Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH RUFO ROBERTO, a.k.a. Joseph Rufu Roberto, Deceased. SUPREME COURT NO. CV-07-0006-GA SUPERIOR COURT NO. 98-983D Cite as: 2010 MP 7 Decided May 12, 2010 Douglas F. Cushnie, Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for Executor-Appellant Brien Sers Nicholas, Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for Claimant-Appellee BEFORE: ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO, Associate Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Justice Pro Tem; and ROBERT J. TORRES, Justice Pro Tem CASTRO, J.: ¶1 The executor1 of the estate of Joseph R. Roberto (“decedent”) appeals the trial court’s Order Granting Partial Removal of Non-Estate Assets (“removal order”) on the grounds that the trial court failed to comply with the mandate and law of In the Matter of the Estate of Roberto, 2003 MP 16 (“Roberto I”). Appellee Matilde DLG Fejeran (“Fejeran”) claims that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and in the event that we find jurisdiction that the trial court did comply with the mandate and law of the case on remand. We find that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. We further hold that the trial court complied with the mandate and law of Roberto I with respect to certain assets, and that it did not do so concerning other assets. We therefore, AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND this matter back to the trial court for determination consistent with this opinion. I ¶2 Decedent was born in Guam on November 7, 1922, and he died in Saipan on July 14, 1998. The decedent either lived in Guam or on the U.S. mainland for most of his life. He moved to Saipan in 1990 or 1991 and shared a home with his first cousin Fejeran. Two of Fejeran’s daughters, Teressa F. Saucedo and Anna F. Racomora, are also parties to this action. Decedent never married and has no children. Fejeran and the decedent had business dealings, they held several joint bank accounts, and Fejeran was the beneficiary and a co-trustee of a trust (“the Roberto Trust”) that decedent created.2 Decedent’s only sibling was his brother Thomas John Roberto who died in Florida on June 26, 1999. Thomas Roberto is survived by his wife Jacqueleen F. Roberto, and his three children Joseph Lee Roberto, Michael L. Roberto, and Dolores Maria Roberto. These children are the only heirs to decedent’s estate. ¶3 Probate proceedings began in 1998. The executor filed an initial inventory of the estate, and Fejeran, on her own behalf and as attorney in fact for her two daughters, filed a notice of claims thereto and requested service of pleadings. Subsequently, the executor twice supplemented the inventory, and Fejeran timely filed amended notices of her claims. Eventually, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in October 2001 (“2001 order”). Fejeran appealed this decision claiming that the trial court failed to exclude certain items of real and personal property from the estate. In response to Fejeran’s appeal, this Court issued Roberto I that affirmed in part and reversed in part the 2001 order, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. ¶4 In response to Roberto I, the trial court issued the removal order in 2007. As stated above, the executor appeals the trial court’s removal order on the grounds that the trial court failed to comply with 1 The estate’s executor is decedent’s nephew Joseph L. Roberto. 2 The Roberto Trust contains twenty-three parcels of real property located in the Commonwealth. Decedent purchased these pieces of real estate and later placed the land into the trust to be managed for the benefit of Fejeran. Decedent, Decedent’s brother Thomas Roberto, and Fejeran were co-trustees. As discussed extensively in Roberto I, while decedent owned the land in fee simple absolute, he was not of Northern Mariana Island descent. the mandate and law of Roberto I on remand. The removal order excluded the following assets from decedent’s estate: (1) the Roberto Trust, (2) Lot No. 1734-New-8, (3) Lot No. 1734-New-15 and past and future rental income derived therefrom, (4) the Pacific Financial Corporation Certificates of Deposits Nos. 2927, 3262, 3588, and 3590, and (5) Pacific Century Trust Account Numbers 140011651 and 140017153. ¶5 On February 2, 2007, the executor filed a motion for reconsideration with the trial court. In late February 2007, the executor also filed this appeal challenging the removal order pursuant to 8 CMC § 2206. Thirty days later the trial court vacated the scheduled hearings on the motion for reconsideration because the present appeal was pending. On March 29, 2007, the executor filed a motion to remand with this Court. Executor admits in his reply memorandum filed with the motion to remand that no procedure exists for this Court to grant the motion. Therefore, this Court declines to create a new procedural rule in order to address executor’s motion to remand.3 II ¶6 The issues before us are two fold: (i) whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal under 8 CMC § 2206, and (ii) whether the trial court followed the mandate and law of Roberto I. Both are questions of law, and therefore, both are subject to a de novo standard of review. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 4 NMI 314, 315 (1995).4 III A. The Commonwealth Constitution and Interlocutory Orders ¶7 In November 1997, House Legislative Initiative 10-3, HS1, HD1 (1997) amended Article IV of the Commonwealth Constitution. The initiative established this Court as the appellate and highest court of the Commonwealth with jurisdiction to “hear appeals from final judgments and orders of the Commonwealth superior court.” NMI Const. art. IV § 3 (emphasis added). The initiative further stated that “all laws, regulations, and rules affecting the judiciary shall continue to exist as if established pursuant to this [amendment], and shall unless clearly inconsistent, be read to be consistent with [this amendment].” House Legislative Initiative 10-3, HS1, HD1 at 4 (emphasis added). ¶8 Recently, this Court had the opportunity to examine the interplay between the constitutional mandate of final judgments and orders under House Legislative Initiative 10-3, HS1, HD1 and appeals of non-final orders under 8 CMC § 2206. In In re Estate of Pilar De Castro, 2009 MP 3 ¶ 18, we cited 3 If executor wished for the trial court to hear his motion for reconsideration he should have filed a dismissal of this appeal pursuant to then applicable Com. R. App. Proc. 42(b). 4 We acknowledge, as the dissent points out, that there may be other issues with the holding of Roberto I. Those matters are not properly before us at this time. We are only asked to determine whether the trial court complied with the mandate and law of the case when it issued its removal order. Malite v. Tudela, 2007 MP 3 ¶ 21, for the proposition that 8 CMC § 2206 appeals are interlocutory. In Malite, the petitioners originally sought a writ of mandamus from this Court ordering attorney fees to be returned in a probate matter. Id. ¶ 1. The Court denied probate for the issuance of a writ, but we converted the petition into an 8 CMC § 2206 interlocutory appeal and found jurisdiction. Id. In doing so, the Court explicitly stated that: We have jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal by virtue of 8 CMC section 2206, which grants the Heirs a right of appeal from an order either “directing or allowing the payment of a debt, claim, legacy, or attorney’s fee . . . [or] refusing to make [such an] order . . . .” Id. ¶ 21 (quoting 8 CMC § 2206). The Malite Court made clear that an “immediate appeal” is permitted when “section 2206’s necessary prerequisites” are met. Id. Malite, however, did not explicitly address the issue of the potential inconsistency between 8 CMC § 2206 and the Commonwealth Constitution after the passage of House Legislative Initiative 10-3, HS1, HD1. We now take the opportunity to provide the rationale behind the continued applicability of 8 CMC § 2206 following the passage of the 1997 amendments to the Commonwealth Constitution. ¶9 In 1990, before the 1997 amendments to the Commonwealth Constitution, but after passage of 8 CMC § 2206 in 1984, the Court determined it was only able to hear appeals from final orders. Commonwealth v. Hasinto, 1 NMI 377, 385 (1990). This was the case even though there was no explicit requirement of finality under the Commonwealth Constitution or statutory law at that time. Id. at 380. Despite the finality requirement, the Court held that interlocutory appeals could be permitted where expressly allowed by statute. Id. at 385. Furthermore, the Court also noted that an additional exception to the finality rule occurred under the “collateral orders doctrine.”5 Under Hasinto, because the Court permitted interlocutory appeals authorized by statute, the appeals permitted by 8 CMC § 2206 would have been permissible before the passage of House Legislative Initiative 10-3, HS1, HD1. ¶ 10 When the 1997 amendments to the Commonwealth Constitution were passed, the intent was “[t]o amend Article IV of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianna Islands so that the Judicial Branch, consisting of a Supreme Court and a Superior Court, would have a firm and secure constitutional foundation, co-equal with the Executive and Legislative Branches.” House Legislative Initiative 10-3, HS1, HD1. In Borja v. Tenorio, we held that House Legislative Initiative 10-3, HS1, HD1 “did not change or give additional authority to the Court . . . . It merely turned a statutory court into a constitutional judiciary.” 