Full Opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 5D2025-0464 LT Case No. 2019-10314-CIDL _____________________________ SAM FLORIO, Appellant, v. FLORIDA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County. Randell H. Rowe, Judge. Derek J. Angell, of O’Connor, Haftel & Angell, PLLC, Orlando, for Appellant. Hinda Klein, of Conroy Simberg, Hollywood, for Appellee. October 2, 2026 KILBANE, J. Sam Florio (“Florio”), a Florida homeowner who suffered property damage after a housefire, brought a breach of contract action against his insurer. After the insurer became insolvent, Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (“FIGA”) was substituted as defendant. On appeal, Florio asserts the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict on his personal property claim and in limiting his ability to assert damages in excess of FIGA’s statutory cap.1 Because Florio submitted adequate evidence to survive directed verdict and his evidence should not be limited by the cap on his recoverable damages, we reverse. Facts Florio owned a home in New Smyrna Beach, Florida, which was insured by Southern Fidelity Insurance Company (“Insurer”). In addition to coverage for damage to the home itself and for additional living expenses, “Coverage C” of the insurance policy covered damages to the home’s contents up to $159,000. For an additional premium, Florio’s damaged personal property was insured “at replacement cost without reservation or holdback of any depreciation in value.” In September 2018, fertilizer and red ant killer in Florio’s garage spontaneously combusted causing damage to the home and its contents. Florio filed a claim with Insurer, who hired Servpro to perform mitigation services, repair the property, and inventory the contents. Unhappy with its business practices, Florio fired Servpro before the work was completed. Insurer paid Florio and Servpro a combined amount of $54,800.66 but was unable to reach an agreement with Florio on the total value of his claims. In February 2019, while represented by counsel, Florio sued Insurer for breach of contract. Insurer admitted the claims were covered by the insurance policy but disputed the amount and scope of his damages. The proceedings were later stayed because Insurer became insolvent and was liquidated. Florio amended his complaint to substitute FIGA as the defendant.2 After Florio’s 1. Florio also asserts the trial court erred in denying his successive motions for continuance. Because we do not find the court abused its discretion in denying those motions, we affirm on that issue. See Lamaze v. Guthrie, 411 So. 3d 16, 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (“A trial court’s decision not to grant a continuance to afford a party the opportunity to obtain new counsel after counsel has withdrawn is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”). 2. “FIGA is a public, nonprofit corporation created by statute to provide a mechanism for payment of covered claims under 2 counsel withdrew and mediation failed, a jury trial was held on January 13 to January 16, 2025, with Florio proceeding pro se. On the morning of trial, FIGA moved to exclude evidence or reference as to total damages that would exceed its statutory cap of $500,000. Florio opposed the motion asserting he was entitled to introduce evidence of the full extent of his damage even though his recovery would be capped. The trial court granted the motion in limine. Before Florio presented any testimony, FIGA stipulated to the admission of Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 to15. In so doing, defense counsel reviewed Florio’s proposed exhibits and informed the court as to which ones contained objectionable pages. Based on FIGA’s objections, Florio agreed to withdraw portions of his proposed exhibits. For example, FIGA objected to a document within Exhibit J that summarized his damaged items and incurred costs. The court told Florio he could not admit the document but could testify to the information within it, which Florio accepted. Florio presented testimony of his expert, Jared Mellick, who provided an estimate of the real property damage. Florio’s only other witness was himself. He testified about how the fire started and his personal observations. He maintained a running log of the work performed on the house and showed the jury receipts of items that he replaced. He admitted into evidence many photographs he had taken of his property and its contents after the fire. He discussed items from his garage that had to be thrown away including several appliances, a kayak, two ATVs, food, spices, and clothes. He also showed pictures of the contents of his freezers, which included animals he had stored both for food and taxidermy. At the end of the first day, Florio told the jury he would provide calculations and totals of his claims the next day. Continuing his testimony the following day, Florio admitted that he never provided Insurer or FIGA with a complete inventory detailing his lost or damaged personal property with its certain classes of insurance policies issued by insurers which have become insolvent.” FIGA v. Devon Neighborhood Ass’n, 67 So. 3d 187, 189 (Fla. 2011) (citations omitted). 