Gard v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr.
CourtOhio Court of Claims
Date FiledOctober 30, 2026
Docket2025-00899JD
JudgeSadler
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Gard v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr., 2026-Ohio-4569.]
IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO
JENNIFER GARD, et al Case No. 2025-00899JD
Plaintiffs Judge Lisa L. Sadler
v. DECISION
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO MEDICAL
CENTER
Defendant
I. Introduction
{¶1} Before the court in this medical-malpractice case is a summary-judgment
motion filed by defendant University of Toledo Medical Center. Defendant maintains that
it is entitled to a summary judgment in its favor because plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred
under R.C. 2305.113(A). Plaintiffs Jennifer Gard and Alva Gard oppose defendant’s
summary-judgment motion. Defendant’s summary-judgment motion is fully briefed.
{¶2} Because, after the evidence is construed most strongly in plaintiffs’ favor,
plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred and defendant is therefore, as a matter of law, entitled
to a judgment in its favor, defendant’s summary-judgment motion shall be granted.
II. Background and Procedural History
{¶3} On October 30, 2025, in a refiled case, plaintiff Jennifer Gard and her
husband, Alva Guard, through counsel, filed a medical-malpractice action against
defendant University of Toledo Medical Center, asserting claims of medical negligence,
vicarious liability, and loss of consortium.1 Plaintiffs assert that defendant should be held
1
On August 13, 2025, in this court, Jennifer Gard and Alva Gard filed a complaint against the
University of Toledo Medical Center, which stemmed from the same circumstances as this case. Jennifer
Gard, et al. v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2025-00740JD. Pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1), this
court sua sponte dismissed Ct of Cl. No. 2025-00740JD without prejudice on October 22, 2025, for failure
to comply with a court order. See generally Pollard v. Elber, 2018-Ohio-4538, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.) (discussing
Case No. 2025-00899JD -2- DECISION
liable for alleged medical negligence by Dr. Nicole Dominiak who, according to plaintiffs,
misdiagnosed a surgical specimen from Jennifer Gard as microcystic adnexal carcinoma
(MAC) in March 2023, and who, at the time, was defendant’s employee. Plaintiffs assert
that an outside surgical pathology review performed by the Cleveland Clinic (which
included a review of the pathology slides analyzed by Dr. Dominiak) later showed that Dr.
Dominiak’s diagnosis was incorrect. Plaintiffs maintain that, after Dr. Dominiak consulted
with the Cleveland Clinic, Dr. Dominiak filed an amended report on or about August 13,
2024, in which Dr. Dominiak changed the diagnosis of March 2023 from MAC to the
correct diagnosis of basal cell carcinoma (BCC). Plaintiffs maintain that Jennifer Gard
underwent a “litany of unnecessary surgical procedures” that not only have been painful
to endure and recover from, but these surgical procedures also left her disfigured and
embarrassed to be seen in public. Plaintiffs further maintain that, if Jennifer Gard’s
healthcare providers had performed a simple Mohs procedure, and if the correct
diagnosis had been made from the March 2023 specimens, then all of the damages
sustained by Jennifer Gard would have been avoided.
{¶4} On November 25, 2025, defendant, through counsel, answered plaintiffs’
complaint, admitting some allegations in the complaint, but denying liability. On
September 1, 2026, defendant moved for a summary judgment in its favor on grounds
that plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. Defendant’s summary-judgment motion is
accompanied by a deposition of Jennifer Gard, which defendant contemporaneously filed
with its summary-judgment motion.
{¶5} Plaintiffs, through counsel, have filed a written response to defendant’s
summary-judgment motion along with several exhibits. Plaintiffs urge the court to deny
defendant’s summary-judgment motion. Plaintiffs
submit a genuine issue of material fact remains as to when Jennifer
discovered the resulting injury in this case, and alternatively, that the
physician-patient relationship for the condition at issue did not terminate
until August 13, 2024. Moreover, Plaintiffs submit that their claims against
Defendant were timely filed, albeit in the Lucas County Court of Common
a trial court’s taking of judicial notice of its own docket, including the docket in a separate case); In re
Adoption of L.S., 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 194, *7-8, 2020 WL 416192 (3rd Dist. 2020).
Case No. 2025-00899JD -3- DECISION
Pleas on July 18, 2025, which were dismissed without prejudice pursuant
to Civil Rule 41(A) on August 21, 2025. R.C. 2305.19 therefore saves their
claims, as the claims were dismissed against University of Toledo Medical
Center “otherwise than upon the merits” and were ultimately refiled on
October 30, 2025, following another dismissal “otherwise than upon the
merits.”