1998 MP 2 ¶ 12. Stated differently, this Court concluded that the amendments 5 Although not directly at issue in this case, the collateral order doctrine remains in effect today. Its continued existence is useful in our assessment of the applicability of the exceptions allowed by 8 CMC § 2206. See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 2002 MP 14 ¶ 1, n.1 (holding that interlocutory appeals are warranted when “the order constitutes a complete, formal, and in trial court, final rejection of the claim the order addresses”). did not fundamentally change the nature of the Commonwealth Supreme Court. Furthermore, in Camacho, this Court acknowledged that exceptions to the finality requirement first recognized before the 1997 amendments still existed after its passage. Camacho, 2002 MP 14 ¶ 1 n.1. Therefore, we hold that this Court still has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals authorized by 8 CMC § 2206 in light of the Constitution’s finality requirement because the statute is not clearly inconsistent with the Constitution. B. Rule 54(b) Certification and the Separate Document Rule ¶ 11 We also find that the absence of a Rule 54(b) certification does not prevent this Court from exercising jurisdiction. Commonwealth Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is a mechanism by which non-final orders are deemed final by the trial court. Generally, non-final orders appealed to this Court must comply with this certification requirement. Orders under 8 CMC § 2206, however, do not require this certification because the probate statute is determinative of jurisdiction.6 In other words, there is no need for Rule 54(b) certification in cases where a statute gives a party a right to appeal an interlocutory order. Therefore, 8 CMC § 2206 and not Commonwealth Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) confers jurisdiction. ¶ 12 The separate document rule requires that a separate entry of judgment form be filed with the Superior Court Clerk before a matter can be appealed to this Court. In re Estate of Pilar De Castro, 2009 MP 3 ¶ 13. This Court finds that it has jurisdiction notwithstanding the requirement “that the separate document rule applies to 8 CMC § 2206.” Id. ¶ 20. A separate entry of judgment document was not filed with the Superior Court Clerk for the removal order. The separate document rule will not, however, prevent us from exercising jurisdiction over this appeal because the parties waived its applicability. “[T]he separate document rule may be waived if a litigant requests that an appellate court set aside an appealable order,” and “the non-appealing party does not contest the appeal on the basis of the separate document rule.” Id. ¶ 21. In the present case, both of these waiver requirements are met. First, the executor requests that this Court set aside the trial court’s removal order; second, Fejeran has not challenged our jurisdiction on the basis of the separate document rule. Therefore, the separate document rule is not a bar to jurisdiction in this case if an independent ground for jurisdiction exists. C. Statutory Jurisdiction and the Law of the Case7 6 In re Estate of Pilar De Castro, 2009 MP 3 (finding jurisdiction to review an appeal under 8 CMC § 2206 without a finding of certification pursuant to NMI. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). See also Matsunaga v. Matsunaga, 2001 MP 11 ¶ 13 (the court may hear appeals from non-final orders when expressly allowed by statute). 7 The dissent argues that Roberto I improperly exercised jurisdiction when it heard Fejeran’s appeal from the trial court’s 2001 order. We explicitly withhold judgment on the question of whether an appeal lies from a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law under 8 CMC § 2206. We do recognize, however, that California’s Estate of Thompson, 61 Cal. App. 2d 188, 188 (1943), refused to hear such an appeal under repealed Probate Code § 1240. We are unwilling to reexamine Roberto I’s jurisdictional foundation, potentially completely vacate the opinion, and reset the litigation circa 2001. After the denial of a Petition for Rehearing, In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph Rufo Roberto, 2004 MP 7, a dismissal from the Ninth Circuit, Appellee’s Excerpts of Record (“ER”) at 8, and the denial of a Petition for Cert from the United States Supreme Court, Appellee’s ER at 11, such a course of ¶ 13 This Court has jurisdiction to hear the executor’s appeal of the trial court’s removal order. The executor brings this action under 8 CMC § 2206, which provides: An appeal may be taken from an order . . . determining heirship or the persons to whom distribution should be made or trust property should pass; distributing property; refusing to make any order mentioned in this section . . . . 8 CMC § 2206. We have had few opportunities to discuss the jurisdictional contours of 8 CMC § 2206. The statute, however, virtually mirrors repealed California Probate Code § 1240. There are numerous California cases that interpret repealed Probate Code § 1240, including the language relevant to this appeal. Therefore, we will examine California jurisprudence for guidance in this matter. ¶ 14 In Estate of Friedman, 100 Cal. App. 3d 810, 813 n.2 (1979) (citing Estate of Warner, 162 Cal. App. 2d 799, 803 (1958)), a California court found that “[t]he right to appeal under section 1240 is determined by the effect of an order, not by its form.”8 The appeal concerned who would take estate assets in the event that the in terrorem clause of the will was violated. The court held that it had jurisdiction pursuant to repealed Probate Code § 1240. The court found that it could examine the in terrorem clause because the effect of the appeal concerned the distribution of estate assets even though the statute did not