Stanz v. Islamic Republic of Iran

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JOHN J. STANZ et al., Plaintiffs, v. Case No. 25-cv-272 (LLA) (GMH) ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant. MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This action, brought by nineteen plaintiffs, arises out of a bombing targeting U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan (“the Attack”). Three of the plaintiffs were soldiers injured in the Attack (herein- after the “Servicemember Plaintiffs”). The remaining sixteen plaintiffs are family members of the injured servicemembers (hereinafter “Family Member Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs bring this action against the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) under the state sponsor of terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Plaintiffs seek compensation for physical and emotional injuries sustained because of the Attack. Plaintiffs allege that the Attack was orchestrated by the Taliban with material support from Iran. When Iran failed to appear to defend this action, Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment. After a thorough review of the record, 1 the undersigned recommends that the Court grant Plaintiffs’ motion and award damages as detailed below. 1 The relevant docket entries considered by the undersigned are (1) Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF No. 1); (2) affidavit requesting foreign mailing (ECF No. 6); (3) certificate of Clerk mailing copy of summons and Complaint to Iran (ECF No. 8); (4) notice of failed service under 28 U.S.C. 1608(a)(3) (ECF No. 9); (5) affidavit requesting foreign mailing (ECF No. 10); (6) certificate of Clerk dispatching copy of summons and Complaint to Iran (ECF No. 12); (7) summons returned unexecuted (ECF No. 13); (8) status report (ECF No. 14); (9) second status report (ECF No. 15); (10) return of service and indicated execution of service under diplomatic notes (ECF No. 16); (11) third status report (ECF No. 17); (12) affidavit for default (ECF No. 18); (13) Clerk's Entry of Default (ECF No. 19); and (14) motion for default  I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background On August 15, 2009, 2 U.S. soldiers stationed in Afghanistan were patrolling an area near Siawashan Village, Herat Province, to counteract Taliban efforts to interfere with Afghan elections. ECF No. 20-2 at 1–2. The soldiers “met resistance and exchanged weapons fire with multiple Taliban fighters.” Id. at 6. Upon completion of the mission, the team began their return to base on a narrow roadway that was the only available exit from the village. Id. at 6–7. Servicemembers John J. Stanz, Marc Laliberte, and Jason Roberts 3 were riding in the sixth of eight armored vehicles in the patrolling convoy. Id. at 2, 7. At approximately 3:45 am on August 16, 2009 their vehicle was struck by an improvised explosive device (“IED”) buried on the roadway. Id. at 2, 7. The vehicle was launched into the air and burst into flames. Id. at 7. The driver and one passenger were killed on impact. Id. at 2. Injured Plaintiffs were ejected from the vehicle and suffered various injuries. Id. Eventually, they were “transported to the Spanish hospital at Herat airfield for emergency medical treatment.” Id. at 7. Injured Plaintiffs continue to endure lasting effects from their injuries. John was in the bed of the vehicle when the explosion occurred. ECF No. 20-4, ¶ 5. The force of the explosion launched him 75 feet from the burning vehicle, knocking him unconscious. Id., ¶¶ 6, 10. He remained in a coma for 52 days. Id., ¶ 10. When he did wake up, he had “no independent memo- ries from two weeks before the Attack until about ten weeks after.” Id., ¶ 9. As a result of his judgment (ECF No. 20). Citations to page numbers reflect the pagination assigned by the Electronic Case Filing sys- tem. 2 Plaintiffs note that documents identify the date of the Attack as both August 15 and August 16, attributing the differ- ence to “no more than a time-zone related complication.” ECF No. 20-2 at 1, n. 1. 3 Because this case involves family members with the same last name, the Court introduces Plaintiffs by first and last name and subsequently refers to them by their first names. 2 injuries, he was found unfit for further military service, effectively ending his “life’s dream of serving and operating in the special operations units of our military,” causing continued frustration. Id., ¶¶ 11–13. Additionally, he had to relearn how to walk, eat, and use the bathroom. ECF No. 20-9, ¶ 18. He suffers from loss of mobility, incontinence, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) outbursts, and the residual impact of a traumatic brain injury. ECF No. 20-4, ¶¶ 16–18. These injuries have made it difficult to maintain jobs. Id., ¶ 14. As a result of the PTSD, he continues to “experience memory issues, anger outbursts, and make inappropriate comments in public.” Id., ¶ 17. These outbursts have created “turmoil” within his family and damaged once healthy rela- tionships. Id., ¶ 18. The explosion launched Marc 100 feet from the vehicle, knocking him unconscious for a short time. ECF No. 20-5, ¶¶ 12–13. Marc remained in the hospital for four months, receiving surgeries and skin grafts to treat various fractures to his “face, head, left wrist, right shoulder, and left hip,” as well as burns across 40 percent of his