Full Opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Angel Torres, : Petitioner : : No. 958 C.D. 2025 v. : : Submitted: September 14, 2026 The Giant Company, LLC (Workers’ : Compensation Appeal Board), : Respondent : BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: October 26, 2026 Angel Torres (Claimant) has petitioned this Court to review an adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), entered July 2, 2025, which affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) in favor of Power Component Systems, Inc. (Employer).1 On appeal, Claimant contends he established causation. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND2 In May 2023, Claimant was a “working supervisor” of a small 1 The correct employer’s name is Power Component Systems, Inc., but no party applied to amend the caption. Tr., 1/12/24, at 6. 2 Unless otherwise stated, we derive the background from the WCJ’s and Board’s decisions, which are supported by substantial evidence, and in the light most favorable to Employer as the prevailing party. Cinram Mfg., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hill), 975 A.2d 577, 583 (Pa. 2009) (Cinram). For context, however, we state conflicting testimony and may simplify medical parlance. demolition crew, and he also demolished walls by hand or crowbar. Claimant Dep. Tr., 11/28/23, at 15; David Sibbach Dep. Tr., 3/26/24, at 7-8, 27. Sibbach, testifying for Employer, explained that the project was a “basic selective demolition job” removing flooring and drywall. Sibbach Dep. Tr. at 7-8. Sibbach described drywall removal as a duty in the “medium range,” i.e., more physically demanding than light- duty work such as painting or fixing carts. Id. at 34. Demolition in the “heavy” range requires “jackhammers and chipping hammers, breaking concrete.” Id. Claimant’s own history stated that his chest pain occurred before that drywall removal. Per the history he gave Dr. Manoj Khandelwal, Employer’s expert, Claimant started having “episodes of chest pain” on May 20th. Dr. Manoj Khandelwal Dep. Tr., 6/19/24, at 10. On May 23rd, before his shift started, Claimant “had episodes of chest pain, which also now radiated into his neck and his jaw,” “shortness of breath,” and “arm weakness.” Id.; contra Claimant Dep. Tr., 11/28/23, at 7 (denying having “problems like this before” and “a history of heart problems”), 26 (denying any prior stress or cardiac testing and any heart attack before May 24th); Tr., 6/26/24, at 10 (same). Turning to that shift, Claimant was scheduled to work overnight from 8:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. (May 23rd to 24th). Sibbach Dep. Tr. at 9-10; Claimant Dep. Tr., 11/28/23, at 18. Claimant testified that he had been using his hands and a crowbar to remove drywall for about four hours. Claimant Dep. Tr. at 6. Around midnight, he “was taking out the drywall from the walls, and [he] started getting like pain in [his] chest, like real hard, like in [his] left arm and all that. [He] didn’t have no power in [his] left arm.” Id. Claimant questioned his coworker about why his “left arm feels so heavy” and told the general contractor (a third party) of his symptoms. Id. at 7, 18. Claimant did not finish his shift and drove himself to a nearby hospital, 2 where he was admitted for three days. Id. at 8, 18-19.3 Sibbach testified that he learned about Claimant’s hospitalization on the 25th and telephoned Claimant at the hospital on May 26th. Sibbach Dep. Tr. at 11. Claimant told Sibbach that he “felt some chest pain or some heavy breathing” from “something to do with [a] clogged artery around his heart, but that blood was flowing in another artery . . . .” Id. at 12. Per Sibbach, Claimant never said his “heart attack was work-related.” Id.4 After the hospital discharged Claimant, he returned to work on May 30th and worked 36.5 hours that week at two other demolition sites performing his pre-injury work duties. Id. at 13-14; accord Tr., 6/26/24, at 13. Claimant last worked for Employer in July 2023.5 Sibbach Dep. Tr. at 37. A few months later, Claimant filed a claim petition describing his injury as a heart attack from “using both hands and arms to pull out sheetrock from the walls.” Pet., 9/12/23. Employer denied liability. The WCJ held several hearings on the petition. Claimant testified live and by deposition; Dr. Solberg, Dr. Khandelwal, and Sibbach testified by trial deposition. Dr. Solberg, Claimant’s expert, is board certified in “physical medicine and rehabilitation and electrodiagnostic medicine.” Solberg Dep. Tr. at 8. Dr. Solberg examined Claimant three times in the fall of 2023. Id. at 9, 14-15. Claimant explained to Dr. Solberg that “he was working with some drywall with repeated 3 Claimant had testified that he drove himself to the hospital around midnight, but hospital records reflect an 8:13 a.m. arrival. Compare Claimant Dep. Tr. at 18-19, with Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 10-11. 