{¶6} In reply, defendant asserts that plaintiffs have failed to identify genuine issues
of material fact to preclude a summary judgment in defendant’s favor, because it is
undisputed that (1) the cognizable event triggering a one-year statute of limitations in this
case occurred on August 6, 2024, and (2) plaintiffs commenced an action in this court on
August 13, 2025, in Ct. of Cl. No. 2025-00740JD—more than one year after the
cognizable event in this case. Defendant also asserts that under Clark v. Hawkes
Hospital of Mt. Carmel, 9 Ohio St.3d 182 (1984) the “termination of patient-physician
relationship” theory has not been good law for over 40 years because, according to Clark,
the termination of the doctor-patient relationship as the accrual point may no longer be
applied by courts in medical malpractice cases. See Clark at 183 (“[n]o longer may courts
apply the termination of the doctor-patient relationship as the accrual point for medical
malpractice causes of action”).
{¶7} Defendant’s summary-judgment motion is before the court for a non-oral
hearing pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and L.C.C.R. 4(D).
III. Law and Analysis
A. Rule 56 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for
summary judgment.
{¶8} Rule 56 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary
judgment. See Civ.R. 56. Under Civ.R. 56(C) summary judgment “shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions,
affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the
action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be
considered except as stated in this rule.” Any evidence that is not specifically listed in
Case No. 2025-00899JD -4- DECISION
Civ.R. 56(C) “is only proper if it is incorporated into an appropriate affidavit under Civ.R.
56(E).” Pollard v. Elber, 2018-Ohio-4538, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.) Accord Barton v. Cty. of
Cuyahoga, 2020-Ohio-6994, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Courts “may consider other evidence if
there is no objection on this basis.” State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. City of Mayfield
Hts., 2009-Ohio-2871, ¶ 17; Pollard at ¶ 22.
{¶9} Under Civ.R. 56(C) a summary judgment “shall not be rendered unless it
appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the
party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled
to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.”2 The
Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that, on motion for summary judgment, the moving
party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion,
and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim.”
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). In Dresher the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated:
[T]he moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are
no genuine issues of material fact concerning an essential element of the
opponent’s case. To accomplish this, the movant must be able to point to
evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that a court is to
consider in rendering summary judgment. The evidentiary materials listed
in Civ.R. 56(C) include “the pleading, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the
2
Discussing Civ.R. 56(C), the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated:
Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be
determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence
that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most
strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against
whom the motion for summary judgment is made.
State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Rels. Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 (1997), citing Temple v. Wean United,
Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 327 (1977).
Case No. 2025-00899JD -5- DECISION
pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any.” These evidentiary
materials must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(Emphasis sic.) Dresher at 292-293.
{¶10} If a moving party “fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary
judgment must be denied.” Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429 (1997). See Omega
Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Koverman, 2016-Ohio-2961, ¶ 69 (2d Dist.) (“unless the
movant satisfies its initial burden on a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant has
no burden of proof”). But if a party who moves for summary judgment has satisfied its
initial burden, then a nonmoving party “has a reciprocal burden outlined in the last
sentence of Civ.R. 56(E).” Dresher at 293. See Civ.R. 56(E) (“[w]hen a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s
response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party”).
{¶11} Under Ohio law a material fact “is an essential element of the claim or
defense, as defined by the substantive law.” Morgan v. Beigel, 2011-Ohio-406, ¶ 8 (3d
Dist.), citing Mount v. Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 39 Ohio App.3d 1, 2 (5th Dist.1987).
“A dispute of fact is ‘material’ if it affects the outcome of the litigation.” Morgan at ¶ 8,
citing Mount at 2. The Tenth District Court of Appeals has discussed a determination of
material facts, as follows:
In every lawsuit there are some disputed issues of fact, but Civ.R. 56
focuses on those which are “material.” The materiality determination of facts
is discussed in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202. The mere existence of some factual disputes,
if not material, will not defeat a summary judgment otherwise proper. If one’s
case is supported only by a “scintilla” of evidence, or if his evidence is
“merely colorable” or not “significantly probative,” summary judgment
should be entered.
Case No. 2025-00899JD -6- DECISION
Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Consol. Stores Corp., 68 Ohio App.3d 19, 22 (10th Dist.1990).
The Tenth District Court of Appeals, however, has cautioned:
At summary judgment, it is not the role of the court to resolve a disputed
fact or weigh the credibility of the evidence, only to determine whether there
exists a genuine dispute of material fact. . . . The trial court is limited to
determining whether admissible evidence of the type contemplated by
Civ.R. 56(C) gives rise to a genuine dispute of material fact; it is exclusively
the role of the fact-finder to determine what weight to give that evidence at
trial.
