Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D2025-1364 _____________________________ GAINESVILLE REGIONAL UTILITY AUTHORITY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA, a municipal subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. George Micah Wright, Judge. October 7, 2026 WINOKUR, J. The Gainesville Regional Utility Authority filed a complaint seeking to prevent the City of Gainesville from dissolving the Authority after the Legislature created it. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City on Count I of the Authority’s complaint and in favor of the Authority on Count II. The Authority appeals the judgment on Count I, and the City cross-appeals the judgment on Count II. We reverse the judgment on Count I and dismiss the cross-appeal on Count II. I In 1912, the City established Gainesville Regional Utilities (GRU) as a publicly owned electric system. In 2023, after the City had operated GRU at a loss, the Florida Legislature enacted a special law, Chapter 2023-348, Laws of Florida, amending the City’s charter to add Article VII, titled “Gainesville Regional Utilities Authority,” creating the Authority to govern GRU. Article VII, section 7.01 of the City Charter establishes the Authority and provides that, upon installation of its members, GRU is to be governed by the Authority. Although the Authority operates as a unit of city government, section 7.01 expressly provides that, except as otherwise specified in Article VII, the Authority “shall be free from direction and control of the Gainesville City Commission.” The charter further states that the Authority “is created for the express purpose of managing, operating, controlling, and otherwise having broad authority with respect to the utilities owned by the City of Gainesville.” Section 7.10(2) addresses the transition of authority from the City to the newly created entity. It provides that all existing city ordinances, policies, rates, fees, assessments, charges, rules, regulations, and budgets relating to the operation of the utilities remain in effect unless and until the Authority modifies them pursuant to the powers granted in Article VII. The provision also contains a clause stating that, in the event of a conflict between Article VII and any other charter provision, ordinance, resolution, decree, or portion thereof, the provisions of Article VII control. In June 2024, the Gainesville City Commission adopted Ordinance 2024-448, which submitted to the City’s voters a proposed charter amendment deleting Article VII from the city charter in its entirety. The Authority sent a letter to the Alachua County Supervisor of Elections explaining its view that Ordinance 2024-448 was unlawful, but in August 2024, the Supervisor still administered the primary election. Upon certification of the results, the Supervisor prepared the ballot for the November 2024 general election. The Authority then filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the City from placing Ordinance 2024-448 on the ballot, and a few days later, it filed an 2 emergency motion for temporary injunction seeking the same relief. Nonetheless, on November 5, 2024, the following summary was placed on the General Election Ballot: SHALL THE CITY OF GAINESVILLE CHARTER BE AMENDED TO DELETE ARTICLE VII, ELIMINATING THE GOVERNOR-APPOINTED GAINESVILLE REGIONAL UTILITY AUTHORITY AND ITS APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR THAT MANAGE, OPERATE AND CONTROL THE CITY OF GAINESVILLE’S LOCAL PUBLIC UTILITIES, AND PLACING THAT RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE ELECTED CITY COMMISSION AND CHARTER OFFICER; AND ELIMINATING LIMITATIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT SERVICES CONTRIBUTIONS AND UTILITY DIRECTIVES, AS PROPOSED BY ORDINANCE NO. 2024-448? The voters approved this charter amendment. Later that month, the trial court enjoined the City “from taking any action to enforce the proposed charter amendment set forth in Ordinance 2024-448 in the event the measure is approved by the voters until the resolution of the issues in this case on the merits.” 1 Following the election, both the City and Authority filed motions for summary judgment. As to Count I, the Authority argued that the City’s decision to amend its charter to remove Article VII conflicted with the Legislature’s special act. The City countered by noting that state law expressly authorizes both the Legislature and the City to amend the City’s charter and that, had the Legislature intended 1 Given that this order was filed after the voters approved the charter amendment, it is unclear why the order states that the City would be enjoined “in the event the measure is approved.” Either way, the order enjoined the City from acting on the charter amendment. 3 to prohibit the City from doing so, it would have enacted a separate special act establishing the Authority outside the charter. As to Count II, the Authority argued that the ballot summary for the 2024 Election was void ab initio because it failed to state the “chief purpose” and was unclear and ambiguous. The City argued that the claim was moot because 73% of Gainesville voters already approved the removal of Article VII from the City’s charter. Alternatively, the City contended that, even if the claim were not moot, the ballot summary was clear and unambiguous because it was required only to state the measure’s chief purpose, which it did. Ultimately, the trial court denied the Authority’s motion for summary judgment and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on Count I. The court relied on section 166.031, Florida Statutes, which permits a municipality to amend its charter “notwithstanding any charter provisions to the contrary[,]” as well as a 1982 Attorney General opinion stating that “[n]o other restrictions are placed on the charter amendment powers granted by [section] 166.031.” But, with regard to Count II, the trial court ruled in the Authority’s favor, concluding that the ballot language was