Full Opinion

[Cite as Deel v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 2026-Ohio-4568.] IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO MEGAN K. DEEL Case No. 2025-00872JD Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck v. DECISION OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL Defendant {¶1} Plaintiff brings this action to recover damages resulting from a motor vehicle collision between herself and an employee of defendant, Trooper Crystal Jones, that occurred in Madison County on May 4, 2022. {¶2} On July 23, 2026, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to Civ.R. 56(A) and defendant filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B). The parties filed responses on August 20, 2026, and replies on August 27, 2026. {¶3} It is noted that plaintiff’s 18-page motion, 20-page response to defendant’s motion, and 14-page reply in support of her own motion all exceed the page limitations set by L.C.C.R. 4(E) (“Supporting, opposing, or memorandum briefs shall not exceed fifteen pages in length, exclusive of attachments. Reply briefs shall not exceed seven pages in length, exclusive of attachments.”). While not required to do so, the court has reviewed the excess pages. See Boggs v. Ohio Real Estate Comm., 2009-Ohio-6325, ¶ 42 (10th Dist.) (“The enforcement of local court rules is well within the sound discretion of the court, including the power to strike a brief that does not comply with such rules.”). {¶4} Both motions are now before the court for a non-oral hearing pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and L.C.C.R. 4. For the reasons explained below, defendant’s motion for summary judgment shall be GRANTED and plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment shall be DENIED. Case No. 2025-00872JD -2- DECISION Standard of Review {¶5} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows: {¶6} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 2004-Ohio-7108, ¶ 6, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977). {¶7} “The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Starner v. Onda, 2023- Ohio-1955, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). “The moving party does not discharge this initial burden under Civ.R. 56 by simply making conclusory allegations.” Id. “Rather, the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate by affidavit or other evidence allowed by Civ.R. 56(C) that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “Once the moving party discharges its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party does not respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists for trial.” Hinton v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 2022-Ohio-4783, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), citing Dresher at 293; Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997); Civ.R. 56(E). Facts {¶8} In support of her motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiff submitted her own affidavit and several attachments, as well as the transcript and supporting exhibits Case No. 2025-00872JD -3- DECISION from a deposition of Trooper Jones. In support of its motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted Trooper Jones’s affidavit and an attached Traffic Crash Report. {¶9} Plaintiff states in her affidavit that on May 4, 2022, at about 2:42 p.m., she was driving her Honda Civic in the northbound lane of Plain City-Georgesville Road, behind a Dodge Charger patrol car driven by Trooper Jones. (Deel Affidavit, ¶ 3-4.) According to plaintiff, “Trooper Jones then pulled Unit 2 off on the right side of the roadway to make a U-turn” and “[a]s Trooper Jones attempted to make a U-turn, I continued north in Unit 1 and was struck by Trooper Jones in Unit 2 as I was passing by in Unit 1”. (Id. at ¶ 5-6.) {¶10} Trooper Jones testified that while driving northbound on Plain City- Georgesville Road, she observed a southbound vehicle traveling at a speed of 66 miles per hour according to the radar system in her patrol car. (Jones Depo., pp. 21, 26; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 3.) The speed limit on this section of road was 50 miles per hour, Trooper Jones stated. (Jones Depo., p. 26; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 3.) Trooper Jones explained that she then slowed down and pulled partially off the road onto a private driveway, as this was a narrow road with no shoulder, in preparation for making a U-turn to pursue the speeding southbound vehicle. (Jones Depo., pp. 22, 25-26; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 3-4.) {¶11} According to Trooper Jones, she checked for traffic and observed two northbound vehicles behind her, which appeared to have stopped. (Jones Depo., p. 22; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 3.) Trooper Jones stated that she reached down to turn on the back light bar of the patrol car to signal to the motorists behind her that she was turning around. (Jones Depo., pp. 23, 28, 64; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 4.) The northbound vehicle that had been directly behind the patrol car then entered the southbound lane and passed on the left side of the patrol car, Trooper Jones recounted. (Jones Depo., p. 24, 51; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 4.) Trooper Jones stated that she looked in both directions and it still appeared that the other northbound vehicle behind her, which was plaintiff’s vehicle, was stopped or slowed down. (Jones Depo., pp. 24, 30; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 4, 6.) {¶12} But, as Trooper Jones related, as she went to make the