3 replacement value. But he testified that he had inventoried 90 percent of the contents and identified a replacement value for many of the items either through receipts or his personal knowledge and research. During the jury’s lunch break, and before Florio rested his case, FIGA admitted Defendant’s Exhibits 1 to11. Defense counsel asserted Exhibit 8 was an inventory of Florio’s personal property created by a company hired by Insurer. Because this exhibit was later excised from the record, we cannot confirm the details of this inventory. Later, in response to a question from the jury, Florio further testified that Servpro removed the contents of his garage into six “pod” portable storage containers. Months later, experts hired by each of the parties pulled the items out to inventory and value them before concluding “it was all trash.” He testified that everything removed from the house—including his stove, lawnmower, motorcycle, and freezer contents—were considered a total loss and disposed of. He asserted that the amount of damages listed on his proof of loss form—which both parties admitted into evidence—was calculated based on his items and receipts. After Florio completed his testimony, he rested his case. The defense moved for a directed verdict on the personal property claim, asserting Florio failed to produce a complete, professional inventory showing ownership of damaged personal property and establishing that he replaced items that he had owned before the fire. Thus, the defense argued, his damages were purely speculative. Florio disagreed. He asserted he had established ownership and value through his testimony and admitted receipts. As Florio struggled to locate his inventory in evidence, the court asked FIGA’s counsel why Florio could not simply testify that he bought a lawnmower to replace one damaged in the fire. Defense counsel responded that he had to show that he replaced items he had previously owned and explained that, typically, public adjusters and inventory companies prepare inventories of damaged property for this purpose. The court asked FIGA why Florio’s testimony could not establish his ownership even without a formal inventory, and counsel responded that if Florio replaced something, it had to 4 be of like kind, which could not be determined from Florio’s testimony alone. When asked why his testimony about ownership of some items was insufficient, the defense responded: “Then he can limit his damages to what he’s testified that he threw out, which is going to be apparently a lawnmower and a kayak and a stove.” The court also noted he had testified to the contents of his freezer, and FIGA agreed. But when asked if FIGA agreed that he had sufficiently addressed those items, defense counsel declined to agree. FIGA also advised the court that Florio’s counsel had included an inventory on his exhibit list—which it appears FIGA had already entered as Defendant’s Exhibit 8—but it was removed from Florio’s pro se amended exhibit list. Florio had no explanation for the omission as he claimed that he had just copied his attorney’s exhibit list. The court explained to Florio that, regardless of its omission from his exhibit list, he could not change the fact that he did not introduce an inventory into evidence. Florio responded that while he had not admitted a professional inventory including associated valuation, Servpro prepared a list of the items removed from his home in an email that was admitted without objection in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15. On this admitted list, Florio had handwritten his own valuation to certain items. The defense argued that there was no evidence or testimony about who created the lists and Florio’s handwritten valuation was not substantiated. The court ultimately granted a directed verdict on Florio’s claim for personal property damage based on the lack of an inventory. After the defense presented its case, Florio moved the court to reconsider its directed verdict on his personal property claim. He argued that he had agreed to the removal of portions of Exhibit J based on FIGA’s objection and reliance on the court’s statement that he would be able to testify to the figures himself. Florio argued that he intended to read the contents to the jury, but the court then prevented him from testifying to those amounts because it was claimed that the jury would already have the document he removed from evidence. He then requested to reopen his case: “I respectfully request the Court to allow me to read those amounts and the totals to the jury as I originally requested. And then after I do that, I would like to respectfully request the Court to set aside 5 the directed verdict and let me present those figures to the Court.” The defense responded that it stipulated to the admission of certain evidence in Exhibit J but had objected to the contents list as hearsay and that Florio voluntarily withdrew that portion of the exhibit without requesting the court to rule on FIGA’s objection or laying a foundation for its admission. The court denied Florio’s request for reconsideration of the directed verdict. The jury rendered a verdict for Florio awarding $104,071.38 for home repairs—consistent with the defense’s expert and argument—and nothing for additional living expenses. On January 21, 2025, the trial court entered final judgment for Florio accordingly. Florio moved the court for additur or new trial, which was denied. Florio timely appeals. Analysis Florio asserts the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict on the contents claim because