Rishi A. Ramlochan v. Evergreen Shipping Agency
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketA-2795-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2795-24
RISHI A. RAMLOCHAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EVERGREEN SHIPPING
AGENCY (AMERICA) CORP.
and EVERGREEN MARINE
CORPORATION (TAIWAN),
LTD.,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________
Submitted September 15, 2026 โ Decided November 19, 2026
Before Judges Gilson, Gummer, and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-2925-21.
Ginarte Gonzalez Winograd, LLP, attorneys for
appellant (Richard M. Winograd and Robert J.
Ciampaglio, Jr., on the briefs).
Betancourt, Greco, Evans & Vignocchi LLC, attorneys
for respondents (Ronald Betancourt, Clayton J.
Vignocchi, and Anthony L. Blair, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Rishi A. Ramlochan appeals from a February 19, 2025 order
barring the report and testimony of his expert witness, Captain Joseph Ahlstrom,
and, consequently, granting summary judgment in favor of defendants
Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corporation (Evergreen) and Evergreen
Marine Corporation (Taiwan), Ltd (EMC). In addition, plaintiff appeals from
an April 25, 2025 order denying his motion for reconsideration of the February
order. Because we conclude the motion court misapplied its discretion in
barring the Captain's report and testimony, we reverse the orders and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
In plaintiff's second amended complaint, he alleged EMC was "a party to
a joint service venture with other entities acting as carriers engaged in the
business of transporting cargo by sea in international trade and commerce." He
claimed EMC was "represented in the United States by" Evergreen. He also
alleged EMC "was and is the owner and operator of a fleet of ocean-going
merchant vessels which regularly called at ports located within the territorial
waters of New Jersey" and "owned, supervised, controlled, maintained[,] and
managed the motor vessel, the MV EVER LUCID" (the Vessel), which "was and
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is an ocean[-]going merchant vessel designed and built for the carriage of goods
by sea."
Plaintiff "was a longshoreman employed by Maher Terminals at the Maher
Terminals facility located within the Port of Elizabeth." He alleged on
December 14, 2018, at 9:45 p.m., he "was engaged in the course of his
employment" and "was required to go aboard the" Vessel. He claimed that as
he "was attempting to make egress from the [Vessel] he began traversing its
gangway, which became dislodged, and caused [him] to fall to the dock and
become injured." Plaintiff alleged defendants breached various duties and
asserted a cause of action against defendants "under 33 U.S.C. ยง 905[(b)] of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act" (LHWCA).
In support of his claim, plaintiff proffered the expert report of Captain
Ahlstrom. The Captain described that:
The [Vessel] docked at Maher Terminal . . . at
[]7[:]30 [a.m.] on [December] 14, 2018 using 5 cranes
to load and discharge the [V]essel . . . . [plaintiff] was
a longshoreman working the [V]essel . . . . On the
evening of December 14[] at around 9[:00 p.m.] he
received a call on his radio to go aboard the [V]essel
and position a shoe for a container. He boarded the
[V]essel and performed this task. On leaving the
[V]essel at about 9:45 [p.m.] he descended the gangway
and attempted to step on the dock. However, the
gangway was positioned on the [c]ap log, a piece of
wood about 2 feet high placed at the end of the dock for
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safety. In attempting to step onto the deck he injured
himself due to the increased height. The gangway
position was confirmed by photos that evening by . . .
[plaintiff] and Maher stevedores[.]
Captain Ahlstrom noted "[i]n depositions, the Maher Terminal and
longshoreman alike testified, with the exception of [one individual], that placing
the gangway on the [c]ap log is an unsafe practice." However, the Captain also
noted "[t]he crew of the [Vessel] believed it to be an acceptable practice . . . ."
Captain Ahlstrom concluded "[t]he gangway should be placed on the dock to
provide safe access and egress from the [V]essel."
In addition, Captain Ahlstrom stated "[i]t is necessary for the gangway
watch to monitor the gangway due to cargo operations and tides to ensure the
gangway does not come off the dock . . . ." The Captain further stated "[t]his
constant monitoring is a required duty of any gangway watch."
