Full Opinion

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 25-FM-0607 FONDA ALLEN, APPELLANT, V. TAMIEKA WHITEHEAD, APPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2024-CPO-003496) (Sean C. Staples, Judge) (Argued May 12, 2026 Decided September 3, 2026) Laura A. Foggan, with whom Jennifer C. Mika, Kelsey Clinton, Alexandra Drobnick, and Alexandrea Scott were on the brief, for appellant. Pamela Soncini, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, and Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for the District of Columbia as amicus curiae. Theodore A. Howard, Victoria N. Lynch-Draper, and Stephanie Rigizadeh were on the brief for DC Kincare Alliance as amicus curiae. Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and MCLEESE, Associate Judges. MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Appellant Fonda Allen is the paternal grandmother and legal custodian of her two grandchildren. Ms. Allen filed a petition 2 for a civil protection order (CPO) against Tamieka Whitehead, the children’s biological mother. Ms. Allen alleges that Ms. Whitehead has made repeated threats against Ms. Allen. The trial court dismissed Ms. Allen’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Ms. Allen is not Ms. Whitehead’s “family member” within the meaning of the D.C. Intrafamily Offenses Act, D.C. Code § 16-1001 et seq., and therefore is ineligible to seek a CPO against Ms. Whitehead. We hold to the contrary that Ms. Allen is Ms. Whitehead’s “family member” within the meaning of the Act. The trial court therefore had jurisdiction over Ms. Allen’s petition. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal order and remand the case for further proceedings. I. Statutory Background The Intrafamily Offenses Act allows an individual to petition for a CPO against someone who has committed an “intrafamily offense.” D.C. Code § 16-1003(a)(1). An “intrafamily offense” is “[a]n offense punishable as a criminal offense against,” among other people, “a family member.” Id. § 16-1001(8)(A). A “[f]amily member,” in turn, is defined to include a person “[t]o whom the offender is related by blood, adoption, legal custody, marriage, or domestic partnership.” Id. § 16-1001(5A)(A). The term “legal custody” is defined elsewhere in the D.C. Code as “legal responsibility for a child,” which “includes the right to make decisions 3 regarding that child’s health, education, and general welfare,” the right to access the child’s medical and educational records, and the right to speak with and obtain information about the child from school officials and healthcare providers. Id. § 16-914(a)(1)(B)(i). II. Factual and Procedural Background The record before the trial court included the following. As previously noted, Ms. Allen is the paternal grandmother of Ms. Whitehead’s two minor children. After a dispute arose as to the custody of the children, Ms. Allen intervened and was awarded permanent sole legal and physical custody of the children. Ms. Whitehead was allowed monthly supervised visitation with her children. Ms. Allen sought a CPO against Ms. Whitehead for multiple alleged incidents of verbal abuse and harassment. For example, Ms. Allen alleged that in one incident, Ms. Whitehead banged loudly on Ms. Allen’s front door, yelled obscenities, and threatened to kill Ms. Allen. According to the trial court’s custody order, Ms. Whitehead acknowledged going to Ms. Allen’s home because “she called me crazy, I wanted to show her crazy.” Ms. Whitehead also testified at the custody proceeding that “I do hope [Ms. Allen] dies; I do want her dead.” 4 Before Ms. Whitehead was served with the petition, the trial court dismissed Ms. Allen’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, the trial court concluded that Ms. Allen is not a “family member” of Ms. Whitehead, and therefore Ms. Allen’s petition did not allege an “intrafamily offense” as required to petition for a CPO under the Intrafamily Offenses Act. D.C. Code § 16-1003(a)(1); id. § 16-1001(5A), (8). The trial court was not persuaded by Ms. Allen’s argument that Ms. Whitehead and Ms. Allen are family members because they are related by legal custody. D.C. Code § 16-1001(5A)(A). The trial court also concluded that Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead are not otherwise related through marriage, blood, adoption, or domestic partnership. III. Analysis The question on appeal is whether the term “family member” under the Intrafamily Offenses Act encompasses the relationship between Ms. Allen (a paternal grandmother vested with legal custody) and Ms. Whitehead (the children’s biological mother with visitation rights). Whether the Act encompasses this relationship is a question of statutory interpretation. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. In re J.W., 263 A.3d 143, 151 (D.C. 2021). We hold that the relationship between Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead is covered by the Act, and the trial court therefore had jurisdiction over Ms. Allen’s petition for a CPO. 5 “We begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs.” Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 238 A.3d 222, 227 (D.C. 2020) (citation modified). When we interpret statutory text, “we first look to see whether the statutory language at issue is plain and admits of no more than one meaning.” Czajka v. Holt Graphic Arts, Inc., 310 A.3d 1051, 1053 (D.C. 2024) (en banc) (citation modified). “We interpret statutory language in light of the historical context in which the statute was enacted,” considering “statutory context and structure, evident legislative purpose, and the potential consequences of adopting a given interpretation.” In re Settles, 218 A.3d 235, 238 (D.C. 2019) (citation modified). “We may also look to the legislative history to ensure that our interpretation is consistent with legislative intent.” Id. (citation modified). This court has “long recognized that the Intrafamily Offenses Act is a remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is intended to protect.” Salvattera v. Ramirez, 111 A.3d 1032, 1034 (D.C. 2015) (citation modified). Whether Ms. Whitehead is Ms. Allen’s “family member” for purposes of the Intrafamily Offense Act turns on whether Ms. Allen and Ms. Whithead are (1) “related” by (2) “blood” (3) “or” (4) “legal custody.” D.C. Code 6 § 16-1001(5A)(A). We separately address these four components of the definition at issue, and then we consider the case as a whole. A. Related The word “related” has multiple meanings, but two seem most potentially relevant for current purposes. First, and more broadly, “related” means “[c]onnected in some way; having relationship to or with something else.” Related, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (defining “relates to” as having “a connection with or reference to”). Second, and more narrowly, “related” means “[c]onnected by blood or marriage; allied by kinship, esp. by consanguinity.” Related, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). We think it clear from context that the narrower meaning is intended in the Intrafamily Offense Act. We conclude that for several reasons. First, the word “related” is here being used as part of the definition of the phrase “family member.” D.C. Code § 16-1001(5A)(A). “When choosing among interpretations of a statutory definition, the ordinary meaning of the defined term is an important contextual clue.” Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423, 435 (2025) (citation modified); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 185 (2012) (In interpreting ambiguous language in definitional provisions, “[f]ar and away the most important . . . factor [is] the word 7 actually being defined. . . . [T]he meaning of the definition is almost always closely related to the ordinary meaning of the word being defined.”). This consideration points strongly in favor of understanding the word “related” in its narrower familial sense, rather than in its broader sense. Second, the connections listed in the definitional provision are of a kind that create familial connections: blood, adoption, legal custody, marriage, and domestic partnership. D.C. Code § 16-1001(5A)(A). It thus is natural to understand the word “related” in that provision in the same way. See generally, e.g., Sivaraman v. Guizzetti & Assocs., Ltd., 228 A.3d 1066, 1075 n.13 (D.C. 2020) (noting “general proposition” of statutory construction that “a word or phrase is known by the company it keeps”) (citation modified). Third, applying the broader definition would give the Intrafamily Offenses Act unclear and potentially limitless scope. There is scientific research that “tends to support the claim that all humans share a common African ancestor.” Frost ex rel. Anderson v. Whitbeck, 654 N.W.2d 225, 233 n.37 (Wis. 2002). If that is true, then all humans are in some sense connected “by blood,” even though we would not normally refer to all humans as being our relatives. Id. at 232-35 (concluding that word “relative” in insurance policy was ambiguous but did not include “a third cousin separated by eight degrees of kinship”). Similarly, a judge who issues a child- 8 custody order, for example, is “connected” to the parties to that custody order in some sense but certainly would not be viewed as a relative of the parties to the order. We are skeptical that the D.C. Council wanted the Intrafamily Offenses Act to reach connections of this kind that are not in some sense familial in character. See Report on Bill 4-195 before the Committee on the Judiciary, D.C. Council, at 9 (May 12, 1982) (explaining Council’s intent to expand access to CPOs to cover “bonds of a genuinely familial, devoted, or homemaking nature”) (citation modified). Finally, the presence of the term “family” in the title of the Intrafamily Offense Act suggests that the definitional provision’s scope is intended to be tied to the concept of family, not to the broader concept of any kind of connection. See, e.g., Mills v. District of Columbia, 259 A.3d 750, 759 n.9 (D.C. 2021) (“[T]he title of a statute may be of use in statutory interpretation if it sheds light on some ambiguous word or phrase in the statute . . . .”) (citation modified). B. Or The definitional provision lists several ways in which people can be “related” for purposes of the Intrafamily Offenses Act, separating the listed items by the word “or.” D.C. Code § 16-1001(5A)(A) (“blood, adoption, legal custody, marriage, or domestic partnership”). The phrase “or” in statutes “can be used in both an inclusive sense (A or B or both) and an exclusive sense (A or B but not both).” Shaw v. Nat’l 9 Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 605 F.3d 1250, 1254 n.8 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation modified); see also, e.g., Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 639 (3d ed. 2011) (“Or” is potentially ambiguous, because it “has an inclusive sense as well as an exclusive sense.”). We think it clear from context that the inclusive sense is intended here. For example, assume for the moment that if person A and person B are brother and sister, they are related by “blood” within the meaning of the Act, and thus either could seek a CPO against the other. Assume also for the moment that if person A and person B were granted joint legal custody of a child, they would also be related “by legal