misleading for several reasons, emphasizing in particular the use of the adjective “elected” to modify both the “City Commission” and the “charter officer.” This appeal and cross-appeal followed. II Before turning to our analysis, we must address a 2026 act the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law after we heard oral arguments—chapter 2026-135, Laws of Florida (2026 Act). Section 4 of the 2026 Act reads as follows: (1) The subject of a regional utilities authority created by the Legislature through charter amendment after January 1, 2023, is expressly preempted to the state. (2) This section shall take effect upon this act becoming a law. 4 The 2026 Act appears to apply to GRUA, and suggests that Ordinance 2024-448 and a consequent election could not alter the terms of Chapter 2023-348, Laws of Florida, which established GRUA. We ordered supplemental briefing to address the effect, if any, the 2026 Act has on this appeal. The City argues that the 2026 Act has no effect on this appeal because it contains no clear retroactive intent, without which it would be unconstitutional to apply the 2026 Act here. Moreover, the City notes that the 2026 Act does not preempt the City’s ability to amend the charter under section 166.031. For its part, GRUA contends that the 2026 Act expressly preempts to the State the entire subject of regional utilities authorities created by post-2023 charter amendments, asserting that the City’s charter amendment abolishing the Authority conflicts with this preemption because abolition is the “ultimate act” of regulation and control. An appellate court generally applies an intervening change in the law while a case is pending on appeal, whether the change results from a statutory amendment or a controlling appellate decision interpreting a statute or rule differently. See Sugarmill Woods Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. S. States Utilities, 687 So. 2d 1346, 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). However, the parties’ arguments reflect that the effect of the 2026 Act, including its constitutionality, is a matter that should be litigated before we consider it. We choose not to address these questions here because we reverse the judgment on Count I and dismiss the cross-appeal on Count II, regardless of the 2026 Act. III Count I of the Authority’s complaint argued that the proposed charter amendment is inconsistent with state law, specifically the special law the Legislature enacted that amended the City’s charter to create the Authority. In its final order, the trial court denied the Authority’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the City on Count I. The trial court found that “under the broad home rule powers enshrined in the Florida Constitution, a local municipality has the right to amend its charter regardless of provisions in the charter to the contrary.” The Authority does not dispute the City’s general authority to amend its charter, but argues that it does not permit the proposed 5 charter amendment because it conflicts with a law the Florida Legislature enacted. Before the adoption of Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution in 1968, municipalities existed solely at the Legislature’s discretion. Lake Worth Utilities Auth. v. City of Lake Worth, 468 So. 2d 215, 217 (Fla. 1985). Article VIII, section 2(b) now provides that municipalities “shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers” and “may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.” Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const. Consistent with this framework, section 166.021(4) of the Florida Statutes grants municipalities broad home-rule authority, but expressly limits that authority to actions not prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter: It is the further intent of the Legislature to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited. Florida law permits municipal charters to be amended in three ways: by ordinance of the governing body, by voter petition and referendum, or by general or special law the Legislature enacts. Art. VIII, § 2, Fla. Const.; § 166.031, Fla. Stat. (“A municipality may amend its charter pursuant to [section 166.031(3) of the Florida Statutes] notwithstanding any charter provisions to the contrary.”). Although municipalities possess “inherent” authority to address local needs, that authority is not “absolute” or “supreme.” Lake Worth Utils. Auth., 468 So. 2d at 217. In Gaines v. City of Orlando, a proposed charter amendment sought to curtail the powers of the Orlando Utilities Commission (OUC) to prevent construction of a coal-fired power plant. 450 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). The OUC, however, had been 6 created in 1923 by a special act of the Legislature as part of Orlando’s government. Id. at 1180–81. That special act was not incorporated into the city’s charter but existed as a separate legislative enactment. Id. at 1181–82. Because the OUC’s authority derived from a special law rather than the charter, the Fifth District held that a charter amendment purporting to diminish those powers conflicted with state law and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 1182. Similarly, in Lake Worth Utilities Authority v. City of Lake Worth, the Legislature created the Lake Worth Utilities Authority (LWUA) by special law approved by referendum. 