U-turn and approached the center line of the road at a speed of approximately six miles per hour, the front driver side of the patrol car collided with the passenger side of plaintiff’s vehicle, which was traveling approximately ten miles per hour. (Jones Depo., pp. 33, 50; Jones Case No. 2025-00872JD -4- DECISION Affidavit, ¶ 4.) Trooper Jones averred that, “[w]hile I was at the scene after the vehicles impacted, I noticed that the emergency lights were not activated on my patrol car, despite my flipping the switch. I had to flip the toggle switch off and then back on again to activate the lights.” (Jones Affidavit, ¶ 5.) {¶13} Trooper Jones acknowledged that a State Highway Patrol sergeant who came to the scene issued her a traffic ticket for improperly turning in the roadway under R.C. 4511.37, to which she pled guilty, and she received a reprimand for damaging the patrol car. (Jones Depo., pp. 35, 39-42, Exhibit D.) {¶14} Plaintiff averred that she sustained neck and back injuries and damage to her vehicle as a result of the collision. (Deel Affidavit, ¶ 7, 18.) According to plaintiff, she received care and treatment at an urgent care clinic and from a chiropractor. (Deel Affidavit, ¶ 7-12.) Trooper Jones sustained a sprained thumb from the collision, she testified. (Jones Depo., p. 36.) The Traffic Crash Report, which Trooper Jones authenticated in her affidavit, notes “minor” damage to both vehicles. (Jones Affidavit, ¶ 7, Exhibit A, p. 6.) Analysis {¶15} Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability only. Plaintiff argues that defendant is liable “because Trooper Jones was negligent as a matter of law, and OSHP’s defenses that . . . the public duty doctrine, and the emergency call doctrine prevent their liability all fail.” (Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 2.) {¶16} Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that it is immune from liability “on the basis of the public duty and emergency call doctrines.” (Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1.) {¶17} Because it is dispositive, the court will first address the “emergency call” defense raised by defendant. Emergency Call Doctrine {¶18} In Baum v. State Hwy. Patrol, 72 Ohio St.3d 469 (1995), “the Ohio Supreme Court held that in the absence of willful or wanton misconduct, the State Highway Patrol Case No. 2025-00872JD -5- DECISION is immune from liability for injuries caused by a patrol officer in the operation of his or her vehicle while responding to an ‘emergency call.’” Posner v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4496, *4-5 (10th Dist. Sept. 29, 2000). “In adopting this rule of law, the Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned that the state should enjoy the same level of immunity that the General Assembly affords to counties, cities, and townships.” Robertson v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2007-Ohio-5080, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing Baum at 472. “The court noted that the ‘state’ as defined in both R.C. 2743.01(A) and 2744.01(H) does not include ‘political subdivisions.’ Nevertheless, the Supreme Court extended the immunity provided to county, city, and township police officers by R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) to the OSHP.” Taylor v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2008-Ohio-5720, ¶ 17 (Ct. of Cl.). {¶19} “Pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a), counties, cities, and townships are immune from liability when ‘[a] member of a municipal corporation police department or any other police agency was operating a motor vehicle while responding to an emergency call and the operation of the vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct.’” Robertson at ¶ 13. {¶20} As used in R.C. Chapter 2744, “emergency call” means “‘a call to duty, including, but not limited to, communications from citizens, police dispatches, and personal observations by peace officers of inherently dangerous situations that demand an immediate response on the part of a peace officer.’” Golden v. Dept. of Hwy. Safety, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2433, *7 (10th Dist. June 11, 1996), quoting R.C. 2744.01(A). “As used in R.C. 2744.01(A), a ‘call to duty’ ‘involves a situation to which a response by a peace officer is required by the officer’s professional obligation.’” Sparks v. Klempner, 2011-Ohio-6456, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.), quoting Colbert v. Cleveland, 2003-Ohio-3319, ¶ 13. “Thus, the inquiry into whether an officer is on an emergency call centers on whether the officer was required to respond by the officer’s professional obligation.” Sparks at ¶ 30. An emergency call “need not involve an inherently dangerous situation.” Smith v. McBride, 2011-Ohio-4674, ¶ 21. {¶21} Defendant argues that Trooper Jones was responding to an emergency call at the time of the collision, as it was her “professional obligation to attempt to stop a vehicle that she observed that was traveling at an unsafe speed significantly above the legal speed limit for the roadway.” (Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8.) Case No. 2025-00872JD -6- DECISION Defendant submitted Trooper Jones’s affidavit in which she avers that on May 4, 2022, she was on duty in a marked patrol car traveling northbound on Plain City-Georgesville Road when she observed a vehicle traveling southbound at a high rate of speed, and when she checked the radar device in her patrol car it registered the speed of that southbound vehicle as 66 miles per hour. (Jones Affidavit, ¶ 3.) According to Trooper Jones, this