Moreover, Captain Ahlstrom opined "[t]he gangway would have to be
taken off the dock if it obstructed the movement of the crane . . . on the dock."
The Captain described the gangway could "be temporarily suspended alongside
the ship" or "the gangway would be lifted and placed back on the dock after the
crane passes." He offered "[i]t is possible that this was a reason for the gangway
not being on the dock when . . . [plaintiff] descended the gangway . . . ."
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Captain Ahlstrom opined the Vessel "was required to comply with the
[International Safety Management Code (ISM)] and [Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS)]." He found "[u]nder SOLAS . . . and the ISM . . . the [Vessel] was
required to have a Safety Management Certificate and a Safety Management
System that provided for a safe environment aboard the [V]essel and safe
operations."
He determined pursuant to ISM Code 1.2, "[t]hat safe environment would
have included a safe gangway [and p]lacing the gangway on the [c]ap log [wa]s
not providing a safe environment." Moreover, "[s]afe practices would have
included monitoring the gangway and informing any person[] using the gangway
of any dangers." The Captain opined the "risk . . . was the increased distance to
the dock created by placing the gangway platform on the [c]ap log."
Captain Ahlstrom stated "Section 7 of the ISM Code, . . . references
procedures[,] plans[,] and instructions for operations aboard a vessel." He
opined "[h]andling the gangway would be one such operation" and "[p]rocedures
to lower and raise the gangway in order to keep it safely on the dock should have
been documented and practiced by qualified crew members."
In the opinion section of his report, Captain Ahlstrom opined:
1. The gangway was under the exclusive control of the
Vessel and its crew. That is, Vessel personnel were
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responsible for deploying the gangway, inspecting the
gangway, and maintaining an active gangway watch to
ensure the safety of all who board and disembark the
Vessel. . . .
2. The gangway was improperly placed on the dock by
Vessel personnel. It was clear in their depositions that
the crew of the [Vessel] felt that placing the gangway
on the [c]ap log was an acceptable practice, it is also
clear by depositions of . . . longshoreman and Maher
stevedores with the exception of one that placing the
gangway on the [c]ap log was an unacceptable and
unsafe practice. I also agree that placing the gangway
on the [c]ap log was an unsafe practice which directly
led to the injury sustained by . . . [plaintiff].
3. In the injury report I reviewed the recommendation
. . . that longshoreman [plaintiff] should have requested
the gangway be moved off the [c]ap log before
ascending the gangway. This implies it was an unsafe
situation which should have been fixed by the crew of
the [Vessel] by placing the gangway on the dock. It
also states . . . [plaintiff] was "aware." In his
deposition, he states he was never "aware" of [the]
gangway being on the cap[ ]log when ascending the
gangway on December 14, 2018.
4. Due to the improper rigging of the gangway, the
Vessel provided . . . [plaintiff] a gangway which was in
a dangerous condition caused by the gangway not being
placed properly on the dock. This dangerous condition
caused the injury sustained by . . . [plaintiff].
5. Vessel crew failed to properly monitor and inspect
the gangway to ensure that the gangway remained on
the dock or to inform those boarding or departing the
[V]essel that the gangway was no longer on the dock
due to operational circumstances. . . .
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6. . . . [plaintiff] states that when he ascended the
gangway it was on the dock and he had no issues going
up the gangway. . . . The cause for . . . [plaintiff']s injury
was the improper tending of the gangway by the crew
of the [Vessel].
[(Emphasis added).]
Defendants moved for summary judgment on liability, contending
plaintiff could not "establish a breach of duty as a matter of law" and that "no
liability c[ould] attach to [the V]essel." Defendants subsequently moved in
limine under Rule 4:25-8, seeking to preclude Captain Ahlstrom's report and
testimony at trial. The court initially heard argument on both motions on
December 6, 2024. The court converted the expert motion into a summary
judgment motion given its potential dispositive impact on the case, allowed the
parties to submit supplemental briefs, and again heard arguments.