468 So. 2d 215, 216 (Fla. 1985). When the city of Lake Worth later attempted to dissolve the LWUA by ordinance, the Florida Supreme Court held that the phrase “except as otherwise provided by law” preserved the Legislature’s authority to create entities by special law and prohibited municipalities from nullifying those enactments. Id. at 217. As a result, the ordinance dissolving the LWUA was unconstitutional. Id. Like the OUC and LWUA, the Legislature enacted a special law in 2023 establishing the Authority. Unlike those prior enactments, the Legislature created the Authority by special law amending the City’s charter rather than through a stand-alone special act. See ch. 2023-348, Laws of Fla. By contrast, the OUC and LWUA were created through independent special laws not incorporated into the municipalities’ charters. See ch. 61-2589, Laws of Fla.; ch. 69-1215, Laws of Fla. In those cases, a charter amendment dissolving the utility authority would conflict with a special law creating those utility authorities. See Lake Worth Utils. Auth., 468 So. 2d at 217; see also Gaines, 450 So. 2d at 1182. Here, the Legislature enacted a special law that both created Article VII of the City’s charter and established the Authority. See ch. 2023-348, Laws of Fla. Although the trial court correctly observed that municipalities may amend their charters “regardless of provisions in the charter to the contrary,” that principle applies only to conflicting charter provisions—not to limitations imposed by the Florida Constitution or by state law. Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const. Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution authorizes municipalities to exercise power only to 7 the extent such action is “not otherwise provided by law.” Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). Likewise, section 166.021(4), Florida Statutes, extends municipal authority only where it is “not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law[.]” (emphasis added). Outside the charter-amendment context, the rule is well settled: municipalities may enact ordinances only to the extent they are consistent with general or special laws enacted by the Legislature. Art. VIII, § 2, Fla. Const.; § 166.031, Fla. Stat. That same limitation should apply to charter amendments. Neither the Florida Constitution nor the Florida Statutes distinguishes special laws based on their purpose or title; so, for purposes of municipal authority, special laws are treated uniformly. See Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const.; see also § 166.021(4), Fla. Stat. The Legislature may create a city’s utility authority either directly by special law or indirectly by enacting a special law that amends the city’s charter. Either way, the utility’s authority stems from a special law enacted by the Legislature. See Lake Worth Utils. Auth., 468 So. 2d at 217; see Gaines, 450 So. 2d at 1182; see also ch. 2023-348, Laws of Fla. Accordingly, even when the Legislature enacts a special law that amends a municipal charter, a municipality cannot subsequently adopt a charter amendment that conflicts with that legislative enactment. For these reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Authority on Count I. IV Count II of the Authority’s complaint alleged that the ballot summary of the proposed charter amendment was unclear, ambiguous, and failed to explain the chief purpose of the measure. The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Authority’s motion for summary judgment on Count II. The trial court found that the ballot summary was misleading in that it suggested to a reasonable voter that the proposed charter amendment would allow for a “direct election of the charter officer in charge of Gainesville Regional Utilities.” But because the election had taken place and the electorate had voted 8 on the challenged ballot language, the trial court’s post-election ruling “nullifi[ed] the expressed will of the voters[.]” The City appealed. After correcting the issues with Ordinance 2024-448 that the trial court identified, the City placed Ordinance 2025-416 on the ballot to remove Article VII. The electorate again approved the removal of Article VII from the City’s charter. Following the election, the Authority again filed suit against the City seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. That action has been stayed pending judgment in this case. The Florida Constitution vests judicial power in the state’s courts, and that power is exercised only in cases presenting an actual, live controversy. Art V, § 1, Fla. Const. The mootness doctrine is a corollary of the constitutional limitation on the exercise of judicial power that confines it to justiciable controversies. Casiano v. State, 310 So. 3d 910, 913 (Fla. 2021). “In general, an appellate court will dismiss a case if the issues raised have become moot.” Id. The Supreme Court of Florida has defined an issue as “moot” when “the controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect.” Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992). Ordinance 2024-448 and Ordinance 2025-416 shared the same purpose: to eliminate Article VII and dissolve the Authority. Since this cross-appeal concerns the ballot summary for Ordinance 2024-448, even if this Court did not reverse the Circuit Court’s final judgment on Count II of the Authority’s complaint, voter approval of Ordinance 2025-416 would still remove Article VII from the charter and dissolve the Authority. A judicial decision on the legality of the ballot summary for the 2024 ordinance “can have no actual effect” now that Ordinance 2025-416 has already achieved the same outcome. See Godwin, 593 So. 2d at 212. Accordingly, we REVERSE the trial court’s orders as to Count I as indicated above and DISMISS the City’s cross-appeal. ROBERTS and KELSEY, JJ., concur. 9 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Alan Lawson, Samuel J. Salario, Jr., Jason Gonzalez, and Jessica Slatten of Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, Tallahassee; David A. Theriaque, S. Brent Spain, and Benjamin R. Kelley of Theriaque & Spain, Tallahassee; S. Scott Walker, Kiersten N. Ballou, and Danielle C. Adams of Folds Walker, LLC, Gainesville; Leonard E. Ireland, Jr. of Clayton-Johnston, P.A., Gainesville; Derek D. Perry of Gainesville Regional Utilities, Gainesville, for Appellant/Cross- Appellee. Sean M. McDermott, Katherine L. Irby, and Daniel M. Nee of City of Gainesville, Gainesville; Ceci Culpepper Berman and Joseph T. Eagleton of Brannock, Berman & Seider, Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 10