explicitly allow for appeals concerning in terrorem clauses. Thus, the appellate court had jurisdiction under the statute because the ultimate issue was the determination of which parties would take under the will. action at this time would work a manifest injustice upon the prevailing party who may have relied on Roberto I’s finality regarding specific assets. In Moriarty v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 961 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000), the appellant argued for the second time before the court that the National Labor Relations Board was the sole body with jurisdiction to hear his “Claim I.” The court, in rejecting this argument stated “[appellant] does not bring any new theories, but continues to argue the same ones that we considered in the first case. We rejected [appellant’s] argument in our initial decision . . . and [appellant’s] attempt to resurrect it without good reason is barred by the law of the case.” Id. In Estate of Aguirre v. Koruga, 154 Fed. Appx. 652 (9th Cir. 2005), the estate challenged a jury’s verdict that power of attorney could be awarded based on extrinsic evidence. The case had previously been appealed to the court, and an earlier panel held that a power of attorney could come into existence based on such evidence. In responding to the dissent, the majority explicitly found that “[r]egardless of whether we would have reached the same decision as the original panel, we cannot say that its decision was clearly erroneous. The prior panel was not so clearly mistaken in its interpretation of the Washington law as to defeat the law of the case.” Id. at 653. Thus, it will take more than the same rehashed arguments by the executor, and claims by the dissent that it would have decided matters differently, for this Court to reopen Roberto I and potentially vacate the entire decision. 8 Estate of Estrem, 107 P.2d 36, 38 (1940) (effect of order denying a motion to set aside will was to allow will into probate); Estate of Hart, 119 Cal. App. 2d 310, 313 (1953) (“order awarding the costs of the executors against Hart, Jr., was in effect an order refusing to direct the executors”); Estate of Effron, 117 Cal. App. 3d 915, 921 n.3 (1981) (“the legal effect here of the order refusing to start the process through which the Bank could have been discharged is the equivalent of the appealable order refusing to revoke letters testamentary”); Estate of Richter, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1361, 1366 (1993) (order that determined whether a proposed action violated a will’s no contest clause was an appealable order because it determined heirship). ¶ 15 Similarly, Maxine B. Dow v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 140 Cal. App. 2d 399, 407 (1956), held that an order that directed the payment of money and distributed property and rights in property was appealable under repealed Probate Code § 1240. In contrast, in Estate of Cole, 106 Cal. App. 2d 823, 824 (1951), a distinction was made between an order “directing payment or allowing payment of a claim and an order of the court merely approving or allowing the claim.” The court found that an appeal was not allowed for an order permitting a claim because assets were not being distributed as a result of the order. Id. Thus, these cases stand for the proposition that jurisdiction pursuant to repealed Probate Code § 1240 exists even though the language of the appeal does not precisely fit within the language of the statute when the legal effect of the order falls within the meaning of the statute. ¶ 16 Here, the trial court’s removal order uses language that does not precisely fit within the types of appeals provided by 8 CMC § 2206 because the statute does not specifically allow for appeals from orders removing non-estate assets. Like in Estate of Friedman and the other cases cited above, however, the legal effect of the removal order determines which parties will receive which assets. The removal order, unlike Estate of Cole, is not a preliminary step in the probate process. Instead, the removal order is concerned with distributing property to parties in this probate case. Therefore, we hold that the legal effect of the removal order falls within the types of orders that are appealable under 8 CMC § 2206. ¶ 17 Before turning to the merits, we address the dissent’s argument that the law of the case doctrine does not apply to the instant appeal and that we should revisit our opinion in Roberto I in resolving the issues involved in this appeal. The dissent states that “our failure to reconsider the Roberto I decision would not only wreak manifest injustice on the heirs of Roberto’s Estate, but would also result in harm to the Commonwealth as a whole.” Dissent ¶ 43. We disagree. ¶ 18 The law of the case doctrine developed to “maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.” Cushnie v. Arriola, 2000 MP 7 ¶ 14 (quoting 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4478 (1981) (“Wright & Miller”)). The doctrine favors finality of court decisions, which: Is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgment of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue, and actually determinate by them. Aldan-Pierce v. Mafnas, 1999 MP 11 ¶ 16 (citing Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Res v. Utah, 114 F.3d 1513, 1524 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897))); See Wabol, 4 NMI at 318. While the doctrine is not a limit on a court’s power, it is our practice to “generally refuse to reopen what has been decided,” Cushnie, 2000 MP 7 ¶ 14, and rests on “the desire to protect both court and parties against the burdens of repeated reargument by indefatigable diehards. . . .” Camacho v. J.C. Tenorio Enterprises, 2 NMI 407, 413-14 (1992) (quoting Wright & Miller). This policy “is true even where the court on remand disagrees with or finds error in the remanding court’s decisions. Wabol, 4 NMI at 318 (citing In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895). Like almost any legal principle, exceptions exist to its application, but none of those exceptions are present in this case. Specifically, there are no unusual circumstances present to warrant our review of Roberto I, and second there are no clear errors in Roberto I that would work a manifest injustice. Cushie, 2000 MP 7 ¶ 16; Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 n.8 (1982) (finding that the general rule is that a court may depart from a prior holding if it was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice). As will be discussed later in the opinion, there is nothing in Robert I that is sufficient for this Court to abandon the law of the case and reopen a seven year old opinion. IV A. Roberto I’s Law and Mandate ¶ 19 The executor claims that the removal order did not comply with the mandate and law of Roberto I. The assets from Roberto I consist of: (1) the Roberto Trust, (2) Lot No. 1734-New-8, (3) Pacific Financial Corporation Certificates of Deposits Nos. 2927, 3262, 3588, and 3590, (4) Pacific Century Trust Account No. 140011651, (5) Pacific Century Trust Account No. 140017153, and (6) Lot No. 1734- New-15 and the initial lease payment and subsequent lease income. While the executor did not appeal the removal order’s distribution of the certificates of deposit, a brief discussion of those assets is necessary to determine whether the removal order properly distributed the initial lease payment. 1. The Roberto Trust ¶ 20 The Court in Roberto I ordered the trial court to award the Roberto Trust, and the parcels of land that constituted the trust res, to Fejeran as her sole property. Roberto, 2003 MP 16 ¶ 31. The Court ordered the trial court to exclude the trust res from the estate because none of decedent’s heirs were of Northern Mariana descent, and therefore, the estate was prevented “from taking any interest in the land in the Roberto Trust.” Id. ¶ 24. Additionally, we found that Fejeran was the beneficiary of the trust so she was the rightful taker of the trust property. Id. ¶ 21. The removal order awarded the properties held in the Roberto Trust to Fejeran in fee simple absolute. The order did not diverge from the remand instructions in any manner; therefore, we find that the trial court’s removal order complied with the mandate and law of the case from Roberto I with respect to the Roberto Trust. ¶ 21 Upon first blush, Roberto I seemingly relies on two different strands of legal reasoning in awarding Fejeran all of the real property. On the one hand Roberto I apparently awards Fejeran the property on the ground that the decedent’s possession of the property was void ab initio and on the other hand that Fejeran exercised her right of recovery within the statute of limitations timeframe pursuant to 2 CMC § 4991. Roberto I was our first case to discuss the applicability of the statute of limitations from 2 CMC § 4991 to Article XII claims.9 Roberto I squared these two competing rationales by accepting that a sale of land to a non-NMD is void ab initio, but that the grantor may only recover the land within six years, and after that the government is the only entity capable of confiscating the property. Id. ¶ 25. We found the statute of limitations constitutional pursuant to Article XII, Section 6’s enforcement powers. Id. ¶ 26. Thus, Roberto I has never stood for the proposition that land sales to non-NMDs are merely voidable instead of void ab initio, and the two principles coexisted in the context of our previous opinion. We are unwilling to rule that the statute of limitations is unconstitutional at this time, and without either approving or disapproving of Robert I’s reasoning, we acknowledge that it will take a future appeal to challenge the constitutionality of 2 CMC § 4991 before we will pass judgment anew on the statute. We will not sua sponte decide that 2 CMC § 4491 is unconstitutional, and that Roberto I incorrectly found otherwise in the context of this appeal. This aspect of Roberto I’s holding constitutes neither unusual circumstances nor a clear error that if left uncorrected would work a manifest injustice sufficient to allow us to reopen to law of the case and pass constitutional judgment at this time. Such a reversal of a recently established precedent demands briefing by the parties, oral argument, and an amicus brief filed by the Attorney General’s office. Therefore, for the purposes of this appeal, we accept Roberto I’s pronouncements concerning the statute of limitations as binding. 