was “an unsafe speed significantly above the 50 miles per hour limit on Plain City-Georgesville Road.” (Id.) As a result, Trooper Jones avers, she slowed down and pulled over in preparation for making a U-turn to pursue the southbound vehicle, and it was in the process of making the U-turn that the collision with plaintiff’s vehicle occurred. (Id. at ¶ 3-4.) {¶22} Plaintiff argues that “[o]ther than a self-serving affidavit produced for motion practice, there is no actual evidence that Trooper Jones was responding to an emergency call or pursuing any alleged violator at the time of the [motor vehicle collision].” (Plaintiff’s Response, p. 4.) The affidavit of Trooper Jones, however, constitutes appropriate Civ.R. 56 evidence demonstrating that at the time of the collision she was attempting to make a U-turn to pursue a vehicle that she observed to be driving 16 miles per hour above the posted speed limit. Plaintiff does not point to any evidence that would contravene this testimony by Trooper Jones. {¶23} Plaintiff argues that Trooper Jones “was not dispatched” and “never called the alleged speeding vehicle into dispatch.” (Plaintiff’s Response, p. 17.) While the definition of “emergency call” in R.C. 2744.01(A) includes, among other things, “police dispatches” as one example of an emergency call, the examples included in that definition are non-exhaustive and expressly include “personal observations by peace officers”. Colbert, 2003-Ohio-3319, at ¶ 14; see also Marquez v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2023- Ohio-4141, ¶ 8 (Ct. of Cl.) (trooper pursuing a motorist whom she observed run a red light was responding to an emergency call); Bentley v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2025-Ohio- 2174, ¶ 14 (Ct. of Cl.) (trooper pursuing a motorist whom he observed run a red light was responding to an emergency call). Trooper Jones testified that she has the discretion under department policy to pull over motorists whom she observes speeding and does not have to contact a dispatcher before doing so. (Jones Depo., pp. 29, 54.) In this instance, Trooper Jones stated, she did not remember if she contacted a dispatcher about Case No. 2025-00872JD -7- DECISION the speeding southbound vehicle. (Id. at p. 28.) Even if Trooper Jones was not dispatched or did not report her activity to a dispatcher, this does not create a genuine issue as to whether she was responding to an emergency call. See Hewitt v. Columbus, 2009-Ohio-4486, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.) (evidence that an officer “did not report to the dispatcher that he was responding to a call for assistance” did not create a genuine issue as to whether the officer was responding to an emergency call). {¶24} Plaintiff argues that defendant “has no photographs, no video, no citation, and no identity for the purported violator.” (Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 16; Plaintiff’s Response, p. 17.) Rather than continuing to pursue and potentially cite the speeding motorist, though, Trooper Jones ended her pursuit and remained at the scene of the collision. (Jones Depo., p. 38.) And the absence of photographic or video evidence does not contravene Trooper Jones’s testimony in her deposition and in her affidavit that she was pursuing a speeding vehicle at the time of the collision. {¶25} Plaintiff also argues that “[t]here is no evidence that Trooper Jones was responding to an emergency call that demanded an immediate response.” (Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 16; Plaintiff’s Response, p. 17.) According to plaintiff, “[i]n her deposition Trooper Jones conceded she did not have to ‘immediately intercept’ the southbound vehicle and that she does not pull over every speeding car she observes.” (Id.) When Trooper Jones was asked in her deposition whether she had to immediately intercept the southbound vehicle, she responded that she did not, but, when asked why, she explained that “it’s not immediately” because she needed to wait for the southbound vehicle to pass and then make her U-turn. (Jones Depo., pp. 52-53.) Trooper Jones did acknowledge that she does not intercept or pursue every vehicle that she observes speeding. (Id. at p. 53-54.) But in this case, Trooper Jones stated, she felt that the speeding vehicle was traveling at an unsafe speed and posed a danger to others. (Id. at p. 54; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 3.) Trooper Jones has averred that her law enforcement responsibilities as a Trooper primarily “involve traffic enforcement, responding to accidents, stopping those violating speed limits and otherwise preventing dangerous driving on Ohio’s roadways”. (Jones Affidavit, ¶ 2.) Case No. 2025-00872JD -8- DECISION {¶26} “[T]he inquiry into whether an officer is on an emergency call centers on whether the officer was required to respond by the officer’s professional obligation.” Sparks, 2011-Ohio-6456, at ¶ 30 (10th Dist.). Here, there is uncontroverted evidence that, while on patrol, Trooper Jones observed a vehicle traveling 66 miles per hour in a 50 mile-per-hour zone, she believed the vehicle was traveling at an unsafe speed and posed a danger, and she proceeded in her patrol car to intercept the vehicle. Reasonable minds can only conclude that the need to pursue the speeding vehicle was a call to duty, and thus Trooper Jones was responding to an emergency call at the time of the collision. See Colbert, 2003-Ohio-3319, at ¶ 19 (officers on patrol observed a suspected drug deal and proceeded in their patrol car to intercept the suspects and investigate a possible criminal act, and were thus