Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3137-24 CHARLES and ANNA SILLA, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Q&R HOME IMPROVEMENTS, LLC, and ROBERT KOSEYAN, Defendants-Appellants. _____________________________ Submitted September 30, 2026 – Decided November 2, 2026 Before Judges Smith and Vinci. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-2528-22. Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellants (Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the brief). Ronal L. Lueddeke, attorneys for respondents (Karri Lueddeke, on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendants Q&R Home Improvements, LLC (Q&R) and Robert Koseyan appeal from a June 4, 2025 amended order for judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs Charles and Anna Silla following a bench trial at which the court found defendants violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8- 1 to -227, in connection with a series of home-improvement contracts.1 We affirm. I. We summarize the facts developed during the bench trial on March 17, 2025. Plaintiffs, who primarily reside in New York, own a second home in Neptune. Q&R provides various home improvement services to residential property owners and Koseyan is the owner of Q&R. Plaintiffs contacted Koseyan to do a "total renovation" of the interior of their Neptune home. On May 14, 2022, the parties entered into a contract for a "bathroom remodel" (May 14 contract). The May 14 contract provided defendants would "demoli[sh the] entire bathroom stripped down to the framing beams and . . . subflooring," install bathroom fixtures, "[i]nstall moisture resistant 1 Defendants also appealed from orders entered on July 9, 2024, September 8, 2023, and November 3, 2023. Defendants did not brief any arguments relating to those orders, and any such arguments are therefore waived. Green Knight Cap., LLC v. Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021). A-3137-24 2 drywall," and "[i]nstall new bathroom vinyl." The contract stated "[p]lumbing configuration to be unchanged. Electrical configuration to be unchanged." The total price for the services included in the May 14 contract was $11,500, which plaintiffs paid in full before any work began. Also on May 14, plaintiffs executed a "change order" (May 14 change order) for additional work. This work included "[g]eneral yard clean up," "[t]rench[ing] electrical to [the] rear yard," "paint[ing the] interior of [the] house," "replac[ing] all hot water baseboard units," "[s]and[ing] [the] entire hardwood flooring throughout [the] house," and "[r]emov[ing] and install[ing] new ceiling fans." The total price for the services included in the May 14 change order was $13,650, which plaintiffs paid in full before the work was completed. On May 28, 2022, the parties executed a second change order (May 28 change order) for additional work, including "[i]nstall[ation of] kitchen cabinets . . . [b]ase cabinets . . . wall cabinets . . . [c]ountertops . . . [a] stainless [steel] sink . . . [and a] backsplash." The price for that work in the kitchen was $18,500. The May 28 change order also included "[d]emolition of . . . flooring to existing floor beams," "[i]nstall[ation of] floor insulation," "[i]nstall[ation of] vinyl thermal pane windows," "[i]nstall[ation of a]luminum roof sealer," "[p]aint[ing the] entire exterior of house and garage," and "[p]aint[ing the] entire A-3137-24 3 interior of house and garage." The total price for the services included in the May 28 change order was $47,000. Plaintiffs paid $35,000 toward the work included in the May 28 change order before the work was completed. On June 16, 2022, the parties executed another change order (June 16 change order), which included "[s]upply/install[ation of three] exterior [half] lite doors," "re-install[ation of] existing storm doors," "[r]emoval of all job related debris," "[s]upply/install[ation of] prefinished flooring throughout [the] entire house," and "install[ation of] underlayment barrier throughout the entire house." The total price for the services included in the June 16 change order was $12,500, which plaintiffs paid in full. The total price for all the work included in the May 14 contract and the change orders was $84,650. As of June 17, 2022, plaintiffs paid Q&R a total of $72,650. Defendants failed to complete the work and left the job site by early July 2022. On September 16, 2022, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging: (1) violations of the CFA; (2) breach of contract; (3) negligence; and (4) violation of the Contractors' Registration Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-136 to -152. Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial. On November 14, 2022, defendants answered. In August 2023, defendants' first counsel moved to withdraw, which A-3137-24 4 the court granted on September 8, 2023. On December 20, 2024, new counsel entered an appearance for defendants. On March 17, 2025, the court conducted a bench trial. Anna Silla testified defendants "began the work." They "strip[ped] off the floors . . . and put [in] the new one."2 Defendants "also changed the windows . . . without doing the sides" and "insulated the whole house." However, defendants did not finish the bathroom, finish the kitchen, buy [plaintiffs] any kitchen cabinets, paint, install countertops, install a tile backsplash, install any appliances, paint the exterior of the home, or install any portion of the bathroom. Anna testified Koseyan "said he [was] going . . . to finish . . . two months from . . . May 14." She "expected that the work would be done at some point in July." Anna testified that when plaintiffs were at the home they "were sleeping in the garage because there [was] no water, no bathroom." They also used restaurant bathrooms to relieve themselves and "wash" themselves. Anna testified that plaintiffs' "communications fell off with . . . Koseyan" and they "ke[pt] calling him. No answer. [They] texted him. No answer. He 2 Because plaintiffs share a common surname, we refer to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended. A-3137-24 5 just ignore[d them]. That[ was] it. Like, gone." Plaintiffs introduced numerous text messages and phone records to corroborate Anna's testimony. Plaintiffs eventually hired their neighbor who was a licensed contractor, Eddie Knee of EBK's Total Construction LLC, who finished the renovations. Plaintiffs paid Knee at least $62,167 for his work. Knee testified that when he first visited the home in July or August 2022, he observed plaintiffs "needed a bathroom done and a kitchen done . . . and a bunch of miscellaneous stuff." He stated Koseyan had installed "[s]heetrock" and "a new floor" in the kitchen. Knee "gutted the walls" in the kitchen because "by code . . . there [were] not enough [electrical] outlets." Knee "t[ook] the [s]heetrock down," "install[ed] the cabinets and countertops," and "re- [s]heetrock[ed]." In the bathroom, Knee testified defendants had installed "the shower pan" and the "walls [were] ready for tile." Knee testified the bathroom was not finished, but some of the work was "salvageable in [his] opinion." Knee "took . . . apart" some of the previous work that was not done "the way he [does] it." He "did[ not] take apart things that [he] could use" and was able to use the "walls" defendants installed. Knee worked on "the hot water baseboards" in the bathroom "because, while they were renovating it, [the baseboards] . . . had to A-3137-24 6 be taken out and moved and [he] put that in and then a couple [of] new covers. " He also "replaced the diverter valve" for the shower. In the living room, Knee "finish[ed the s]heetrock" and there were "some spots that needed to be spackled" and there was "a little strip off the bottom . . . that [he] had to put on." Knee testified that "when [he] turned the heat on, it did[ not] work" and he had to replace the "gas valve" and "the pump that circulates the water." Knee needed to use outside professionals such as electricians, plumbers, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) specialists for some of the work. Koseyan testified that defendants completed a portion of the work they agreed to do. Specifically, they removed and replaced the floors, removed and reinstalled insulation and sheetrock, painted the roof with a waterproof material, removed a set of steps in the rear of the house, and painted the ceilings and interior other than the kitchen and bathroom. Koseyan claimed some of the work he did was not included in his contract and change orders with plaintiffs, including demolition and removal of "a structure in the back" of the property, grading the back yard, reframing a wall in the bathroom, and replacing beams, floor joists, and insulation as a result of water damage. A-3137-24 7 Koseyan testified that the work was delayed because, after defendants started work, plaintiffs said they "wanted to reconfigure" the kitchen and change "where everything had to go." That reconfiguration would have entailed electrical and plumbing work he could not do. He told plaintiffs he "needed a licensed electrician" and a "licensed plumber" to do that work. Koseyan also told plaintiffs he needed an HVAC professional to change the baseboard heating elements "if they really want[ed] the heat to work properly in the house." According to Koseyan, plaintiffs did not want to pay for the additional electrical and plumbing work, which "interfered with the completion of the project." Defendants continued the outside work while they were "waiting to understand how [plaintiffs] wanted . . . to configure . . . the kitchen and the bathroom." Charles "was the point person" and "he just was taking his time getting back to [Koseyan]." Koseyan claimed defendants completed "probably about [eighty-five] percent" of the work they agreed to do. Koseyan admitted defendants did not finish the bathroom work and did not "refund any portion of the $11,500" plaintiffs paid Q&R in connection with the May 14 contract. He also admitted defendants did not do all of the work included on the May 14 change order. Defendants did not "trench the electrical," "paint[] the bathroom," or "replace all hot water baseboard units." Defendants A-3137-24 8 also did not sand the hardwood flooring because it was replaced with laminate flooring. Defendants did not refund any portion of the $13,650 