Full Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 6D2025-0045 Lower Tribunal No. 2023-CA-009103 _____________________________ LONNE LETTERI, Appellant, v. SAFEPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. _____________________________ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County. Michael T. McHugh, Judge. October 2, 2026 TRAVER, C.J. Lonne Letteri appeals the trial court’s final summary judgment for Safepoint Insurance Company. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Letteri raced to the courthouse to file a breach of contract lawsuit against his insurer before the claims process broke down. Accordingly, Safepoint’s post-filing payment of policy limits following an appraisal process that complied with the insurance policy’s terms did not constitute a “confession of judgment” entitling Letteri to recover his attorney’s fees under section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (2022). Letteri’s notice of intent to sue under section 627.70152, Florida Statutes (2022), does not change this conclusion. While this statute allowed Letteri to file his lawsuit, it did not require it. Finally, the statute neither imposed an extra-contractual appraisal deadline nor entitled Letteri to recover his attorney’s fees automatically. We affirm. 1 I. Letteri’s home suffered damage from Hurricane Ian, and he promptly filed a claim. Safepoint inspected the property, accepted coverage, and issued payments totaling about $200,000. A month later, Letteri submitted a notice under section 627.70152. This statute requires insureds to notify the Department of Financial Services of their intent to sue. § 627.70152(3)(a). The notice must contain, among other information, an explanation of “[t]he alleged acts or omissions of the insurer giving rise to the suit” and a presuit settlement demand. § 627.70152(3)(a)2., 5.a. The Department then notifies the insurer. § 627.70152(3)(a). The insured must give notice at least ten business days before suing, but only after the insurer has made a coverage determination. Id. 1 We separately affirm the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest without further discussion. See § 627.70131(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“However, failure to comply with this subsection does not form the sole basis for a private cause of action.”); see also Riley v. Heritage Prop. & Cas. Ins., No. 23-11678, 2025 WL 574244, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 21, 2025) (rejecting appellants’ breach of contract claims for insurance company’s failure to pay interest because claims were “thinly disguised claims for statutory breach of Subsection [(7)](a)” which were “precluded by Subsection [(7)](a)’s private action bar”). 2 Within ten business days of receiving notice, the insurer must respond to the insured. § 627.70152(4). If the insurer does not deny coverage, it “must respond by making a settlement offer or requiring the claimant to participate in appraisal or another method of alternative dispute resolution.” § 627.70152(4)(b) (emphasis added). If the insurer elects appraisal, and that process is incomplete within ninety days after the expiration of the ten-day notice period, the insured “may immediately file suit without providing the insurer additional notice.” Id. When Letteri served his notice, section 627.70152 contained an attorney’s fees provision. § 627.70152(8). That provision, since repealed, 2 grounded an insured’s fee recovery, if any, under section 627.428(1). 3 § 627.70152(8)(a). It first required determination of the difference between the “amount obtained” by the insured and the insurer’s “presuit settlement offer,” and then a calculation of a percentage based on that figure and the “disputed amount.” § 627.70152(2), (8)(a). In his notice of intent to sue, Letteri sought more than $200,000 in additional damages and $10,000 in attorney’s fees. In response, Safepoint required him to participate in appraisal. See NCI, LLC v. Progressive Select Ins., 350 So. 3d 801, 806 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“Appraisals are creatures of contract and the subject or 2 Ch. 2022-271, § 17, Laws of Fla. (eff. Dec. 16, 2022). 3 This statute has also since been repealed. Ch. 2023-15, § 11, Laws of Fla. (eff. Mar. 24, 2023). 3 scope of appraisal depends on the contract provision.” (quoting Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Branco, 148 So. 3d 488, 491 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014))). The policy outlined the parties’ appraisal rights and procedure for it. “The goal of appraisal provisions is to settle disputes without litigation.” Id. (citing SafePoint Ins. v. Hallet, 322 So. 3d 204, 207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)). The policy required each party to choose a competent appraiser within twenty days. The appraisers would each set the amount of loss, and if they could not agree, select a competent and impartial umpire. The policy did not contain a deadline for the parties to complete appraisal, but if an appraisal award was filed, Safepoint had to pay Letteri that amount within sixty days. The appraisal process proceeded uneventfully. Both parties timely chose appraisers, and those appraisers agreed on an umpire. But when the process did not conclude within ninety days, Letteri sued Safepoint for breach of contract. He alleged that Safepoint had breached the policy by refusing to pay him for his benefits owed. Safepoint immediately moved to abate the lawsuit to allow for completion of the appraisal process, and Letteri agreed. The umpire later issued an appraisal award for policy limits, and Safepoint paid the award within the sixty days the policy required. Below, Letteri conceded that any delay in finalizing the appraisal award was nobody’s fault, and his appraiser attested that the umpire’s inability to complete the process sooner stemmed from her post-hurricane workload. 