Full Opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 5D2025-0442 LT Case No. 2023-CF-003095-C _____________________________ DWIGHT DEON OLIVER, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County. Jessica Recksiedler, Judge. Matthew R. McLain, of McLain Law, Longwood, for Appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Bureau Chief, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. October 9, 2026 PER CURIAM. Dwight Deon Oliver appeals his convictions for drug trafficking and possession, contending that the State failed to establish that he constructively possessed contraband in a locked safe that a family friend attempted to remove from a house in Oliver’s neighborhood. Because the State failed to present sufficient independent evidence that Oliver constructively possessed the contraband inside the safe, we reverse. I. Oliver was subject to an arrest warrant. Officers located him in a truck backing out of the driveway of a house on Molten Avenue in Sanford, Florida. He was arrested and placed in a police vehicle. While awaiting a search warrant for the house, officers observed Jessica Green in the backyard of the house. She was carrying a bag and a locked safe; the safe had a keyhole and a keypad for entering a security code. Officers stopped Green and secured the locked safe. Green knew Oliver and has a child with Oliver’s brother. When Oliver was taken into custody, an officer observed a lanyard around his neck bearing several keys. One was later determined to be for the Molten Avenue house and the other for the safe. Officers used the key taken from Oliver’s lanyard to open the safe, revealing the contraband at issue. Oliver was charged with two counts of trafficking the contraband found in the safe (one for fentanyl and one for phenethylamines) and two counts of possession of other contraband found in the safe (one for cocaine and the other for a controlled substance). At trial, Oliver moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State failed to provide sufficient independent evidence that he knew of and had dominion and control over the contraband in the safe. He argued that he did not have actual possession of the safe (Green did), that no evidence established that he knew of the contraband in the safe, and that, at best, he potentially had access because he had a key that was used to open the safe. The State responded that Oliver’s possession of a key to the house and safe, plus his family connection to Green, were collectively sufficient to submit the case on a constructive possession theory. The trial judge denied the motion, stating that Oliver “not only had the key to the residence, but he also had the key to the safe. And the safe is where the drugs were specifically found.” Oliver’s renewed motion for relief was also denied. II. 2 The dispositive issue is whether Oliver’s possession of the two keys and his family connection to Green are sufficient to establish constructive possession. Constructive possession is established when a defendant, though lacking “actual, physical possession of the controlled substance,” knows of “its presence on or about the premises, and has the ability to exercise and maintain control over the contraband.” Harris v. State, 954 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). To establish constructive possession, the State bears the burden of proving that the accused “(1) had dominion and control over the contraband, (2) knew the contraband was in [his/]her presence and (3) knew of the illicit nature of the contraband.” State v. Reese, 774 So. 2d 948, 949 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Mere proximity to the contraband, by itself, is insufficient to establish control. Harris, 954 So. 2d at 1262. Moreover, where the premises on which the contraband is discovered is not in the accused’s exclusive possession, neither knowledge of the contraband’s presence on the premises nor the ability to control it may be inferred absent independent proof. Sierra v. State, 746 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Independent proof may take the form of the accused’s actual knowledge of the contraband’s presence, incriminating statements, or “circumstances other than the mere location of the substance[] from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge.” Cordero v. State, 589 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (quoting Murphy v. State, 511 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)); see also Santiago v. State, 991 So. 2d 439, 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“Generally, independent proof can be established by the admission into evidence of a pretrial statement made by an accused, by witness testimony, or by scientific evidence.”). Oliver’s possession of a key to the Molten Avenue house does not establish constructive possession of the safe that had been inside the house. The house belonged to a third party. The State presented no evidence that Oliver owned, resided in, or otherwise exercised control over the house. Because the house was not in Oliver’s exclusive possession, the State could not rely on the safe’s location within the residence to infer Oliver’s knowledge of, or control over, the contraband inside the safe. See Stevens v. State, 3 120 So. 3d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (stating a defendant’s possession of a key providing access to the premises where contraband was located was insufficient, without more, to establish constructive possession, since a “next-door neighbor, a housekeeper, or a landlord” might likewise hold a key to the premises without committing any crime). Independent proof is required. The same is true of the safe key. Having failed to establish that Oliver had exclusive possession of the house, the State likewise could not rest on his possession of the safe key to show that he knew of or controlled what the safe contained. Again, independent proof was required. No evidence, including fingerprints, DNA, or otherwise, was provided to show that Oliver handled, possessed, or controlled the safe or the contents inside. A key affording access, without more, establishes only opportunity, not possession. See id. (“[T]he fact that one has ‘access’ to contraband or, as in this case, merely to the place where the contraband is located, is simply not a crime, or even an element of a crime, under the law of Florida.”). Neither does Green’s possession of the safe fill this evidentiary deficiency. Officers observed Green, not Oliver, carrying the safe from the house, and she did so only after Oliver had already been secured in custody. Green testified that the safe belonged to her, that she had placed it in the residence the night before, and that she could access it without a key by using a PIN code. The State presented no evidence that Green was acting at Oliver’s direction or that Oliver was aware that she was removing the safe from the premises. Green’s actual possession of the safe establishes her knowledge and control over the safe’s contents, not Oliver’s. III. Accordingly, because the State failed to present sufficient independent evidence from which a rational jury could find constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in denying Oliver’s motion for judgment of acquittal. See id. (“‘[C]onstructive’ possession, as the state claims in this case, requires, among other things, evidence that one knows of the 4 presence and has dominion and control over the contraband. There was no evidence of any of this at the trial.”). REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to discharge. JAY, C.J, and MAKAR and LAMBERT, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 5