Full Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ERIC MCCALL, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 26-1184 (JEB) PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Eric McCall, a D.C. resident, sustained grievous bodily injuries from an automobile accident in 2021 while on the job in Virginia. He alleges in this suit that the three companies involved in administering his occupational-accident insurance policy — Defendants Protective Insurance Company, Independent Haulers Association, and SCI, LLC — defaulted on a range of duties, causing him delay in accessing covered medical care at great physical, economic, and emotional cost. He has thus brought claims for breach of contract, insurer bad faith, and fraudulent misrepresentation against Protective and negligence against IHA and SCI, as well as a separate count seeking declaratory relief. Protective has now moved to dismiss the counts against it on grounds of untimeliness and failure to state a claim, and IHA and SCI have jointly done the same. Behind such a pedestrian description lie myriad nuanced choice-of-law questions, given that the underlying insurance policy was issued in Indiana. After walking through all the conflicts analysis, the Court ultimately concludes that Plaintiff has stated plausible claims for breach of contract against Protective and negligence against IHA and SCI. The Court will, on 1 the other hand, grant Protective’s Motion with respect to Plaintiff’s counts for insurer bad faith, fraudulent misrepresentation, and declaratory relief because the applicable law does not recognize them as standalone claims except in circumstances not plausibly present here. I. Background The Court draws its facts from the Amended Complaint. See Naz v. Wright, 177 F.4th 1242, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2026). It also relies, as it may at this stage, on documents “incorporated by reference in the complaint, or documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies.” Thomas v. Pompeo, 438 F. Supp. 3d 35, 40 (D.D.C. 2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A. Factual Background On November 24, 2021, McCall was involved in a motor-vehicle accident while working — presumably as a truck driver — in Virginia, where he lived at the time. See ECF No. 17 (Am. Compl.), ¶¶ 1–2, 12; see also id., ¶¶ 1, 22, 39 (never specifying Plaintiff’s occupation but stating that IHA sponsored his insurance). He lost the functional use of his left hand and suffered serious brain, knee, ankle, and eye injuries, as well as other orthopedic and neurological harm. Id., ¶¶ 1–2, 54. At some point after the accident, he moved to Washington, D.C. Id., ¶ 17. Plaintiff was covered by an occupational-accident insurance policy jointly administered by IHA and SCI and underwritten by Protective (sometimes mislabeled as “Progressive” in the pleadings). Id., ¶¶ 39, 74–76; see generally ECF No. 1-3 (Policy). IHA and SCI served as intermediaries between Plaintiff and Protective, handling enrollment, recordkeeping, premium payments, notice of loss, and policy administration generally. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 45–46, 48; see also id., ¶ 77 (listing duties related to claim intake, documentation, and communication). For 2 example, SCI deducted premiums from Plaintiff’s wages and served as Protective’s chief “claims administrator.” Id., ¶¶ 47, 75. IHA oversaw and helped administer the program. Id., ¶¶ 48, 76. About nine days after the accident, on December 3, 2021, Plaintiff called and emailed SCI to initiate a claim. Id., ¶ 55. He also called Protective directly. Id., ¶ 63. Both paths led to dead ends. SCI assigned McCall a claim number but then allegedly failed to transmit his claim to Protective and withheld information from McCall about his claim and policy. Id., ¶ 57; see also id., ¶ 69 (“Plaintiff did not have access to the Policy.”); id., ¶ 101 (“SCI breached [its] duties by . . . [f]ailing to provide Plaintiff with access to the Policy . . . .”). During Plaintiff’s call with Protective, an intake agent told him “in substance” that his “only option for medical coverage” was Medicare, not his private insurance plan. Id., ¶ 63. The agent, McCall now alleges, was wrong. Id., ¶ 66. He says that the policy’s “plain language” covered medical expenses “incurred as a direct result of” a “sudden, unforeseen, and unexpected [occupational] event causing bodily injury,” regardless of fault. Id., ¶¶ 40, 93; see ECF No. 18 (Opp.) at 10; but see Policy (apparently not containing quoted language verbatim). Those covered expenses allegedly included “reasonable and necessary medical treatment, hospitalization, surgery, and related care.” Am. Compl., ¶ 40. And nothing in the plan conditioned benefits on Medicare status. Id., ¶ 42. McCall does not explain why he lacked access to the policy from the start. The agent’s words swayed McCall at the time. He stopped pursuing his claim, even as he kept paying premiums. Id., ¶¶ 70, 90. In his telling, he believed that “no private occupational accident coverage existed” because an “authorized claims representative” had said so “during formal claim intake . . . , at a time when [Protective] possessed superior knowledge of coverage unavailable to Plaintiff, and while Plaintiff did not have access to the Policy.” Id., ¶¶ 69–70. 