Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0495-25 AYESHA MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHGATE APARTMENTS, LLC, MOSHOLU REALTY, LLC, KGP MANAGEMENT, LLC, and EY & SONS, LLC, Defendants-Respondents. _____________________________ Argued October 15, 2026 – Decided November 9, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and Augostini. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-0514-23. Brian R. Lehrer argued the cause for appellant (Brandon J. Broderick, LLC, attorneys; Brian R. Lehrer, on the briefs). Janae Banner argued the cause for respondents Southgate Apartments, LLC and KGP Management, LLC (Edelstein Law LLP, attorneys; Jay L. Edelstein, on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff Ayesha Moore appeals from a September 26, 2025 order granting summary judgment to defendants Southgate Apartments, LLC and KGP Management, LLC. We reverse and remand for the reasons expressed in this opinion. I. Plaintiff rented an apartment on property owned by defendants. On September 17, 2020, she contacted the property management office to report the unevenness in the master bedroom floor was spreading, and "[t]here[] [was] another bulge close to [the] closet and as you enter [the] bedroom." Approximately seven months later, a contractor came out and assessed the flooring. According to plaintiff, "[m]aintenance came by" and "[m]easured the floor and the crawl space." The contractor concluded it did "not pose any immediate need for repair," and advised plaintiff "if anything new changes, [she was] to inform the office." Defendants decided they would repair the floor once plaintiff moved out. In May 2022, plaintiff contacted the property management office to complain about the floor's unevenness and again they came out and measured the floor. The next month, plaintiff explained the floor's "swelling started to A-0495-25 2 increase a bit[;]" therefore, she "notified them again." Plaintiff stated management had the "flooring expert come by to measure and check the floor." When the expert returned to the apartment, plaintiff inquired as to the cause of the floor's unevenness and he responded he would have to "discuss that with management and they would let [plaintiff] know." No repairs were made. Defendants dispute plaintiff's assertion of these more recent calls. They contend there was no written work order documenting these calls. On July 19, 2022, plaintiff got out of bed, tripped on the wood board sticking up from the floor, and fell to ground. She was knocked unconscious, fracturing her wrist and ankle. Plaintiff testified she fell that morning because "something was introduced that wasn't there" "from the night before." She agreed something had "changed overnight" and there was something different about the floor that morning. Plaintiff described the area where she fell as "a portion of the wood [that was] . . . sticking up[,]" and the floor had a "hole" in it. On March 10, 2023, plaintiff sued defendants, alleging negligence. Following the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment , contending plaintiff could not establish notice. The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding plaintiff failed to produce evidence A-0495-25 3 defendants had notice of the floor buckling, which created the dangerous condition causing plaintiff's fall and injuries. On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erred in granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to defendants' notice of the dangerous condition causing plaintiff's injuries, and plaintiff's expert sufficiently opined on causation. II. "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard that governed the trial court's determination." Padilla v. Young Il An, 257 N.J. 540, 547 (2024). When determining whether to grant summary judgment pursuant to Rule 4:46-2(c), "'the court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party defending against the motion and must accord [them] the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom, and if reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied.'" Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 535 (1995) (quoting Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 174 (1991)) (internal citations omitted). "When no issue of fact exists, and only a question of law remains, [we] afford[] no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court." A-0495-25 4 Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). Our Supreme Court has held "[t]he fundamental elements of a negligence claim are [(1)] a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, [(2)] a breach of that duty by the defendant, [(3)] injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach, and [(4)] damages." Coleman v. Martinez, 247 N.J. 319, 337 (2021) (quoting Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208 (2014)). "A plaintiff bears the burden of proving negligence, . . . and must prove that unreasonable acts or omissions by the defendant proximately caused [their] injuries." Underhill v. Borough of Caldwell, 463 N.J. Super. 548, 554 (App. Div. 2020) (internal citations omitted). "To act non-negligently is to take reasonable precautions to prevent the occurrence of foreseeable harm to others." New Gold Equities Corp. v. Jaffe Spindler Co., 453 N.J. Super. 358, 377-78 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Fernandes v. DAR Dev. Corp., 222 N.J. 390, 403-04 (2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care to guard against foreseeable dangers arising from use of those portions of the rental property over which the landlord retains control." J.H. v. R&M Tagliareni, LLC, 239 N.J. 198, 218 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Scully v. Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114, A-0495-25 5 121-22 (2004)). "'That duty requires the landlord to maintain that property in a reasonably safe condition,'" ibid. (quoting Scully, 179 N.J. at 122), which includes "proper installation and attentive repair work," Anderson v. Sammy Redd & Associates, 278 N.J. Super. 