Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2795-24 RISHI A. RAMLOCHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EVERGREEN SHIPPING AGENCY (AMERICA) CORP. and EVERGREEN MARINE CORPORATION (TAIWAN), LTD., Defendants-Respondents. ___________________________ Submitted September 15, 2026 โ€“ Decided November 19, 2026 Before Judges Gilson, Gummer, and Paganelli. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-2925-21. Ginarte Gonzalez Winograd, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Richard M. Winograd and Robert J. Ciampaglio, Jr., on the briefs). Betancourt, Greco, Evans & Vignocchi LLC, attorneys for respondents (Ronald Betancourt, Clayton J. Vignocchi, and Anthony L. Blair, on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff Rishi A. Ramlochan appeals from a February 19, 2025 order barring the report and testimony of his expert witness, Captain Joseph Ahlstrom, and, consequently, granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corporation (Evergreen) and Evergreen Marine Corporation (Taiwan), Ltd (EMC). In addition, plaintiff appeals from an April 25, 2025 order denying his motion for reconsideration of the February order. Because we conclude the motion court misapplied its discretion in barring the Captain's report and testimony, we reverse the orders and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. In plaintiff's second amended complaint, he alleged EMC was "a party to a joint service venture with other entities acting as carriers engaged in the business of transporting cargo by sea in international trade and commerce." He claimed EMC was "represented in the United States by" Evergreen. He also alleged EMC "was and is the owner and operator of a fleet of ocean-going merchant vessels which regularly called at ports located within the territorial waters of New Jersey" and "owned, supervised, controlled, maintained[,] and managed the motor vessel, the MV EVER LUCID" (the Vessel), which "was and A-2795-24 2 is an ocean[-]going merchant vessel designed and built for the carriage of goods by sea." Plaintiff "was a longshoreman employed by Maher Terminals at the Maher Terminals facility located within the Port of Elizabeth." He alleged on December 14, 2018, at 9:45 p.m., he "was engaged in the course of his employment" and "was required to go aboard the" Vessel. He claimed that as he "was attempting to make egress from the [Vessel] he began traversing its gangway, which became dislodged, and caused [him] to fall to the dock and become injured." Plaintiff alleged defendants breached various duties and asserted a cause of action against defendants "under 33 U.S.C. ยง 905[(b)] of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act" (LHWCA). In support of his claim, plaintiff proffered the expert report of Captain Ahlstrom. The Captain described that: The [Vessel] docked at Maher Terminal . . . at []7[:]30 [a.m.] on [December] 14, 2018 using 5 cranes to load and discharge the [V]essel . . . . [plaintiff] was a longshoreman working the [V]essel . . . . On the evening of December 14[] at around 9[:00 p.m.] he received a call on his radio to go aboard the [V]essel and position a shoe for a container. He boarded the [V]essel and performed this task. On leaving the [V]essel at about 9:45 [p.m.] he descended the gangway and attempted to step on the dock. However, the gangway was positioned on the [c]ap log, a piece of wood about 2 feet high placed at the end of the dock for A-2795-24 3 safety. In attempting to step onto the deck he injured himself due to the increased height. The gangway position was confirmed by photos that evening by . . . [plaintiff] and Maher stevedores[.] Captain Ahlstrom noted "[i]n depositions, the Maher Terminal and longshoreman alike testified, with the exception of [one individual], that placing the gangway on the [c]ap log is an unsafe practice." However, the Captain also noted "[t]he crew of the [Vessel] believed it to be an acceptable practice . . . ." Captain Ahlstrom concluded "[t]he gangway should be placed on the dock to provide safe access and egress from the [V]essel." In addition, Captain Ahlstrom stated "[i]t is necessary for the gangway watch to monitor the gangway due to cargo operations and tides to ensure the gangway does not come off the dock . . . ." The Captain further stated "[t]his constant monitoring is a required duty of any gangway watch." Moreover, Captain Ahlstrom opined "[t]he gangway would have to be taken off the dock if it obstructed the movement of the crane . . . on the dock." The Captain described the gangway could "be temporarily suspended alongside the ship" or "the gangway would be lifted and placed back on the dock after the crane passes." He offered "[i]t is possible that this was a reason for the gangway not being on the dock when . . . [plaintiff] descended the gangway . . . ." A-2795-24 4 Captain Ahlstrom opined the Vessel "was required to comply with the [International Safety Management Code (ISM)] and [Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)]." He found "[u]nder SOLAS . . . and the ISM . . . the [Vessel] was required to have a Safety Management Certificate and a Safety Management System that provided for a safe environment aboard the [V]essel and safe operations." He determined pursuant to ISM Code 1.2, "[t]hat safe environment would have included a safe gangway [and p]lacing the gangway on the [c]ap log [wa]s not providing a safe environment." Moreover, "[s]afe practices would have included monitoring the gangway and informing any person[] using the gangway of any dangers." The Captain opined the "risk . . . was the increased distance to the dock created by placing the gangway platform on the [c]ap log." Captain Ahlstrom stated "Section 7 of the ISM Code, . . . references procedures[,] plans[,] and instructions for operations aboard a vessel." He opined "[h]andling the gangway would be one such operation" and "[p]rocedures to lower and raise the gangway in order to keep it safely on the dock should have been documented and practiced by qualified crew members." In the opinion section of his report, Captain Ahlstrom opined: 1. The gangway was under the exclusive control of the Vessel and its crew. That is, Vessel personnel were A-2795-24 5 responsible for deploying the gangway, inspecting the gangway, and maintaining an active gangway watch to ensure the safety of all who board and disembark the Vessel. . . . 