3 About two years later, McCall learned from a coworker that such coverage in fact existed. Id., ¶ 70. He “promptly” contacted SCI again to pursue benefits. Id. According to McCall, however, Defendants’ conduct had already caused him to delay treatment, leading to out-of-pocket medical expenses, aggravation of his injuries, permanent physical and cognitive impairment, and other economic and emotional harm. See id., ¶ 72; see also id., ¶ 96 (listing similar set of harms); id., ¶ 137 (listing bases for damages). While the Amended Complaint does not describe what happened next, Plaintiff states in his Opposition that an SCI representative “allegedly acknowledged that SCI had failed to report, transmit, or act on the notice” that McCall originally submitted. See Opp. at 1–2. In addition, Plaintiff at some point provided “Proof of Loss” related to his accident, as required by the policy. See Am. Compl., ¶ 110. Protective eventually “adjusted the claim,” though it “paid only approximately $10,579.20, while full benefits” — in an unspecified amount — “remain unpaid.” Opp. at 2. Several other factual allegations are embedded elsewhere in the Amended Complaint. Because the timing and details are not entirely clear, the Court rehearses them here in bulk. As to Protective, McCall alleges not only that the company misrepresented his coverage and failed to process his claim but also that it (1) never provided him with a complete copy of his insurance policy upon request; (2) misclassified his claim as non-occupational and therefore not covered; (3) failed to issue payment or a formal written denial identifying an applicable exclusion from coverage; (4) demanded “duplicative and burdensome” documentation without identifying deficiencies in Plaintiff’s prior submissions; (5) refused to correct “known misrepresentations once discovered”; and (6) engaged in a “pattern of delay and obstruction designed to discourage pursuit of benefits.” Am. Compl., ¶ 91. McCall likewise alleges that SCI — in addition to not 4 processing his claim properly at the outset — did not provide him with access to his policy or correct “known misstatements of coverage.” Id., ¶ 101. And he states that IHA failed to ensure proper claim processing, correct known claim mishandling, and provide policy documentation upon request. Id., ¶ 103; see also id., ¶ 82 (making similar allegations about all three companies acting in “coordinated” manner). B. Procedural Background McCall sued Defendants in D.C. Superior Court on February 16, 2026. See generally ECF No. 1-2 (Super. Ct. Compl.). IHA and SCI filed a Notice of Removal on April 7, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See ECF No. 1 (Removal Notice), ¶¶ 5–6 (alleging complete diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy above $75,000). They then moved to dismiss the Complaint on April 7. See ECF No. 2 (First IHA/SCI MTD). After some back and forth, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint that clarified Protective’s identity but remained substantially the same. See ECF No. 13 (Mot. for Leave to File Am. Compl.) at 3 (describing changes). That operative pleading offers a mix of claims sounding in contract and tort, including breach of contract, insurer bad faith, and fraudulent misrepresentation against Protective (Counts I–III) and negligence against IHA and SCI (Count IV). See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 107–33. McCall seeks declaratory relief, framed as a separate cause of action (Count V); an order compelling payment of all benefits due; and compensatory damages. Id., ¶¶ 135, 137–38. He also seeks punitive damages against Protective. Id., ¶ 138. IHA and SCI have now filed a renewed Motion to Dismiss, see generally ECF No. 15 (IHA/SCI MTD), and Protective has similarly moved. See generally ECF No. 16 (Protective MTD). 5 II. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must treat “well-pleaded factual allegations as true” and draw “all reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Vilsack, 111 F.4th 1219, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But the court need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Finally, where a defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion raises a statute of limitations as a basis for dismissal, the case “cannot be dismissed [on that ground] unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no state of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Jones v. Rogers Mem’l Hosp., 442 F.2d 773, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1971). That is a high bar, particularly given that “statute of limitations issues often depend on contested questions of fact.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) as “conclusively time-barred” only if “a trial court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Momenian v. Davidson, 878 F.3d 381, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 III. Analysis As a preliminary matter, Indiana and D.C. laws loom large in the briefing. Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction “must apply state law to the substantive issues before it,” including statutes of limitations. A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Erie and Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)). To determine which state’s law applies, it must look to the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits — here, the District’s. Petra, 62 F.3d at 1458; see also id. (confirming that same principles apply even though District is not a state). Plaintiff argues that Indiana law governs the entire suit based on the terms of his insurance policy, see Am. Compl., ¶¶ 27–28, which was “issued and delivered in the State of Indiana and is governed by the laws of Indiana.” Policy at ECF p. 27. He nonetheless relies on caselaw from both jurisdictions to argue that his claims should not be dismissed as time-barred. See Opp. at 5–9. On the other side, Protective often alternates between Indiana and D.C. authorities without providing arguments for when or why a particular jurisdiction’s law should apply. See, e.g., Protective MTD at 5–7. IHA and SCI, meanwhile, contend that D.C. law governs Plaintiff’s negligence claim and the corresponding statute of limitations under Erie and the applicable D.C. choice-of-law rules. See IHA/SCI MTD at 4, 7–8. To deal with this fine kettle of fish, the Court addresses choice-of-law issues only as needed. It first considers whether Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred “beyond doubt.” Jones, 442 F.2d at 775. Finding that they are not, it moves to the merits. 7 A. Timeliness According to Defendants, the limitations period for Plaintiff’s claims is three years, whether under the insurance policy or D.C. law, rendering his suit too late. See Protective MTD at 4–5, 7–8; IHA/SCI MTD at 4–5; see also Policy at ECF p. 24 (“No lawsuit [to recover on this policy] may be brought after three (3) years from the time written Proof of Loss is required to be given by this policy.”) (formatting altered). McCall nowhere disputes that number, instead arguing that he did not miss the deadline because his claims accrued later than Defendants suppose and, in any event, equitable principles justify an exception from strict application of the limitations period. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 29–34; Opp. at 5–10. The Court looks separately at the claims brought against Protective and IHA/SCI because it finds different bases to allow certain counts to proceed. 1. Claims Against Protective As it is unclear whether Plaintiff is making two separate arguments related to claim accrual against Protective, compare Opp. at 4–5 (possibly relating to accrual under insurance contract), with id. at 9–10 (relating to accrual under D.C. law), the Court begins and ends with his argument for equitable estoppel, which would apply regardless. On that front, a conflict-of- laws analysis is “unnecessary” because no relevant conflict exists between Indiana and D.C. laws, as shown below. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of the Nat’l Cap. Area, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co. of Canada, 275 F.3d 1145, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Plaintiff principally contends that “[a]ny statute of limitations or contractual suit- limitation is tolled by Progressive’s [sic] active and intentional fraudulent concealment of the existence and availability of coverage,” Am. Compl., ¶ 29, and that it should be “equitably 8 estopped” from asserting a timeliness defense. Id., ¶ 33. He later frames substantially the same argument in terms of “waiver,” “prevention,” and “lulling,” too. See Opp. at 3, 5–6, 8. Equitable estoppel is a “flexible doctrine” that “prevents one party from misleading another to the other party’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.” 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 1 (2026). Under both Indiana and D.C. laws, the party seeking estoppel must show that he lacked knowledge or the means to acquire knowledge of the relevant facts; that he relied on the conduct of the party being estopped; and that he acted accordingly in a way that changed his position for the worse. Story Bed & Breakfast, LLP v. Brown Cnty. Area Plan Comm’n, 819 N.E.2d 55, 67 (Ind. 2004); see Cassidy v. Owen, 533 A.2d 253, 255 (D.C. 1987) (additionally requiring that estopped party make false representation or conceal material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of truth and with intention that other party rely on misrepresentation). Generally, estoppel is appropriate in the statute-of-limitations context only where the defendant has acted affirmatively to delay the plaintiff from filing suit. See Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd., 134 N.E.3d 370, 383 (Ind. 2019) (stating that party’s conduct “must be of a sufficient affirmative character to prevent inquiry or to elude investigation or to mislead and hinder”) (citation omitted); Onyeneho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 80 A.3d 641, 647 (D.C. 2013) (“Equitable estoppel, sometimes called fraudulent concealment, only comes into play if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time . . . .”) (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff has presented facts sufficient to warrant equitable estoppel, whether the relevant limitations period is established by the contract (and thus governed by Indiana law) or set by D.C. law. Consistent with the elements of equitable estoppel in both jurisdictions, he has alleged that (1) Protective, through its agent, affirmatively misrepresented his insurance coverage 9 by telling him that his only option was Medicare, see Am. Compl., ¶¶ 4, 31; (2) Protective intended that he rely on that misrepresentation, id., ¶¶ 29, 