50, 54 (App. Div. 1994). However, "a landlord is liable only for injurious consequences to a tenant by reason of defects of which he has knowledge or of defects which have existed for so long a time that . . . he had both an opportunity to discover and to remedy." Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 52 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 63 N.J. 577 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Francisco v. Miller, 14 N.J. Super. 290, 296-97 (App. Div. 1951)). In the context of a landlord-tenant relationship, "[n]egligence . . . requires not only proof of the condition which caused the injury but that the condition was known or should have been known by the landlord prior to the occurrence, so that [they] had an opportunity to correct it." Ibid. The primary issue is whether defendants had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition, which erupted the morning of plaintiff's fall and injury. In determining defendant did not have notice, the court found the buckling plaintiff complained of was not what actually "suddenly appeared" causing her to fall. The court concluded a jury, based on common knowledge, A-0495-25 6 would not be able to "draw [the] connection" between the buckling and the hole in the floor on the morning of the incident. Pursuant to our de novo review, we reach a different conclusion. The facts show plaintiff alerted defendants of the "bulge" in the bedroom flooring as early as September 2020 and complained again about the "swelling" and "unevenness" in the bedroom flooring approximately two months before the incident. Plaintiff's complaints months before the incident were specific to the flooring in the same location where she fell. Her recent complaints related to the floorboards being "uneven," "bulging," "swelling," and looking as though there was a "hump." Those complaints were not substantially different from the prior complaints dating back to 2020. The dangerous condition resulting from the floorboards sticking up from the floor was not so far afield of plaintiff's ongoing complaints regarding the flooring in the bedroom. We conclude a jury is competent to evaluate plaintiff's credibility as to whether she notified the property manager months before the "explosion" of the flooring and whether defendants had sufficient notice of the floor issue incident to take remedial action. Accepting plaintiff's description of the floorboards, as we must under the summary judgment standard, we are satisfied she provided A-0495-25 7 sufficient notice to defendants of the condition that posed a potential risk and foreseeable danger. The court further found "some kind of expert perhaps[] [was needed] to educate the jury that when you see this condition in a month or two ahead of time[,] you should know overnight it can explode" because "it's not a res ipsa [loquitor] case." It concluded summary judgment should also be granted because plaintiff's expert did not opine the buckling plaintiff complained of caused the "overnight development." The court expounded: The mere fact of a buckling somewhere, . . . is not . . . automatically connected to something that arose overnight. It's a leap I don't think I could make as a lay person. . . [D]o I think it makes sense? Yeah, I think it makes sense. But is that something that's competent evidence to prove that point? I don't. However, plaintiff's expert opined "[t]he hazardous conditions involved in the subject incident did not develop overnight and had been present for at least one year prior to the incident timeframe." The expert further opined defendants "had actual notice of the deteriorated condition involved in the subject incident for approximately one year prior to the incident timeframe," and "the defective walkway surface . . . caused [plaintiff to] trip and fall." "[E]xpert testimony is not always required to assess whether a particular defendant acted negligently." Jacobs v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 452 A-0495-25 8 N.J. Super. 494, 505 (App. Div. 2017). For example, our courts have held expert testimony is not required to explain: "the dangers that might follow when a lit cigarette is thrown into a pile of papers or other flammable material," Scully, 179 N.J. at 127; the danger of a missing brick in the top step of a front patio staircase, Berger v. Shapiro, 30 N.J. 89, 102 (1959); the risk a dark, unlit sunken foyer might lead a houseguest to trip and fall, Campbell v. Hastings, 348 N.J. Super. 264, 270-71 (App. Div. 2002); and whether a hole in the ground was "left unattended too long without durable warnings or barriers," Jacobs, 452 N.J. Super. at 508. "Basic principles of negligence law routinely call for lay jurors to evaluate if a defendant's conduct was unreasonable." Id. at 505 (citing Model Jury Charge (Civil), 5.10A, "Negligence and Ordinary Care" (approved before 1984)). Here, the court correctly noted the expert did not state the floor buckling was "the proximate cause of th[e] overnight development." Nonetheless, a jury is competent to decide whether the condition of the floorboards created such a risk of falling and injury, and whether defendants' failure to repair was a breach of its duty to maintain the property in a safe condition. See Scully, 179 N.J. at 130 ("It is for the jury to determine what evidence is credible, what inferences are to be drawn from the evidence, whether defendant breached a duty owed to A-0495-25 9 plaintiff, and last, whether that breach was a proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff."). Defendants did not seek to bar plaintiff's expert's opinion. As a result, this issue is not properly before us, and we need not address it for the first time in this appeal. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19-20 (2009). We are satisfied, under the facts viewed most favorably towards plaintiff together with the expert's opinion, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding causation to survive summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-0495-25 10