Full Opinion

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 22-AA-0871 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., PETITIONERS, V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT, and VERA BRUMMELL, INTERVENOR. Petition for Review of a Decision of the Compensation Review Board of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (2022-CRB-000037) (Argued March 27, 2025 Decided October 8, 2026) Lucy E. Pittman, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, and Alex Fumelli, Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief, for petitioners. Tonya A. Robinson, General Counsel for the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, filed a Statement in Lieu of Brief for respondent. Harold L. Levi, with whom Robert P. Newman was on the brief, for intervenor. Before DEAHL and HOWARD, Associate Judges, and STEADMAN, Senior Judge. 2 PER CURIAM ∗: Intervenor Vera Brummell is receiving temporary total disability benefits under the District of Columbia’s workers’ compensation program for public employees (the Program) established under the District’s Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA). At the same time, she is also receiving retirement benefits from the federal Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) for which she is eligible as a long-time District employee. The dispositive legal question before us is whether Brummell is barred from receiving both benefits at the same time by a statutory provision of the CMPA. In the case immediately before us, the Compensation Review Board (CRB), a unit of the D.C. Department of Employment Services, has ruled that she can receive both benefits at the same time. The Office of Risk Management (ORM), which administers the Program, challenges this CRB ruling and asserts that the statute bars Brummell from receiving such dual benefits. As a threshold matter, we conclude that Brummell’s challenge was properly before OAH and the CRB. But on the merits, we agree with ORM and hold that the ∗ Senior Judge STEADMAN is the principal author of the opinion for a unanimous court as to all but Part II.A. Associate Judge DEAHL is the principal author of Part II.A, which Judge HOWARD joins and Judge STEADMAN does not join, for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion at page 19. 3 statute’s wording, structural setting, and provenance compel the conclusion that Brummell is barred from receiving both benefits contemporaneously. I. Background A. Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act “In the 1973 Home Rule Act, Congress directed the District government to establish its own comprehensive personnel system to replace the federal system which previously controlled.” District of Columbia v. Hunt, 520 A.2d 300, 302 (D.C. 1987). To fulfill this mandate, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the CMPA in 1979. See District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 632 (D.C. 1991); D.C. Code § 1-601.01 et seq. The CMPA “includes a system of workers’ compensation for District of Columbia government employees.” Newman v. District of Columbia, 518 A.2d 698, 703 (D.C. 1986). The CMPA, whose workers’ compensation provisions were largely based on the preexisting Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, generally requires the District to “pay compensation . . . for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his or her duty.” D.C. Code § 1-623.02. The CMPA grants the Mayor broad authority to “promulgate rules necessary or useful for the administration and enforcement of” the Program. Id. § 1-623.44. 4 “This authority can be—and over the years, has been—delegated by the Mayor to different administrative agencies.” Webb v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 204 A.3d 843, 847 (D.C. 2019). For example, after the establishment of ORM in 2003, 1 the Mayor “issued an Order, which remains in effect today, delegating to the Director of ORM mayoral authority for rule-making as provided in” Section 1-623.44 of the CMPA. Id. at 848 (citing Mayor’s Order 2004-198 (Dec. 14, 2004)). For purposes of this appeal, the critical provision of the CMPA is its bar on concurrent dual compensation, which reads as follows: While an employee is receiving compensation under [the CMPA] . . . he or she may not receive salary, pay, or remuneration of any type from the District of Columbia, except: 1 As we have explained, the reorganization plan that created ORM served to [T]ransfer[] responsibility over D.C.’s public sector disability compensation program and other similar programs to ORM, with a goal, inter alia, of “minimiz[ing] the probability, occurrence and impact of accidental losses in the District government.” D.C. Code § 1-1518.01, 4(a), Subch. XVIII, 2003, Part A, Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 2003. ORM was directed to “[a]dminister, organize, and exercise all of the powers, duties and functions concerning the District of Columbia Government Employees’ Disability Compensation Program,” and the plan directed that all of the “powers, duties, and functions” over the Program be transferred from the District’s personnel office to ORM. Id. at 6(j). Webb, 204 A.3d at 848 (alterations in original). 