2. The gangway was improperly placed on the dock by Vessel personnel. It was clear in their depositions that the crew of the [Vessel] felt that placing the gangway on the [c]ap log was an acceptable practice, it is also clear by depositions of . . . longshoreman and Maher stevedores with the exception of one that placing the gangway on the [c]ap log was an unacceptable and unsafe practice. I also agree that placing the gangway on the [c]ap log was an unsafe practice which directly led to the injury sustained by . . . [plaintiff]. 3. In the injury report I reviewed the recommendation . . . that longshoreman [plaintiff] should have requested the gangway be moved off the [c]ap log before ascending the gangway. This implies it was an unsafe situation which should have been fixed by the crew of the [Vessel] by placing the gangway on the dock. It also states . . . [plaintiff] was "aware." In his deposition, he states he was never "aware" of [the] gangway being on the cap[ ]log when ascending the gangway on December 14, 2018. 4. Due to the improper rigging of the gangway, the Vessel provided . . . [plaintiff] a gangway which was in a dangerous condition caused by the gangway not being placed properly on the dock. This dangerous condition caused the injury sustained by . . . [plaintiff]. 5. Vessel crew failed to properly monitor and inspect the gangway to ensure that the gangway remained on the dock or to inform those boarding or departing the [V]essel that the gangway was no longer on the dock due to operational circumstances. . . . A-2795-24 6 6. . . . [plaintiff] states that when he ascended the gangway it was on the dock and he had no issues going up the gangway. . . . The cause for . . . [plaintiff']s injury was the improper tending of the gangway by the crew of the [Vessel]. [(Emphasis added).] Defendants moved for summary judgment on liability, contending plaintiff could not "establish a breach of duty as a matter of law" and that "no liability c[ould] attach to [the V]essel." Defendants subsequently moved in limine under Rule 4:25-8, seeking to preclude Captain Ahlstrom's report and testimony at trial. The court initially heard argument on both motions on December 6, 2024. The court converted the expert motion into a summary judgment motion given its potential dispositive impact on the case, allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs, and again heard arguments. In its memorandum of decision accompanying the February order, the court stated "[t]he [LHWCA] . . . permits [l]ongshoremen to bring a cause of action against the owner of a ship for injuries sustained due to the owner's negligence," citing 33 U.S.C. ยง 905(b). The court stated the LHWCA had been construed "to impose three narrow duties on a vessel: (1) the turnover duty, (2) the active control duty, and (3) the duty to intervene," citing Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981). A-2795-24 7 The court found plaintiff had asserted two theories regarding defendants' negligence. Under the first theory, plaintiff contended that when he "boarded the Vessel, the gangway was on the pier and later, unbeknownst to him, it was moved onto the cap log" and, thus defendants had breached the duty of "active control and/or its duty to intervene." Under the second theory, plaintiff contended, the "initial placement of the gangway on the cap log was unsafe, breaching [defendants'] turnover duty." The court noted plaintiff "did not oppose [d]efendants ['] argument as to duty to intervene." Regarding Captain Ahlstrom, the court found he was "qualified to testify" and the "the safety of the placement of a gangway . . . [wa]s clearly outside the ken of the average juror and require[d] expert testimony to set forth the standard of care and how a defendant's conduct deviated from that standard." The court stated "Captain Ahlstrom reached two overreaching conclusions[,] that the gangway was moved without plaintiff's knowledge and/or that its placement on the cap log was unsafe." Concerning the movement of the gangway, the court determined Captain Ahlstrom's conclusion, that plaintiff "was not informed that the gangway was moved onto the cap log while he was aboard the Vessel and as a result, was injured[,]" was not supported by the "evidence in the record." A-2795-24 8 The court reasoned: Seaman Kuan-Cheng Yeh testified that he had operated the Vessel and, safely and without complaint, placed the gangway on the cap log; other Maher's employees, including superintendent Joseph D'Auria, could not recall the placement of the gangway; Maher's manager of marina operations wrote a letter to plaintiff memorializing that plaintiff "acknowledged knowing the gangway was improperly positioned on the cap log" as he traversed the gangway for ingress and egress; and the crane was moving, so not obstructed by the gangway on the pier, after plaintiff was injured and there was no support for the proposition that the cap log had been moved before plaintiff's accident. Thus, the court concluded Captain Ahlstrom had authored a "net opinion" on the movement of the gangway because "the facts he relied upon [we]re not established in the record." In addition, as to safety, the court acknowledged Captain Ahlstrom had opined "that [the] placement of the gangway on the cap log was an improper, unsafe, or dangerous condition" and had referenced the ISM and SOLAS codes, describing them as "requir[ing] that a vessel provide an overall safe environment." However, the court determined Captain Ahlstrom "d[id] not go beyond" referencing these sources and, although he "list[ed] specific provisions A-2795-24 9 of each code, he fail[ed] to say how [d]efendants breached those provisions other than saying they created an unsafe environment." Moreover, the court reasoned "the only support for [Captain Ahlstrom's] contention that it was unsafe was because the 'longshoreman and Maher stevedores with the exception of one [believed] that placing the gangway on the [c]ap log was an . . . unsafe practice.'" The court noted that Captain Ahlstrom had stated he "'also agree[d] that placing the gangway on the [c]ap log was an unsafe practice.'" (Emphasis added). The court concluded the Captain had offered a net opinion because he gave "a bare conclusion without support" and did "not say why it was unsafe." The court held "[t]he fact that an injury occurred d[id] not mean the condition was unsafe." Further, the court determined Captain Ahlstrom's statement that the gangway's placement was unsafe because plaintiff was told "he should have reported . . . [its] placement on the cap log" "implies it was an unsafe condition" was "an argument, not an opinion." Nevertheless, the court found the opinion "still d[id] not address why or how it was allegedly unsafe." Because the court concluded plaintiff's claims required the support of an expert opinion and because the court barred Captain Ahlstrom's expert opinion, the court granted defendants summary judgment. A-2795-24 10 Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the February order. In a written statement of reasons, accompanying its April 25, 2025 order denying reconsideration, the court addressed plaintiff's further argument that "there [wa]s sufficient circumstantial evidence that the gangway was moved while plaintiff was aboard the [V]essel." The court determined Yeh had "testified he placed the gangway on the cap log on the morning of the day in question" and plaintiff had "reported . . . that the gangway was on the cap log when he boarded the [V]essel" although "later testif[ied] he could not recall." Further, the court noted plaintiff's belated submittal concerning D'Auria's deposition testimony about his Lo/Lo Vessel Inspections Reports (Lo/Lo reports) and that "the absence of a notation in the report that the gangway was on the cap log mean[t] it was on the pier." However, the court reasoned "these arguments were not raised by [p]laintiff in . . . opposition to summary judgment." Thus, the court concluded, it would not consider them on reconsideration. Nevertheless, the court noted it had originally considered D'Auria's deposition testimony and he "could not recall how the gangway was positioned on the day in question." Therefore, the court determined because "Yeh testified he placed the gangway on the cap log" and plaintiff acknowledged "the gangway A-2795-24 11 was on the cap log when he boarded the [V]essel" although "later testif[ied] he could not recall," [n]o other witness could testify on this subject. Therefore, the court concluded, "there [wa]s no circumstantial evidence, merely speculation." The court considered plaintiff's argument that Captain Ahlstrom "did not author a net opinion" concerning safety. The court determined it had "properly found that Captain Ahlstrom's report" was a net opinion because he "failed to set forth the whys and wherefores of his opinion[,]" and instead "cite[d] the ISM and SOLAS, [but] he fail[ed] to indicate how they were breached" and "merely state[d] he believed placing the gangway on the cap log was unsafe because other witnesses said so." The court found Captain Ahlstrom's report was "simply not sufficient." The court concluded there was "no basis to reconsider its decision" and because "Captain Ahlstrom's report was properly barred," plaintiff could not sustain his burden of proof. II. On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred in concluding that Captain Ahlstrom's opinion was an inadmissible net opinion, referencing the Captain's more than forty years of maritime experience with similar vessels. In addition, he asserts "the Maher Terminal and longshoreman alike testified that placing the A-2795-24 12 gangway on the [c]ap log [wa]s an unsafe practice." Moreover, he asserts Captain Ahlstrom considered "maritime safety standards contained in the ISM" but that the court failed to "even mention" the Captain's analysis of the standards. Appellate courts review an order granting "summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court." Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). A court must grant summary judgment when "reviewing 'the competent evidential materials submitted by the parties,'" viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "'there are [no] genuine issues of material fact . . . the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.'" Grande v. St. Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)); R. 4:46-2(c). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we "must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)). We do not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but . . . determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. A-2795-24 13 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). "Where there is no material fact in dispute . . . '[an appellate court] must then decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" N.J. Realtors v. Twp. of Berkeley, 479 N.J. Super. 