2. Lot No. 1734-New-8 ¶ 22 Roberto I determined that Lot No. 1734-New-8 must be excluded from the estate and re- conveyed to the Roberto Trust. Id. ¶ 33. The Court found that the lot was initially part of the Roberto Trust, and that it was conveyed from the trust to the decedent by a quitclaim deed on August 19, 1997. Id. ¶ 32. The decedent, however, was not of Northern Mariana Island decedent, and thus, the form of title that he held violated Article XII. Id. ¶ 33. As a result, “[t]he conveyance of Lot 1734-New-8 from the Roberto Trust to Decedent violated Article XII and is void.” Id. We found that the transaction “clearly violates Article XII and Ms. Fejeran, an interested party as both co-trustee and beneficiary of the Roberto Trust, challenged this transaction in a timely manner. . . .” Id. The Court remanded the matter and ordered that the lot be reconveyed back to the Roberto Trust, and therefore, to Fejeran. The trial court, following Roberto I’s remand instructions, ordered the property returned to the Roberto Trust, and thus, to Fejeran in fee simple absolute. There is nothing in its disposition of the property that is in contravention with 9 The case does not explicitly rely on the statute of limitations in ordering certain assets be awarded to Fejeran, and therefore it may be possible to interpret the statute of limitations language as dicta. We will not speculate on this matter now because it is inconsequential to determining whether the trial court followed the law and mandate of Roberto I. That opinion engaged in legal analysis, and then for every appealed asset, gave clear and unambiguous instructions for how it was to be distributed; since we are only asked whether the trial court followed those specific instructions, we will limit our discussion of Roberto I’s legal analysis to only those areas where it is necessary to determine this appeal. Roberto I. The lot was ordered back into the Roberto Trust, and thus, owned by Fejeran; therefore, the trial court followed the mandate and law of the case in Roberto I with respect to Lot No. 1734-New-8. 3. Pacific Financial Corporation Certificates of Deposits Nos. 2927, 3262, 3588, and 3590 ¶ 23 We acknowledge that the executor did not challenge the removal order’s disposition of the certificates of deposit. Roberto I, however, stated that the initial lease payment from Lot 1734-New-15 would be distributed in the same manner as the certificates of deposit and trust accounts because the initial lease payment was comingled with those funds. Id. ¶ 36. Roberto I ordered the trial court to distribute the certificates of deposit, or the proceeds therefrom, to Fejeran as her sole property. Id. ¶ 47. Accordingly, the trial court’s removal order directed that the proceeds from the certificates of deposit be turned over to Fejeran. We keep this distribution in mind when we analyze the initial lease payment below. 4. Pacific Century Trust Account No. 140011651 ¶ 24 The Court in Roberto I ordered that the proceeds from Pacific Century Trust Account number 140011651 be turned over to Fejeran. The Court found that despite Fejeran’s name being removed from the account prior to decedent’s death, it was decedent’s intent “to maintain a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.” Id. ¶ 42. Roberto I stated that the trial court “committed clear error” in not finding that the account was held in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Id. ¶ 42. As a result, “[o]n remand, the trial court shall order that the account, or account proceeds, be returned to Ms. Fejeran, with interest as appropriate.” Id. ¶ 42. In response to Roberto I, the removal order stated that account 140011651 was the sole property of Fejeran, and ordered that the proceeds be turned over to her possession. Therefore, the removal order complied with the mandate and law of Roberto I. ¶ 25 We acknowledge that Roberto I broke with the common law when it awarded Pacific Century Trust Account No. 140011651 to Fejeran. Roberto I, based on extrinsic evidence, found that it was the decedent’s intent for the accounts to remain joint accounts with the right of survivorship, and that the only reason Fejeran’s name was removed was because the decedent did not want her soon-to-be ex-husband claiming any of those proceeds in the then upcoming divorce proceedings. Id. ¶ 38. Roberto I found that the account was established as a joint account with the right of survivorship, id. ¶ 37, that decedent wrote a letter indicating that Fejeran was still to have rights to authorize the account and sign on the account, and that a bank employee testified that the decedent wanted the account to remain a joint account and that he would add Fejeran’s name once her divorce was finished. Id. ¶ 40. Roberto I concluded that even though her name was not on the account when he died that the evidence was overwhelming that he intended to maintain a joint account with the