Loren v. E'Saipan Motors Inc.
CourtSupreme Court of The Commonwealth of The Northern Mariana Islands
Date FiledApril 16, 1990
JudgeBorja
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
CLERK OF COURT
SUPREME COURT. CNMI
FILED .
'F1"fR-'PfrnLTCATTON
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
HUGO LOREN, ) A PPEAL NO. 89-006
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. �6-644
)
vs. )
) O PINION
E 1 SAIPAN MOTORS, INC. , )
Defendant/Appellee. )
____)
Submitted Without Oral Argument March 26, 1990
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant: Reynaldo 0. Yana
P. 0. Box 5 2
Saipan, M P 96950
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee: Kenneth L. Govendo
P. 0. Box 2377
Saipan, M P 96950
BEFORE: DELA CRUZ, Chief Justice, BORJA, Justice, and KOSACK,
Special Judge.
BORJA, Justice:
FACTS
This is an employment case, involving a non-resident
worker, Hugo Loren, hereafter 11Loren,11 who sued his employer,
E'Saipan Motors, Inc., hereafter 11E'Saipan,11 for �npaid
overtime wages.
At the conclusion of a non-jury trial, the lower court
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issued its decision on october 27, 1987, and concluded, as a
matter of law, among other things, that:
3. Loren's inability to perform as a qualified
outboard motor mechanic constituted a breach of
his contract with Alvarez [E'Saipan]. Loren could
not perform under the contract and the contract
became void and unenforceable.
4. The agreement on the part of Loren, Regis and
Alvarez to allow Loren to continue to work at
Alvarez' business as a general helper and cleaner
and to reduce his salary without the approval of
the Chief of Labor was in direct violation of law
and specifically 3 CMC 4436 and 4437 (e) .
The lower court, therefore, adjudged that Loren take nothing
from E'Saipan.
Loren appealed.
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the District Court
for the Northern Mariana Islands, in its Opinion of November
8, 19a8, stated that
The decision of the trial court is REVERSED
and this matter is REMAN DED with instr�ctions
that the trial court:
1. Find the rates of pay paid to the
appellant by the appellee during the
time of his employment;
2. Compute the overtime wages due
appellant;
3. Find whether the failure to pay
overtime wages wa$ willful and, if so,
assess liquidated damages and pward
attorney fees.
On remand, the lower court refused to follow the mandate
of the appellate court. Its rationale was basically that it
had found two (2) reasons as to why the contract was unen-
forceable. Since Loren appealed only one ( 1) of the reasons,
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the trial court interpreted the opinion of the appellate court
as reversing it on only one of the two reasons. Consequently,
in its May 9, 1989, Judgment After Remand from the Appellate
Court, it determined that the contract was still unenforce-
able.
Loren filed a motion for reconsideration. After a
hearing, the lower court denied the motion.
This appeal followed.
ISSUE PRESENTE D
The sole issue we need to address on this appeal is
whether the trial court erred in not following the mandate of
the appellate court. 1
STAN DARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review in this appeal is de DQYQ , since
the issue raised involves a legal question. Robinson v.
Robinson, No. 89-0 12, slip op. at 4 (NMI February 5, 1990) ;
E DLF v. Pangelinan, 2 CR 45 1 ( D. NMI App. Div. 1986) ; and
Marianas Public Land Trust v. Government NMI, 2 CR 870 ( D. NMI
App. Div. 1986) . See also, United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d
1 195 (9th Cir. 1984) .
ANALYSIS
The lower court erred in its Judgment After Remand frpm
1 Resolution of this issue is dispositive of this appeal.
We need not reach the other issues raised by the parties.
136
the Appellate Court.
The first basis for our holding is that the trial court
was in error when it found that it had been reversed on only
one issue. The appellate court ruled that "The decision of
the trial court is REVERSE D . • . . " (Underscoring added.) It was
not reversing on only one issue. It was reversing the deci-
sian of the trial court.
Secondly, the trial court erred when it read the
Appellate Division's Opinion as directing it to enforce the
contract. See page 2 of Judgment After Remand from Appellate
Court. While there is language in the Opinion of the Appel-
late Division that the contract is enforceable, that court, in
its conclusion, does not enforce the contract, but decides the
appeal on a quasi-contract theory, i.g., restitution. Compare
pages 7 and 1 1 of Opinion.
Lastly, even assuming that the lower court was correct in
its interpretation of the Appellate Division Opinion, it erred
in its conclusion that it did not have to comply with the
mandate. It was required to comply with the mandate. As
stated in Vinton Eppsco Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes,
Inc., 6 38 P.2d 1070 (N.M. 1981)
The district -courts have only such
jurisdiction on remand as the opinion and
mandate of an appellate court specifies.
(Citation omitted.) It is well settled that the
duty of a lower court on remand is to comply
with the mandate of the appellate court, and to
obey the directions therein without variation
(emphasis in original) , even though the mandate
137
may be erroneous. {Citation omitted. ) (Emphasis
added.)
In Puritan Leasing Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara
County, 142 Cal. Rptr. 676, 76 C. A. 3d 140 {1977), it is
further stated that
" • The trial court is empowered to act only
. .
in accordance with the direction of the
reviewing court: action which does not conform
to those directions is void." (Citation
omitted. ) The strict rule applies although
• . .
the directions of the reviewing court are
based upon an erroneous concept. The remedy
of the party aggrieved by the error lies only
in a petition to a reviewing court. (Citation
omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
See, also, Cerminara v. The Eighth Judicial District
Court, 765 P. 2d 182 (Nev. 1988).
The trial court had a duty to comply strictly with the
mandate of the appellate court. This is not a case where the
appellate court left discretion to the lower court. It would
be a different case if the appellate court had stated that the
lower court was to hold further proceedings, without more.
See generally, 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, § 992. Here,
the appellate court was specific as to what the lower court
was to do on remand.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Judgment After Remand from the Appel-
late Court is reversed and remanded with instructions to
strictly comply with the judgment and opinion of November 8,
138
1988, of the Appellate Division of the District Court for the
Northern Mariana Islands.
� �-
Jose s. Dela cruz
Chief Justice
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