68; (3) it knew or should have known that McCall’s insurance covered his injuries, id., ¶ 67; (4) Plaintiff relied on this misrepresentation, id., ¶ 69; and (5) he therefore delayed pursuing his claim and filing suit, to his detriment. Id., ¶¶ 70, 72. Critically, McCall also alleges that (6) he lacked knowledge of the truth or the means to acquire it because he did not have access to his insurance policy and Defendants refused to provide it upon request. Id., ¶¶ 69, 101, 104, 128; Opp. at 15, 19, 22, 23. To be sure, Plaintiff’s case for equitable estoppel is close. Several points of fact and law appear to weigh against his claim, but they are ultimately not enough to justify dismissal. First, according to the D.C. Court of Appeals, the “general rule” in the insurance context is that a company “is not estopped to assert [a contractual] limitations period as a bar to a claim[] unless the company has conceded liability and some discussion of a settlement offer has occurred,” Bailey v. Greenberg, 516 A.2d 934, 938–39 (D.C. 1986) (emphasis added), which Plaintiff does not allege occurred during his initial phone call with Protective. But that “general rule” rests on caselaw from other jurisdictions, id., and was not part of the holding in Bailey, since the company in that case allegedly told the claimant that her claim would be paid. Id. at 940. Bailey’s dicta is insufficient evidence that that the D.C. Court of Appeals — much less the Indiana Supreme Court — would apply such a rule in a case where, as here, a plaintiff has otherwise pled facts sufficient to support equitable estoppel and was not issued a formal claim denial when the misrepresentation allegedly occurred. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 82, 91. Second, as Protective notes, see Protective MTD at 6–7, “an insured cannot estop the insurer from asserting a policy’s limitations period” when “the inducement by the insurance company not to file suit ended well before the limitations period expired.” 1426 Wisconsin 10 L.L.C. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 110 F. Supp. 3d 259, 263 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Bailey, 516 A.2d at 939). Judge John Bates of our district in 1426 Wisconsin deemed one year “ample time” to file suit in such a scenario — approximately the amount of time that passed between when McCall learned he had coverage and the 2024 deadlines that Protective invokes. Id. at 263–64; see Protective MTD at 6–7. Yet Judge Bates did so at the summary-judgment stage, 1426 Wisconsin, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 261, based in part on facts about subsequent dealings between the parties. Id. at 270. Here, the details of what transpired after Plaintiff learned of his coverage are fuzzy. See supra Section I.A. Dismissing the suit now because Plaintiff might have had “ample time” to file would therefore be premature, particularly in light of the rule that a complaint may be dismissed as “conclusively time-barred” only if no other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could “possibly cure” the deficiency. Momenian, 878 F.3d at 387 (citation omitted). Third, Protective’s appeal to the “failure to discover damages” rule is inapt: the Indiana cases it cites deal with discovery of property damage that itself would have been compensable under the insurance contract if found sooner. See Protective MTD at 5–6 (citing United Techs. Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 725 N.E.2d 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), and New Welton Homes v. Eckman, 830 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 2005)). In those cases, the plaintiffs discovered physical damage to their property after the relevant contractual limitations period had expired, including environmental contamination and structural flaws in a home’s drainage system, respectively. United Techs., 725 N.E.2d at 873; New Welton Homes, 830 N.E.2d at 33–34. By contrast, this case involves Plaintiff’s discovery of the fact of coverage after Protective’s alleged “misdirection.” Opp. at 7. So the Indiana rule that failure to discover damages does not justify 11 tolling an insurance contract’s limitations period — to the extent it applies at all here — is not necessarily dispositive. While equitable estoppel is an “extraordinary remedy,” 28 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 3, Plaintiff’s estoppel argument does not lie outside the realm of plausibility. Given the fact- intensive nature of the inquiry and the high threshold for deeming a claim conclusively time- barred at this stage, dismissal of the claims against Protective on timeliness grounds is not appropriate. Cf. Suarez v. Compass Coffee LLC, 2025 WL 3062798, at *11–12 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2025) (citation omitted) (citing “many contested questions of fact” in declining to dismiss claim based on statute of limitations where parties disputed issues related to accrual and equitable estoppel). 