealth if the disclaimer occurs after the unconstitutional act. That is, a person cannot violate the constitution now, and then later attempt to correct the violation by saying that all that was intended was a constitutionally permissible interest. 531 occur until and unless a court declares a transaction to be violative of Article XII. Therefore , there can be no automatic illegal purpose under Article XII. A court must first declare a transaction to be unconstitutional. In adopting the principles set forth in I saacs v. De Hon , 11 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1926) , the Aldan-Pierce Court held that A resulting trust in real property in the Commonwealth in favor of a person who is not of Northern Marianas descent is valid, unless the equitable interest held for them in trust is declared , in a judicial proceeding , to be violative of Article XII. If the equitable interest is ruled violative of Article XI I , the underlying transaction through which the person who is not of Northern Marianas descent acquired the interest becomes void ab initio. Article X I I , § 6. (Footnote omitted.) We reaffirm such analysis and holding on this exception. Only a court of competent jurisdiction can determine if an acquisition of land violates Article XII of the NMI Constitution. Prior to such judicial determination , the resulting trust is valid. This exception does not apply. Equal Protection Diana 1 s argument on this issue must fall. 3 Her brief , at 58, n.47 , correctly notes that this argument was made to the United States Court of Appeals fo� the Ninth Circuit and was rejected. 3we disagree with the Mafnas sisters that this issue may not be raised on appeal since it was not raised in the trial court. This issue falls within one of the three exceptions noted in Camacho v. Northern Marianas Retirement Fund , No. 90-007 , 1 N.Mar. I. 131 (Sept. 2 1 , 1990). The exception is that 11the issue is only one of law not relying on any factual record • • • • " Id. at 135-136. 532  4 S e e Wab o l v . Vi l l acrus i s , 908 F . 2d 411 {9th C i r . 1990) . There i s no equa l protect i on v i o l at i on under the NMI Cons t i tut i o n , o r th e Un i ted States Constitut ion . CONCLUS ION Ba s ed on the above , the conveyanc e s from the Ma fnas s i st ers to D i ana v i o l ated A rt i c l e X I I of the NMI Cons t i tu t ion . The Gri zzards acqu ired a cons t i tutiona l ly imperm i s s ib l e i nterest i n real property in the Commonw e a l th when the conveyan c e s were made . Such conveyance s were void from the date they were executed . The grant o f summary j udgment i s he reby AFFIRMED. -I� Jo s e s. D e l a Cruz � Ch i e f Jus t i c e Borj a 4 We note that we a r e agre e i ng only w i th the ana l y s i s of the N i nth C i rcu i t on t h i s i s su e . 533 KING, S pecial Judge (Dissenting): I can readily agree with the Court's conclusion that some of the rights which James and Barbara Grizzard and Frank Ferreira sought to obtain in the S an Roque land constituted permanent and long term interests in land. I accept also the majority's conclusion that the form of arrangement under which a person not of Northern Marianas descent (hereafter a "non-NMD") attempts to acquire control over, and a beneficial interest in, land in the Commonwealth is not dispositive. Thus, we are also in agreement that acquisition of any long term or permanent interest, whether legal, equitable or contractual, and whether held individually or th rough ownership of some form of business enterprise such as a partnersh ip or corporation, falls within the constitutional prohibition. I therefore concur that the transaction between the Grizzards, Frank Ferreira and Diana Ferreira was violative of article XII of the NMI Constitution and was void ab initio. Despite these important agreements however, I have serious misgivings about the C?urt's use of th e resulting trust d octrine in this context and I find the ultimate conclusion unnecessarily and dangerously disruptive of economic and private property interests in the NMI. Because of the importance of article XII to the people and jurisprudence of the NMI, my reasons are set out here fully. I. The Resulting Trust Doctrine The keystone of the Court's analysis in this opinion, and in 534 the recent case of Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas , No. 89-003 (N.M.I. July 5, 1991) is the resulting trust doctrine. For the following reasons , I do not believe this doctrine is being properly applied by the Court. A. Nature and Purpose of the Doctrine. The resulting trust doctrine is merely an analytic tool designed for the limited purpose of assisting courts to sort out the equities and relative rights between one who has furnished funds and one who holds the legal title as a result. G. Bogert , Trusts § 170 (6th ed. 1987) (hereafter , " Bogert , Trusts"). The court's attempt here to use the doctrine for the wholly unfamiliar purposes of determining whether article XII of the Constitution of the NMI has been violated and for enforcing the constitutional prohibitions against the parties who have provided funds for the purchase of land necessarily rips the resulting trust doctrine from its moorings. The attempt therefore is inherently suspect. B. Rey Principles Predictably, this novel effort has forced the Court to ignore or modify key aspects of the doctrine , and thereby to transmogrify the resulting trust doctrine itself. 1. A resulting trust is to be invoked for the one who pays - The resulting trust doctrine creates a trust " in favor of the person by whom the purchase price is paid " Restatement {Second) of Trusts, § 440 (1959). Bogert, Trusts§ 35 at 128. 535  The Mafnas si sters d id not pay the purchase pr ice , but instead sold the ir property to D iana Ferreira and accepted payment from her . To permit sellers o f land to invoke the result ing trust doctrine is unprecedented . To permit them to do so aga inst the suppo sed beneficiaries of the doctrine in