4 As a “working supervisor,” Claimant was responsible for reporting any on-site injury to the office or project manager. Sibbach Dep. Tr. at 27-28. Claimant did not ask to submit a workers’ compensation claim or incident report. Id. at 12; Claimant Dep. Tr. at 20. Employer learned about Claimant’s injury shortly before the next night shift began. Sibbach Dep. Tr. at 30. 5 Later that month, Claimant saw Dr. Peter Stempniewicz, a cardiologist, who examined Claimant’s heart and diagnosed narrowed arteries from high cholesterol. Dr. Byrne Solberg Dep. Tr., 12/4/23, at 20, 22-23. 3 heavy lifting, and he had a sudden onset of his left arm feeling very numb and heavy, and becoming discolored,” followed by shortness of breath. Id. at 10. Dr. Solberg noted that Claimant had quit smoking after his heart attack, that his job history reflected “a very physically demanding job,” and that Claimant “basically denied” any “past medical history” “prior to his cardiac event.” Id. at 11. Dr. Solberg conducted “neuromuscular skeletal examinations, all of which were essentially within normal limits.” Id. As for Claimant’s heart, Dr. Solberg testified: “The cardiac evaluation I didn’t get too wrapped up in as he’s being followed by cardiology.” Id. at 11-12. Upon being asked whether a causal connection existed between his diagnoses and the work incident, Dr. Solberg answered: “We can say that his physical activities, you know, caused his symptoms on that day. You know, would he have had an eventual heart attack some other time is speculative. I don’t really know. I can’t really say . . . . He was doing very physically demanding work and had a heart attack.” Id. at 16. Dr. Solberg agreed that “physically heavy exertion on Claimant’s preexisting condition” could “trigger a heart attack.” Id. On cross-examination, Dr. Solberg conceded he is “not a cardiologist.” Id. at 19. Dr. Solberg also conceded that he reviewed only Dr. Stempniewicz’s July 2023 office notes and none of Claimant’s hospital records. Id. at 20. He was unaware those records documented Claimant’s “intermittent chest pain that had occurred on two different occasions the day before he presented to the hospital.” Id. at 21. He was also unaware those records documented that those symptoms “were not explicitly related to exertion,” and he acknowledged “some discrepancy there.” Id. at 21-22. Dr. Solberg agreed that Dr. Stempniewicz did not “specifically relate” Claimant’s “atherosclerotic heart disease and hyperlipidemia” to Claimant’s work 4 incident. Id. at 22. Dr. Solberg agreed that he did not provide Claimant cardiac treatment and that his causation opinion “that the heart attack was work related or his symptoms were brought on by his work activity is based upon what” Claimant told Dr. Solberg. Id. at 25 (relying on Claimant’s “truthfulness and veracity”). Dr. Khandelwal, Employer’s expert, is board certified in cardiology, interventional cardiology, and internal medicine. Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 4. His practice spans “the entire range of cardiology from consulting outpatients to performing emergency interventional procedures,” including one to two independent medical evaluations per year. Id. at 5-6. Dr. Khandelwal examined Claimant in December 2023. Id. at 8. Claimant reported to Dr. Khandelwal that he had worked in demolition “his whole life” and described the chest pain he had (a) on May 20th, (b) before his shift started on May 23rd, and (c) during his shift around midnight. Id. at 10. Claimant arrived at work around 8:00 p.m., began “breaking drywall, and then he felt at that time also a left arm heaviness.” Id. The hospital records showed that Claimant “arrived at the emergency room around 8:13 a.m.” on May 24th, where “blood testing performed that morning” provided evidence that Claimant had suffered a heart attack. Id. at 10-11. The hospital did not immediately catheterize Claimant because it had determined that the heart attack had already occurred. Id. at 11. The hospital discharged Claimant on May 26th because his blocked artery was not treatable without open heart surgery. Id. at 11, 28-29.6 6 Claimant “was discharged because it was felt that his artery that was occluded was not amenable to a percutaneous intervention,” i.e., a stent. Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 11, 28-29 (explaining the treatment options of stent versus open heart surgery). Simply, a stent is a tube placed within the blocked blood vessel. See 2 Att’ys Med. Advisor § 27:47 (discussing heart surgery procedures). 