2. Claims Against IHA and SCI Plaintiff similarly argues that his claims against IHA and SCI should not be dismissed as time-barred because (1) they plausibly accrued when he learned of his coverage from a coworker around December 2023, making them timely, and (2) even if they were prima facie untimely, equitable tolling and estoppel are appropriate. See Opp. at 17–18; see also East v. Graphic Arts Indus. Joint Pension Tr., 718 A.2d 153, 160 n.21 (D.C. 1998) (distinguishing between related doctrines known as “the discovery rule, equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling”). Because the Court agrees with McCall on the first point, it need not address the second. In addition, no relevant conflict of laws exists with respect to accrual, as the cases below show, so the Court need not conduct a full conflicts analysis. See Young Women’s Christian Ass’n, 275 F.3d at 1150. A cause of action generally accrues — and the applicable limitations period begins to run — when the injury occurs. Radbod v. Moghim, 269 A.3d 1035, 1044 (D.C. 2022); see also Keep 12 v. Noble Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 696 N.E.2d 422, 425 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“Generally, a cause of action accrues when a wrongfully inflicted injury causes damage.”). Under the “discovery rule,” however, a cause of action can accrue later if certain information was “obscure” when the injury happened; in that scenario, the cause of action accrues when “one must know or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know” of the injury, “its cause in fact,” and “some evidence of wrongdoing.” Morton v. Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc., 725 A.2d 462, 468 (D.C. 1999) (citation and emphasis omitted); see also Pflanz v. Foster, 888 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ind. 2008) (“Under Indiana’s discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when a claimant knows or in exercise of ordinary diligence should have known of the injury.”); cf. supra Section II.A.1 (distinguishing Indiana caselaw cabining discovery rule). What counts as sufficient diligence is a “highly factual analysis” that requires consideration of “all relevant circumstances,” including the defendant’s conduct, “the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s reliance,” and the plaintiff’s “confidence” in the defendant. Radbod, 269 A.3d at 1044 (citation omitted); see also Wehling v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind. 1992) (describing discovery rule’s applicability as “a question of fact for the factfinder to answer”). Sometimes, the “relevant facts may be such that it may be reasonable to conduct no investigation at all.” Radbod, 269 A.3d at 1045 (citation omitted). Here, IHA and SCI insist that Plaintiff’s negligence claim accrued more than three years before he filed this suit, making it untimely under the District’s default three-year statute of limitations. See IHA/SCI MTD at 5; D.C. Code § 12-301. Specifically, they argue that Plaintiff should have known the relevant information on December 3, 2021, when the Protective representative told him that Medicare was his only option and McCall therefore learned that 13 “there was no claim being adjusted.” IHA/SCI MTD at 5. Plaintiff counters that he “did not discover the existence” of his coverage until about two years later, see Opp. at 17, and maintains that he “acted reasonably and with due diligence in relying on Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions[,] and in later discovering coverage.” Am. Compl., ¶ 30. While McCall does not allege many facts demonstrating diligent investigation, he does not need to do so at this stage. The facts that he does allege suggest that it might have been reasonable for him not to investigate the alleged omissions for some time because he believed — based on Protective’s statements — that he had no valid claim for IHA and SCI to act (or sit) on. Rather than bolstering IHA and SCI’s accrual argument, the phone call with Protective on December 3, 2021, undercuts it. Of course, additional facts could show that Plaintiff knew or should have known that IHA and SCI owed him continuing duties or that his reliance on Protective’s statements was unreasonable. Such a showing might be enough to prove that his negligence claims accrued on December 3, 2021, as IHA and SCI contend. But none of those conclusions flows inexorably from the facts that McCall alleges, and the Court cannot dismiss a claim as time-barred unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no state of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Jones, 442 F.2d at 775; see also E.M. v. Shady Grove Reprod. Sci. Ctr., P.C., 2025 WL 947515, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025), opinion clarified, 2025 WL 1707695 (D.D.C. June 18, 2025) (not dismissing count as time-barred where there was “factual dispute regarding when the tort accrued”). Here, that demanding standard for dismissal is not met: Plaintiff plausibly alleges an accrual date that would render his negligence claims timely, and so the Court will not dismiss that count as conclusively time-barred. 14 B. Merits The Court now turns to the merits. It preliminarily notes that Protective does not argue that Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim (Count I) should be dismissed on grounds other than timeliness, compare Protective MTD at 4–8, with id. at 8–11, so the Court will allow it to proceed without further analysis. As for the other counts, Defendants maintain that McCall has failed to state a claim for each under D.C. law. See Protective MTD at 8–11; IHA/SCI MTD at 6–10. He responds that his claims all arise under Indiana law, see Am. Compl., ¶ 28, while maintaining that he has stated claims under D.C. and Indiana law alike. See, e.g., Opp. 13–15, 18–19. The Court must thus analyze choice-of-law issues claim by claim. See Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels. Action Network, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 222, 235 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Under District of Columbia conflict of laws principles, the Court must conduct the choice of law analysis for each claim being adjudicated.”). 