Kiser v. United Dairy Farmers, 2023-Ohio-2136, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).
B. R.C. 2743.16 establishes the statute of limitations for actions against the
state.
{¶12} Under Ohio law, as used in R.C. Chapter 2743, the term “state” “means the
state of Ohio, including, but not limited to . . . all departments, boards, offices,
commissions, agencies, institutions, and other instrumentalities of the state.” R.C.
2743.01(A). In defendant’s summary-judgment motion, defendant does not dispute—and
appears to concede—that, for purposes of this case, it should be considered an institution
or instrumentality of the state under R.C. 2743.01(A). See generally R.C. 3364.06(A)
(combining the University of Toledo and the medical university of Ohio at Toledo).
{¶13} In Agrawal v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2017-Ohio-8644, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), the
Tenth District Court of Appeals discussed the statute-of-limitations for bringing an action
against the state. The Tenth District Court of Appeals explained in Agrawal at ¶ 12:
“Pursuant to R.C. 2743.16(A), ‘civil actions against the state permitted by sections
2743.01 to 2743.20 of the Revised Code shall be commenced no later than two years
after the date of accrual of the cause of action or within any shorter period that is
applicable to similar suits between private parties.’” Accord Coleman v. Columbus State
Cmty. College, 2015-Ohio-4685, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.).
{¶14} R.C. 2305.113(A) provides the statute of limitations for bringing a medical
malpractice action. Under R.C. 2305.113(A), except as otherwise provided in
R.C. 2305.113, an action upon a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim “shall
be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued.” See
Case No. 2025-00899JD -7- DECISION
R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) (defining the term “medical claim,” as used in R.C. 2305.113). 3 A
review of plaintiffs’ complaint, with its claims of medical negligence, vicarious liability, and
loss of consortium, shows that plaintiffs have asserted medical claims against defendant
under R.C. 2305.113(E). Because plaintiffs have asserted medical-negligence claims,
the applicable statute of limitations is the one-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C.
2305.113(A), since R.C. 2305.113(A) governs such actions between private parties and
is shorter than the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2743.16(A). See Rankin v. Ohio
Reformatory for Women, 2009-Ohio-6575, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).
{¶15} In Hershberger v. Akron City Hospital, 34 Ohio St. 3d 1 (1987), the Supreme
Court of Ohio discussed the accrual date in applying the statute of limitations in a medical
malpractice action. In Hershberger, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained:
[I]n a medical malpractice action, for the purposes of determining the
accrual date in applying the statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.11(A), the
trial court must look to the facts of the particular case and make the following
determinations: when the injured party became aware, or should have
3
As used in R.C. 2305.113, the term “medical claim”
means any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a . . . hospital, home, or residential
facility, against any employee or agent of a . . . hospital, home, or residential facility . . . and
that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person. “Medical claim”
includes the following:
(a) Derivative claims for relief that arise from the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a
person;
(b) Derivative claims for relief that arise from the plan of care prepared for a resident of a
home;
(c) Claims that arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person or claims
that arise out of the plan of care prepared for a resident of a home and to which both types
of claims either of the following applies:
(i) The claim results from acts or omissions in providing medical care.
(ii) The claim results from the hiring, training, supervision, retention, or termination of
caregivers providing medical diagnosis, care, or treatment.
(d) Claims that arise out of the plan of care, medical diagnosis, or treatment of any person
and that are brought under [R.C. 3721.17];
(e) Claims that arise out of skilled nursing care or personal care services provided in a home
pursuant to the plan of care, medical diagnosis, or treatment.
Case No. 2025-00899JD -8- DECISION
become aware, of the extent and seriousness of his condition, which, of
course, may occur without the necessity of further medical consultation;
whether the injured party was aware, or should have been aware, that such
condition was related to a specific professional medical service previously
rendered him; and whether such condition would put a reasonable person
on notice of need for further inquiry as to the cause of such condition.
Hershberger at 5-6. See Allenius v. Thomas, 42 Ohio St. 3d 131 (1989), syllabus (holding
that “[t]he ‘extent and seriousness of his condition’ language of the test set forth in
Hershberger v. Akron City Hosp. (1987), 34 Ohio St. 3d 1, 516 N.E.2d 204, paragraph
one of the syllabus, requires that there be an occurrence of a ‘cognizable event’ which
does or should lead the patient to believe that the condition of which the patient complains
is related to a medical procedure, treatment or diagnosis previously rendered to the
patient and where the cognizable event does or should place the patient on notice of the
need to pursue his possible remedies”).