custody” within the meaning of the Intrafamily Offenses Act. We see no possible reason why the D.C. Council would have wanted to exclude person A and person B from the scope of the Act if they were related in both of those ways instead of just one. C. Blood For reasons we have previously explained, we focus here on what it means to be related by blood in the familial sense, not in some broader sense, such as being connected by having the same blood type or working at the same blood clinic. Even with our focus narrowed in that way, uncertainties remain. All humans perhaps share a single ancestor. Frost, 654 N.W.2d at 233 n.37. On that view, we all are arguably “blood relatives” to some degree. See, e.g., Relative, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th 10 ed. 2024) (defining “blood relative” to mean “[s]omeone who shares an ancestor with another”). As we have already explained, however, we are confident that the D.C. Council did not intend the Intrafamily Offenses Act to apply without limit to offenses committed against any other person. The question then becomes what degree of relation by blood suffices to make two people related by blood for purposes of the Intrafamily Offenses Act. The Act sheds no direct light on that question. There is another provision of the D.C. Code, however, that turns on the degree of blood relation between people. The incest statute prohibits marriage, cohabitation, or sexual intercourse between persons who are “related . . . within and not including the fourth degree of consanguinity, computed according to the rules of the Roman or civil law.” D.C. Code § 22-1901; see generally Consanguinity, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “consanguinity” as “[t]he relationship of persons of the same blood or origin”). Without wading into the details of the Roman or civil law approach to consanguinity, we have no difficulty concluding that both Ms. Whitehead, as the children’s biological mother, and Ms. Allen, as the children’s paternal grandmother, are related by blood to the children under the approach reflected in the incest statute. See, e.g., Smallman v. Powell, 23 P. 249, 250 (Or. 1890) (under civil law, parent and child are related by one degree of consanguinity and grandparent and grandchild are 11 related by two degrees of consanguinity). On the other hand, Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead do not appear to be related to each other by blood under the approach reflected in the incest statute, because there is no evidence that they share a sufficiently close common ancestor. See, e.g., Morales v. Roman, 912 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding that mother and paternal grandparent were not family members, for purposes of protection-order statute, where family member was defined to include “persons related by consanguinity”); Cheeks v. State, 507 S.E.2d 204, 207 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (degree of consanguinity under civil law is “computed by counting from one of the persons up to the common ancestor, and then down again to the other person”) (citation modified); Cvengros v. Farm Bureau Ins., 548 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that father was not related “by blood” to his child’s mother for purposes of insurance coverage because “one must look to an ancestor and not a progeny to establish a relation by blood”). We express no view on whether the approach to blood relation reflected in the incest statute should be adopted in its entirety as the interpretation of the concept of being “related by blood” for purposes of the Intrafamily Offenses Act. We note that several courts have adopted a broader approach to the concept of being “related by blood” for purposes of protective orders. Under that approach, people who do not have a close common ancestor are treated as related by blood if they both have a sufficiently close blood relationship to a common descendant. See, e.g., Slusser v. 12 DeBoer, 985 A.2d 974, 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding that paternal grandfather and child’s mother are family members “related by consanguinity” because they both “have a direct blood relationship to the child, and by extension are inextricably linked to each other by that relationship”); Turner v. Lewis, 749 N.E.2d 122, 123-26 (Mass. 2001) (holding that paternal grandmother and child’s mother were family members “related by blood”; “[T]he child is related by blood to both parties, making the mother and grandmother related by blood through that child.”) (citation modified); Treat v. Verderame, FA 990066167S, 2000 WL 1058684, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 14, 2000) (custodial maternal grandmother and child’s father are related “by blood” because “[w]hile it is normal to trace consanguinity through a common ancestor, this Court sees no reason to ignore the obvious familial connection by considering the common progeny”). We need not decide, and therefore do not decide, whether in the present case the blood relationship Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead each have to the children are sufficient by themselves to make Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead “related by blood” for purposes of the Intrafamily Offenses Act. Rather, as we will explain, we consider those blood relationships in combination with the connection between Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead with respect to the custody of the children. 