5 Dr. Khandelwal’s examination of Claimant’s heart revealed normal blood pressure, pulse, oxygen level, and a normal cardiac exam. Id. at 13. An electrocardiogram also revealed a “possible old heart attack.” Id. Dr. Khandelwal dated that old heart attack to well before the shift. Id. at 13-14. He opined that Claimant “did not have a work-related injury,” because there “were multiple data that showed that he had symptoms and signs consistent with a heart attack that occurred well before his date of injury.” Id. Such data included “cardiac enzymes” “consistent with a remote heart attack.” Id. at 14.7 Dr. Khandelwal clarified that the “enzymes suggest that the heart attack occurred in the range of about 24 to 32 hours before his arrival at the hospital emergency room.” Id. at 26. But when Claimant’s counsel restated that range as “24 to 48 hours,” Dr. Khandelwal responded that “the timing of the event is in the range of about 24 to 32 -- 24 to 48 hours. Yeah, that’s a fair assessment given those cardiac enzyme levels.” Id. at 27.8 He explained that the “enzyme pattern” signaled to the emergency room that the event “didn’t happen in the last few hours, the last six to eight hours,” but rather “one to two to three days before.” Id. Accordingly, Dr. Khandelwal opined that Claimant’s demolition work did not cause his heart attack: “His symptoms began many days before his claim of the date of injury. So this had been an ongoing virtually chronic event now for this man before he arrived at the emergency room.” Id. at 14-15. He explained that the “majority of [heart attacks] are not activity-related or stress-related. They typically 7 Claimant “had elevated cardiac enzymes in the form of troponins and [SGOT] that were markedly elevated at the time the blood samples were obtained that are consistent with a remote heart attack and, as I also mentioned before, his symptoms and his EKG also suggested that he had a heart attack prior to his arrival in the emergency room.” Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 14. 8 Employer and the WCJ rely on the 48-hour upper bound, and the Board relies on the 32- hour upper bound. Regardless, the credited evidence established that Claimant’s heart attack occurred before his shift. 6 occur at rest. Ninety-six percent typically occur in the morning when patients wake up with either symptoms or signs of a mild heart attack.” Id. at 15. Activity-related heart attacks are “extremely rare,” accounting for “only about four percent,” and even then “it only occurs in those that have a sudden change in their level of activity,” e.g., “an individual who is sedentary who suddenly shovels snow for the first time.” Id. Dr. Khandelwal opined that the cause was Claimant’s continued smoking, history of high blood pressure, and high cholesterol. Id. at 15-16 (disagreeing completely with Dr. Solberg’s opinion); see Tr., 6/26/24, at 25 (reflecting Claimant’s testimony that in May, he had been smoking “half a pack a day,” and post-heart attack, continued to smoke once “in a while”).9 On cross-examination, Claimant asked Dr. Khandelwal “whether the exertional level” during his overnight shift “was higher than he had previously been experiencing in his job.” Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 24. Dr. Khandelwal responded that Claimant stated he was doing “exactly what he does at his job every day.” Id. The WCJ found Claimant credible regarding “his pre-injury job duties and ongoing symptoms and restrictions,” but not credible “regarding suffering a work-related cardiac injury.” WCJ Op. at 11. The WCJ explained that “the causal connection between the cardiac injury and Claimant’s employment [was] not obvious.” Id. Further, Claimant’s testimony conflicted with Dr. Khandelwal’s “credited, accepted medical testimony.” Id. The WCJ discredited Dr. Solberg’s opinion where it conflicted with Dr. Khandelwal’s because Dr. Solberg is not a cardiologist, did not conduct a complete cardiac examination, and never reviewed the hospital records. Id. at 12. The WCJ credited Dr. Khandelwal’s opinion that a blocked artery caused Claimant’s heart attack, which “had already occurred prior to Claimant’s” overnight shift. Id. (citing 9 Cf. Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 13 (noting Claimant’s normal blood pressure at his exam). 