{¶16} The First District Court of Appeals has discussed when a cause of action
accrues, noting:
As a general rule, a cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful
act is committed. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline Union’s Mortg. Co., 128
Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 13. An exception to the
general rule is the discovery rule. It provides that a cause of action does
not arise until the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
should know, that he or she has been injured by the defendant’s conduct.
Id. at ¶ 13-14. The discovery rule tolls the running of the statute of
limitations. LGR Realty, Inc. v. Frank & London Ins. Agency, 2016-Ohio-
5044, 58 N.E.3d 1179, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.), appeal allowed, 148 Ohio St. 3d
1425, 2017-Ohio-905, 71 N.E.3d 297.
Chateau Estate Homes v. Fifth Third Bank, 2017-Ohio-6985, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). And the
Tenth District Court of Appeals has explained that
under the discovery rule, which is an exception to the general rule, a cause
of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have discovered, that he or she was injured by the
Case No. 2025-00899JD -9- DECISION
wrongful conduct of the defendant. Id., citing both O’Stricker v. Jim Walter
Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 4 Ohio B. 335, 447 N.E.2d 727, and Oliver
v. Kaiser Community Health Found. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 111, 5 Ohio B.
247, 449 N.E.2d 438, syllabus. “In essence, the running of the limitations
period is delayed until triggered by a ‘cognizable event’ that alerts the
plaintiff that he or she was injured by the defendant.” Collins, at 507-508. It
is unnecessary for a plaintiff to be aware of the full extent of damages before
there is a cognizable event. See Allenius v. Thomas (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d
131, 133-134, 538 N.E.2d 93.
Rosendale v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2008-Ohio-4899, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.),
{¶17} In support of defendant’s summary-judgment motion, defendant urges that
plaintiff Jennifer Gard has testified in a deposition that, during a televisit on August 6,
2024, with a medical provider of the Cleveland Clinic, she was informed that
Dr. Dominiak’s pathology reports from March 2023 were incorrect. (Gard Deposition, 55-
56.) Defendant notes that plaintiffs Jennifer Gard and Alva Gard did not sue defendant
until August 13, 2025—more than one year after Jennifer Gard’s cause of action accrued
as to Dr. Dominiak’s alleged medical negligence.4 Defendant reasons that plaintiffs’
action against defendant is therefore untimely and time-barred.
{¶18} Plaintiffs submit, however, that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
when Jennifer Gard discovered her resulting injury in this case because, according to the
Cleveland Clinic’s medical record (Exhibit G, Plaintiffs’ response), on August 6, 2024,
additional pathology review was in process to rule out the diagnosis of microcystic
adnexal carcinoma (MAC), and Jennifer Gard’s medical record at the University of Toledo
Medical Center was not amended until August 20, 2024, and was not electronically signed
until August 22, 2024. (Exhibit J, Plaintiffs’ response).
{¶19} Despite plaintiffs’ arguments, after the submitted evidence is construed in
plaintiffs’ favor, as required by Civ.R. 56(C), a reasonable person would conclude that,
on August 6, 2024, at the telehealth visit with the provider at the Cleveland Clinic, Jennifer
4
In Jennifer Gard, et al. v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2025-00740JD, Jennifer Gard
and Alva Gard (who are the plaintiffs in this case), through counsel, filed a complaint on August 13, 2025,
arising from the same circumstances as this case.
Case No. 2025-00899JD -10- DECISION
Gard became aware, or should have become aware, that Dr. Dominiak’s pathology
reports from March 2023 were incorrect, thereby creating a “cognizable event” under
Hershberger and Allenius, which, in turn, triggered the running of the one-year statute of
limitations. See Rosendale at ¶ 6 (10th Dist.). Since, in Jennifer Gard, et al. v. Univ. of
Toledo Med. Ctr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2025-00740JD, Jennifer Gard and Alva Gard (who are
the plaintiffs in this case) filed a complaint on August 13, 2025, that is based on the same
facts and circumstances as this case, plaintiffs’ lawsuit in Ct. of Cl. No. 2025-00740JD, at
the outset, was untimely.
C. Ohio Savings Statute (R.C. 2305.19) does not preclude a summary
judgment in defendant’s favor.
{¶20} Ohio Savings Statute (R.C. 2305.19) “permits a plaintiff to refile a claim that
would otherwise be time-barred within one year after the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon
the merits.” Boozer v. Univ. of Cincinnati Sch. of Law, 2006-Ohio-2610, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).
See R.C. 2305.19(A) (savings statute).5 The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that R.C.
2305.19 is a remedial statute that “is to be given a liberal construction to permit the
decision of cases upon their merits rather than upon mere technicalities of procedure.”
Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 82 (1960), paragraph
5
R.C. 2305.19(A) provides:
In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a
judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits,
the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, the plaintiff’s
representative may commence a new action within one year after the date of the reversal
of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period
of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. This division applies
to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.
R.C. 2305.19 applies to medical claims. See Wilson v. Durrani, 2020-Ohio-6827. In Wilson at ¶ 18, the
Supreme Court of Ohio explained:
R.C. 2305.19(A) neither operates as a statute of limitations nor operates to toll the
statute of limitations. Lewis v. Connor, 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 21 Ohio B. 266, 487 N.E.2d 285
(1985), citing Reese v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 6 Ohio St.3d 162, 163, 6 Ohio B. 221, 451
N.E.2d 1196 (1983). Rather, it provides a plaintiff with a limited period of time in which to
refile a dismissed claim by commencing a new action that would otherwise be barred by
the statute of limitations. Int’l Periodical Distribs. v. Bizmart, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 452, 2002-
Ohio-2488, 768 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 7.
Case No. 2025-00899JD -11- DECISION
one of the syllabus. Under Ohio law, however, a liberal construction of R.C. 2305.19 does
not provide a license to enlarge the statute, strain the statute’s meaning, give an unnatural
meaning to the statute, or expand R.C. 2305.19 to meet a particular set of facts. See,
e.g., Daugherty v. Cent. Trust Co., 28 Ohio St. 3d 441, 447 (1986); Nicolas v. Dir., Ohio
Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2005-Ohio-2635, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.).
{¶21} The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained: “R.C. 2305.19 can have no
application unless an action was timely commenced, was dismissed without prejudice,
and the applicable statute of limitations had expired by the time of such dismissal.” Reese
v. Ohio State Univ. Hosps., 6 Ohio St. 3d 162, 163 (1983). Accord Lewis v. Connor, 21
Ohio St. 3d 1, 4 (1985) (“R.C. 2305.19 has no application unless an action is timely
commenced and is then dismissed without prejudice after the applicable statute of
limitations has run”). Here, as demonstrated above, plaintiffs’ action against defendant
was not timely commenced because, in Jennifer Gard, et al. v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr.,
Ct. of Cl. No. 2025-00740JD, plaintiffs commenced their medical-practice action on
August 13, 2025—more than one year after the cognizable event occurring on August 6,
2024, that alerted, or should have alerted plaintiff Jennifer Gard, that she was injured by
Dr. Nicole Dominiak’s apparent misdiagnosis of Gard’s condition. Consequently, R.C.
2305.19 (Ohio Savings Statute) does not apply, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ arguments.
{¶22} Additionally, as noted by plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ action against the University of
Toledo Medical Center in the Lucas County Common Pleas Court was dismissed on
August 21, 2025—eight days after plaintiffs brought their medical malpractice action in
Jennifer Gard, et al. v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2025-00740JD. Thus, at
the time that plaintiffs first sued defendant in this forum, the action in the common pleas
court had not yet been dismissed. Because the action in the common pleas court had
not been dismissed before plaintiffs commenced their first action in this court, the Ohio
Savings State does not apply. See Windsor House, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family
Servs., 2010-Ohio-257, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.) (savings statute does not apply where a plaintiff
files a second complaint before failing otherwise than upon the merits in a previous
complaint); see also R.C. 2305.19(A) (“[i]n any action that is commenced or attempted to
be commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails
otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action
Case No. 2025-00899JD -12- DECISION
survives, the plaintiff’s representative may commence a new action within one year after
the date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the
merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever
occurs later. This division applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant”
(emphasis sic)).
{¶23} In sum, after the summary-judgment standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C) is
applied to the submitted evidence, defendant has demonstrated that plaintiffs’ claims are
time-barred under R.C. 2305.113(A) and plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their reciprocal
burden under Dresher, and as outlined in Civ.R. 56(E), to show that their action against
defendant is not time-barred.
IV. Conclusion
{¶24} For reasons set forth above, defendant’s summary-judgment motion shall be
granted and a summary judgment in defendant’s favor shall be issued.
LISA L. SADLER
Judge
[Cite as Gard v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr., 2026-Ohio-4569.]
JENNIFER GARD, et al. Case No. 2025-00899JD
Plaintiffs Judge Lisa L. Sadler
v. JUDGMENT ENTRY
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO MEDICAL
CENTER
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO
{¶25} For reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith, defendant’s
motion for summary judgment filed on September 1, 2026, is GRANTED. Judgment is
entered in defendant’s favor. All previously scheduled events are VACATED. Court costs
are assessed against plaintiffs. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this
judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.
LISA L. SADLER
Judge
Filed October 30, 2026
Sent to S.C. Reporter 11/19/26