responding to an emergency call when their patrol car collided with another vehicle). {¶27} As explained earlier, defendant “is immune from liability for injuries that a patrol officer causes while operating his vehicle in response to an emergency call unless the officer engages in willful or wanton misconduct.” Robertson, 2007-Ohio-5080, at ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing Baum, 72 Ohio St.3d 469, at syllabus. Therefore, unless Trooper Jones’s actions amounted to willful or wanton misconduct, the state is entitled to immunity. Id. {¶28} “Willful misconduct implies an intentional deviation from a clear duty or from a definite rule of conduct, a deliberate purpose not to discharge some duty necessary to safety, or purposefully doing wrongful acts with knowledge or appreciation of the likelihood of resulting injury.” Herron v. Columbus, 2016-Ohio-503, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), citing Anderson v. Massillon, 2012-Ohio-5711, paragraph two of the syllabus; see also Scott v. Kashmiry, 2015-Ohio-3902, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). {¶29} “‘Wanton misconduct is the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result.’” Stevens v. Maxson, 2013-Ohio-5792, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.), quoting Anderson at paragraph three of the syllabus. “To constitute wanton misconduct, the defendant must recognize this great probability of harm.” Blair v. Columbus Div. of Fire, 2011-Ohio-3648, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.). “When evaluating whether a police officer has engaged in wanton Case No. 2025-00872JD -9- DECISION misconduct, a finder of fact must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Robertson at ¶ 19. {¶30} Defendant contends there is “no evidence of such misconduct in this case”, as the affidavit testimony from Trooper Jones establishes that she was “cognizant of the safety of other drivers”, having “pulled over to a stop on the side of the road before executing a u-turn, attempted to engage her emergency lights, checked for traffic behind her, and mistakenly believed Plaintiff’s car was stopped to allow the patrol car to execute a u-turn, before proceeding at a speed of approximately 6 miles per hour speed and making contact with Plaintiff’s vehicle.” (Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 10.) {¶31} Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that Trooper Jones did engage in willful or wanton misconduct. Plaintiff argues that Trooper Jones “willfully executed a U-turn across traffic without functioning overhead lights, without a siren, and without a turn signal, in direct violation of R.C. §4511.37(B), R.C. §4511.39, and OSHP Policy OSP 200.06 . . . .” (Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 16-17; Plaintiff’s Response, p. 18.) While there is no dispute that the overhead lights of the patrol car were not activated, Trooper Jones’s uncontroverted testimony was that she reached to flip a switch to activate the overhead lights, and when she discovered after the crash that the lights were not activated, she had to toggle the switch off and back on to activate them. (Jones Depo., p. 23; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 4-5.) Even if Trooper Jones violated a department policy or traffic statute by making the U-turn without functioning overhead lights, “‘the violation of a statute, ordinance, or departmental policy enacted for the safety of the public is not per se willful, wanton, or reckless conduct, but may be relevant to determining the culpability of a course of conduct.’” Champagne v. Franklin Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2019- Ohio-1459, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.), quoting Anderson, 2012-Ohio-5711, at paragraph five of the syllabus. “To demonstrate that a policy violation is evidence of more than negligence, there must be ‘evidence of an accompanying knowledge that the violations “will in all probability result in injury.”’” Id., quoting Anderson at ¶ 38, quoting O’Toole v. Denihan, 2008-Ohio-2574, ¶ 92. In this case, Trooper Jones has testified that she pulled partially off the road and stopped, attempted to turn on the light bar on the patrol car to let motorists know she was turning around, she looked for both northbound and southbound traffic, Case No. 2025-00872JD -10- DECISION she observed plaintiff’s northbound vehicle behind her and thought it was stopped or at least slowed down, and then she initiated the U-turn and was travelling approximately six miles per hour at the time of the collision with plaintiff’s vehicle, which was traveling approximately ten miles per hour. (Jones Depo., pp. 22-24, 30, 50.) This evidence demonstrates that Trooper Jones took precautionary measures and exercised care toward other motorists, and plaintiff has not presented evidence showing that Jones had knowledge that violating department policy or traffic laws with respect to the U-turn would result in injury. See Champagne at ¶ 28. {¶32} Plaintiff argues that Trooper Jones “failed to verify that Ms. Deel’s Unit 1 was stopped despite an unobstructed view”. (Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 17; Plaintiff’s Response, p. 18.) But Trooper Jones testified that she looked for other motorists, that she saw plaintiff’s vehicle, and that it appeared plaintiff’s vehicle had stopped or slowed such that Jones could make the U-turn. (Jones Depo., pp. 24, 30; Jones Affidavit, ¶ 4, 6.) Whether or not Trooper Jones was mistaken about plaintiff having stopped or slowed down, “‘[h]uman error’ might mean negligence, but it does