body. Id., ¶¶ 15–17. After leaving the hospital, Marc continued scar treatments and occupational therapy as part of his recovery process. Id., ¶ 19. The burns and scars “drastically changed” Marc’s physical appearance, and he “will never look the way [he] did before the Attack.” Id. In addition to the physical injuries, Marc suffered severe emotional trauma requiring “several psychiatric sessions to cope with the psychological and emo- tional impacts.” Id., ¶¶ 20–21. The medications he took made him “callous and numb,” which took a toll on his familial relationships. Id., ¶ 22. He struggled to emotionally and physically engage with his wife, eventually leading to divorce. Id., ¶ 23. His inability to be physically active also affected the ways in which he could spend time with his children, ultimately leading to a loss of closeness with them. Id., ¶ 24. 3  At the time of the Attack, Jason was manning the machine gun in the turret of the vehicle. ECF No. 20-6, ¶ 6. The explosion launched him in the air, knocking him temporarily unconscious. Id., ¶¶ 7–8. He awoke to discover his “left leg was severely injured and disfigured,” and crawled to his teammates to seek medical help. Id., ¶ 8. He lost consciousness again and has no memories until a week later in the hospital. Id., ¶ 9. As a result of the explosion, Jason’s left leg was ampu- tated, and shrapnel had to be removed from throughout his body. Id., ¶ 10. In addition to the leg injury, Jason sustained fractures to his “pelvis, scapula, nose, lumbar vertebrae, and five of [his] ribs.” Id. He remained in the hospital for over eight months. Id., ¶ 11. Jason states that “no area of [his] life” was “left untouched by the bombing.” Id., ¶ 12. His military career was cut short, he remains in constant pain, and he struggles to “connect with others socially or emotionally.” Id., ¶¶ 12, 16–17. Plaintiffs allege that the Attack “was planned, authorized, and executed by the Taliban, with the material support and resources of Iran.” ECF No. 20-2 at 2. To aid their allegations of material support, Plaintiffs provide an expert report from Donald Wade Barker, and request that the Court take judicial notice of an additional expert report provided in a previous case. Id. at 3- 4, 11. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, an expert must be qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” and their testimony must be “based on sufficient facts or data” and “reliable principles and methods.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Donald Wade Barker is an expert on the “supply, distribution, and use of explosive devices” by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. ECF No. 20-2 at 11; ECF No. 20-3, ¶ 8. Mr. Barker served as a member of the U.S. Army between 1995 and 2009, including multiple combat tours in Af- ghanistan. ECF No. 20-3, ¶ 1. He received several military service awards. Id., ¶ 4. Following his time in the Army, he worked as a researcher at the Georgia Institute of Technology studying 4 and assessing IED technology. Id., ¶ 3. Currently, he serves as the CEO and Chief Engineer of Evans Research and Development and continues to study “ongoing technological and strategic developments in [his] field on a regular basis.” Id., ¶ 6. He has been qualified as an expert witness in multiple other cases 4 involving the use of IEDs and counter IED technology. Id., ¶¶ 8–10. The undersigned finds Mr. Barker sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert on the use of explosive devices in Afghanistan during the relevant timeframe. Mr. Barker provided an expert affidavit dated March 24, 2026, assessing evidence and doc- uments related to the Attack. ECF No. 20-3. He reports that the timing of the Attack and placement of the IED buried on a narrow road that was “the only road available for the convoy to return” to base suggests the “intentional targeting of American service members” and “foreign involvement or training.” Id., ¶ 15. Mr. Barker opines that the sophisticated triggering mechanism and the explosive material used is “suggestive of support from the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps].” Id., ¶¶ 16–18. Further, he avers that the geographic location of the Attack near the Iran- Afghan border and the occurrence of the Attack during a time when the Taliban was seeking to disrupt Afghan elections is “consistent with Iranian goals to undermine broader security efforts within Afghanistan.” Id., ¶¶ 21–22. Mr. Barker concludes based on the evidence he reviewed that the IED that caused the Attack “was designed and build with direct Iranian involvement and/or training.” Id., ¶ 23. Plaintiffs also request that the Court take judicial notice of the Expert Report of Steven A. Wood, presented as evidence in another case before this District involving the same bombing. ECF No. 20-2 at 4. See generally Cabrera v. Islamic Republic of Iran (“Cabrera I”), Nos. 19-cv-3835, 4 See, e.g., Karcher v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 396 F. Supp. 3d 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2019); Roberts v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 581 F. Supp. 3d 152, 159 (D.D.C. 2022); Lee v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 518 F. Supp. 3d 2 475, 482 (D.D.C. 2021); Stearns v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 633 F. Supp. 3d 284, 291 (D.D.C. 2022); Soto v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 15-cv-08410, 2024 WL 1376439, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2024). 