5 (1) In return for service actually performed; (2) Pension for service in the Army, Navy, or Air Force; (3) Other benefits administered by the Veterans Administration unless such benefits are payable for the same injury or the same death; and (4) Retired pay, retirement pay, retainer pay, or equivalent pay for service in the armed forces or other uniformed services, subject to the reduction of such pay in accordance with § 5532 of Title 5 of the United States Code. Eligibility for or receipt of benefits under subchapter III of Chapter 83 of Title 5 of the United States Code [i.e., CSRS benefits,] or another retirement or disability system for employees of the government does not impair the right of the employee to compensation for scheduled disabilities specified by subsection (c) of § 1-623.07. D.C. Code § 1-623.16(a). Pursuant to its rule-making authority, ORM has specifically stated that “[f]ederal retirement benefits accrued as a result of District employment” are included within this statutory ban on concurrent dual compensation. 7 D.C.M.R. § 134.2(b). B. The Facts The following facts are uncontested. 2 Brummell was hired by the D.C. Department of Corrections on November 20, 1972, shortly before the passage of the 2 We set forth only the facts relevant to this opinion. 6 Home Rule Act. In June of 1993, she suffered an emotional breakdown following extended on the job harassment and retaliatory treatment and thereafter received temporary total disability (TTD) and medical benefits under the District’s Program. On May 4, 2006, the District terminated Brummell’s TTD benefits over her alleged failure to comply with vocational rehabilitation. One day after receiving notice of that termination, Brummell applied for and began receiving federal retirement benefits for which she was eligible under the federal government’s Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). Because Brummell was hired before September 30, 1987, she was in effect grandfathered into her ability to participate in and receive federal retirement benefits under the CSRS. See D.C. Code § 1-626.02 (providing that “[e]xisting retirement systems, which include the [CSRS], . . . shall continue to be applicable to all employees except that the [CSRS] . . . shall not be applicable to employees first employed after September 30, 1987”); see generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331-8351. At the same time, she also appealed the termination of her TTD benefits to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Brummell prevailed in that appeal, and her TTD benefits were restored, but she continued to receive federal retirement benefits. 7 After eventually discovering that Brummell was receiving both TTD and federal retirement benefits, ORM issued a Notice of Benefits (NOB) on January 28, 2020, in which it “terminated immediately” Brummell’s TTD benefits. ORM asserted that, under Section 1-623.16(a), Brummell had “no legal right” to concurrently receive TTD benefits and federal retirement annuity benefits. Brummell appealed the NOB to OAH, where an ALJ ruled in Brummell’s favor. The ALJ reasoned that Section 1-623.16(a) does not preclude the concurrent receipt of TTD and federal retirement annuity benefits because the latter, on account of being administered by the federal government, does not come “from” the District. The CRB affirmed, agreeing with the ALJ’s conclusion. That affirmance is now before us for review. II. Discussion A. The Proper Forum for Brummell’s Challenge Before reaching the merits, we address a threshold matter the parties have contested throughout this litigation: whether Brummell’s challenge to the termination of her disability benefits belonged before OAH, subject to review by the CRB, or instead before ORM’s Chief Risk Officer, subject to review by the Superior Court. The parties refer to this as a “jurisdictional” question, but that label is imprecise, at least as to our authority to review the CRB’s decision. Whether or not 8 Brummell’s challenge was properly before the CRB does not affect our authority to review the CRB’s final decision. See D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 308 A.3d 699, 702 (D.C. 2023) (noting that “[e]ven if the CRB lacked the authority to review the particular ORM decision at issue in this case,” that did not affect our jurisdiction to review the CRB’s decision). The real question is simply which administrative route the CMPA prescribes for a claimant in Brummell’s position, and the answer to that question is not of jurisdictional import for purposes of our review. Id. We nonetheless address this issue, though it is not strictly necessary to do so, as it has been debated throughout the proceedings to date and it is likely to recur in future proceedings. And we hold that the CMPA prescribes a hearing before OAH, and that Brummell’s challenge was thus properly before the CRB. The CMPA entitles a claimant to a hearing before an ALJ at OAH whenever an “award of compensation” is modified. See D.C. Code § 1-623.24(d), (f); see also id. § 1-623.24(d)(2) (providing that “[i]f the Mayor determines that modification of the award is required, the Mayor shall provide written notice to the claimant of the modification, including the reasons for the modification and the claimant’s right to seek review of that decision” before OAH). ORM terminated Brummell’s disability benefits outright—benefits she had received for years and that an ALJ had restored after a formal hearing. A termination of an existing award is a modification of that 9 award under any ordinary understanding of the word, and it is difficult to imagine a claimant with a stronger claim to a hearing before a neutral adjudicator than one whose benefits have not merely been reduced but have been cut off entirely. ORM and the District resist this conclusion and posit that four of our decisions, at least when read in combination, compel a contrary result. See Frazier v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 229 A.3d 131 (D.C. 2020); D.C. Pub. Schs. