Full Opinion

25-2472-cv Espinal Lora v. Cowan Intermodal Group, LLC UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 19th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. Present: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, GERARD E. LYNCH, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ NANCY M. ESPINAL LORA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 25-2472-cv COWAN INTERMODAL GROUP, LLC, STEPHEN K. WIRTZ, Defendants-Appellees. _____________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: Mitchell Dranow, Sea Cliff, N.Y., Appellate Counsel to Harmon, Linder & Rogowski, New York, N.Y. For Defendants-Appellees: Julia Harvey and James M. Strauss, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New York, N.Y. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Mary Kay Vyskocil, District Judge). 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED. Plaintiff-Appellant Nancy M. Espinal Lora appeals from a final judgment entered by the district court on October 1, 2025, granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Cowan Intermodal Group, LLC and Stephen K. Wirtz (together, “Cowan”) on Lora’s claim for negligence and damages pursuant to what is commonly called the New York No Fault Law, N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 5101-5109. Lora sued Cowan after she got into a car accident with a truck driven by Wirtz and owned by Cowan Intermodal. As relevant here, Lora alleged that she suffered a cervical spine (neck) injury from the physical trauma of the crash. Lora and Cowan submitted dueling medical opinions about the causation of her neck injury. Lora submitted evidence from three doctors which, she argued, supported the conclusion that her injury was caused, at least in part, by the accident. Cowan submitted evidence in support of a contrary conclusion—namely, that the injury was degenerative in origin, rather than traumatic. The district court granted Cowan’s motion for summary judgment because it found that Lora had failed to rebut Cowan’s evidence that the neck injury was degenerative in origin. On appeal, Lora argues that she offered evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the accident caused her neck injury. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Raymond v. 1199SEIU Nat’l Benefit Fund, 184 F.4th 42, 53 (2d Cir. 2026). “Summary judgment is warranted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Romano v. Ulrich, 49 F.4th 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 2 Both parties agree that New York’s No Fault Law governs this case. To prevail on a personal injury claim under that law in a case such as this, where the fact of the accident is not at issue, “a plaintiff is required to present competent, non-conclusory expert evidence sufficient to support a finding” that (1) “the alleged injury is ‘serious’ within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d),” and (2) “the injury was proximately caused by the accident at issue.” Carter v. Full Serv., Inc., 815 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (1st Dep’t 2006). If the defendant offers “persuasive evidence that plaintiff’s alleged pain and injuries were related to a preexisting condition, plaintiff ha[s] the burden to come forward with evidence addressing defendant’s claimed lack of causation.” Pommells v. Perez, 4 N.Y.3d 566, 580 (2005). “In the absence of any such evidence, . . . defendant [i]s entitled to summary dismissal of the complaint.” Id. The district court granted summary judgment for Cowan only on the basis of the second, causation prong. The court concluded that Cowan provided persuasive evidence that Lora’s neck injury was caused by a degenerative condition, and that Lora’s evidence did not adequately address Cowan’s evidence regarding causation. Upon our independent review of the record, we disagree. New York courts have recognized that, under the No Fault Law, a physician’s determination that an injury was caused by an accident can be sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. See, e.g., Moreira v. Mahabir, 71 N.Y.S.3d 38, 39 (1st Dep’t 2018) (“To the extent that defendants raised an issue as to degeneration, plaintiff’s physicians adequately addressed the issue by ascribing her injuries to a different, yet equally plausible, explanation—the accident.”); see also De Diaz v. Klausner, 203 N.Y.S.3d 68, 70 (1st Dep’t 2024) (“Plaintiff’s physicians adequately addressed defendant’s evidence that the injuries were degenerative by opining, based on examination, the lack of prior symptoms, and observations during surgery, that plaintiff’s injuries were causally related to the accident, thereby 3 ascribing a different, yet equally plausible explanation for the conditions.”). Although the matter is close, we conclude that the evidence submitted by Lora was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation, sufficient to preclude a grant of summary judgment in Cowan’s favor with respect to causation under the New York No Fault Law. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. We note that the district court did not rule on Cowan’s summary judgment motion with respect to the question of whether Lora’s neck injury was “serious” under the first prong of New York’s No Fault Law, N.Y. Ins. Law § 5102(d). See Carter, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 43. We express no view on that question, which is best addressed in the first instance by the district court. See B.B. by Rosenthal v. Hochul, 166 F.4th 259, 280 (2d Cir. 2026) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)) * * * For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4