Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D2025-2879 _____________________________ CHAUDRA BLACKMON PATTERSON, Appellant, v. RUSSELL VAN DIEPEN, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the County Court for Escambia County. Barry E. Dickson, Jr., Judge. October 7, 2026 PER CURIAM. Appellee Russell Van Diepen and his wife co-own a single- family residence which they leased to Appellant Chaudra Blackmon-Patterson (“Tenant”). After Van Diepen filed this residential eviction action, Tenant failed to timely deposit the required past-due rent into the court registry. As a result, the trial court entered a final judgment for possession and awarded Van Diepen a $7,800 judgment for damages. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment for possession but reverse and remand the judgment for damages. We affirm the default judgment for possession because Tenant’s nonpayment of the accrued rent into the court registry entitled Van Diepen to “an immediate default judgment for removal of the tenant with a writ of possession to issue without further notice or hearing thereon.” § 83.60(2), Fla. Stat. (2025). Tenant asserts on appeal that the trial court erred by not dismissing the action due to the nonparty status of Van Diepen’s wife, whom Tenant claims was an indispensable party. But, at least with respect to the judgment for possession, the trial court properly denied Tenant’s motion to dismiss based on the defense of Van Diepen’s alleged failure to join an indispensable party. Tenant’s failure to pay the rent into the court registry waived any such defense to the claim for possession. See § 83.60(2), Fla. Stat. (nonpayment of the accrued rent “constitutes an absolute waiver of the tenant’s defenses other than payment”); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b) (identifying “failure to join indispensable parties” as a “defense”). As to the judgment for damages, however, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. The trial court ruled that Tenant “failed to deposit rent monies into the court registry . . . to qualify for a trial in this case.” But the registry deposit provisions in section 83.60(2) only apply to “an action by the landlord for possession of a dwelling unit,” not to an action for damages. § 83.60(2), Fla. Stat. In First Hanover v. Vazquez, the Third District concluded that a default judgment and writ of possession issued under section 83.60(2) would not apply to a separate cause of action for damages. 848 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); see also Zambrano v. Quintana, 435 So. 3d 687, 688–89 (Fla. 3d DCA 2026) (same). Other districts have decided similarly. See Famsun Invest, LLC v. Therault, 95 So. 3d 961, 963–64 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“A default under [the registry deposit statute] determines only the possessory interest and does not resolve a dispute for damages.”); Premici v. United Growth Props., L.P., 648 So. 2d 1241, 1243–44 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (holding that a registry- based default only “results in a default for possession,” so the lower court “should have tried” the disputed damages claim before entering a final judgment). * We agree with the reasoning of our * Although these cases applied the statutory provisions governing nonresidential tenancies, not residential tenancies, both statutes similarly provide that a failure to pay the outstanding rent into the court registry entitles the landlord to an immediate 2 sister districts and conclude that Tenant’s failure to deposit the accrued rent into the court registry did not entitle Van Diepen to judgment on his damages claim. The damages claim must be separately adjudicated by the trial court. In doing so, the trial court may consider any defenses properly raised by Tenant, about which we express no opinion. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED. ROBERTS, WINOKUR, and TREADWELL, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Daniel Clibbon and Patrick W. Jennings of Legal Services of North Florida, Tallahassee, for Appellant. No appearance for Appellee. default for “possession.” §§ 83.232(5), 83.60(2), Fla. Stat.; see also Zambrano, 435 So. 3d at 688 (noting the similarity between the nonresidential statute, section 83.232(5), and the residential statute, section 83.60(2)). We therefore find such cases to be persuasive in the residential context. 3