In the Admission of Eleanor O. Nisperos
CourtSupreme Court of The Commonwealth of The Northern Mariana Islands
Date FiledDecember 31, 2007
Docket2007-ADM-0031-BAR
JudgeDemapan, Castro, Manglona
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
IN THE ADMISSION OF ELEANOR ODUCAYEN NISPEROS
SUPREME COURT NO. 2007-ADM-0031-BAR
Cite as: 2007 MP 33
Decided December 31, 2007
Elanor O. Nisperos, Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, Pro Se
BEFORE: MIGUEL S. DEMAPAN, Chief Justice; ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO, Associate Justice; and
JOHN A. MANGLONA, Associate Justice
PER CURIAM:
¶1 Eleanor Oducayen Nisperos (“Nisperos”) engaged in the practice of law as an assistant
attorney general without first being admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth. Because
Nisperos failed to submit a timely application to practice law, and because the Attorney General’s
Office delayed her application, we find that Nisperos violated the Commonwealth Rules of
Admission, and that the Attorney General’s Office contributed to Nisperos’s unauthorized
practice of law.
I
¶2 On November 28, 2007, the Court received Nisperos’s application for admission to
practice law as an assistant attorney general in the Commonwealth courts on a temporary basis
pursuant to 1 CMC § 3603. Nisperos’s contract with the Attorney General’s Office states that her
employment was to begin June 20, 2007, but Nisperos did not sign the contract until July 31,
2007. The differing dates make it unclear as to the exact date Nisperos began working for the
Attorney General’s Office. Nisperos, however, claims she began work as an assistant attorney
general on July 16, 2007.
¶3 After beginning work with the Attorney General’s Office, Nisperos signed and filed
pleadings in the trial court in her official capacity as an assistant attorney general. On August 2,
2007, she filed an answer in Li v. Department of Labor, Civil No. 07-0215 (NMI Super. Ct. Aug.
2, 2007) (Answer to Complaint of Judicial Review of Agency Action at 3), but failed to affix her
bar association number. 1 We use Nisperos’s appearance as an assistant attorney general in the
trial court, for the purposes of this decision only, as the official starting date of her practice of
law. The Commonwealth Rules of Admission state that attorneys may not commence practicing
law for the Commonwealth government until their bar application is approved and they have
taken the oath of admission before a Supreme Court Justice. Com. R. Admiss. II(5)(J). Thus, in
violation of Com. R. Admiss. II(5)(J), 2 it took Nisperos from August 2, 2007 until November 28,
1
Nisperos also signed and filed a motion to dismiss before this Court in her official capacity as an
Assistant Attorney General on September 2, 2007. See Wu v. Dep’t of Labor, Appeal No. 07-0009-GA
(Defendant-Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss).
2
Although we referenced 1 CMC § 3603(a)(4) in ordering Nisperos to show cause as to why she
should not be disciplined for practicing law without a license, the practice of law in the Commonwealth is
ultimately governed by this Court’s inherent powers. NMI Const. art. IV, § 3; see also NMI Const. art. IV,
§ 9. In that regard, we have adopted a variety of rules governing the practice of law in the Commonwealth,
including the Commonwealth Rules of Admission, which govern the present case. While the scope,
2007, almost four months after she signed and filed documents in the trial court, to request
admittance to practice law in the Commonwealth courts. 3
¶4 On December 11, 2007, we ordered Nisperos to cease her practice of law and show cause
as to why she should not be disciplined and her application for admission should not be denied
for practicing law in the Commonwealth without a license. On December 17, 2007, Nisperos
responded to the order to show cause. In her response, Nisperos accepted complete responsibility
for failing to be admitted to the CNMI Bar Association before practicing law in the
Commonwealth. However, she noted that she initially submitted her completed application to the
Attorney General’s Office on September 10, 2007. She claims that her original application
authorized payment for her background check from her personal credit card. However, Nisperos
states that the Attorney General’s Office removed her payment authorization form and assured
her that the Attorney General’s Office would pay for the background check. On September 12,
2007, the Attorney General’s Office submitted Nisperos’s application without the required $250
payment, resulting in its rejection.
¶5 Nisperos states that although she inquired about the status of her application via email
with Deputy Attorney General Greg Baka on September 18, 2007 and November 26, 2007, Baka
did not inform her of her rejected application until December 6, 2007. On December 11, 2007,
the same day this Court ordered Nisperos to show cause as to why she should not be disciplined
for practicing law without a license, the Attorney General’s Office placed Nisperos on
administrative leave.
¶6 During the order to show cause hearing on December 20, 2007, Nisperos accepted full
responsibility for her rejected application, as well her unauthorized practice of law. Nisperos
highlighted her record as a government attorney for thirty-six years, and continually stressed that
she meant no disrespect to the Court, the CNMI Bar Association, or the people of the
Commonwealth. 4
interpretation, and constitutionality of 1 CMC § 3603 merits further discussion, we find it less than ideal to
address those issues in the present case.
3
Additionally, all attorneys in the Commonwealth are required to affix their CNMI Bar Association
“identification number immediately to the right of their names on the signature of all pleadings in the
Commonwealth Courts.” General Order 2005-100. Nisperos failed to do so, as she was not a member of
the CNMI Bar Association.
4
In contrast, in In re Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 2, our decision was heavily influenced by the prosecutor’s
unwillingness to accept blame for her mistakes, as well as for her disrespectful conduct toward the Court.