1. Count II: Insurer Bad Faith Against Protective To make out his claim of “insurer bad faith” — which he styles as a tort — Plaintiff alleges that Protective owed him a “duty of good faith in claim handling” and that it knowingly breached that duty by (1) concealing coverage, (2) misdirecting him to Medicare, (3) failing to initiate a claim and conduct a reasonable investigation, (4) irrationally delaying payment without issuing a written denial identifying an exclusion, (5) acting with “dishonest purpose and conscious wrongdoing,” and (6) “[p]rioritizing its financial interests over Plaintiff’s rights.” Am. Compl., ¶¶ 115–16. He states that Protective’s conduct was “willful, malicious, and in reckless disregard of [his] rights,” id., ¶ 117, and accordingly seeks punitive damages. Id., ¶ 119. 15 a. Choice of Law Unfortunately for the reader, there is a genuine conflict between D.C. and Indiana laws on insurer bad faith. In Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080 (D.C. 2008), the D.C. Court of Appeals declined to recognize a tort of insurer bad faith because every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith under D.C. law, meaning that damages for insurer bad faith can generally be recovered as part of an action for breach of contract. Id. at 1087–88. By contrast, in Erie Insurance Co. v. Hickman ex rel. Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. 1993), the Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed “the existence of a duty that an insurer deal in good faith with its insured” and recognized “a cause of action in tort for the breach of that duty.” Id. at 517. The Court must therefore undertake a choice-of-law analysis. Not surprisingly, the parties offer opposing positions. Protective assumes without argument that D.C. law governs Plaintiff’s bad-faith claim and relies on D.C. precedent to argue that this count is a contract claim masquerading as a tort. See ECF No. 21 (Protective Reply) at 2 (“Plaintiff allege[s] breach of contract claims disguised as a tort.”) Plaintiff meanwhile insists that Indiana law governs all his claims, even as he contends that they are entirely independent from the contract. See, e.g., Opp at 13–15, 22. The threshold question, then, is not just whose choice-of-law rules apply, but what kind of choice-of-law rules apply — those applicable to contract claims, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (Am. L. Inst. 1971), or those associated with tort claims. See, e.g., id., § 145. The “whose rules” question is easy. “A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state — here, the District of Columbia.” In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The “what rules” question is harder. Because the D.C. Court of Appeals has not squarely addressed whether a bad-faith claim pleaded as a tort 16 independent from any contract is subject to tort- or contract-related choice-of-law rules, this Court must “predict” how that court would rule. Edge Inv., LLC v. Dist. of Columbia, 927 F.3d 549, 559 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1991)). In this Court’s view, the D.C. Court of Appeals would likely treat Plaintiff’s bad-faith claim as a tort claim for choice-of-law purposes (consistent with the pleadings) and apply its general governmental-interests analysis rather than a choice-of-law test tailored to contract claims. Although the D.C. Court of Appeals did not grapple with this issue in Choharis, its treatment of the bad-faith claim there is instructive. After determining that insurer bad faith was generally compensable under contract principles and thus not cognizable as an independent tort, see 961 A.2d at 1087, the court did not take it upon itself to reconstrue the plaintiff’s claim as a permissible breach-of-contract claim; instead, it affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the bad- faith claim. See id. at 1083 (affirming on all issues); id. at 1086 (noting that trial court dismissed bad-faith claim as matter of law); id. at 1088 (“The trial court here correctly dismissed the count based on a distinct tort of bad faith.”). If the court took the plaintiff’s tort framing at face value in Choharis when considering whether to dismiss his bad-faith claim, it would likely follow the same straightforward approach when deciding what choice-of-law rules to apply here. To be sure, some courts have taken a different tack, most notably in Maryland. The Choharis court cast Maryland law as persuasive authority on insurer bad faith, see id. at 1088 (quoting Fourth Circuit’s gloss on Maryland law), and federal courts in Maryland have applied contract-related choice-of-law principles to insurer-bad-faith claims on at least two occasions. See Cecilia Schwaber Trust Two v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 485, 488–89 (D. Md. 2006) (applying lex loci contractus rule to insurer-bad-faith claim where no 17 such