7 Dr. Khandelwal’s credentials, examination, and review of all medical records). The WCJ credited Sibbach regarding Claimant’s work duties. The WCJ thus denied Claimant’s petition.10 Claimant appealed to the Board, arguing that several of the WCJ’s findings lacked record support and that medical evidence “was not required” to prove that “strenuous physical work” caused his heart attack. Notice of Appeal, 12/20/24. The Board affirmed, reasoning that the causal relationship “was not obvious” and thus required medical evidence. Bd. Op., 7/2/25, at 2. Claimant timely petitioned this Court for review. II. ISSUE Claimant contends that because his work duties obviously caused his heart attack, he was not required “to present medical evidence.” Claimant’s Br. at 4. III. DISCUSSION11 A. Arguments Claimant argues the record established that prior to May 24th, he “had no history of chest and arm pain.” Id. at 9-10.12 During his overnight shift, he felt 10 The WCJ acknowledged that Dr. Solberg’s license was provisionally reinstated in 2020 and not fully reinstated until 2024, after he examined Claimant. WCJ Op. at 6. The WCJ did not explicitly refer to Dr. Solberg’s licensure as a basis for discrediting his testimony. See WCJ Op. 11 “Under the appellate standard of review pertaining to administrative agency adjudications, agency findings are subject to judicial review to assure that they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cinram, 975 A.2d at 583 (citations omitted). Credibility “determinations are within the exclusive province of the [WCJ] and findings of fact can be overturned only if they are arbitrary and capricious.” Lehigh Cnty. Vo-Tech Sch. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Wolfe), 652 A.2d 797, 800 (Pa. 1995) (Wolfe) (citations and footnote omitted). 12 In support, Claimant cited, inter alia, Morgan v. Giant Markets, Inc., 397 A.2d 415 (Pa. 1979); Metelo v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Old Original Bookbinders Rest.), 642 A.2d 653 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); and Malecki v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 582 C.D. 2020, filed Mar. 26, 2021), 2021 WL 1157693. A party may cite to an unreported decision of this Court “for its persuasive value.” 210 Pa. Code § 69.414. 8 such pain, stopped work, and went to the hospital, where he was treated for a heart attack. Id. at 10. Claimant reasons that notwithstanding equivocal medical testimony, “the accepted factual testimony can establish the necessary causal connection and relieve the injured worker of the burden of presenting unequivocal medical testimony.” Id. at 11 (citations omitted). Claimant reiterates that when the facts obviously establish a “causal connection between the work activity and the heart attack, [his] testimony alone can establish causation.” Id. at 12 (citation omitted). Employer counters that the WCJ properly discredited Claimant’s contradictory testimony and Dr. Solberg’s opinion, given his lack of “training, expertise[,] or qualifications in treating cardiac conditions” and his failure to “review the initial hospital records.” Employer’s Br. at 24, 27. In contrast, Employer notes the WCJ credited Dr. Khandelwal, a board-certified cardiologist, who testified that Claimant’s preexisting conditions caused his heart attack “24 to 48 hours before his admission to the hospital.” Id. at 25. Employer argues that the “mere fact that [C]laimant experienced symptoms of a heart attack at work, even while performing his work activities, does not render those symptoms or the underlying cause of the symptoms work-related.” Id. at 26-27 (noting Claimant’s admission that “he had similar symptoms in the days prior to the date of injury”). Employer reiterates Dr. Khandelwal’s testimony that less than 4% of heart attacks are due to “strenuous physical activity,” and those generally “involve a normally sedentary person who suddenly exerts himself far beyond his usual activity level.” Id. at 27. Employer posits that Claimant, who performed demolition work daily, would not fall into that category. Id. 9 B. Legal Standards The Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)13 defines “injury” to mean “an injury to a [claimant], regardless of his previous physical condition, arising in the course of his employment and related thereto.” 77 P.S. § 411(1). A heart attack is compensable only if it both (1) arises in the course of employment and (2) is related thereto. Brody v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n), 588 A.2d 575, 577 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). A claimant establishes compensability by proving a causal connection between the heart attack and the employment, which requires more than “he was injured at work.” Cardyn v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Heppenstall), 534 A.2d 1389, 1390 (Pa. 1987) (emphasis in original). A “claimant has the burden of proving a causal relationship between a work-related incident and his alleged disability.” Lewis v. Commonwealth, 498 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa. 1985) (citations omitted). When “no obvious causal connection” exists “between an injury and the alleged cause,” unequivocal medical testimony must establish that connection. Id. (citation omitted). In this context, obviousness “involves a nexus that is so clear that an untrained layperson would not have a problem in making the connection between the injury and a disability.” Tobias v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Nature’s Way Nursery, Inc.), 595 A.2d 781, 784 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).14 Discerning obviousness “often involves a ‘natural and probable’ development . . . and could sometimes 13 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710. For ease, we refer to the Act’s sections “only by their Purdon’s citation.” Herold v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 329 A.3d 1159, 1166 n.1 (Pa. 2025). 