he presented sufficient evidence to support his claims. Further, Florio contends the trial court erred in granting FIGA’s motion in limine restricting him from seeking more than the $500,000 statutory cap on damages. We address each in turn. A. Directed Verdict “A trial court’s order directing a verdict is reviewed de novo.” Sells v. CSX Transp., Inc., 170 So. 3d 27, 32 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citation omitted). “A trial court’s construction of an insurance policy to determine coverage is a matter of law subject to de novo review.” Am. Integrity Ins. v. Estrada, 276 So. 3d 905, 911 n.13 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citation omitted). “A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.480(a). In pursuing directed verdict, “the movant admits the truth of all evidentiary facts, as well as every reasonable conclusion or inference favorable to the opposing party from those facts.” Dolgen Corp, LLC v. Doty, 383 So. 3d 864, 866 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (citation modified). “Directed verdict is proper only when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that a jury could not reasonably differ about the existence of a material fact and the 6 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citation modified). “If there are conflicts in the evidence or if different reasonable inferences could be drawn from the evidence, then the issue is a factual one that should be submitted to the jury and not be decided by the trial court as a matter of law.” Id. (citation omitted). FIGA moved for directed verdict on Coverage C damages arguing that, based on the evidence presented, these damages would be “purely speculative.” FIGA asserted that Florio could not establish these damages because he had failed to submit a complete inventory of the damaged contents of his home. It was “based on the argument for lack of a proper inventory in evidence” that the court granted directed verdict as to the personal property. However, because Florio paid an additional premium to insure his personal property for its replacement value—rather than the actual cash value3—he did not need to admit evidence beyond proof of ownership of damaged property and the associated replacement cost. Florio presented evidence of these damages through his testimony, admitted photographs and receipts, and a “list” found in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 15. Within Exhibit 15, specifically, were emails that documented items that were removed from Florio’s home alongside handwritten valuations. See Marconi v. Erturk, 293 So. 3d 19, 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (“An owner of property may testify as to its value.”); Reliance Ins. v. Pro-Tech Conditioning & Heating, 866 So. 2d 700, 701 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“Florida and other jurisdictions permit an owner to testify as to property damages and value.”). While the defense later argued that there was no evidence or testimony regarding who created the lists, the emails were not authenticated, and Florio’s handwritten valuations were not substantiated, these objections were waived when it stipulated to its admission without limitation. See § 90.107, Fla. Stat. (“When evidence that is admissible as to one party or for one purpose, but inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose, is admitted, the court, upon request, shall 3. Personal property insured for actual cash value accounts for depreciation. See SFR Servs., LLC v. Tower Hill Prime Ins., 364 So. 3d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023). 7 restrict such evidence to its proper scope and so inform the jury at the time it is admitted.” (emphasis added)); see also Rich v. Rich, 337 So. 3d 138, 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“This stipulation was binding and resulted in the waiver of the Former Wife’s obligation to lay a foundation for admission and authentication of these records.”); Adamson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 325 So. 3d 887, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“Hearsay received without objection becomes part of the evidence in the case and is usable as proof just as any other evidence, limited only by its rational, persuasive power.” (citation modified)). “Because the trial court appropriately received these records into evidence, it could not summarily disregard them without even considering their substance.” Rich, 337 So. 3d at 148; see Dortch v. State, 137 So. 3d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“A stipulation cannot be impeached or swept aside merely by the bald statement of a party desiring to renege.” (citation modified)); see also Eagle FL VI SPE, LLC v. T & A Fam. P’ship, Ltd., 177 So. 3d 1277, 1280 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“The general rule is that a party will be relieved from a stipulation entered into under a mistake as to a material fact, if there has been reasonable diligence exercised to ascertain such fact. On the other hand, if a party enters into an agreement, not as a result of a mistake of fact, but merely due to a lack of full knowledge of the facts, caused by the party’s failure to exercise due diligence to ascertain them, there is no proper ground for relief.” (citation modified)). The stipulated admission of Florio’s content list in Exhibit 15, alongside