Full Opinion

Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Oct 14 2026, 10:42 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Julia Beaman and William Bobbs, Jr., Appellants-Plaintiffs v. F. Jefferson Crump, III, Estate of Carolyn Janice Bobbs, and First Financial Bank, N.A., Appellees-Defendants October 14, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-2471 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable David Certo, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D08-2202-PL-6085 Opinion by Judge May Judges Mathias and Felix concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 1 of 16 May, Judge. [1] Julia Beaman (“Julia”) and William Bobbs, Jr., (“Bobbs Jr.”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of attorney F. Jefferson Crump III in their legal malpractice action against him. Plaintiffs raise three issues for our review, but we find one dispositive: whether Plaintiffs’ suit was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm. Facts and Procedural History [2] Plaintiffs are the adult children of William Bobbs Sr. (“Bobbs Sr.”) and his first wife, Daisy, who passed away. In 1999, Bobbs Sr. married Carolyn Janice Bobbs (“Jan”). Jan had been one of Crump’s high school teachers, and he had performed some legal work for her after becoming an attorney. On August 29, 2017, Bobbs Sr. and Jan met with Crump at his law office in Columbus, Indiana. After exchanging pleasantries, Bobbs Sr. “kind of took over the meeting.” (Appellants’ App. Vol. 4 at 163.) Bobbs Sr. explained that he and Jan were considering moving into the Four Seasons Retirement Community (“Four Seasons”), and they wanted to find a way to ensure Jan could stay at Four Seasons if she outlived Bobbs Sr. Following the initial meeting, Crump drafted a letter outlining three ways Bobbs Sr. and Jan could accomplish that goal and spoke with Bobbs Sr. several times. Their discussions turned to creating a Qualified Terminable Interest Property trust1 (“QTIP trust”) for the 1 “The utilization of a QTIP Trust in an estate plan is designed to provide the surviving spouse with income for life, yet make certain that upon the surviving spouse’s demise, the assets go to specified individuals, such Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 2 of 16 purposes of ensuring that Jan could stay at Four Seasons should Bobbs Sr. predecease her and minimizing Bobbs Sr.’s estate tax exposure. On November 3, 2017, Crump, Bobbs Sr., and Seth Keele, a trust officer at First Financial Bank (“FFB”), met at Crump’s law office and discussed setting up a QTIP trust, and Bobbs Sr. decided to proceed with creating a QTIP trust. [3] On November 23, 2017, Crump sent a letter to Bobbs Sr. and Jan outlining the terms of their attorney-client relationship. The letter included a summary of the work intended to be accomplished: “Draft a trust or other document(s) for the benefit of Jan guaranteeing sufficient funding to pay rental to Four Seasons Retirement Center in the event that Jan survives Bill and hereafter perform other legal work as requested by the two of you for the benefit of each other.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 3 at 11.) In addition, the letter explained Crump’s joint representation of both Bobbs Sr. and Jan: Our representation will be of you jointly in this aspect of your estate planning. Each of you inherently has a potential conflict of interest with the other of you in the development of your estate plans; however, after discussions with both of you there appears to be no current conflict of interest in this aspect of your estate plans. (Id.) The letter also advised Bobbs Sr. and Jan to consult independent legal counsel if any concern arose regarding Crump’s representation of both. Bobbs as the children by the first marriage.” 26A Ind. Prac., Anderson’s Wills, Trusts & Est. Plan § 12:20 (2025-26 ed.). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 3 of 16 Sr. and Jan returned to Crump a signed copy of the final page of the letter indicating they agreed to the terms of the attorney-client relationship outlined in the letter. [4] On December 9, 2017, Bobbs Sr. met with Bobbs Jr. and Julia for lunch, and the three discussed Bobbs Sr.’s decision to hire Crump to set up a QTIP trust to provide for Jan to stay at Four Seasons should she outlive him. Julia and Bobbs Jr. “had never heard of a QTIP Trust before and did not know what it was or how it differed from a regular Trust.” (Appellants’ App. Vol. 5 at 98.) Julia used an application on her smart phone to record the conversation between Bobbs Sr., Bobbs Jr., and herself.2 During the conversation, the three spoke about the revocability of the QTIP Trust: [Julia:] What happens if you change your mind? Are you able to pull it out or is it hard and fast? Are you stuck? [Bobbs Jr.:] Yeah. Say something happens to Jan and you decide to come up to Indianapolis and you’re living with Julia or I, can you pull that – back that trust if you want? [Bobbs Sr.:] Uh-huh. [Bobbs Jr.:] Okay. [Bobbs Sr.:] Uh-huh. 2 Plaintiffs had the recorded conversation transcribed by a certified court reporter. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 4 of 16 [Bobbs Jr.:] It’s revocable. It’s not irrevocable. [Bobbs Sr.:] Uh-huh. [Julia:] Okay. [Bobbs Sr.:] Uh-huh. Well, that’s—while I’m alive, the money in the trust is still under my direction, the investment. (Id. at 104.) In hearing about Bobbs Sr.’s employment of Crump to create a QTIP Trust, Bobbs Jr. felt that his father “was being sucked into something. It just didn’t smell right. . . . [I]t seemed that there was some conflict of interest. It’s almost like he was wooed into it some way.” (Appellants’ App. Vol. 3 at 115.) During the lunch, Bobbs Jr. raised his concern to his father about Crump having a conflict of interest, but Bobbs Sr. did not agree. In “cocktail talk” with “friends who are attorneys,” (id. at 118-19), Bobbs Jr. discussed his suspicion of Crump’s potential conflict of interest, and Bobbs Jr. referenced what he “heard from an attorney” during the lunch. (Appellants’ App. Vol. 5 at 101.) [5] On December 11, 2017, Crump emailed a draft of the QTIP trust to Bobbs Sr. In the following days, Crump spoke with Bobbs Sr. over the phone and revised the draft QTIP trust. Bobbs Sr. was hospitalized with influenza on December 30, 2017, and released from the hospital on January 2, 2018. He also returned to the hospital on January 6, 2018, and he was discharged that same day. He was alert and oriented and in no distress when he was discharged from the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 5 of 16 hospital. On January 9, 2018, Crump phoned both Keele and Bobbs Sr. and arranged from them to come into his office the following day. [6] On January 10, 2018, Crump, Bobbs Sr., and Keele met in Crump’s office, and Bobbs Sr. executed the QTIP trust agreement. It named Bobbs Sr. as the Settlor and Individual Trustee and FFB as the Bank Trustee. The QTIP trust agreement explained that Bobbs Sr. had delivered approximately $3,000,000 as trust property to FFB and that the trust property “shall be held and disposed of by the Trustees pursuant to the terms and conditions of this ‘Trust Agreement.’” (Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 55.) In addition, the QTIP trust agreement prohibited the Settlor from revoking or amending any of its terms. Section 3.1. of the QTIP trust agreement provided: During the lifetime of the Settlor, the Trustee may pay all the income to the Settlor. Any income not distributed to the Settlor shall be added to the corpus of the Trust Property. (Id. at 55-56.) Section 3.2 of the trust agreement concerned the distribution of trust property during Jan’s lifetime. It explained: From and after the death of the Settlor and during Jan’s lifetime, the Trustee shall pay to Jan all the net income of the Trust Agreement, in monthly or other installments but not less often than quarterly. The Trustee shall distribute to Jan, in addition, such portion or all of the principal of the Trust Property as the Trustee, in its discretion, determines to be necessary to pay Jan’s monthly rental to the Four Seasons Retirement Center solely from the income and principal of the Trust Agreement. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 6 of 16 (Id. at 56.) It provided that any money left in the QTIP trust after Jan died was to be paid to Bobbs Jr. and Julia. The QTIP trust agreement identified Bobbs Sr. as the sole trustee upon establishment of the QTIP trust with “the authority and duty to manage the Trust Property.” (Id. at 64.) FFB as Bank Trustee was responsible for being the custodian of the trust property upon establishment of the QTIP trust, and following Bobbs Sr.’s death or incapacity, FFB was to succeed him as the sole trustee. The QTIP trust agreement also gave Jan the authority, following Bobbs Sr.’s death, to remove the sole trustee of the QTIP trust and appoint any successor trustees. [7] On January 23, 2018, Bobbs Sr. and Jan entered into a continuing care agreement with Four Seasons and moved into the retirement center. The continuing care agreement contemplated the payment of a monthly service fee and various ancillary fees. It did not designate any one fee as “rent.” The monthly cost to live at Four Seasons when Bobbs Sr. and Jan first moved into the retirement center was approximately $4,000. Bobbs Sr. died on May 12, 2020. After Bobbs Sr. died, FFB became the successor trustee of the QTIP trust. Shortly thereafter, Jan fell and injured herself. Jan required additional care post-fall and was transferred to a different, more intensive, unit at Four Seasons. The more intensive unit required substantially higher fees for Jan to stay there, and FFB, as trustee, authorized the QTIP trust to pay those fees. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 7 of 16 [8] On February 24, 2022, Plaintiffs filed suit against Crump and Jan.3 The complaint alleged that the QTIP trust was invalid and asserted a claim of negligence against Crump. The complaint alleged: 5. In consulting with Crump during 2017, [Bobbs Sr.] made it clear that he wished to primarily benefit [Bobbs Jr.] and Julia through his estate planning. With respect to his wife Jan, his only goals in discussing and eventually executing the Purported Trust were to save on estate taxes and to provide for the payment of her expected future rent at Four Seasons, a progressive care facility. 6. However, by Crump’s design, the Purported Trust pays out excessive amounts to Jan, well beyond those desired by or anticipated by [Bobbs Sr.]. And these excessive distributions greatly harm and injure [Bobbs Jr.] and Julia, who are the remainder beneficiaries of the Purported Trust. ***** 9. Upon information and belief, on or before January 10, 2018, Crump knew or should have known that [Bobbs Sr.’s] health had deteriorated and that he was of unsound mind and lacked the level of capacity necessary to sustain the Purported Trust, an irrevocable trust. 10. Upon information and belief, as of January 10, 2018, Crump knew or should have known that the Purported Trust was not 3 Jan later filed a third-party complaint against FFB, but FFB is not a party to this appeal. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 8 of 16 consistent with [Bobbs Sr.’s] well-established wishes for his estate plan. 11. Upon information and belief, as of January 10, 2018, Crump knew or should have known that he was facilitating Jan’s undue influence over [Bobbs Sr.] regarding the Purported Trust. 