14 Although “the connection between an ejaculatory dysfunction and a spinal cord injury is perhaps obvious to the medical community because . . . this symptom is seen in approximately 90% of spinal cord injured men, the question is whether or not it is ‘obvious’ as applied to the causation issue in” workers’ compensation. Tobias, 595 A.2d at 784 (emphases added). “‘Obvious’ in this latter setting involves a nexus that is so clear that an untrained layperson would not have a problem in making the connection between the injury and a disability.” Id. (emphasis added). 10 involve an immediacy of occurrence such as an immediate back injury following heavy lifting.” Id. at 784-85. For example, a causal connection may be obvious when a claimant experiences pain “at the point of force or strain.” Morgan, 397 A.2d at 416.15 Thus, a claimant who had no prior back issues and who felt lower back pain while lifting a heavy bag “did not need unequivocal medical evidence to establish that his injury was work related.” Malecki, 2021 WL 1157693, at *6. “We have also held that similar recognition must be given in cases where the disability is the natural and probable consequence of an injury, although the disability is not immediately manifested.” Metelo, 642 A.2d at 655 (citations omitted).16 But when the injury is a heart attack, we have required unequivocal medical testimony connecting the injury to the work. Faust v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 422 A.2d 1246 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (addressing a police officer who died of a heart attack at work, after arriving at the scene of an accident). In Faust, the decedent’s family doctor had “testified that he did not know the cause of the decedent’s death and made no conclusion as to whether the decedent had heart or coronary disease, and further, he did not know what happened to the decedent.” 15 In Morgan, a delivery driver braced “his feet against the front interior of the truck” and pushed a stack of empty pans toward the rear door, when his “lower back ‘gave-way’ and he collapsed.” Morgan, 397 A.2d at 415-16. Because the driver presented no medical testimony, this Court found no obvious causation connection “between the work incident and the injury.” Id. at 416. Morgan reversed this Court: “Where one is doing an act that requires force or strain and pain is experienced at the point of force or strain, the injury may be found to have been established. Pain is an excellent symptom of an injury. Of course, the trier of fact will determine the credibility of the witness’s testimony as to the total situation.” Id. 16 Metelo addressed a busboy who contracted a disease while eating shellfish at his employer’s restaurant. Metelo, 642 A.2d at 654. Metelo stated that although the disease “cannot be said to immediately result from eating shellfish because manifestation of the illness requires an incubation period, the causal relationship is nonetheless obvious where the overwhelming evidence indicates that the disability is the natural and probable result of the exposure to the disease.” Id. at 656 (footnote and citations omitted). 11 Faust, 422 A.2d at 1246. Faust held that absent “an obvious causal connection, unequivocal medical testimony must be presented,” and found “a total failure in establishing . . . the heart attack was causally connected to his employment.” Id. (citation modified). Faust noted that the decedent’s high blood pressure, stoutness, and prior complaint of “a vague amount of chest pain” made it “difficult to presume an ‘obvious causal connection’” between his “employment and his heart attack.” Id. at 1247 & n.2. Additionally, prior complaints may reflect a claimant’s preexisting condition rather than a new injury. See Hudack v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 379 A.2d 1074, 1075 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977). In Hudack, a claimant had experienced chest pains for two weeks before the day in question, which were later “diagnosed as manifestations of a preexisting progressive heart disease . . . .” Id. While climbing stairs at work, she “experienced a severe pain in her chest which required her to sit down on the steps for about