In In re Roy, the prosecutor stated that she should not be disciplined for failing to file a brief on two
separate appeals because, inter alia, she was overworked and one of the cases was “relatively minor.” At
the order to show cause hearing, the prosecutor “repeatedly turned to face onlookers in the courtroom and
II
¶7 Any person who practices law in the Commonwealth without being admitted to practice
law in this jurisdiction is subject to discipline. Com. Disc. R. & P. 17. Discipline may consist of
“[d]isbarment, suspension, public censure, private reprimand, and/or any other sanction that is
deemed appropriate.” Id. 3(a). “We have ‘the inherent authority to impose sanctions that are not
specifically addressed by rule.’” In re Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 3 (quoting Tenorio v. Superior Court,
1 NMI 112, 127 (1990)). “‘The purpose of suspension or disbarment is not to punish the
attorney, but rather to guard the administration of justice, maintain the dignity of the courts and
the integrity of the profession, and protect the public.’” Id. ¶ 4 (quoting Saipan Lau Lau Dev. Inc.
v. Superior Court, 2001 MP 2 ¶ 38). Sanctions are imposed to deter other attorneys who are
considering violating the rules of our profession. In re Disciplinary Proceedings of Rhodes, 2002
MP 2 ¶ 16.
¶8 “Notice and an opportunity to respond must always be given before sanctions” are
imposed to comply with due process. Lucky Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Tokai, U.S.A., Inc., 3 NMI 343, 363
(1992). In the instant case, Nisperos received due process after she had an opportunity to respond
in writing to our order to show cause, as well as the opportunity to be heard at a hearing. See In
re Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 6 (“An opportunity to respond in writing to an order to show cause
regarding sanctions and a chance to be heard at a hearing provide adequate due process.”); Milne
v. Lee, 2001 MP 16 ¶ 32 (determining that there was no due process violation after the attorney
facing discipline was given a hearing).
¶9 “We have the inherent authority and jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of attorneys
practicing before us.” In re Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 7. Nisperos, appearing before this Court and the
trial court in her official capacity as an assistant attorney general, is subject to our jurisdiction.
“The practice of law is not limited to appearances in court. It also embraces the preparation of
papers that are to be filed in court on another’s behalf and that are otherwise incident to a
lawsuit.” Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Joelson, 872 N.E.2d 1207, 1208-09 (Ohio 2007) (per curiam). To
determine the appropriate sanction, we consider “the nature of the misconduct, the cumulative
weight of the violations, and the harm to the public and the profession.” In re Giberson, 581
N.W.2d 351, 354 (Minn. 1998). “We look to other cases involving similar attorney misconduct
for guidance.” Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 7. In Joelson, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that where
a non-lawyer engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, civil penalties were unwarranted when
mouthed words to them.” Id. ¶ 12 n.4. After the hearing, “the prosecutor stormed out of the courtroom,
made loud remarks to seated onlookers as she left, and slammed the door before the Justices exited the
courtroom.” Id.
the non-lawyer respondent ceased his unauthorized practice of law, cooperated in investigative
proceedings, and caused no significant harm. 872 N.E.2d at 1209. “Nonetheless, we decide the
instant case, like each case, on its unique circumstances and facts.” In re Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 7.
¶ 10 Here, Nisperos’s contrite responses to this Court’s order to show cause, her sincere
demeanor at the order to show cause hearing, and her outstanding record as a government
attorney for thirty-six years strongly influence our decision. Notwithstanding Nisperos’s
apologetic attitude and acceptance of blame, however, we cannot ignore her conduct. As an
assistant attorney general, Nisperos has an obligation to both the Commonwealth and the legal
profession to abide by the rules of the Court and the laws of the Commonwealth. With thirty-six
years of experience as a government attorney, we find it disconcerting that Nisperos failed on
such a fundamental level.
¶ 11 We are equally troubled with the role the Attorney General’s Office played in this matter.
The primary responsibility of the Attorney General’s Office is to serve the people of the
Commonwealth in upholding and enforcing the Commonwealth’s laws. When the Attorney
General’s Office disregards Court rules, or otherwise contributes to the unauthorized practice of
law, the Commonwealth is ill-served. The Attorney General’s Office took two-and-a-half months
to notify Nisperos of her rejected application, which came about in part because the Attorney
General’s Office failed to provide proper payment for its processing. There is no doubt that the
Attorney General’s Office harms the people of the Commonwealth when it carelessly delays the
admittance of an assistant attorney general into the CNMI Bar Association. The Attorney
General’s Office is the highest institution of law enforcement in the Commonwealth, and it
should be the first to follow the rules of the Court.
¶ 12 For practicing law without a license in the Commonwealth for a period of almost four
months in violation of Com. R. Admiss. II(5)(J), Nisperos and the Attorney General’s Office
must be disciplined “in order to protect the courts, the legal profession, and the people of the
Commonwealth.” In re Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 12. A mere reprimand would fail to reform the
practices of the Attorney General’s Office in its processing of applications for admission to
practice law in the Commonwealth. See id. (stating that a reprimand would encourage others to
disregard the orderly process by which our courts and the legal profession are governed).
III
¶ 13 Pursuant to our broad power under Com. Disc. R. & P. 17, and good cause appearing, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Assistant Attorney General Nisperos’s application for admission to practice law in the
Commonwealth be accepted by the CNMI Bar Administrator. Nisperos’s admittance, however, is
contingent upon a favorable background check by the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
(2) The Attorney General’s Office and Nisperos are jointly and severally fined $500,
payable to the Supreme Court within fifteen days of this opinion.
Concurring:
Demapan, C.J., Castro, J., Manglona, J.