his testimony and other evidence, presented sufficient support for a jury to find some—though perhaps not all—of his claimed personal property damages.4 See Homeowners Choice 4. Additionally, the defense admitted a professional inventory as Defendant’s Exhibit 8 before Florio rested. See Padgett v. State, 53 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 1951) (“Although the trial court has some discretionary powers in admitting such exhibits out of the regular order, such discretion should be rarely exercised and then only when special circumstances render it desirable, and such practice should not be encouraged.”). After moving for directed verdict, however, FIGA sought to withdraw the inventory: 8 Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 410 So. 3d 99, 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (“A disagreement between the parties as to the scope and extent of the damage is resolved by a factfinder.”), review denied, No. SC2025-0871, 2025 WL 2925370 (Fla. Oct. 15, 2025). Thus, the trial court erred in entering directed verdict on this claim. See Weston v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins., 425 So. 3d 638, 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025) (“A motion for directed verdict should be granted only where no view of the evidence, or inferences made therefrom, could support a verdict for the nonmoving party.” (citation modified)), reh’g denied (Jan. 8, 2026); Gelsomino v. ACE Am. Ins., 207 So. 3d 288, 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“A directed verdict is improper if any evidence will support a verdict for the non-moving party.” (citation modified)). And FIGA has not shown that the error was harmless. See GEICO Gen. Ins. v. Tsao, 397 So. 3d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (“The burden to demonstrate that an error was harmless lies with the beneficiary of the error, who must show that [Defense Counsel]: That’s -- I said to the Judge, when we were doing housekeeping, we moved it into an exhibit for us as a housekeeping issue because I didn’t think we’d be arguing directed verdict on it. THE COURT: So we have it but it’s your exhibit. [Defense Counsel]: It’s mine. I entered it as an exhibit prior to lunch so we could move things along. Though not raised by Florio on appeal, once admitted, this inventory could only be withdrawn with written leave of the court. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.450(b); cf. § 22:9. Taking evidence, Trawick, Fla. Prac. & Proc. § 22:9 (2026 ed.) (“The defending party must be careful in introducing evidence out of order not to jeopardize a motion for directed verdict or dismissal at the close of the plaintiff’s or petitioner’s case.”). No written leave was sought or obtained and yet the inventory was excised from the record. This inventory would have added further support for Florio’s claim. 9 there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.”). B. FIGA’s Statutory Cap The trial court’s order granting a motion in limine is reviewed for abuse of discretion except as limited by the rules of evidence. Tsao, 397 So. 3d at 1188. “A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. (citation modified). Statutory construction is reviewed de novo. Id. FIGA is only obligated to pay up to $500,000 for covered homeowners’ insurance claims. § 631.57(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. However, as conceded by FIGA, this statutory cap on its obligation to pay covered claims for insolvent insurers does not prohibit the insured from presenting evidence as to the full extent of his damages. Cf. Jones v. FIGA, 908 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 2005) (noting FIGA’s duty “to defend a claim against an insured party is identical to that of the insolvent insurer” (emphasis added)); id. at 453 (noting FIGA’s statutory cap “becomes applicable only if FIGA’s obligation would otherwise exceed that amount”). That the cap operates as a post-verdict ceiling tracks with other areas of Florida law. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Hudnall, 416 So. 3d 370, 371 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025) (“Before litigating a first-party bad faith claim in an uninsured motorist case, an insured is entitled to a jury determination of liability and the full extent of his or her damages, which may be in excess of the policy limits.” (citation modified)); S. Broward Topeekeegeeyugnee Park Dist. v. Martin, 564 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“[T]he mere fact the legislative act places a cap upon the amount of damages recoverable against the governmental entity does not affect the plaintiff’s right to a judgment for his full damages.” (quoting Gerard v. Dep’t of Transp., 472 So. 2d 1170, 1173 (Fla. 1985))). Because Florio should have been allowed to present evidence of damages exceeding FIGA’s statutory cap, the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine. 10 Conclusion Because the trial court erred in granting directed verdict on the contents claim and in limiting Florio’s evidence of damages to $500,000, we reverse the directed verdict on the personal property claim, vacate the order granting FIGA’s motion in limine, and remand for further proceedings. ORDER VACATED; REVERSED; and REMANDED for further proceedings. BOATWRIGHT and MACIVER, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 11