4 Both parties moved for summary judgment. Letteri moved first, claiming the appraisal award was a confession of judgment entitling him to recover his attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. Safepoint moved next, claiming it did not breach the policy when it timely paid the appraisal award, and insisting it would have paid the appraisal award whether Letteri sued or not. The trial court granted Safepoint’s motion and denied Letteri’s. It concluded the claims process had not broken down, and just because section 627.70152 allowed Letteri to sue, it did not mean that an attorney’s fees award was appropriate or authorized. It determined that the ninety-day deadline in section 627.70152(4)(b) was not a deadline for appraisal’s completion, and that because Safepoint had elected appraisal rather than make a settlement offer, section 627.70152(8)’s fee recovery formula did not apply. Lastly, it observed that if an insurer unreasonably delayed the appraisal process or payout, a confession of judgment allowing for fee entitlement may occur. But it concluded that this had not occurred. II. We review de novo the trial court’s summary judgment. Pial Holdings, LTD v. Riverfront Plaza, LLC, 379 So. 3d 547, 550 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (citing Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000)). We likewise review statutory interpretation issues de novo. See Marlin Constr. Grp., LLC v. Bollinger, 412 So. 3d 812, 815 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024). 5 III. On this record, no confession of judgment occurred. We decline to apply this judicially created doctrine when the parties’ claim process has not broken down, and the insured races to the courthouse to seek his attorney’s fees under section 627.428(1). Nothing about section 627.70152 alters this conclusion. A. Section 627.70152 has never provided an independent right to attorney’s fees; our inquiry is driven by section 627.428(1)’s applicability. See Citizens Prop. Ins. v. Vazquez, 368 So. 3d 456, 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). As the Fourth District explained, section 627.70152(8)’s plain language recognizes section 627.428(1) as the source of the insured’s fee claim. See id. (citing § 627.70152(8)). And we agree with our sister court that “a dispute over attorney’s fees alone cannot be the trigger for a lawsuit or a fee award” under section 627.70152. See id. B. Section 627.428(1) is inapplicable to Letteri’s case, and it does not compel his fee recovery. Before its repeal, this statute provided that an insured could recover his attorney’s fees “[u]pon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named or omnibus insured or the named beneficiary under a policy or contract executed by the insurer.” § 627.428(1). Of course, no such judgment occurred when Safepoint paid the appraisal award. But 6 the Florida Supreme Court broadened section 627.428(1)’s applicability to include situations where an insurer settled a case before a judgment’s entry. See Wollard v. Lloyd’s & Cos. of Lloyd’s, 439 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1983). In Wollard, an insured suffered a loss, and the insurer denied coverage. Id. at 217–18. The insured hired an attorney and sued. Id. at 218. On the eve of trial, the parties settled. Id. The trial court awarded the insured his attorney’s fees, but the district court reversed, relying on section 627.428’s plain language requiring a judgment’s entry. Id. The Wollard Court disagreed, reasoning that the statute’s “literal requirement . . . exalts form over substance to the detriment of public policy.” Id. It observed that “[r]equiring the plaintiff to continue litigation in spite of an acceptable offer of settlement . . . puts an unnecessary burden on the judicial system, fails to protect any interest—the insured’s, the insurer’s or the public’s—and discourages any attempt at settlement.” Id. This “confession of judgment doctrine” thus addressed policy considerations; the Wollard Court concluded it was unfair to require an insured to continue litigating a lawsuit that the insurer forced him to file based on its belated acceptance of its contractual breach. Id. Untethered to the statute’s plain language, the confession of judgment doctrine led to predictable questions. Relevant here, whether an insured is entitled to fees when an insurer did not breach the policy, but the parties’ resolution occurred after the insured had filed suit. Our sister courts have all said no. See, e.g., Allstate 7 Fire & Cas. Ins. v. Castro, 351 So. 3d 127, 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022); Progressive Select Ins. v. Hilchey, 396 So. 3d 775, 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024); Valdivieso v. Citizens Prop. Ins., 388 So. 3d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024); People’s Tr. Ins. v. Farinato, 315 So. 3d 724, 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Lorenzo, 969 So. 2d 393, 397 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). The Lorenzo court, for example, declined to apply the confession of judgment doctrine “where the insureds were not forced to sue to receive benefits; applying the doctrine would encourage unnecessary litigation by rewarding a race to the courthouse for attorney’s fees even where the insurer was complying with its obligations under the policy.” 