5 18-cv-2065, 2022 WL 2817730 (D.D.C. July 19, 2022). Cabrera is a bellwether case in which the court heard evidence regarding material support provided by Iran to a terrorist syndicate in Af- ghanistan between 2006 and 2019. The court in Cabrera held a three-day evidentiary hearing regarding eleven bellwether attacks, one of which was the IED Attack at issue in this case. Cabrera I, 2022 WL 2817730, at *1. There, the court found “Iran’s material support for the Taliban sub- stantially contributed to the Taliban’s ability to conduct” the August 15, 2009 attack. Id. at *18– 19. Because “the FSIA does not require this Court to relitigate issues that have already been settled,” courts can and do take judicial notice “‘of related proceedings and records in cases before the same court’” and of the “findings of other judges in this jurisdiction” when determining FSIA jurisdictional issues. See Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 263 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Heiser I”)). Of course, courts cannot merely adopt the findings reached in a prior, related case. “Instead, courts in this district rely on the evidence presented” in the other cases “and make their own independent findings of fact based on that evidence.” Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d 68, 73 (D.D.C. 2014). Taking judicial notice in this manner is consistent with the “unusual degree of discretion” district courts have “over evidentiary rulings in a FSIA case against a de- faulting state sponsor of terrorism.” Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017) vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418 (2020); see also Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting that “the Supreme Court has ‘recognize[d] very realistically’ that courts have the authority—indeed, we think, the obligation—to ‘adjust [evidentiary requirements] to . . . dif- fering situations’”) (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 6  Therefore, the Court should not blindly adopt Cabrera’s findings of fact, but may take ju- dicial notice of the Expert Report of Steven A. Wood. The Cabrera court qualified Lt. Col. Wood as an expert in “attack attribution analysis.” Cabrera I, 2022 WL 2817730, at *5. Lt. Col. Wood has “extensive experience in intelligence and weapons analysis related to U.S. counterterrorism operations, particularly in the Afghanistan theater of operations.” Expert Report of Steven A. Wood at ¶ 1; Cabrera v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-3835 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2021), ECF No. 59-3 (hereinafter “Wood Report”). Lt. Col. Wood relied on his prior experiences working in anti- terrorism for the U.S. military, and a review of relevant military intelligence documents to draw the conclusions reached in his report. Id., ¶ 5. Based on the information reviewed, Lt. Col. Wood concludes that “the Taliban committed the August 16, 2009 complex attack.” Id., ¶ 153. He bases that conclusion on the geographic location of the attack, the IED attack method, and U.S. govern- ment investigation documents. Id. First, the attack occurred near the Iran-Afghanistan border, and “proximity to the Iranian border made the area a focus in the struggle between Western security forces and the Taliban.” Id., ¶ 155. Next, Lt. Col. Wood opines that the “high level of training and coordination” required to execute the attack indicates reliance on outside training and weapons from Iran. Id., ¶ 161–162. Lastly, Lt. Col. Wood cites the U.S. investigations report for further evidence that the Taliban conducted the attack. Id., ¶ 164–165. B. Procedural Background Plaintiffs filed this action on January 30, 2025, seeking to hold Iran responsible under the terrorism exception of the FSIA for injuries resulting from an act of extrajudicial killing. ECF No. 1. On March 6, 2025, Plaintiffs requested the Clerk of the Court’s assistance to effect service on Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3). ECF No. 6. On March 12, 2025, the Clerk dis- patched by mail a copy of the summons, complaint, notice of suit, and copy of each translated into Farsi. ECF No. 8. When Defendant failed to respond within thirty days, Plaintiffs requested the 7 Clerk's assistance in effecting service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4) on April 14, 2025 via diplomatic note through the Foreign Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran. ECF Nos. 10 & 16. Service was executed on Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs via that method on December 21, 2025. ECF No. 16. Defendant had sixty days to file a response. Id. When Defendant failed to respond or file an answer by the deadline, Plaintiffs filed an affidavit for entry of default on March 2, 2026. See ECF No. 18. The Clerk of the Court entered default the next day. ECF. No. 19. On April 14, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the present motion for default judgment. ECF No. 20. On May 14, 2026, this case was randomly referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on the motion. Minute Order (May 14, 2026). II. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish a two-step process for entry of default judg- ment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)–(b); see also United States v. Twenty-Four Cryptocurrency Accounts, 473 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2020). First, a plaintiff must request “that the Clerk of Court enter default against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Cryptocurrency, 473 F. Supp. 3d at 4 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). Second, the plaintiff must then apply for a default judgment against the absent defendant. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)). A default judgment is available only when “the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Doe v. Syrian Arab Republic, No. 18-cv-66, 2020 WL 5422844, at *5 (D.D.C. Sep. 10, 2020) (internal citations omitted). “[D]efault judgment is war- ranted if a defendant is a ‘totally unresponsive’ party and its default is plainly willful, as reflected by its failure to respond, ‘either to the summons and complaint, the entry of default, or the motion for default judgment.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). However, a notation of default by the Clerk of the Court against an unresponsive defendant does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a default judgment. Rather, it is appropriate only if the complaint's well-pleaded allegations, 8 accepted as true, state an adequate claim for relief. See Marmaras v. Marafatsos, No. 18-1236, 2019 WL 3414363, at *2 (D.D.C. July 29, 2019); Jackson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 564 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2008). In other words, entry of default “‘establishes the defaulting party's lia- bility for the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint,’ but not for allegations that are not suffi- ciently pleaded.” United States v. $6,999,925.00 of Funds Associated with Velmur Mgmt. Pte Ltd., 368 F. Supp. 3d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2011)). In that way, “‘[c]onceptually, . . . a motion for default judgment is like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.’” Doe, 2020 WL 5422844, at *5 (alteration in original) (quoting Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015)). A default judgment may be entered against a foreign sovereign defendant when (1) personal jurisdiction is properly exercised over the defendant; (2) subject matter jurisdiction over the claims is established; (3) the plaintiff has satisfactorily presented evidence establishing the defendant's liability to the plaintiff; and (4) plaintiffs have satisfactorily proven that they are entitled to the monetary damages they seek. See Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2017). The FSIA requires a plaintiff to establish his or her “claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). That evidence must also be admissible. Owens, 864 F.3d at 786–87. A court must “scrutinize the plaintiff's allegations and ‘may not un- questioningly accept a complaint's unsupported allegations as true.’” Colvin v. Syrian Arab Re- public, 363 F. Supp. 3d 141, 152 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 845 F. Supp. 2d 204, 211 (D.D.C. 2012)). However, “[c]ourts take uncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by admissible evidence as true.” Blank v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-3645, 2021 WL 3021450, at *6 (D.D.C. July 17, 2021) (internal citations omitted). An evidentiary 9 hearing is not required; rather, a “plaintiff may establish proof by affidavit.” Compagnie Sa- hélienne d'Entreprise v. Republic of Guinea, No. 20-cv-1536, 2021 WL 2417105, at *2 (D.D.C. June 14, 2021); see also Przewozman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 628 F. Supp. 3d 307, 312 (D.D.C. 2022) (“‘In the absence of an evidentiary hearing,’ plaintiffs may satisfy their burden of demon- strating personal jurisdiction by making a ‘prima facie showing’ based on ‘their pleadings,’ and ‘bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.’” (quoting Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005))). Additionally, “the procedural posture of a default does not relieve a federal court of its ‘affirmative obligation’ to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.” Egypt Dep't of Def. v. Alboghdady, No. 21-cv-1144, 2021 WL 3737682, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2021) (quoting James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The party seeking the default judgment is required to demonstrate that “the court has both subject- matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction over the absent defendant.” Rad- manesh v. Gov't of Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-cv-1708, 2019 WL 1787615, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2019), aff'd sub nom. Radmanesh v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 F.4th 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2021). And “‘[e]ven if there are sufficient contacts for a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it lacks power to do so unless the procedural requirements of effective service of process are satisfied.’” Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia Berhad, 985 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2021). If a court deems default judgment appropriate, it must independently determine the appro- priate remedies. See Pescatore v. Palmera Pineda, 345 F. Supp. 3d 68, 70 (D.D.C. 2018) (“‘[U]nless the amount of damages is certain, the court is required to make an independent deter- mination of the sum to be awarded.’” (quoting Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 10 2001))). Specifically, “unlike a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as to liability, a court does not take factual allegations related to damages as true.” Doe, 2020 WL 5422844, at *6. Rather, “a court makes its damages determination ‘in light of the facts and the circumstances of the case at hand.’” Id. (quoting SEC v. Whittemore, 691 F. Supp. 2d 198, 209 (D.D.C. 2010)). “While the court may conduct a hearing to fix the amount of damages, it is not required to do so, ‘as long as it ensure[s] that there [is] a basis for the damages specified in the default judgement.’” Id. (quoting SEC v. China Holdings, Inc., No. 09-cv-2045, 2010 WL 11603046, at *2 (D.D.C. Sep. 24, 2010) (alterations in original)). III. DISCUSSION A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction For FSIA cases, subject matter jurisdiction is a precondition for personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Therefore, the undersigned begins with the issue of subject matter jurisdic- tion over Plaintiff’s claims. Section 1330(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code grants district courts original subject-matter jurisdiction “without regard to amount in controversy” over (1) non- jury civil actions (2) as to any claim for relief in personam (3) against a foreign state (4) provided that the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under sections 1605 to 1607 of the FSIA or under international agreement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a); Braun, 228 F. Supp. 3d at 75; Reed, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 210. The first three factors are easily met here: (1) Plaintiffs filed a nonjury civil action, (2) seeking in personam relief, (3) against a foreign sovereign, Iran. See generally ECF No. 1. Thus, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the present “nonjury civil action” against Iran “if, and only if, the conditions for the waiver of immunity found in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A are satisfied.” Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran (“Fritz I”), 320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 77 (D.D.C. 2018). Plaintiffs contend that this lawsuit falls within the FSIA’s “terrorism exception”—§ 1605A—because 11 Defendant provided material support and resources to the Taliban causing Plaintiffs’ personal in- juries as a result of an extrajudicial killing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1); ECF No. 20-2 at 7–13. The terrorism exception provides that: A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act . . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). For an FSIA claim to be heard in federal court, the victims seeking relief under this exception must prove that (1) “the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act . . . occurred,” § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); and (2) “the claimant or the victim was, at the time the act . . . occurred a national of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 5 For a foreign sovereign's immunity to be nullified, the plaintiffs must also (3) seek monetary damages “for personal injury or death caused by ‘torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage taking”; and (4) the act, or the provision of material support or resources for the act, must be engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of the defendant. Mo- hammad v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)). Each requirement will be addressed in turn. 1. State Sponsor of Terrorism The United States designated Iran a state sponsor of terror in January 1984, and it has remained so designated since that time. See Determination Pursuant to Section 6(i) of the Export Administration Act of 1979—Iran, 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02 (Jan. 23, 1984) (statement of Secretary 5 Section 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii) also requires that, in a case in which the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought, the claimant must afford the foreign state a “reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with the accepted international rules of arbitration.” Because Plaintiffs here bring suit against Iran for an attack that occurred in Afghanistan, the Plaintiffs do not need to satisfy the arbitration requirements. ECF No. 20- 2 at 8 n. 3; see also Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic, 167 F. Supp. 3d 22, 35 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that the plaintiffs did not need to satisfy the third arbitration requirement because they brought suit against Syria for a terrorist attack that occurred in Jordan). 12 of State George P. Shultz); Selig v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F. Supp. 3d 40, 59 (D.D.C. 2021) (noting that “the U.S. State Department designated Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism [https://perma.cc/VF4X-JQU4] (last visited on September 29, 2026). 