plaintiffs paid Q&R for the work included on the May 14 change order. With respect to the May 28 change order, Koseyan admitted defendants did not install the kitchen cabinets, base cabinets, countertops, sink, or backsplash. Q&R was "paid for this change order," but defendants did not refund any portion of the $18,500 plaintiffs paid for the work in the kitchen that was not completed. Defendants also did not paint the exterior of the house because "the color was[ not right]." Defendants did not refund any portion of the $7,200 plaintiffs paid for the exterior painting work. On March 19, 2025, the court entered final judgment in favor of plaintiffs, supported by an oral decision. The court found "there could be no legitimate argument that defendant[s] did not breach the contract as [they] admitted receiving monies from the . . . plaintiffs for work admittedly not performed and [they have] not offered to refund any of that money." The court determined "[t]he only real question is the extent of damages . . . and whether or not it ultimately results in a finding of a violation of the [CFA]." The court rejected defendants' claim that plaintiffs were not entitled to a refund because they did work that was not included in the contract and change A-3137-24 9 orders. The court found Anna's testimony that defendants did not complete any additional work "was credible . . . and . . . consistent with all the evidence, or lack thereof, to the contrary." It noted "there was no documentary evidence of any kind, no corroborating witness testimony, no photographs, no receipts, nothing . . . that would explain, articulate, or provide reference for the work that allegedly was performed." The court also rejected defendants' claim that they did not abandon the job because plaintiffs failed to advise him how to proceed with the configuration of the bathroom and kitchen. It found "again, [defendants] provided no documentation or communication between [them] and the plaintiffs indicating that [they were] waiting [for] this crucial information before [they] could proceed." The court found Anna "testified that they never intended to change the layout of either the bathroom or the kitchen, which is why the initial contract specifically state[d] that the configuration of the plumbing and electrical in the bathroom would remain unchanged." Her testimony was "once again consistent with the documentary evidence" and "[t]he fact that the kitchen and bathroom were ultimately finished by . . . [K]nee . . . in their original configuration clearly furthers the credibility of . . . plaintiff[s] in this regard." A-3137-24 10 In addition, plaintiffs produced "numerous text exchanges with [Koseyan] . . . as well as a telephone call log, all of which support [their] contention that at no time did [defendants] ever even infer that the reason for not continuing the work . . . was due to plaintiffs' failure . . . to advise . . . defendant[s] about any changes or reconfigurations of . . . the rooms." The court concluded "defendant[s'] argument as to why [they] . . . cancelled [their] work in or about July . . . 2022 and did not return to the property . . . to not be credible." The court determined defendants committed unlawful business practices as defined in the CFA by violating numerous provisions of the Home Improvement Practice Regulations (HIPR), N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.1 to -16.2. The court found defendants violated N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(6)(v), which prohibits a contractor from having a consumer make "final payment on the contract before the home improvement is completed in accordance with the term[s] of the contract." The court found it was "undisputed that . . . plaintiffs paid in full for a number of the contracts that were signed . . . prior, not only to completion, but prior to any work being performed." A-3137-24 11 The court found defendants violated N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(6)(vi), (vii), and (viii) 3 by failing to advise plaintiffs in the "contract and change orders which apply to the bathroom and kitchen" they "did not perform [electrical or plumbing work]" and the work defendants contend plaintiffs wanted done "necessarily involve[d] either the plaintiffs going out and finding their own electrician and plumber or [defendants] contracting with an electrician or plumber for an additional cost." "None of which [was] reflected in writing in 3 Those sections provide it is unlawful to: vi. Misrepresent or fail to disclose that the offered or contract price does not include delivery or installation, or that other requirements must be fulfilled by the buyer as a condition to the performance of labor, services, or the furnishing of products or materials at the offered or contract price; vii. Mislead the prospective buyer into believing that the down payment or any other sum constitutes the full amount the buyer will be obligated to pay; viii. Misrepresent or fail to disclose that the offered or contract price does not include all financing charges, interest service charges, credit investigation costs, building or installation permit fees, or other obligations, charges, cost