969 So. 2d at 398. The Farinato court asked whether the insured’s lawsuit “was filed for a legitimate purpose, and whether the filing acted as a necessary catalyst to resolve the dispute and force the insurer to satisfy its obligations under the insurance contract.” 315 So. 3d at 728 (quoting State Farm Fla. Ins. v. Lime Bay Condo., Inc., 187 So. 3d 932, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)). If it was not, the confession of judgment doctrine did not apply. Id. While we are bound by Wollard’s holding and must apply the confession of judgment doctrine, we need not expand it to include situations to which the holding does not pertain. See Pedroza v. State, 291 So. 3d 541, 547 (Fla. 2020). We thus agree with our sister courts that the doctrine does not apply to a “race to the courthouse” situation. And this is what Letteri did here. Safepoint accepted 8 coverage and elected its right to appraisal. This process led to a policy-limits payout that Safepoint timely paid under the policy. Letteri did not have to sue Safepoint to obtain this recovery. Safepoint did not, for example, avoid or delay appraisal or payment following appraisal. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Ins. of Ill. v. Meadows MRI, LLP, 900 So. 2d 676, 678–79 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (concluding confession of judgment occurred post-appraisal when insured had to hire counsel to compel insurer to accept coverage and seek declaratory relief on “an expensive and drawn out” appraisal procedure); Goff v. State Farm Fla. Ins., 999 So. 2d 684, 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (awarding fees under confession of judgment theory because “lawsuit forced [insurer] to request an appraisal and to pay significant additional amounts”). Nobody forced Letteri to sue to receive his benefits, and his lawsuit did not act as a necessary catalyst to resolve the dispute. The confession of judgment doctrine does not apply. IV. Section 627.70152 does not alter this conclusion. It permitted Letteri to sue Safepoint when appraisal had not concluded within ninety days. See § 627.70152(4)(b); Burzee v. Am. Traditions Ins., 425 So. 3d 1161, 1163 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025). But the statute’s permissiveness did not compel his actions. See § 627.70152(4)(b) (“If the appraisal or alternative dispute resolution has not been concluded within 90 days after the expiration of the 10-day notice of intent to initiate 9 litigation specified in subsection (3), the claimant or claimant’s attorney may immediately file suit without providing the insurer additional notice.” (emphasis added)). Nor does this ninety-day deadline to sue constitute a deadline for an appraisal’s completion. The statute does not reference such a deadline. Neither does the policy. Concluding a deadline existed would require us to add something to the statute that is not there, and we decline this invitation. See Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. J.H., 418 So. 3d 765, 775 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (citing Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926)). Finally, we reject Letteri’s invitation to award fees based on section 627.70152(8)’s formula, which turned, in part, on the insurer’s presuit settlement offer. Letteri insists that because Safepoint did not make a settlement offer, we should assess its “presuit settlement offer” at $0. See id. § 627.70152(2), (8)(a). To Letteri, a zero-dollar presuit offer justifies his fee recovery under the statute. But he again misreads section 627.70152 to include words that are not there. The statute did not require an insurer to make a settlement offer if it did not deny coverage and instead elected to force an insured to participate in appraisal. See § 627.70152(4)(b) (“If an insurer is responding to a notice provided to the insurer alleging an act or omission by the insurer other than a denial of coverage, the insurer must respond by making a settlement offer or requiring the claimant to participate in appraisal or 10 another method of alternative dispute resolution.” (emphasis added)). Because Safepoint accepted coverage of Letteri’s loss and invoked appraisal, it need not have made a presuit settlement offer. See id. § 627.70152(4)(b); Telophase Soc. of Fla., Inc. v. State Bd. of Funeral Dirs. & Embalmers, 334 So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1976) (“‘Or’ when used in a statute is generally to be construed in the disjunctive.” (citation omitted)). V. On this record, the confession of judgment doctrine does not apply, and Letteri has no basis to recover his attorney’s fees. We thus affirm. AFFIRMED. STARGEL and BROWNLEE, JJ., concur. Michael A. Cassel, of Cassel Law, P.A., Hollywood, and Mark A. Boyle and Thomas E. Shepard, of Boyle, Leonard & Anderson, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant. Patrick M. Chidnese and Frieda C. Lindroth, of Bickford & Chidnese, LLP, Tampa, for Appellee. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED 11