12. Crump owed a duty to [Bobbs Sr.] due to his attorney-client relationship with him. 13. Crump breached that duty through his representations or by remaining silent when he had a duty to speak regarding the Purported Trust, which was inconsistent with [Bobbs Sr.’s] expressed intentions and desires. 14. As described above and otherwise, Crump was negligent, breached his duties to [Bobbs Sr.], and did not conform his conduct to the appropriate standard of care. 15. The Plaintiffs, [Bobbs Jr.] and Julia, as remainder trust beneficiaries under the Purported Trust, were known and intended third-party beneficiaries of [Bobbs Sr.’s] plan and under the Trust agreement. 16. Crump’s actions and inactions as described above have caused the Plaintiffs to suffer loss and injury. 17. As a result of Crump’s actions as described herein and otherwise, Plaintiffs have suffered damages. (Id. at 52-53.) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 9 of 16 [9] Jan died on September 20, 2023, and Plaintiffs substituted her estate as a defendant. Plaintiffs also filed an amended complaint that contained the same substantive allegations against Crump as the original complaint. On March 1, 2024, Crump filed a motion for summary judgment that asserted Plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs opposed Crump’s motion for summary judgment, and after extensive briefing by both sides, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. On July 8, 2025, the trial court issued an order granting Crump’s motion for summary judgment.4 The trial court explained: The designated evidence in this case indicates the Plaintiffs knew of Bobbs. [sic] Sr.’s plan to execute the QTIP Trust before December 9, 2017, as they described their “concerns” about his plan and their questions about whether Crump had a conflict of interest in representing their father. According to the rule articulated by our Court of Appeals in Ickes [v. Waters, 879 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) aff’d on reh’g, 886 N.E.2d 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied], the latest date the “dispositive effect” could have occurred for Plaintiffs was when Bobbs, Sr. executed the Irrevocable QTIP Trust on January 10, 2018. The Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until February 24, 2022, well past [sic] the two year statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions. Confronted by the designated evidence, the court cannot accept Plaintiffs’ position that damages—if any— did not begin to occur and the statute of limitations did not begin 4 Jan’s estate also filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the estate’s motion on September 9, 2025. Plaintiffs also sought to appeal that grant of summary judgment, but on April 22, 2026, Jan’s estate filed a notice of settlement and motion to dismiss the appeal with prejudice. We granted the motion to dismiss on May 19, 2026. Therefore, Jan’s estate is no longer a party to this appeal. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 10 of 16 to run until Bobbs, Sr.’s death on May 12, 2020, as the date he executed the QTIP Trust is undisputed. ***** Crump notes and the designated evidence reflects Plaintiffs felt concerns about the proposed QTIP Trust before their lunch with Bobbs, Sr. on December 9, 2017. Despite these concerns and their “cocktail talk” lawyerly friends, Plaintiffs did not ask for or obtain a copy of the irrevocable trust instrument. If Plaintiffs had acted on their concerns in a timely manner, they could have pursued an alternate course of action with their father and his estate plans. Their lack of action in the face of their misgivings is not the ordinary diligence one might expect from parties with misgivings about long term estate planning with meaningful assets at stake. (Id. at 31-32.) Discussion and Decision [10] Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Crump on the basis that their attorney malpractice claim was barred by the statute of limitations. “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as the trial court.” McElhany v. Grisham, 260 N.E.3d 987, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Schon v Frantz, 156 N.E.3d 692, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). “We construe all reasonable Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 11 of 16 inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” McElhany, 260 N.E.3d at 991. “A fact is material if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is genuine if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hatfield, 28 N.E.3d 247, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “Although we are not bound by the trial court’s findings and conclusions, they aid our review by providing reasons for the trial court’s decision. If the trial court’s entry of summary judgment can be sustained on any theory or basis in the record, we must affirm.” Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Heck, 873 N.E.2d 190, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted). [11] A statute of limitations advances multiple public policy objectives. Krieg Devault LLP v. WGT V, LLC, 206 N.E.3d 1171, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. “By encouraging prompt presentation of claims, statutes of limitation spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The statute of limitations for attorney malpractice is two years. The two-year period begins to run when the plaintiff knows of, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, the tortious conduct.” Chenore v. Plantz, 56 N.E.3d 123, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation omitted); see also Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a) (providing that action for injury to personal property must be commenced within two years of when the cause of action accrues). “For a cause of action to accrue, it is not Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 12 of 16 necessary that the full extent of damage be known or even ascertainable, but only that some ascertainable damage has occurred.” Silvers v. Brodeur, 682 N.E.2d 811, 813-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. The diligence expected is “simply that an injured party must act with some promptness where the acts and circumstances of an injury would put a person of common knowledge and experience on notice that some right of his has been invaded or that some claim against another party might exist.” Krieg Devault LLP, 206 N.E.3d at 1182 (quoting Perryman v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 683, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). [12] Plaintiffs assert their claim was timely because they did not discover Crump’s alleged malpractice until after Bobbs Sr.’s death, and they attempt to draw a comparison to Shideler v. Dwyer, 415 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 1981). In Shideler, our Indiana Supreme Court examined when an intended beneficiary’s cause of action for legal malpractice accrued against an attorney who the intended beneficiary alleged had negligently drafted a will resulting in a gift meant for the intended beneficiary being declared invalid. Id. at 284. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action accrued at the time of the testator’s death because that was when the will “was operative” and had a “dispositive effect.” Id. at 290. Any wrong set in motion by the drafting of the will “became irremediable” upon the testator’s death. Id. Likewise, the Plaintiffs assert they relied on Bobbs Sr.’s indication that the QTIP trust was revocable and were not aware of any cause of action against Crump until they read the QTIP trust agreement after Bobbs Sr.’s death. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 13 of 16 [13] However, while a will does not have a dispositive effect until the testator dies, an inter vivos5 trust becomes operative when it is executed. Ickes, 879 N.E.2d at 1109. The Plaintiffs knew about the QTIP trust because they had discussions with Bobbs Sr. and attorneys about it around the time of its creation, but in the two years following creation of the QTIP trust, the Plaintiffs did not challenge it as invalid. They also did not ask Bobbs Sr. for a copy of the QTIP trust agreement to read, even though Bobbs Jr. concedes Bobbs Sr. likely would have provided them with one. If the Plaintiffs believed Bobbs Sr. was of unsound mind or under undue influence when he created the QTIP trust or that the trust was otherwise invalid, they did not act with ordinary diligence in seeking to invalidate it.6 See, e.g., id. (holding plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim against the attorney who assisted with establishment of an inter vivos trust was barred by the statute of limitations because she initiated suit more than two years after funding the trust). Because Plaintiffs waited more than two years after creation of the QTIP trust to assert Crump committed legal malpractice, their claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and we affirm the trial court’s grant of Crump’s motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Est. of Spry v. Batey, 804 5 “Inter vivos” is Latin for “between the living” and means “[o]f, relating to, or involving property conveyed not by will or in contemplation of an imminent death, but during the conveyor’s lifetime.” INTER VIVOS, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). 6 In their surreply memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, the Plaintiffs included a section attempting to clarify what they intended to prove at trial. That section acknowledges the Plaintiffs’ intent to abandon some of the theories advanced in the operative complaint and to focus solely on their claim that Crump drafted the QTIP trust agreement in such a way that it did not accurately reflect Bobbs Sr.’s intentions. However, any legal malpractice claim based on such a theory would have also accrued at creation of the QTIP trust and is untimely. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 14 of 16 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding the legal malpractice claim of the estate of a passenger killed by a drunk driver was barred by the statute of limitations when the estate brought suit against attorney over two years after learning that the release the attorney had advised them to sign also barred suit against the establishment where the drunk driver had been drinking before the accident), trans. denied. Conclusion [14] Plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the statute of limitations because it was brought more than two years after creation of the QTIP trust. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. [15] Affirmed. Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 15 of 16 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS John A. Cremer Jonathan E. Lamb Kaleb A. Salisbury Cremer & Lamb Fishers, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Michael Edward O’Neill Daniel Ford O’Neill, McFadden & Willett LLP Schererville, Indiana Elizabeth N. Whitaker Christopher J. Mueller Lewis Wagner & Trimble LLP Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-2471 | October 14, 2026 Page 16 of 16