or fees to be paid by the buyer. [N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(6)(vi), (vii), and (viii).] A-3137-24 12 any of the documents provided" and "defendant[s] knew or should have known that additional expenses beyond those contemplated in the contract and change orders would be required." The court found defendants violated N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(7)(ii) and (iii)4 by failing to set forth any "timeframes, start[,] or end dates . . . in any of the written documents." Defendants also failed to advise plaintiffs in writing of "the basis for any delays" including that the cause of the delay allegedly was "out of [their] control because [they were] waiting on information from the plaintiffs." The court also found defendants violated N.J.A.C. 13:45A- 4 Those sections provide it is unlawful to: ii. Fail to begin or complete work on the date or within the time period specified in the home improvement contract, or as otherwise represented, unless the delay is for reason of labor stoppage; unavailability of supplies or materials, unavoidable casualties, or any other cause beyond the seller's control. Any changes in the dates or time periods stated in a written contract shall be agreed to in writing; or iii. Fail to give timely written notice to the buyer of reasons beyond the seller's control for any delay in performance, and when the work will begin or be completed. [N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(7)(ii) and (iii).] A-3137-24 13 16.2(a)(12)5, which "is sort of a catchall" based on the same conduct that violated the other more specific regulations. The court found plaintiffs proved they suffered "ascertainable loss" "due to defendant[s'] violations of the [HIPR] and therefore the CFA" that "stem[med] from defendants' undisputed failure to . . . complete the promised work . . . and . . . refund any monies to plaintiffs despite" failing "to complete the work . . . plaintiffs paid for." It determined "[p]laintiffs' damages . . . consist of monies paid for items not performed which subsequently had to be performed by their secondary contractor." The court awarded plaintiffs damages in the amount of $36,621 based on what they paid for "work that was not performed." With respect to the May 14 5 That section provides: 12. Home improvement contract requirements— writing requirement: All home improvement contracts for a purchase price in excess of $500.00, and all changes in the terms and conditions thereof shall be in writing. Home improvement contracts which are required by this subsection to be in writing, and all changes in the terms and conditions thereof, shall be signed by all parties thereto, and shall clearly and accurately set forth in legible form and in understandable language all terms and conditions of the contract, . . . [N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(12).] A-3137-24 14 contract, for which plaintiffs paid the full amount of $11,500, the court gave defendants "credit . . . for demolition done and the installation of the shower pan" in the amount of $1,500, "leaving damages on the [May 14] contract in the amount of $10,000." The court awarded damages in the amount of $11,650 on the May 14 change order. It determined plaintiffs paid the full $13,650 due for that change order but gave defendants a "credit . . . in the amount of $2,000" for painting and yard cleanup that was done. On the May 28 change order, the court awarded damages in the amount of $13,700. It reasoned that plaintiffs paid a total of $35,000 toward the May 28 change order, but defendants performed some of the work included in that change order totaling $21,300, leaving a balance owed to plaintiffs of $13,700. The court also awarded plaintiffs $940 for the "electrical work . . . to add outlets to the kitchen to make it up to code which would have been within the scope of work required for [the] kitchen renovation" and $331 for installation of "ceiling fans, which were part of defendant[s'] contracted obligations." The court then trebled the damage award pursuant to the CFA, for a total award of $109,863, and awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs.6 The court dismissed plaintiffs' 6 The court also found Koseyan individually liable pursuant to the CFA. Defendants did not brief any arguments relating to that aspect of the June 4, A-3137-24 15 "breach of contract claim as duplicative." It also dismissed plaintiffs' CRA claim. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for attorneys' fees in the amount of $26,140 and costs in the amount of $622.84, supported by an affidavit of services in accordance with Rule 4:42-9(b). Plaintiffs' counsel certified she devoted 49.8 hours to the case, and her hourly billing rate was $550 per hour. Defendants opposed the application, arguing only that "$475 per hour is appropriate as a rate in this case," which "would bring the fee application to a more fair and reasonable $23,655." On June 3, 2025, the court granted plaintiffs' application in an oral decision. The court "note[d] [defendants did] not oppose or attempt to distinguish in any way the number of hours spent" but it "did review those as well." It found "the rate of $550 per hour . . . [was] certainly well within the range of a reasonable and customary fee . . . and the requested fee [was] fair and reasonable." The court then reviewed "the affidavit of service[s] in its entirety" and addressed each of the factors set forth in Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.5(a). It found "the total hours expended were 49.8" and none of the 2025 judgment. Any such arguments are, therefore, waived. Green Knight Cap., LLC, 469 N.J. Super. at 396. A-3137-24 16 time expended was "unnecessary, overstated, duplicative, or otherwise improper." The court granted plaintiffs' application and awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $26,140, plus costs in the amount of $622.84. On June 4, 2025, the court entered an amended order for judgment. This appeal followed. II. On appeal, defendants argue, the "failure to hold a jury trial, which both parties demanded in their pleadings, was harmful error." Defendants did not raise this argument in the trial court. Defendants also argue the court "misapplied the [CFA's] causal connection and ascertainable loss requirements." Specifically, they contend the court "erred in awarding treble damages under the [CFA] because . . . plaintiffs failed to prove that there was a causal relationship between the unlawful practices under the CFA and the claimed" ascertainable loss. Relatedly, defendants argue "[t]he damages in this case . . . should have been measured by the extra money . . . plaintiffs had to pay . . . [Knee] . . . to perform the work that . . . defendant[s] . . . promised to accomplish but did not." They contend the court's $36,621 damage award "generally applies the proper measure for expectation damages" and should be "affirmed" as "breach-of- contract damages, not CFA damages." A-3137-24 17 Defendants also argue the court's award of attorneys' fees was excessive because it did not "separat[e] which portion[s] of the fees resulted from proving the [CFA] violations – which were recoverable – and which resulted from the breach of contract claim, which were not." III. Defendants' claim that the court deprived them of their right to a jury trial is raised for the first time on appeal. Generally, we "will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. '" Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)). Because defendants failed to raise this argument in the trial court, it is waived. Even if we considered defendants' argument, we are convinced it is without merit. Rule 4:35-1(d) provides, in relevant part, that: When trial by jury has been demanded as provided by this rule, the trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless all parties or their attorneys, by written [consent] and filed stipulation or oral stipulation made in open court and entered on the record, consent to trial by the court without a jury. [Ibid.] A-3137-24 18 It has long been the rule that the right to a jury trial may be waived. See Guber v. Peters, 149 N.J. Super. 138, 139 (App. Div. 1977) (holding that the defendants waived their right to a jury trial requested in their initial pleadings by failing to press that right to the court thereafter). Waiver is a "voluntary . . . relinquishment of a known right" evidenced by a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act from which an intention to relinquish the right can be based. Sroczynski v. Milek, 197 N.J. 36, 63-64 (2008) (Rivera-Soto, J., concurring) (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003)). At times, a waiver may be implied by conduct or acquiescence. Guber, 149 N.J. Super. at 140. Plaintiffs contend defendants expressly waived their right to a jury trial at a pretrial conference, and the trial transcript supports that claim. At the outset of the trial, the court stated the "matter [was] before the [c]ourt for a bench trial." Defense counsel, accompanied by Koseyan, did not object, confirmed defendants did not have any objections to plaintiffs' proposed trial exhibits, waived the opportunity to make an opening statement, and proceeded with the bench trial. We are convinced, based on the record, that defendants expressly waived their right to a jury trial prior to trial as plaintiffs contend, or implicitly waived that right through their statements and conduct at the time of trial. A-3137-24 19 IV. We are unpersuaded by defendants' claim that the court incorrectly found plaintiffs established a causal connection between the HIPR and CFA violations and their ascertainable loss. Our review of a final determination made following a bench trial is "subject to a limited and well-established scope of review." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). We do not disturb a trial court's findings of fact unless "convinced that those findings and conclusions [a]re 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "To the extent that the trial court's decision constitutes a legal determination, we review it de novo." D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013). The CFA's private cause of action "requires a plaintiff to prove three elements: '1) unlawful conduct by defendant; 2) an ascertainable loss by plaintiff; and 3) a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.'" Id. at 184 (quoting Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 557 (2009)). A-3137-24 20 "Unlawful conduct" is either an affirmative act, knowing omission, or regulatory violation. See Thiedmann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 245 (2005). If a contractor violates the HIPR, the first element of the CFA's three-step analysis is satisfied. Roberts v. Cowgill, 316 N.J. Super. 