2. Plaintiff’s Citizenship Each of the three Injured Plaintiffs are United States citizens and were serving active duty as members of the United States armed forces at the time of the Attack. ECF No. 20-4, ¶¶ 1, 3; ECF No. 20-5, ¶¶ 1, 4; ECF No. 20-6, ¶¶ 1, 3. With one exception, the remaining Family Member Plaintiffs were also United States citizens at the time of the Attack. ECF No. 20-7, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-8, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-9, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-10, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-11, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-12, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-13, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-14, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-15, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-16, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-17, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-19, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-20, ¶ 1; ECF No. 20-21, ¶ 1. Betsy Laliberte, mother of Marc Laliberte is a Canadian citizen and was not a United States citizen at the time of the Attack. ECF No. 20-18, ¶ 1. However, “‘this fact is non-consequential’ for jurisdictional purposes, . . . because ‘the waiver of foreign sovereign immunity applies so long as ‘the claimant or the victim was, at the time of the’ terrorist attack, a U.S. national, member of the armed forces, or government em- ployee.’” Estate of Fouty v. Syrian Arab Republic, 743 F. Supp. 3d 118, 145 (D.D.C. 2024) (em- phasis in original) (quoting Force v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 464 F. Supp. 3d 323, 369 (D.D.C. 2020)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (“the claimant or the victim was, at the time the act . . . occurred a national of the United States”) (emphasis added). Therefore, because the direct victims of the Attack—the Servicemember Plaintiffs—were United States citizens when the Attack occurred, all Plaintiffs have satisfied this requirement. 13  3. Extrajudicial Killing Plaintiffs’ theory is that their injuries were caused by an act of extrajudicial killing. ECF No. 20-2 at 8-9. An “[e]xtrajudicial killing” is defined for purposes of the FSIA (by means of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991) as “a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judg- ment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.” Tor- ture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note); 28 U.S.C. § 1350(3)(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). The D.C. Circuit has interpreted this text to include three elements: “(1) a killing; (2) that is deliberated; and (3) is not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 770. Additionally, for a terrorist attack to constitute an extrajudicial killing, the attack must result in the death of at least one person other than the perpetrator. See Borochov v. Islamic Re- public of Iran, 94 F. 4th 1053, 1060–61 (D.C. Cir. 2024); see also Cabrera v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 752 F. Supp. 3d 183,189 (D.D.C. 2024) (noting that the Circuit Court in Borochov “made clear that § 1605A only confers jurisdiction over a claim if the relevant attack resulted in a com- pleted extrajudicial killing” (emphasis in original)). Here, two individuals were killed in the At- tack. ECF No. 20-2 at 2. Although Servicemember Plaintiffs were not killed, because at least one individual was killed in the attack, the attack constitutes an extrajudicial killing. See Baker v. Is- lamic Republic of Iran, No. 22-cv-2765, 2025 WL 2480075, at *17 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2025) (find- ing injuries are caused by an extrajudicial killing when, despite plaintiffs’ survival, the attack re- sults in “at least one fatality either of a U.S. servicemember or a foreign national”); see also Salz- man v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-cv-2475, 2019 WL 4673761, at *12 (D.D.C. Sep. 25, 2019) (finding that, although plaintiffs survived, their injuries resulted from an extrajudicial killing 14 because five others died in the same attack). There is no evidence that the IED attack at issue was authorized by “a prior judgement affording judicial guarantees or due process.” See Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 202 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Han Kim, 774 F.3d at 1050–51 (concluding that an extrajudicial killing is one without due process). Therefore, the Attack satisfies the extrajudicial killing requirement. 4. Material Support Material support is the provision of “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, in- cluding currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, train- ing, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communica- tions equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . and transporta- tion, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(3) (defining “material support or resources” for the purposes of the FSIA to have the “meaning given that term in section 2339A of title 18.”). Although evidence found sufficient to demonstrate a foreign sovereign's material support of a terrorist organization varies, successful showings have generally focused on the foreign state's offer of safe haven to the terrorist group, provision of financing, weapons, or assistance with its recruitment, or motive to foment unrest in an area where the group is operating. See generally W.