379, 391 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he evaluation of every motion for summary judgment requires the court, trial or appellate, to review the motion record against not only the elements of the cause of action but also the evidential standard governing that cause of action." Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 40. "The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015). Thus, "[a]s a discovery determination, a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to strike expert testimony is entitled to deference on appellate review[,]" ibid., and is "review[ed] . . . against an abuse of discretion standard." Id. at 53 (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371-72 (2011)). "When . . . a trial court is 'confronted with an evidence determination precedent to ruling on a summary judgment motion,' it 'squarely must address A-2795-24 14 the evidence decision first.'" Ibid. (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384-85 (2010)). Our "review of the trial court's decisions proceeds in the same sequence, with the evidentiary issue resolved first, followed by the summary judgment determination of the trial court." Ibid. When a court "determines the admissibility of expert testimony, N.J.R.E. 702 and N.J.R.E. 703 frame its analysis." Ibid. Rule 702 "governs the admission of expert testimony." Kemp ex rel. Wright v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 423 (2002). The Rule provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." N.J.R.E. 702. Thus, Rule "702 imposes three core requirements for the admission of expert testimony." Townsend, 221 N.J. at 53. The requirements include: "(1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony." [Ibid. (quoting Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345, 355 (2005)).] A-2795-24 15 Rule "703 addresses the foundation for expert testimony." Ibid. The Rule mandates that expert opinion be grounded in "facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts." [Ibid. (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).] As a corollary to Rule 703, "[t]he net opinion rule . . . forbids the admission of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data." Id. at 53-54 (quoting Polzo, 196 N.J. at 583). The net opinion rule "requires that an expert 'give the why and wherefore that supports the opinion, rather than a mere conclusion.'" Id. at 54 (quoting Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale, LLC, 216 N.J. 115, 144 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The net opinion rule is not a standard of perfection." Ibid. "[A]n expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion." Id. at 55. We consider whether Captain Ahlstrom authored a net opinion. The court reasoned the Captain's opinion, concerning the unsafe or dangerous placement of the cap log on the gangway, was a net opinion because: (1) although he referenced specific codes "he fail[ed] to say how [d]efendants breached those A-2795-24 16 provisions other than saying [defendants] created an unsafe environment"; (2) the only support for the Captain's opinion was based on the statements of longshoreman and Maher stevedores that the placement of the gangway on the cap log was unsafe; and (3) the inference the condition was unsafe because plaintiff was advised he should have reported the condition was "an argument, not an opinion." We disagree that Captain Ahlstrom rendered a net opinion, and, accordingly, we reverse. The Captain relied upon the ISM and SOLAS codes to establish defendants had a duty to provide a safe environment, which included a safe gangway. He opined defendants had breached their duty by placing the gangway on the cap log. Further, the Captain explained the cap log was "a piece of wood about 2 feet high placed at the end of the dock" and "[i]n attempting to step onto the dock [plaintiff] injured himself due to the increased height." He opined "[t]his dangerous condition caused the injury sustained by" plaintiff. Therefore, Captain Ahlstrom provided more than a "mere conclusion" and provided the "why and wherefore" to support his opinion. See Townsend, 221 N.J. at 54. Any factual disputes about the actual placement of the gangway or plaintiff's knowledge of it should be left to a jury to determine. A-2795-24 17 Further, neither the fact that the Captain also agreed with others that the condition was unsafe, nor the fact that the Captain noted plaintiff had been advised that he should have reported the condition, are fatal to the Captain's opinion or render it a net opinion. Thus, we conclude the court misapplied its discretion in barring Captain Ahlstrom's report and testimony and erred in granting summary judgment on that basis. We also reject the trial court's determination that Captain Ahlstrom's opinions concerning the movement of the gangway were net opinions. Whether the gangway was moved after plaintiff went on to the Vessel and before he came back down the gangway are disputed issues of material facts. Consequently, Captain Ahlstrom's opinions regarding the Vessel crews' responsibility for any movement of the gangway and the positioning of the gangway on a flat surface of the pier as compared to the cap log are sufficiently supported by facts in the record. Therefore, issues and related expert opinions concerning the movement of the gangway should be resolved by the jury at trial. We emphasize the scope of our opinion. We conclude only that Captain Ahlstrom did not propose to offer net opinions and thus summary judgment was incorrectly entered on this basis. The Captain's opinions will be subject to A-2795-24 18 cross-examination, and plaintiff continues to bear the burden of proof subject to defendants' defenses. In sum, we reverse and vacate the February 19, 2025 order in its entirety. Because we reverse that order, we also reverse the April 25, 2025 reconsideration motion order. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-2795-24 19