In its memorandum of decision accompanying the February order, the
court stated "[t]he [LHWCA] . . . permits [l]ongshoremen to bring a cause of
action against the owner of a ship for injuries sustained due to the owner's
negligence," citing 33 U.S.C. ยง 905(b). The court stated the LHWCA had been
construed "to impose three narrow duties on a vessel: (1) the turnover duty, (2)
the active control duty, and (3) the duty to intervene," citing Scindia Steam
Navigation Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
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The court found plaintiff had asserted two theories regarding defendants'
negligence. Under the first theory, plaintiff contended that when he "boarded
the Vessel, the gangway was on the pier and later, unbeknownst to him, it was
moved onto the cap log" and, thus defendants had breached the duty of "active
control and/or its duty to intervene." Under the second theory, plaintiff
contended, the "initial placement of the gangway on the cap log was unsafe,
breaching [defendants'] turnover duty." The court noted plaintiff "did not
oppose [d]efendants ['] argument as to duty to intervene."
Regarding Captain Ahlstrom, the court found he was "qualified to testify"
and the "the safety of the placement of a gangway . . . [wa]s clearly outside the
ken of the average juror and require[d] expert testimony to set forth the standard
of care and how a defendant's conduct deviated from that standard." The court
stated "Captain Ahlstrom reached two overreaching conclusions[,] that the
gangway was moved without plaintiff's knowledge and/or that its placement on
the cap log was unsafe."
Concerning the movement of the gangway, the court determined Captain
Ahlstrom's conclusion, that plaintiff "was not informed that the gangway was
moved onto the cap log while he was aboard the Vessel and as a result, was
injured[,]" was not supported by the "evidence in the record."
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The court reasoned: Seaman Kuan-Cheng Yeh testified that he had
operated the Vessel and, safely and without complaint, placed the gangway on
the cap log; other Maher's employees, including superintendent Joseph D'Auria,
could not recall the placement of the gangway; Maher's manager of marina
operations wrote a letter to plaintiff memorializing that plaintiff "acknowledged
knowing the gangway was improperly positioned on the cap log" as he traversed
the gangway for ingress and egress; and the crane was moving, so not obstructed
by the gangway on the pier, after plaintiff was injured and there was no support
for the proposition that the cap log had been moved before plaintiff's accident.
Thus, the court concluded Captain Ahlstrom had authored a "net opinion" on the
movement of the gangway because "the facts he relied upon [we]re not
established in the record."
In addition, as to safety, the court acknowledged Captain Ahlstrom had
opined "that [the] placement of the gangway on the cap log was an improper,
unsafe, or dangerous condition" and had referenced the ISM and SOLAS codes,
describing them as "requir[ing] that a vessel provide an overall safe
environment." However, the court determined Captain Ahlstrom "d[id] not go
beyond" referencing these sources and, although he "list[ed] specific provisions
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of each code, he fail[ed] to say how [d]efendants breached those provisions other
than saying they created an unsafe environment."
Moreover, the court reasoned "the only support for [Captain Ahlstrom's]
contention that it was unsafe was because the 'longshoreman and Maher
stevedores with the exception of one [believed] that placing the gangway on the
[c]ap log was an . . . unsafe practice.'" The court noted that Captain Ahlstrom
had stated he "'also agree[d] that placing the gangway on the [c]ap log was an
unsafe practice.'" (Emphasis added). The court concluded the Captain had
offered a net opinion because he gave "a bare conclusion without support" and
did "not say why it was unsafe." The court held "[t]he fact that an injury
occurred d[id] not mean the condition was unsafe."
Further, the court determined Captain Ahlstrom's statement that the
gangway's placement was unsafe because plaintiff was told "he should have
reported . . . [its] placement on the cap log" "implies it was an unsafe condition"
was "an argument, not an opinion." Nevertheless, the court found the opinion
"still d[id] not address why or how it was allegedly unsafe."
Because the court concluded plaintiff's claims required the support of an
expert opinion and because the court barred Captain Ahlstrom's expert opinion,
the court granted defendants summary judgment.