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 427 F. Supp. 3d 117, 136 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that Iran pro- vided material support to the Badr Organization through support of efforts to overthrow Sunni rule in Iraq and direct funding); Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (finding Syria provided material support to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) by allowing it to operate and plan terrorist attacks from within Syria by providing essential financing to the group); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding Syria provided material support to AQI by offering it a safe haven for its operations, and by supporting its training and recruitment efforts); Ben-Rafael v. 15 Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that Iran provided material support to Hezbollah by funding training camps). Plaintiffs rely on the expert reports of Mr. Barker and Lt. Col. Wood to demonstrate Iran’s provision of material support of the Attack. Sufficient evidence indicates that the Taliban commit- ted the Attack with support from Iran. See Wood Report ¶¶ 161–63, 167(b)–(c); see also Cabrera I, 2022 WL 2817730, at *18. The U.S. Investigations and Incidents Report reviewed by Lt. Col. Wood concluded that the Attack was “conducted by ‘Insurgents.’” Wood Report ¶ 164. Lt. Col. Wood opines that the term “insurgents” was commonly used by the U.S. government to reference Taliban-led and anti-Afghan forces to avoid official recognition of the term “Taliban.” Id., ¶ 165; Cabrera I, 2022 WL 2817730, at *19 (noting that the U.S. government used the term “insurgents” to avoid the “potentially honorary connotations of the term ‘Taliban’”). Further, the sophistication of the Attack and premeditated placement of the IED indicate training and aid from outside groups. ECF No. 20-3, ¶¶ 23–24. The triggering mechanism that caused the explosion required sophisticated engineering knowledge “beyond the tactical capabili- ties of the Taliban in 2009 without the active assistance of a state sponsor.” Id., ¶ 20. And, the tactical coordination of the Attack was “unusual for typical Taliban encounters and likely indicates significant foreign training or direct participation by foreign fighters.” Wood Report ¶ 162. Given the proximity of the Attack to Iran and cultural ties in the area, there is sufficient evidence that Iran provided material support for the Attack. See id., ¶¶ 163; ECF No. 20-3, ¶ 21. At the time of the Attack, Iran and the IRGC directly supported Taliban efforts to disrupt Afghan elections. Wood Report ¶¶ 162–63; ECF No. 20-3, ¶ 22. Based on all the evidence before it, the Court should determine that Iran provided material support to the Taliban to conduct the Attack. 16  Finally, Plaintiffs have shown that Iran’s material support of the Taliban was a legally suf- ficient cause of the Attack. See Owens, 864 F.3d at 778 (requiring plaintiffs to show that the for- eign sovereign’s material support is a legally sufficient cause of the terrorist attack at issue). To satisfy this standard, Plaintiffs must show that (1) the defendant’s actions were a “substantial fac- tor” in the sequence of events that caused plaintiff’s injury and (2) the injury was a “reasonably foreseeable consequence or anticipated as a natural consequence” of defendant’s conduct. Id. at 794 (quoting Rothstein v. UBS, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)). As noted above, the Attack’s advanced engineering, planning, and tactical coordination would have been beyond the capabilities of the Taliban acting alone. ECF No. 20-3, ¶¶ 20, 24(a)–(b); Wood Report ¶¶ 162, 167(b). Thus, Iran’s support for the Taliban was clearly a substantial factor in enabling this Attack. See also Cabrera I, 2022 WL 2817730, at *18 (finding based on testimony from Lt. Col. Wood that “Iran’s material support for the Taliban substantially contributed to the Taliban’s ability to conduct” this Attack). Plaintiffs’ injuries were also a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Iran’s actions sup- porting the Taliban. Injuries such as those suffered by the Servicemember Plaintiffs are clearly foreseeable consequences of Iran’s assistance in the design and detonation of the explosive device used in the Attack. See ECF No. 20-3, ¶¶ 16–18. As this Court has acknowledged before, “injuries [] and trauma are obviously reasonably foreseeable results of a terrorist attack. Indeed, those are the goals of a terrorist attack of this sort.” Estate of Khalil Farhat v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-3631, 2024 WL 706971, at *8 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2024) (emphasis in original). Thus, the material support that Iran provided the Taliban was a proximate cause of the Attack. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. 17  B. Personal Jurisdiction The undersigned next examines if effective service has been made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b), which governs personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. That section provides that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction . . . where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Service is made on a foreign state under section 1608 in one of four ways: 1. by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivi- sion; or 2. if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial docu- ments; or 3. if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by sending a copy of the sum- mons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the cou