right of survivorship with Fejeran. Id. ¶ 42. ¶ 26 We acknowledge that this holding modified the common law rule concerning joint bank accounts with the rights of survivorship by creating an exception that states that the right of survivorship can continue to exist based on extrinsic evidence sufficiently indicating the decedent’s intent. Regardless of whether this rule constituted clear error for the purposes of overturning the law of the case, it does not work a manifest injustice. Arizona, 460 U.S. at 619 n. 8. Roberto I found that it was the decedent’s intent for Fejeran to have the funds after his death, and we do not believe that this finding amounts to manifest injustice because it was supported by several pieces of extrinsic evidence. At this point in the litigation, we feel that manifest injustice would result from reopening Roberto I and redistributing the account proceeds. Therefore, the removal order properly awarded account 140011651 to Fejeran. 5. Pacific Century Trust Account No. 140017153 ¶ 27 Roberto I ordered the trial court to make additional findings of fact to determine whether Pacific Century Trust Account No. 140017153 was held in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship or whether it was held in decedent’s name alone. The Court stated that if it was a joint account then it should be disposed of in the same manner as account 140011651. If the trial court determined that account 140017153 was not held jointly between the decedent and Fejeran, then the account would be part of decedent’s estate. The trial court determined that account 140017153 was the sole property of Fejeran. Its disposition of account 140017153 in the removal order mirrored its disposition of account 140011651. In making this ruling, however, the trial court did not make any findings of fact. Its order simply stated that account 140017153 was the sole property of Fejeran. Removal Order at 4. The trial court must determine the status of account 140017153 in light of Roberto I’s analysis concerning how a joint bank account with the right of survivorship may continue to exist based on extrinsic evidence clearly indicating the decedent’s intent. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not comply with the mandate and law of Roberto I. We remand the determination of this account’s status back to the trial court. We instruct the trial court to make findings of fact concerning whether Pacific Century Trust Account No. 140017153 was a joint account with right of survivorship, or whether it was decedent’s personal property. 6. Lot No. 1734-New-15 ¶ 28 The Court in Roberto I determined that Lot 1734-New-15 was originally part of the Roberto Trust as part of a larger parcel of land known as Lot 1734-New-R2. Id. ¶ 35. We did not, however, determine whether the lot was reconveyed to the decedent prior to it being leased to Calvary Christian Academy, or whether it was leased while it was still part of the Trust. Instead, we concluded that in either event, the lot would become Fejeran’s property because it was either part of the Trust, or if it was reconveyed to the decedent it would be treated like Lot 1734-New-8, and Fejeran properly exercised her right of recovery as a co-trustee of the Roberto Trust. Id. Our mandate was clear that Fejeran would take possession of the property, id., and the removal ordered followed our mandate by stating that “Lot No. 1734-New-15 is hereby excluded from this Estate and is awarded to Claimant Fejeran as her sole property in fee simple absolute . . . .” Removal Order at 2-3. We also ordered that the $99,000 initial lease payment be analyzed similarly to Pacific Century and Pacific Financial accounts because the funds were commingled. All of the above accounts are to be awarded to Fejeran except account 140017153 because, as discussed above, the trial court must make additional findings of fact before it can determine who owns those proceeds. The removal order was silent regarding the initial lease payment, though it discussed the amounts that comprised the other accounts. The trial court must explicitly distribute the initial lease payment. We find that the law and mandate of Roberto I was not followed in disposing of the initial lease payment; therefore, we order the trial court to distribute the $99,000 initial lease payment in the same manner as the other accounts. ¶ 29 The removal order also specified that the lease income from Lot 1734-New-15 be turned over to Fejeran. The income that the executor possessed at the time of the removal order was $219,030 for September 2000 through October 2004. Id. at 3. From October 2004 through January 2007 the rental income was in held in trust by Calvary’s attorney and totaled $123,011.58. Id. The trial court ordered that all of this money be turned over to Fejeran, and that all future rental payments were to be made to Fejeran. Roberto I did not discuss the rental income from Lot 1734-New-15, and we also failed to determine or order the trial court to determine, who owned the lot when the lease was entered into. Fejeran is entitled to the lease income regardless of whether the Roberto Trust or the dec