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs. (Karim), 262 A.3d 213 (D.C. 2021); D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs. (Atkins), 281 A.3d 588 (D.C. 2022); Buitrago v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 320 A.3d 332 (D.C. 2024). In their view, this quartet of cases— principally, Frazier—held that any ORM action falling outside the five circumstances enumerated in Section 1-623.24(d)(4)(A)-(E) lies beyond OAH’s review. We read those cases more narrowly, in light of the facts presented in them. See Richman Towers Tenants’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Richman Towers LLC, 17 A.3d 590, 598 (D.C. 2011) (explaining that the “words of our opinions are to be read in the light of the facts of the order under discussion” (quoting, imprecisely, Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1944) (referring to “the case under discussion”))); see also Martin v. Bicknell, 99 A.3d 705, 710 (D.C. 2014) (declining to treat “passing statement” on an unpresented issue as binding precedent). Unlike this case, none of those four cases involved the reduction or termination of an existing award, and we 10 read them to hold only that such a reduction or termination of a benefits award is the essence of a “modification” of it. In Frazier and Karim, the claimants sought new schedule awards after their disability benefits had otherwise ceased—no preexisting award was modified, and those cases concerned only whether the claimants were entitled to a new award. Frazier, 229 A.3d at 134-35; Karim, 262 A.3d at 216-17. In Atkins, it was ORM that challenged a reclassification that had benefited the claimant—again, there was no reduction or termination of the claimant’s preexisting benefits award at issue. 281 A.3d at 590-91. And in Buitrago, the claimant disputed the size of a late-payment penalty that had issued in his favor, but no one proposed to reduce or terminate his preexisting award; the dispute was only about how much more he was owed in the form of a late-payment penalty. 320 A.3d at 334. In each of those cases, the claimant was seeking a new award, an increase to an existing award, or some additional penalty payment on top of an existing award; in none of them was the District proposing to reduce or terminate an existing award. That distinction is critical here. Our cases instruct that while the denial of a request for new or additional benefits is not a “modification” of an award subject to OAH review, a reduction or termination of an existing award is a “modification” subject to OAH review. See Frazier, 229 A.3d at 136 (the term “modification” “refers to a 11 reduction in or terminations of benefits”); Buitrago, 320 A.3d at 336 (same). Brummell’s benefits were terminated, so her challenge falls on the side of the line where OAH review lies. Even under ORM’s narrower reading—that the reason for a termination must fit one of the five categories in Section 1-623.24(d)(4)(A)-(E)—it is not obvious that Brummell’s challenge does not fit within one of those five categories. Subsection (d)(4)(A) reaches a determination that “[t]he disability for which compensation was paid has ceased or lessened,” D.C. Code § 1-623.24(d)(4)(A), and disability in this context “is an economic and not a medical concept,” Howard Univ. Hosp. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 952 A.2d 168, 175 (D.C. 2008). ORM terminated Brummell’s benefits because it concluded that her concurrent receipt of federal retirement income had so changed her economic circumstances as to render her ineligible for compensation—that, in substance, is at least arguably a determination that her economic disability had ceased or lessened. The CRB understood ORM’s action the same way. See Brummell v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. CRB 22-037, 2022 WL 16825976 (D.C. Oct. 17, 2022). We ultimately do not decide whether this challenge fits within subsection (d)(4)(A), however, because the parties have not briefed that question and it is ultimately of no moment. In any case, an outright termination of a claimant’s benefits is inescapably a modification of those benefits. 12 The District further counters by positing that ORM did not modify Brummell’s award of compensation but instead “simply notified” her that she was no longer eligible to receive it. That distinction does not withstand a moment’s scrutiny: ORM did not in fact simply notify Brummell that she was no longer eligible to receive her disability benefits. It also took the further step of actually terminating those benefits. ORM’s own notice to Brummell emphasized exactly that: “your temporary wage-loss benefits are terminated immediately.” Moreover, if this was not a modification under Section 1-623.24 (as the District and ORM maintain), then it is entirely unclear what authority ORM had to terminate Brummell’s benefits. Neither the District nor ORM has identified any provision other than Section 1- 623.24 that authorizes ORM to terminate an existing award, so ORM cannot on the one hand invoke its power to terminate Brummell’s benefits under that section, while denying her the hearing the same provision guarantees. And while Section 1- 623.16(a) includes the substantive bar on receiving dual compensation, that provision by itself provides no authority for modifying an existing award, as that statutory authority is located exclusively in Section 1-623.24. 