Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed October 7, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D25-1051 Lower Tribunal No. 22-5310-CA-01 ________________ Miurel Del Carmen Menuez, Appellant, vs. Westport Recovery Corporation, Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Charles Johnson, Judge. Dorothy G. Negrin, P. A., and Dorothy G. Negrin, for appellant. Friedman & Greenberg, P.A., and Robert D. Friedman (Sunrise), for appellee. Before SCALES, C.J., and LOGUE and LINDSEY, JJ. LOGUE, J. Miurel del Carmen Menuez appeals the trial court’s final summary judgment entered in favor of Westport Recovery Corporation in her action to quiet title to real property, vacate a Sheriff’s Levy, Sale, and Deed, and for declaratory relief. The challenged final summary judgment determined that, by virtue of an unelaborated order in a county court case to which Menuez was not a party, the doctrine of res judicata served as an absolute bar to Menuez’s circuit court claims. We reverse. BACKGROUND In December 1998, the county court entered a judgment against Kenan L. Paicely and Tammy P. Paicely. In September 2018, almost twenty years later, Westport, as successor-in-interest of the original judgment creditor, obtained title to a property previously owned by one of the judgment debtors, Kenan L. Paicely (hereinafter, the “Property”), through a sheriff’s levy and sale. Five years prior, however, Menuez had acquired title to the Property via a warranty deed. Westport did not seek to amend the county court’s final judgment to add Menuez as a party. Menuez, in turn, sought to intervene in the county court action to reopen the matter and vacate the sheriff’s sale. The county court conducted a hearing on Menuez’s Second Amended Motion to Reopen, Intervene, Vacate Sale, and Set Aside Sheriff’s Deed, but no transcript of this hearing 2 has been provided. The county court subsequently entered an unelaborated written order stating: “ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that third party, Miurel Del Carmen Menuez’s, Second Amended Motion to Reopen, Intervene, Vacate Sale and Set Aside Sheriff’s Deed is denied.” Menuez did not appeal the county court’s order but rather brought the underlying action in the circuit court seeking to quiet title to the Property and to set aside the sheriff’s sale. In addition to raising several arguments she would have asserted in the county court action had she been granted leave to intervene and the matter had been reopened, Menuez also asserted in the circuit court action that the Property was her homestead. The parties ultimately filed competing summary judgment motions. Westport argued it was entitled to summary judgment because Menuez’s claims were precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, Westport contended the county court’s order denying Menuez’s Second Amended Motion to Reopen, Intervene, Vacate Sale and Set Aside Sheriff’s Deed constituted a decision on the merits of the same claims Menuez now brought in the circuit court. Menuez, in turn, argued in her own summary judgment motion that the county court’s order denying her Second Amended Motion to Reopen, Intervene, Vacate Sale and Set Aside Sheriff’s Deed did not rule on the 3 merits of her claims, but rather simply denied her request to re-open the case and intervene. As such, Menuez contended, the order did not adjudicate the issues presented in her circuit court action and therefore did not have preclusive effect. The trial court conducted hearings on the parties’ summary judgment motions and thereafter entered the challenged judgment, granting final summary judgment in favor of Westport and denying Menuez’s summary judgment motion. The trial court determined Menuez was entitled to no relief because Westport’s res judicata defense constituted a complete bar to Menuez’s claims. Menuez timely appealed the final summary judgment. ANALYSIS We review, de novo, a trial court’s summary judgment. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). Whether a cause of action is barred by res judicata is a question of law that we also review de novo. Fernandez v. Cruz, 341 So. 3d 410, 412-13 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). A party claiming the benefit of res judicata has the burden of establishing, with sufficient certainty by the record or by extrinsic evidence, that the prior order adjudicated the merits of the matter. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Badra, 765 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). “For res judicata or 4 collateral estoppel to apply, there must [ ] exist in the prior litigation a ‘clear- cut former adjudication’ on the merits.” Suniland Assocs., Ltd. v. Wilbenka, Inc., 656 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (quoting State, Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. LaPlante, 470 So. 2d 832, 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)). We conclude that Westport failed to meet its burden at summary judgment to establish with “sufficient certainty” that the county court’s order actually adjudicated the merits of the same claims Menuez now brings in her circuit court action. First, Menuez’s claim that the Property was protected homestead falls outside the ambit of any res judicata stemming from the county court order because it could not have properly been raised or adjudicated in the county court as such claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court. Sepulveda v. Westport Recovery Corp., 145 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (holding section 222.10, Florida Statutes, grants circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction to determine a claimed homestead exemption). More broadly, without a transcript of the county court hearing, we do not know whether the county court reached, much less adjudicated, the merits of Menuez’s Second Amended Motion to Reopen, Intervene, Vacate Sale, and Set Aside Sheriff’s Deed. And, the county court’s unelaborated 5 order, merely denying Menuez’s motion, provides no guidance. An unelaborated order is generally not deemed a decision on the merits unless there is a citation to authority or other statement that clearly shows the issue was considered and adjudicated by the court. Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1258 (Fla. 2004). Finally, res judicata does not apply when, as here, the prior judgment might have rested on either of two grounds, only one of which goes to the merits. deCancino v. E. Airlines, Inc., 283 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 1973). See also Kent v. Sutker, 40 So. 2d 145, 147 (Fla. 1949) (“Where there are two issues in a case, upon either of which a judgment may rest, one going to the merits and the other not, its disposition is generally considered as resting upon the latter, so that the merits remain unadjudicated, unless the judgment appears to have been upon the merits.”). Here, the county court certainly could have denied Menuez’s intervention motion without reaching the merits, thus res judicata is inapplicable. Westport urges us to read Pensacola Beach, L.L.C v. American Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 294 So. 3d 976, 981-82 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), for the proposition that denial of a party’s motion to intervene in all cases, ipso facto, constitutes a merits adjudication of the claims that would have been brought had intervention been granted. We do not read Pensacola Beach so broadly 6 and, in any event, find Pensacola Beach dispositively distinguishable. Unlike the instant case, Pensacola Beach does not involve a party seeking—almost two decades post-judgment—intervention into a case in which it was never a party, nor does it involve a situation in which the basis for the denial of intervention is wholly unknown. In sum, our de novo review of the summary judgment record leads us to conclude that Westport did not meet its burden to establish that the county court’s order constituted an adjudication on the merits. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to bar Menuez’s claims in the instant circuit court action. And because, in our view, the trial court’s determination that res judicata barred Menuez’s claims permeated its conclusions throughout the challenged judgment, we reverse both the trial court’s grant of Westport’s motion for summary judgment and its denial of Menuez’s motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. 7