not constitute willful or wanton misconduct.” Whitley v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 2009- Ohio-6933, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.). Even if Trooper Jones was negligent, “‘[m]ere negligence is not converted into wanton misconduct unless the evidence establishes a disposition to perversity on the part of the tortfeasor,’ and ‘[s]uch perversity must be under such conditions that the actor must be conscious that his conduct will in all probability result in injury.’” Scott, 2015-Ohio-3902, at ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), quoting Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 2008-Ohio-2567, ¶ 37. Plaintiff does not identify any evidence demonstrating that Trooper Jones was conscious that her conduct would in all probability result in injury. {¶33} Finally, plaintiff compares the facts of this case with those in Ceasor v. E. Cleveland, 2018-Ohio-2741 (8th Dist.), where it was concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether a police officer engaged in willful or wanton misconduct. (Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 17; Plaintiff’s Response, p. 19.) The officer, who drove “at a speed of approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour” at night on a roadway with inoperable overhead streetlights, “was speeding through a dark intersection known to be frequently populated with pedestrians in a vehicle with one Case No. 2025-00872JD -11- DECISION working headlight. His own testimony establishe[d] that his visibility was significantly compromised and that he had not activated his overhead lights or sirens.” Ceasor at ¶ 3, 22. {¶34} In contrast to the officer whose “visibility was significantly compromised” in Ceasor, the collision in this case occurred at about 2:42 p.m. and there is no evidence of conditions that would adversely affect the visibility of Trooper Jones or other motorists. There is no dispute that Trooper Jones could see other vehicles and that other motorists could see her patrol car. Also, as opposed to the officer “speeding through” an intersection in Ceasor, in this case Trooper Jones was not traveling through an intersection and at the time of the collision her rate of speed was approximately six miles per hour, according to her uncontroverted testimony, and plaintiff was traveling approximately 10 miles per hour. Accordingly, the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Ceasor. {¶35} Upon review, even when construing the evidence most strongly in plaintiff’s favor, reasonable minds can only conclude that Trooper Jones did not engage in willful or wanton misconduct. And, as established earlier, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Trooper Jones was operating her patrol vehicle in response to an emergency call. Therefore, because defendant “is immune from liability for injuries that a patrol officer causes while operating his vehicle in response to an emergency call unless the officer engages in willful or wanton misconduct”, defendant is entitled to immunity as a matter of law. Robertson, 2007-Ohio-5080, at ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing Baum, 72 Ohio St.3d 469 (1995), at syllabus. Public Duty Rule {¶36} As noted earlier, defendant also argues that it is immune from liability under the public duty rule set forth in R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(a) (“Except as provided in division (A)(3)(b) of this section, the state is immune from liability in any civil action or proceeding involving the performance or nonperformance of a public duty.”). Since the emergency call doctrine recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Baum plainly confers defendant with immunity from liability, however, the court need not address the applicability of the public duty rule, which is independent of the rule established in Baum. See Wallace v. Case No. 2025-00872JD -12- DECISION Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 2002-Ohio-4210, ¶ 31, fn. 9 (“Baum did not, however, involve the public-duty rule.”). Conclusion {¶37} Based upon the foregoing, defendant met its burden under Civ.R. 56 of coming forward with evidence demonstrating that it is immune from liability on plaintiff’s claim. Even when construing the evidence most strongly in plaintiff’s favor, plaintiff did not meet the reciprocal burden of pointing to evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. The court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment shall be granted, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment shall be denied, and judgment shall be rendered in favor of defendant. {¶38} The court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment shall be granted, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment shall be denied, and judgment shall be rendered in favor of defendant. LISA L. SADLER Judge [Cite as Deel v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 2026-Ohio-4568.] MEGAN K. DEEL Case No. 2025-00872JD Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck v. JUDGMENT ENTRY OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL Defendant IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO {¶39} A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith, the court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As a result, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED, and judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. All previously scheduled events are VACATED. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. LISA L. SADLER Judge Filed October 16, 2026 Sent to S.C. Reporter 11/19/26