tort existed); see also E. Stainless Corp. v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 829 F. Supp. 797, 798–99, 801 (D. Md. 1993) (taking similar approach before state high court had ruled on whether bad- faith tort existed). That said, the federal district court in Cecilia Schwaber did not confront a situation where, as here, applying the law selected in the contract would contravene the forum state’s “considered choice” to bar tort claims of insurer bad faith. See 437 F. Supp. 2d at 489. On the contrary, one reason that the court treated the bad-faith claim as contractual for choice-of- law purposes was that doing otherwise would allow the claim to proceed, which would “run[ ] counter to Maryland public policy.” Id. While that logic might seem objectionably results oriented, it at least suggests that the Maryland cases are distinguishable and do not defeat this Court’s prediction that the D.C. Court of Appeals here would not apply choice-of-law rules made for contract claims. The Court will accordingly apply the District’s general method for analyzing choice-of- law questions in tort cases, known as “modified governmental interests analysis.” Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n, 900 A.2d 168, 180 (D.C. 2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. Vaughan v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 702 A.2d 198, 202–03 (D.C. 1997) (treating interests-based analysis as “general” approach also relevant to contract claims in insurance context). To “identify the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the dispute,” D.C. courts “evaluate the governmental policies underlying the applicable laws and determine which jurisdiction’s policy would be more advanced by the application of its law to the facts of the case under review.” Washkoviak, 900 A.2d at 180 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d at 51 (employing Washkoviak “as our guide”). As relevant here, the rule announced in Choharis rests on the D.C. court’s determination that contract principles should chiefly govern insurer-insured relationships and that any further 18 regulation of those relationships is “most appropriately” left to the legislature. See 961 A.2d at 1087; see also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. CTIA, 480 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that D.C. Code lacks general cause of action for insurer bad faith). The Indiana Supreme Court’s different conclusion in Hickman hinges primarily on the “special relationship” between insurer and insured, the harm that results from insurer bad faith, and the notion that “it is in society’s interest that there be fair play between insurer and insured.” 622 N.E.2d at 518–19. Neither set of policies clearly trumps the other. The District has a strong interest in holding insurers doing business there accountable to their contract terms — and those terms alone — absent a truly independent basis for tort recovery or a decision by the legislature to regulate the insurance industry differently. Cf. In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d at 53 (noting, based on D.C. law, that rules of “non-liability” are owed “the same consideration in the choice-of-law process” as rules that impose liability). At the same time, Indiana has a strong interest in ensuring that its corporate citizens and other companies executing contracts in the state deal fairly with consumers. The Court thus “cannot say” whether the policies underlying either jurisdiction’s rule would be “more advanced than the policies of the other by the application of its law” to this case. Washkoviak, 900 A.2d at 180. Where no government’s interest prevails, D.C. courts also consider (1) “the place where the injury occurred”; (2) “the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred”; (3) “the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties”; and (4) “the place where the relationship is centered.” Id. at 180–81 (citation omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (enumerating same factors). Again, those factors do not point decisively in either direction. Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “caused tortious injury in the District of Columbia,” including “bad-faith claim delay,” he says 19 that the company did so “by acts and omissions outside the District.” Am. Compl., ¶ 16 (emphasis added). And while McCall is domiciled in the District, see id., ¶ 35, Protective is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Indiana. See Removal Notice, ¶ 6. Finally, the parties’ relationship is not squarely centered in one jurisdiction or the other: the insurance policy was “delivered” in Indiana, see Policy at ECF pp. 2, 27, but Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “transacted business in the District of Columbia by administering, adjusting, supervising, and communicating regarding Plaintiff’s insurance claim while Plaintiff resided in the District.” Am. Compl., ¶ 15. In addition, the “insured risk” likely lay in Virginia, given that McCall lived and worked there before he moved to the District. Vaughan, 702 A.2d at 202 (citation omitted); Am. Compl., ¶¶ 12, 52. So must we flip a coin? Fortunately, there is a rule for this situation. Where the Court “cannot determine from the pleadings which jurisdiction has a greater interest in the controversy” — particularly given that neither