3 3 One could argue that Section 1-623.24 provides the review procedures only for the subset of modifications that are based on a “change of condition,” see D.C. Code § 1-623.24(d)(1) (permitting the Mayor to “modify an award of compensation” based on “a change of condition”), while there is some other universe of modifications that are not subject to OAH review. That is not a plausible reading of the statute, however. It is clear from Section 1-623.24’s text, when read in its 13 Our reading further accords with the statute’s purpose. A hearing before a neutral adjudicator is the principal protection the CMPA affords against the erroneous loss of benefits, and it would be incongruous to guarantee that protection to a claimant whose award is merely reduced while withholding it from one whose award is terminated altogether. See Frazier, 229 A.3d at 141 (noting the heightened need for hearings “for claimants facing a Program proposal to reduce or terminate benefits”). We hold that Brummell’s challenge was properly before OAH and the CRB and now turn to the merits. B. Legality of Brummell’s Receipt of Dual Benefits entirety, that it was meant to occupy the entire field of permissible modifications to existing awards—that is, the only permissible modifications of awards stem from some “change of condition.” For instance, Section 1-623.24(d)(2) provides that whenever “a modification of [an] award is required,” id. § 1-623.24(d)(2), the claimant will receive the host of statutory protections, including the right to OAH review, provided in Section 1-623.24(b)(1). And Section 1-623.24(d)(3) similarly provides that “[t]he Mayor may not modify benefits until requirements under this subsection have been completed,” except certain modifications that can take effect while the procedural requirements play out. Id. § 1-623.24(d)(3). Both of these provisions speak broadly to any modification of benefits, without any regard to the basis for the modification. The takeaway is that Section 1-623.24 provides the procedural protections required for all modifications of compensation awards, so that if this was not a “modification” under Section 1-623.24(d)(1) (as the District suggests), the result is that the modification was not permitted in any case, not that it falls outside of OAH’s authority to review it. That is no doubt why the District argues that this was a mere “notification,” and not a “modification” at all. But as we have already explained, that sophistry does not withstand any scrutiny. 14 Because the controlling issue here is a pure question of law, our review is de novo. See, e.g., McClam v. United States, 329 A.3d 298, 304 (D.C. 2025). It is true that we have traditionally given “substantial deference to agency interpretations of the laws they administer and the regulations they have promulgated.” Mallof v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 1 A.3d 383, 392 n.39 (D.C. 2010). And both the CRB and ORM here claim that such deference should be given to their respective and conflicting interpretations of the relevant statute. However, questions have arisen with respect to whether we still owe agencies any deference on questions of statutory interpretation. See LHL Realty Co. DC v. District of Columbia, 357 A.3d 1165, 1171 (D.C. 2026) (discussing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)). Furthermore, to the extent we still owe agencies deference on matters of statutory interpretation, the case for deference here is (at least) substantially diminished where two different executive agencies are both granted some authority to interpret the underlying statute and have reached opposite conclusions about the statutory interpretation question at issue. See Salleh v. Christopher, 85 F.3d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (collecting cases for the proposition that courts “have declined to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute when more than one agency is granted authority to interpret the same statute”). Assuming for argument’s sake that we still owe the CRB some modicum of deference, despite ORM’s conflicting interpretation—which even the CRB calls “not unreasonable”—it is not 15 enough to render its statutory interpretation controlling here where it is contrary to the statute’s “language, structure, [and] purpose.” Atkins, 281 A.3d at 592. As is typical, we begin with a reading of the statutory text. The essence of the interpretation of Section 1-623.16(a) that the CRB and Brummell focus on is its operative provision: “While an employee is receiving compensation under [the CMPA] . . . he or she may not receive salary, pay, or remuneration of any type from the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 1-623.16(a) (emphasis added). In their view, a retirement benefit paid by a federal entity cannot be said to come “from” the District of Columbia. As a matter of linguistics, the word “from” in this usage is not limited to a direct payment. 4 But a proper interpretation of the statute requires an appreciation of its full structure and operation, as applied to Brummell, which we now undertake. Brummell became a District of Columbia employee in 1972, shortly before the Home Rule Act set the District on a path of transitioning its employees from the federal personnel system to one established by the District. Included among the matters addressed were workers’ compensation and retirement benefits. With respect 4 See From, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/from; https://perma.cc/NN55-L7B9 (last visited August 27, 2026) (noting the word’s use “to indicate the source, cause, agent, or basis”). 