Milnar, Min v. Knox County
CourtTennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Date FiledOctober 21, 2026
Docket2026-30-1227
JudgeGodkin, Weaver, Conner
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FILED
Oct 21, 2026
04:22 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Min Milnar Docket No. 2026-30-1227
v. State File No. 72678-2025
Knox County
Appeal from the Court of Workers’
Compensation Claims
Lisa A. Lowe, Judge
Affirmed and Remanded
In this interlocutory appeal, the employee argues the trial court erred in excluding some of
her filings as untimely. The employee sustained an injury to her finger while operating a
meat slicer, and the employer provided authorized medical treatment, including a tetanus
vaccination. The employee alleged suffering serious side effects from the vaccine, and the
employer declined to provide treatment for those alleged conditions. The employee filed
a petition for benefits and requested a hearing on the record, and the trial court issued a
docketing notice that included certain filing deadlines for both parties. The employee
attempted to file documentation twice after her deadline had passed, and the employer filed
motions in limine to exclude those documents. The trial court granted both motions and
excluded all of the documents filed by the employee after her deadline had passed. The
employee has appealed both orders. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the
trial court’s orders and remand the case.
Judge Meredith B. Weaver delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding
Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.
Min Milnar, employee-appellant, pro se
Evan E. Hauser, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, Knox County
1
Memorandum Opinion1
Min Milnar (“Employee”) was working for Knox County (“Employer”) at the
Juvenile Service Center on April 23, 2025, when she injured her left middle finger on a
meat slicer. Employer authorized medical treatment, including a tetanus vaccination as
recommended by the authorized physician. Employee later alleged significant health
conditions that she contended were primarily caused by the tetanus vaccine.2
When Employer declined to provide medical treatment for those alleged conditions,
Employee filed a petition for benefit determination on February 23, 2026. A dispute
certification notice was entered March 17, 2026, and Employee filed a request for a
decision on the record. The trial court issued a docketing notice, which listed the
documents already received for consideration, set filing deadlines for both parties to
provide any supplemental information, and set a deadline for both parties to object to any
filings. Specifically, the trial court instructed Employee to file any supplemental evidence
for the court’s consideration by June 9, 2026, stating it would not consider any evidence
filed after that date. Employer was given until June 23, 2026, to file any further evidence,
and both parties’ objections were to be submitted by July 2.
On June 23, 2026, two weeks after her evidentiary deadline, Employee filed a
“Supplemental Statement to the Court Regarding the Tetanus Vaccine Reaction and
Subsequent Left Lower Extremity Deep Vein Thrombosis,” with medical records attached
as exhibits. That same day, Employer filed a motion in limine, arguing the statement and
exhibits should be excluded as they were not filed timely. On July 2, Employee filed
another document entitled “Employee’s Response in Objection and Opposition to Motion
to Compel Discovery.”3 Employer filed a “renewed” motion in limine on July 6, 2026,
asking the trial court to also exclude Employee’s July 2 filing.
On July 10, the trial court granted Employer’s first motion in limine and excluded
Employee’s June 23 filing. On July 11, Employee filed a response to Employer’s
“renewed” motion in limine, arguing that the trial court should review all filings after the
June 9 deadline “according to their nature and purpose,” rather than disregarding them as
untimely evidence. On July 13, the trial court entered an order granting Employer’s second
motion in limine and excluding the July 2 filing, finding it was filed after the deadline to
1
This decision is being filed pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. and Regs. 0800-02-22-.03(1) (2023).
2
Due to the procedural posture of this case, no documents have been entered into evidence. Consequently,
we have gleaned this factual information from the filings contained in the technical record.
3
During this time, there were also various discovery disputes pending before the trial court as reflected in
a motion to compel filed by Employer on May 21, 2026. These issues are irrelevant to the present appeal.
2
submit additional evidence and that it did not contain any evidentiary objections.
Employee has appealed both orders.4
Employee did not file a brief timely and has provided us with no meaningful legal
argument to explain how she believes the trial court erred in declining to consider evidence
not timely filed in compliance with the court’s directions. As stated by the Tennessee
Supreme Court, “[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct
a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her.” Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of
Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). On her notice of appeal, Employee asserts she
did not receive notice of certain deadlines. However, we can find no instance in the record
on appeal of Employee’s raising this allegation in the trial court. As we have previously
observed, it is not the role of the Appeals Board to address a party’s issues in the first
instance. See Buckner v. Eaton Corp., No. 2016-01-0303, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.
LEXIS 84, at *12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 9, 2016).
A trial court has broad discretion to control the pace of litigation and address pre-
trial motions, Valladares v. Transco Prods., Inc., Nos. 2015-01-0117 & -0118, 2016 TN
Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 31, at *26 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. July 27, 2016),
and the trial court has the discretion to exclude evidence when it is not filed in compliance
with the court’s orders, see Carter v. Ricoh Am. Corp., No. 2015-06-0466, 2020 TN Wrk.
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 64, at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 2, 2020). To
the extent Employee contends that the trial court’s enforcement of its previously-set
deadlines was an abuse of discretion, we disagree. An abuse of discretion is found if the
trial court “applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its
decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that
causes an injustice to the complaining party.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty.
Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008). We see no such abuse of discretion here.5
In short, the trial court set clear deadlines, and Employee failed to abide by them.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand the
case. Costs on appeal are waived.
4
After filing her notice of appeal of both orders, Employee attempted to file a motion “under seal” with the
Clerk of the Appeals Board, which we dismissed because it was not served on Employer. Employee also
filed a “Motion to Permanently Seal Entire Case File” with the trial court, and we remanded the case to the
trial court for the purpose of addressing that motion in the first instance. The trial court issued an order
denying Employee’s motion because it did not comply with the requirements for sealing court records as
set forth in Henderson v. Henderson, W2025-00499-COA-R3-CV, 2026 Tenn. App. LEXIS 513 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sep. 1, 2026). That order has not been appealed.
5
Employee also filed a motion seeking an indefinite stay of the appeal while she travels abroad. All of
Employee’s appellate deadlines had passed prior to the day she indicated she would be leaving, rendering
the motion for a stay moot. Moreover, this request exceeds our statutory authority for granting extensions
of time. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(d)(1) (2026). Accordingly, the motion for stay is denied.
3