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Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the February order. In a written
statement of reasons, accompanying its April 25, 2025 order denying
reconsideration, the court addressed plaintiff's further argument that "there
[wa]s sufficient circumstantial evidence that the gangway was moved while
plaintiff was aboard the [V]essel." The court determined Yeh had "testified he
placed the gangway on the cap log on the morning of the day in question" and
plaintiff had "reported . . . that the gangway was on the cap log when he boarded
the [V]essel" although "later testif[ied] he could not recall."
Further, the court noted plaintiff's belated submittal concerning D'Auria's
deposition testimony about his Lo/Lo Vessel Inspections Reports (Lo/Lo
reports) and that "the absence of a notation in the report that the gangway was
on the cap log mean[t] it was on the pier." However, the court reasoned "these
arguments were not raised by [p]laintiff in . . . opposition to summary
judgment." Thus, the court concluded, it would not consider them on
reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the court noted it had originally considered D'Auria's
deposition testimony and he "could not recall how the gangway was positioned
on the day in question." Therefore, the court determined because "Yeh testified
he placed the gangway on the cap log" and plaintiff acknowledged "the gangway
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was on the cap log when he boarded the [V]essel" although "later testif[ied] he
could not recall," [n]o other witness could testify on this subject. Therefore, the
court concluded, "there [wa]s no circumstantial evidence, merely speculation."
The court considered plaintiff's argument that Captain Ahlstrom "did not
author a net opinion" concerning safety. The court determined it had "properly
found that Captain Ahlstrom's report" was a net opinion because he "failed to
set forth the whys and wherefores of his opinion[,]" and instead "cite[d] the ISM
and SOLAS, [but] he fail[ed] to indicate how they were breached" and "merely
state[d] he believed placing the gangway on the cap log was unsafe because
other witnesses said so." The court found Captain Ahlstrom's report was "simply
not sufficient."
The court concluded there was "no basis to reconsider its decision" and
because "Captain Ahlstrom's report was properly barred," plaintiff could not
sustain his burden of proof.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred in concluding that Captain
Ahlstrom's opinion was an inadmissible net opinion, referencing the Captain's
more than forty years of maritime experience with similar vessels. In addition,
he asserts "the Maher Terminal and longshoreman alike testified that placing the
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gangway on the [c]ap log [wa]s an unsafe practice." Moreover, he asserts
Captain Ahlstrom considered "maritime safety standards contained in the ISM"
but that the court failed to "even mention" the Captain's analysis of the
standards.
Appellate courts review an order granting "summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard used by the trial court." Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J.
73, 78 (2022). A court must grant summary judgment when "reviewing 'the
competent evidential materials submitted by the parties,'" viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, "'there are [no] genuine issues of
material fact . . . the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.'" Grande v. St. Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting
Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)); R. 4:46-2(c).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we "must
'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving
party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original)
(quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)). We do not
"weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but . . . determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J.
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1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995)).
"Where there is no material fact in dispute . . . '[an appellate court] must
then decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" N.J. Realtors
v. Twp. of Berkeley, 479 N.J. Super. 379, 391 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting
DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super.
325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he
evaluation of every motion for summary judgment requires the court, trial or
appellate, to review the motion record against not only the elements of the cause
of action but also the evidential standard governing that cause of action."
Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 40.
"The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court." Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015).
Thus, "[a]s a discovery determination, a trial court's grant or denial of a motion
to strike expert testimony is entitled to deference on appellate review[,]" ibid.,
and is "review[ed] . . . against an abuse of discretion standard." Id. at 53 (quoting
Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371-72 (2011)).
"When . . . a trial court is 'confronted with an evidence determination
precedent to ruling on a summary judgment motion,' it 'squarely must address
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the evidence decision first.'" Ibid. (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384-85 (2010)). Our "review of the trial court's
decisions proceeds in the same sequence, with the evidentiary issue resolved
first, followed by the summary judgment determination of the trial court." Ibid.
When a court "determines the admissibility of expert testimony, N.J.R.E.
702 and N.J.R.E. 703 frame its analysis." Ibid. Rule 702 "governs the admission
of expert testimony." Kemp ex rel. Wright v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 423 (2002).