16 to workers’ compensation, the CMPA established the Program, from which Brummell benefits. However, with respect to retirement, as already set forth, the District grandfathered its employees hired on or before September 30, 1987, into existing federal retirement programs then enjoyed by them. Brummell thus retained the right to benefits from the federal CSRS on which she drew. The CSRS itself is a defined benefit, contributory retirement system for federal employees who entered covered service between August 1, 1920, and December 31, 1986. It involves a federal fund into which both eligible employees and their agencies make contributions, as described below. So Brummell’s two key employment benefits of workers’ compensation and retirement were split between the District and the federal program. But her eligibility to participate in the federal CSRS was wholly dependent on her District employment. And the process whereby her federal retirement benefit was funded depended, as required by law, on the District’s withholding of a percentage from her District salary. This sum was then matched by the District from its own appropriation for employee pay and the total of the two was transmitted to “the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the [Civil Service Retirement and Disability] Fund.” 5 U.S.C. § 8334(a)(2). (Similar withholdings and matching sums were also required from federal agencies whose employees participated in the CSRS.) 17 Brummell’s federal retirement benefits can thus only properly be said to come “from” the District. But there is more. The interaction between the federal government and the District is further illustrated by the origin of the statute’s section prohibiting dual compensation. This provision in the CMPA, like much of the CMPA, is taken almost word for word from the comparable federal program. See id. § 8116(a). It is clear that a federal employee cannot receive both workers’ compensation and federal retirement annuities. Id. As a regulation interpreting that statutory provision puts it, “a beneficiary may not receive wage-loss compensation concurrently with a Federal retirement or survivor annuity.” See 20 C.F.R. § 10.421(a). It is no surprise that ORM regulations previously cited likewise expressly forbid the concurrent receipt of workers’ compensation and federal retirement benefits, or that the D.C. Council in enacting the provision would intend the same result. The underlying policy consideration seems to be that it is incongruous for a worker to receive compensation benefits for lost wages as an employee and, at the same time, receive benefits based on the worker’s retired status. And it certainly may seem incongruous for a District employee to have the right to joint benefits when a federal employee would enjoy no such right. 18 Finally, turning again to the statute itself, the Council of the District of Columbia recognized that Section 1-623.16 forbade joint benefits by the inclusion of its final exception in subsection (4): that “[e]ligibility for or receipt of benefits under subchapter III of Chapter 83 of Title 5 of the United States Code or another retirement or disability system for employees of the government does not impair the right of the employee to compensation for scheduled disabilities specified by subsection (c) of § 1-623.07.” D.C. Code § 1-623.16(a)(4). This exclusion, aimed squarely at receipt of retirement benefits, would plainly be unnecessary if federal retirement systems—as well as compensation for unscheduled disabilities, like Brummel’s—were not intended to be subject to the ban on dual compensation. The same understanding of the statute’s general inclusion of federal retirement benefits is evidenced by the itemization of several types of excluded federal pensions. See id. § 1-623.16(a)(2). As mentioned, the CRB and Brummell rely heavily on the requirement that compensation must come “from” the District and the absence in the statute of any express prohibition against the receipt of federal retirement benefits. 5 As discussed 5 Brummell draws attention to the addition of Section 1-623.16(a-1), which makes an employee ineligible for compensation under the Program if he or she was employed by the District or the federal government before October 1, 1987, and is receiving disability retirement benefits from the federal government for the same injury. D.C. Code § 1-623.16(a-1). She asserts that the Council could have added a ban on receipt of ordinary federal retirement benefits at the same time, but did not. 19 above, we do not think these arguments can withstand a close analysis of the statute and its function and provenance. In light of all these considerations, we are convinced of the correctness of ORM’s interpretation of the statutory ban and its application to Brummell’s situation. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of the CRB and reinstate the challenged order of the District suspending Brummell’s workers’ compensation benefits. So ordered. STEADMAN, Senior Judge, concurring: I join the opinion of the court in all regards except for Part II.A. It is unnecessary to resolve this administrative dispute on this appeal in order to rule on the merits. As the opinion of the court points out, whether or not Brummell’s challenge was properly before the CRB does not affect our authority to review the CRB’s final decision in all respects. We think this is a weak reed to resolve the instant dispute. As perhaps a Hail Mary, she also argues that the District has never proven that it actually paid anything toward her federal annuity, an assertion that contradicts the presumption that the government obeys its own laws.