33, 38-40 (App. Div. 1998). Our Supreme Court has held "ascertainable loss" requires "that the plaintiff suffered an actual loss." Thiedemann,183 N.J. at 248. The loss "must be presented with some certainty demonstrating that it is capable of calculation." Ibid. "In addition, the CFA requires a consumer to prove that the loss is attribut[ed] to the conduct that the CFA seeks to punish by including a limitation expressed as a causal link." Bosland, 197 N.J. at 555. "[A] plaintiff who cannot prove the causal link between the asserted regulatory violation and his [or her] loss cannot find relief within the CFA." Id. at 560. Here, defendants do not dispute the court's determination that they violated numerous provisions of the HIPR, nor do they challenge the court's determination of plaintiffs' ascertainable loss. Rather, they contend the court incorrectly found a causal link between the HIPR violations and plaintiffs ' loss. We disagree. A-3137-24 21 There can be no serious dispute that plaintiffs' loss was causally connected to defendants' violation of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(6)(v), which prohibits a contractor from having a consumer "make final payment on the contract before the home improvement is completed in accordance with the terms of the contract." That regulation is intended to protect consumers from precisely what happened in this case. Defendants took plaintiffs' full payments for work that was not complete and abandoned the project. Plaintiffs, who had already paid defendants for the work, were then forced to expend tens of thousands of dollars to complete the same work. Nor can there be any legitimate dispute that plaintiffs' loss was causally connected to defendants' violations of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-16.2(a)(7)(ii) and (iii). As the court correctly found, defendants violated those regulations by failing to set forth any "timeframes, start[,] or end dates" for the work and failing to advise plaintiffs in writing of the "basis for any delays" including that the cause of the delay allegedly was "out of [their] control because [they] were waiting on information from the plaintiffs." If, as defendants contend, their work was delayed and ultimately abandoned because they were waiting to hear from plaintiffs, compliance with the requirement to advise plaintiffs of the cause of the delay would have resolved A-3137-24 22 the miscommunication. According to defendants, had plaintiffs simply responded, they would have completed the work in a timely manner. Compliance with the HIPR, therefore, would have prevented plaintiffs' loss. Conversely, therefore, defendants' failure to comply with the HIPR caused plaintiffs' loss. There is no basis for us to disturb the court's determination that plaintiffs' losses were caused by these and the other HIPR violations it found. We are satisfied the court's factual findings were amply supported by competent, credible evidence in the record and the court properly applied those facts to the law. For the same reasons, we are convinced defendants' claim that the court should have awarded damages for breach of contract instead of treble damages under the CFA lacks merit. V. Defendants' claim that the court's award of attorneys' fees was excessive is not persuasive. Defendants' argument that the court failed to differentiate between fees attributable to breach of contract and the CFA violations is raised for the first time on appeal. In the trial court, defendants only challenged counsel's hourly billing rate and conceded the balance of the application, including the number of hours expended. Defendants abandoned that argument A-3137-24 23 on appeal. Because defendants' newly-minted argument was not raised in the trial court, it is waived. Nieder, 62 N.J. at 234. Even if we considered their argument, the court correctly determined plaintiffs' losses resulted solely from defendants' CFA violations and dismissed the breach of contract claim. There is, therefore, no basis to apportion fees to anything other than the CFA claim. We have, nevertheless, reviewed the court's award of attorneys' fees on the merits. "We review [a] trial court's award of [attorneys'] fees and costs in accordance with a deferential standard. Such an award 'will be disturbed only on the rarest occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion. '" Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp., 253 N.J. 191, 211-12 (2023) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). We are satisfied the court properly reviewed plaintiffs' application in accordance with Rule 4:42-9(b), RPC 1.5(a), and applicable law, and do not find any basis to disturb the court's award of attorneys' fees and costs. Affirmed. A-3137-24 24