The Rule provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." N.J.R.E.
702.
Thus, Rule "702 imposes three core requirements for the admission of
expert testimony." Townsend, 221 N.J. at 53. The requirements include:
"(1) the intended testimony must concern a subject
matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2)
the field testified to must be at a state of the art such
that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable;
and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to
offer the intended testimony."
[Ibid. (quoting Creanga v. Jardal, 185 N.J. 345, 355
(2005)).]
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Rule "703 addresses the foundation for expert testimony." Ibid. The Rule
mandates that expert opinion be grounded in "facts or
data derived from (1) the expert's personal
observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3)
data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily
admissible in evidence but which is the type of data
normally relied upon by experts."
[Ibid. (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569,
583 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).]
As a corollary to Rule 703, "[t]he net opinion rule . . . forbids the
admission of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence
or other data." Id. at 53-54 (quoting Polzo, 196 N.J. at 583). The net opinion
rule "requires that an expert 'give the why and wherefore that supports the
opinion, rather than a mere conclusion.'" Id. at 54 (quoting Borough of Saddle
River v. 66 E. Allendale, LLC, 216 N.J. 115, 144 (2013)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). "The net opinion rule is not a standard of perfection." Ibid.
"[A]n expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as to the
basis of his opinion." Id. at 55.
We consider whether Captain Ahlstrom authored a net opinion. The court
reasoned the Captain's opinion, concerning the unsafe or dangerous placement
of the cap log on the gangway, was a net opinion because: (1) although he
referenced specific codes "he fail[ed] to say how [d]efendants breached those
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provisions other than saying [defendants] created an unsafe environment"; (2)
the only support for the Captain's opinion was based on the statements of
longshoreman and Maher stevedores that the placement of the gangway on the
cap log was unsafe; and (3) the inference the condition was unsafe because
plaintiff was advised he should have reported the condition was "an argument,
not an opinion." We disagree that Captain Ahlstrom rendered a net opinion,
and, accordingly, we reverse.
The Captain relied upon the ISM and SOLAS codes to establish
defendants had a duty to provide a safe environment, which included a safe
gangway. He opined defendants had breached their duty by placing the gangway
on the cap log. Further, the Captain explained the cap log was "a piece of wood
about 2 feet high placed at the end of the dock" and "[i]n attempting to step onto
the dock [plaintiff] injured himself due to the increased height." He opined
"[t]his dangerous condition caused the injury sustained by" plaintiff. Therefore,
Captain Ahlstrom provided more than a "mere conclusion" and provided the
"why and wherefore" to support his opinion. See Townsend, 221 N.J. at 54.
Any factual disputes about the actual placement of the gangway or plaintiff's
knowledge of it should be left to a jury to determine.
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Further, neither the fact that the Captain also agreed with others that the
condition was unsafe, nor the fact that the Captain noted plaintiff had been
advised that he should have reported the condition, are fatal to the Captain's
opinion or render it a net opinion. Thus, we conclude the court misapplied its
discretion in barring Captain Ahlstrom's report and testimony and erred in
granting summary judgment on that basis.
We also reject the trial court's determination that Captain Ahlstrom's
opinions concerning the movement of the gangway were net opinions. Whether
the gangway was moved after plaintiff went on to the Vessel and before he came
back down the gangway are disputed issues of material facts. Consequently,
Captain Ahlstrom's opinions regarding the Vessel crews' responsibility for any
movement of the gangway and the positioning of the gangway on a flat surface
of the pier as compared to the cap log are sufficiently supported by facts in the
record. Therefore, issues and related expert opinions concerning the movement
of the gangway should be resolved by the jury at trial.
We emphasize the scope of our opinion. We conclude only that Captain
Ahlstrom did not propose to offer net opinions and thus summary judgment was
incorrectly entered on this basis. The Captain's opinions will be subject to
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cross-examination, and plaintiff continues to bear the burden of proof subject to
defendants' defenses.
In sum, we reverse and vacate the February 19, 2025 order in its entirety.
Because we reverse that order, we also reverse the April 25, 2025
reconsideration motion order.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
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