13 D. Legal Custody Here too, for reasons we have previously explained, we focus on what it means to be related by legal custody in a familial sense, not in some broader sense, such as being connected in the way that a judge who issues a custody order might be said to be related to the people whose rights are determined by the custody order. We take as a given that custody orders can create relationships that are sufficiently familial in character to fall within the scope of the Intrafamily Offenses Act. For example, a person who has legal custody over a child can reasonably be understood to have a parent-like relation to the child. We thus think it clear that, subject to certain limits, a child could obtain a CPO against the child’s legal custodian. D.C. Code § 16-1003(b), (c) (addressing CPO petitions brought by minors). Similarly, we assume that if two otherwise unrelated persons have joint custody of a child, they can be viewed as having a coparent-like relationship that would suffice to make them “related by . . . legal custody,” so that each could obtain a CPO against the other. In this case, however, Ms. Allen has full legal and physical custody of the children, and Ms. Whitehead thus no longer has any custodial rights over the children. Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights have not been terminated, however, and Ms. Whitehead continues to have rights and responsibilities with respect to the 14 children. D.C. Code § 16-831.10 (“An order awarding physical or legal custody of a child to a third party shall not terminate the parent and child relationship, including” listed rights and responsibilities.). For example, Ms. Whitehead has visitation rights under the custody order. Arguably, the foregoing considerations by themselves would support a conclusion that Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead are related in a familial sense in light of the custody order. As we will explain, however, we need not and do not rule so broadly in this case. Thus, for example, we do not decide whether an unrelated foster parent, or an employee of the District of Columbia exercising legal custody over a child, could obtain a CPO against the child’s biological parent, or vice versa. E. Circumstances in Combination As we have noted, we do not rely in this case solely on the connections of blood Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead each have to the children. Nor do we rely solely on the connection between Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead arising from the legal custody order. We do hold, however, that those connections, taken together, suffice to establish that Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead are related in the familial sense required by the Intrafamily Offenses Act. 15 As a preliminary matter, we note that, in our view, it is permissible to consider the connections of blood and legal custody cumulatively, even if it is assumed (as we do in this opinion, without deciding the issue) that neither connection by itself would suffice to establish jurisdiction under the Intrafamily Offenses Act. To illustrate with a more concrete example, imagine a statute that requires payment “by check or cash.” In our view, such a statute’s requirements would be met by providing sufficient total payment, in part by check and in part by cash. We view the jurisdictional requirement of the Intrafamily Offense Act in the same way: If the connections between the parties include ties of blood and custody that together establish a sufficiently close familial relationship, the jurisdictional requirement is met. Our conclusion that the Intrafamily Offenses Act applies in the current circumstances is supported by the well-settled principle that the “Act is a remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is intended to protect.” Salvattera, 111 A.3d at 1034 (citation modified). Our conclusion also is fully supported by the legislative history of the Act and the policies underlying the Act. 16 1. Legislative history The D.C. Council has amended the provisions relevant here several times since the Intrafamily Offenses Act’s initial enactment. Taken together, those amendments support a reading of the statute that includes the relationship between Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead. Most of the amendments have expanded the categories of people who can petition for a CPO under the Act by broadening the definition of “intrafamily offense.” Initially, an “intrafamily offense” was defined as an act committed by “one spouse against the other,” a “parent, guardian, or other legal custodian against a child,” or a person “shar[ing] a mutual residence” who “is in a close relationship” with the petitioner. See District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 16-1001(1), 84 Stat. 473, 546 (1970). A “family member” was defined as someone in one of those listed relationships. Id. § 16-1001(2). In 1982, the Council “broadened the remedies available under the Act and criticized the prior judicial interpretation of the legislation as having been too narrow.” Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929 (D.C. 1991). The Council adopted a variety of amendments, including adding more categories and the “related by” modifier to the definition of “intrafamily offense.” See Report on Bill 4-195 at 3-4. The changes expanded CPO availability “namely [to] persons who are related 17 to the offender by blood (to include grandparents or siblings, for example), who have had a child in common with the offender,” and who have or have had “an intimate relationship” with the offender. See id. at 9. According to the Council, the “key” under the new amendments was meant to be “the substance of the relationship, not its form.” Id. The Council made several other amendments in the following decades that support a broad rather than narrow reading of the term “family member.” In 1994, for example, the Council expanded the definition of “intrafamily offense” further to make CPOs available to individuals who are dating, but do not live with, the offender. Report on Bill 10-477 before the Committee on the Judiciary, D.C. Council, at 1-2 (Oct. 12, 1994). Likewise, in 2008, the Council made changes to ensure that minors could seek CPOs against their intimate partners, noting that practitioners “realized over time that the need for a CPO results from a relationship that is not, strictly speaking, intrafamily.” Report on Bill 17-55 before the Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary, D.C. Council, at 2 (Nov. 25, 2008). In 2020, the Council amended the law to both expand and restrict the groups of people eligible to seek CPOs. The Council amended the statute to exclude from CPO eligibility landlord-tenant relationships and instances where the only connection between the offender and the petitioner is a former romantic partner— 18 fact patterns the Council determined were “inappropriate” for a CPO. Report on Bill 23-0181 before the Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety, D.C. Council, at 2 (Nov. 23, 2020). At the same time, the amendments “expand[ed] eligibility to cases that are best addressed by [CPOs]” by amending the definition of “intrafamily offense” to include sex-trafficking offenses and animal-cruelty offenses against the pet animal of an intimate partner, family member, or household member. Id. The term “family member” as one of the groups of people eligible to seek CPOs was added as a defined term as part of these amendments. Id. The Council made clear, however, that even with these changes to the definition of “intrafamily offense,” the meaning of the term “family member” would stay “mostly identical” to prior statutory language, “cover[ing] individuals related by blood, adoption, legal custody, marriage, or domestic partnership.” Id. at 9. A restrictive reading of the term “family member” would be in significant tension with the Council’s intent over the years to make CPOs available to some degree “beyond typical family relationships.” A.R. v. F.C., 33 A.3d 403, 407 (D.C. 2011). Although the legislative history does not directly address the relationships at issue here, the Council’s continued emphasis on “substance over form” and the appropriateness of a CPO remedy in applicable cases counsel in favor of reading the Intrafamily Offenses Act to include the relationship between Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead. 19 2. Statutory purpose and policy The Act is “designed to protect victims of family abuse from acts and threats of violence.” Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 929. To that end, the Act created the CPO mechanism to “provide[] for the civil treatment of intra-family offenses,” which gives courts reviewing CPO petitions “a wider range of dispositional powers than criminal courts in order to effect rehabilitation rather than retribution.” Id. (citation modified). CPOs authorized by the Act are a remedial, flexible tool. As amici note, thousands of children in D.C. live with their grandparents. Many of those children would otherwise be placed in the foster-care system. Ensuring that custodial grandparents like Ms. Allen can seek CPOs against the biological parents protects the safety of those grandparents and supports the welfare of the children in their care because CPOs can provide targeted protection through a noncriminal process with a burden of proof that is more easily met than other alternatives. This case illustrates the kind of intrafamily conflict that can arise between custodial relatives and noncustodial parents. The incidents that form the basis of Ms. Allen’s CPO petition appear to derive from the custody order and child-based interactions between the parties. This case thus demonstrates the public-policy rationale for an understanding of the Act that includes the relationship between Ms. 20 Allen and Ms. Whitehead. See, e.g., Turner, 749 N.E.2d at 126 (“When grandparents are charged with the responsibility of caring for their grandchildren, they must often face the biological parents’ frequent resentment of the grandparental custody, and/or their jealousy of the attention being paid by their parents to their offspring.”) (citation modified). As previously noted, and in significant part due to these policy considerations, courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions under their own statutes governing eligibility to seek CPOs or other similar protective orders. Although the precise statutory language and rationales differ somewhat, multiple courts have recognized that the connections between a custodial grandparent and a biological parent create a close relationship justifying the protections of CPO provisions. See, e.g., Slusser, 985 A.2d at 975; Turner, 749 N.E.2d at 124-26; Treat, 2000 WL 1058684, at *1; Morales, 912 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97 (explaining that although mother and paternal grandparent were not family members for purposes of protection-order statute, protection order was available because mother and paternal grandparent had sufficiently “intimate” relationship under statute). In sum, we are persuaded that the Intrafamily Offense Act covers the relationship between Ms. Allen and Ms. Whitehead. Through a combination of “legal custody” and “blood,” by way of law and biology, Ms. Allen and Ms. 21 Whitehead are properly understood as “family members” within the meaning of the Act. We therefore reverse the order of the Superior Court dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case for further proceedings. So ordered.