five minutes.” Id. She completed her shift, and nine days later, a cardiologist examined her and concluded that she had suffered a heart attack “at some time during the preceding two weeks.” Id. The cardiologist testified that climbing “stairs is a typical form of effort to cause pain in coronary disease and indeed with her, caused that pain.” Id. at 1076 (citation modified). But as to “whether or not the ‘pain’ experienced by the claimant at work was the actual heart attack or simply a manifestation of the preexisting” heart disease, the cardiologist testified that it was “impossible” to determine when the heart attack occurred. Id. Hudack held that testimony was “not equivalent to testimony that the claimant’s exertion at work caused the heart attack.” Id. C. Discussion Instantly, the issue is whether Claimant’s testimony alone sufficed or 12 whether Claimant also required expert medical testimony to establish that his work activities caused his mid-shift heart attack. Compare Morgan, 397 A.2d at 416 (treating lower back pain at the time of the work incident as evidence of causation), with Hudack, 379 A.2d at 1075-76 (evaluating chest pain before and at the time of the work incident as evidence of causation). Initially, we reject Claimant’s argument that his lay testimony of mid- shift chest pain, by itself, proves causation without the need for expert testimony. The WCJ had discredited his causation testimony and had credited expert testimony that Claimant’s heart attack occurred before his shift, roughly one to two days before his hospital visit. See WCJ Op. at 11-12; Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 10, 14 (reflecting cardiac enzymes consistent with a heart attack “well before his date of injury”), 26- 27. Unlike the Morgan and Malecki claimants, whose back pain at the point of strain evidenced a new injury, Claimant felt mid-shift chest and arm pain that reflected a pre-shift heart attack. See Morgan, 397 A.2d at 415-16; Malecki, 2021 WL 1157693, at *6; Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 10, 26-27. Metelo is similarly inapt as that addressed a disease obviously caused by work exposure, i.e., eating the shellfish. See Metelo, 642 A.2d at 655-56. Thus, as the WCJ held, no comparable obvious causal connection exists. WCJ Op. at 11. Without an obvious causal connection, Claimant needed unequivocal expert testimony. See Lewis, 498 A.2d at 802; Cardyn, 534 A.2d at 1390. But the WCJ also discredited Dr. Solberg, who provided the only expert testimony connecting Claimant’s heart attack to his work. See WCJ Op. at 12. In contrast, Dr. Khandelwal attributed that heart attack to Claimant’s smoking and history of high blood pressure and cholesterol. See Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 15-16; Tr., 6/26/24, at 25. Claimant’s risk factors, like the Faust decedent’s risk factors of prior chest pain, 13 high blood pressure, and stoutness, undermine any presumption of an obvious causal connection between the work incident and Claimant’s heart attack. See Faust, 422 A.2d at 1246-47 & n.2. Thus, as in Faust, Claimant did not provide credited unequivocal expert testimony connecting his heart attack to his work. See id. Claimant’s heart attack, like the Hudack claimant’s, also followed prior chest pain: the Hudack claimant had chest pains for two weeks before her work incident. See Hudack, 379 A.2d at 1075; Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 10; Claimant Dep. Tr. at 6. Although Claimant had denied prior chest pain, the WCJ discredited his testimony in favor of Dr. Khandelwal’s testimony. Claimant Dep. Tr. at 7, 26; WCJ Op. at 11. Unlike the Hudack cardiologist, who could not opine on whether the claimant’s pain while climbing stairs was the heart attack itself, Dr. Khandelwal opined that Claimant’s heart attack occurred before his shift. See Hudack, 379 A.2d at 1076; Khandelwal Dep. Tr. at 26-27. Thus, based on the credited testimony, Claimant failed to prove an obvious causal connection between his work and his heart attack and, therefore, could not prove compensability. See Lewis, 498 A.2d at 802; Brody, 588 A.2d at 577. IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we affirm. At bottom, the issue is whether Claimant suffered a heart attack before or during his overnight shift. The credited medical evidence established that Claimant had a heart attack before his overnight shift. LORI A. DUMAS, Judge 14 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Angel Torres, : Petitioner : : No. 958 C.D. 2025 v. : : The Giant Company, LLC (Workers’ : Compensation Appeal Board), : Respondent : ORDER AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2026, we AFFIRM the order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, entered on July 2, 2025. LORI A. DUMAS, Judge