Ward v. Baycare Health System, Inc., Baycare Medical Group, Inc.
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket2D2026-0977
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
LONNIE WARD, III,
Appellant,
v.
ST. ANTHONY'S HOSPITAL, INC.; MORTON PLANT MEASE
HEALTH CARE, INC.; BAYCARE MEDICAL GROUP, INC.;
BAYCARE HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.; NATIONAL KIDNEY
PARTNERS, LLC; MICHAEL BRUCCULERI, M.D.;
NATIONAL KIDNEY PARTNERS FOUNDATION, INC.;
and RENAL HYPERTENSION CENTER,
Appellees.
No. 2D2026-0977
November 20, 2026
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; John Carassas,
Judge.
Lonnie Ward, III, pro se.
Brian J. Aungst, Jr., and Mitchel D. den Tuinder of Macfarlane Ferguson
& McMullen, P.A., Clearwater, for Appellees St. Anthony's Hospital, Inc.,
Morton Plant Mease Health Care, Inc., Baycare Medical Group, Inc., and
Baycare Health System, Inc.
Zachary M. Borello and Jeffrey M. Goodis of Wicker, Smith, O'Hara,
McCoy & Ford, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellees Renal Hypertension
Center, Michael Brucculeri, M.D., National Kidney Partners, LLC, and
National Kidney Partners Foundation, Inc.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
Lonnie Ward, III, appeals the trial court's order dismissing his
complaint with prejudice. Although his complaint is difficult to follow,
Ward appears to have sued in part for medical malpractice. The
defendants certainly thought so, because they moved to dismiss
principally on the basis that Ward had failed to comply with the presuit
notice requirements of chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2025). Because a
statute of limitations bar is not evident from the face of Ward's
complaint, however, the dismissal of his medical malpractice claim
should have been without prejudice. See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So. 2d
278, 283 (Fla. 1996) ("[F]ailure to comply with the presuit requirements
of the statute is not necessarily fatal to a plaintiff's claim so long as
compliance is accomplished within the two-year limitations period
provided for filing suit." (citing Stebilla v. Mussallem, 595 So. 2d 136, 139
(Fla. 5th DCA 1992))); see also Shands Teaching Hosp. v. Miller, 642 So.
2d 48, 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding that when a plaintiff has failed to
comply with chapter 766's corroborating medical expert opinion
requirement, "if the limitations period has not run, the action should be
dismissed without prejudice; if the statute has run, the action should be
dismissed with prejudice"); Suarez v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 634 So. 2d
217, 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ("While the medical opinion was not verified
at the time the Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation and the complaint
were filed, that, in itself, is not fatal if compliance is secured prior to the
expiration of the appropriate statute of limitation."). For this reason, we
reverse in part.
We otherwise affirm the trial court's order without further
discussion, except to the extent that it grants certain defendants
entitlement to an award of attorney's fees and costs. To that extent, we
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dismiss this appeal as from a nonfinal, nonappealable order. See Guerin
v. Countryside Imperial Ridge Homeowners Ass'n, 436 So. 3d 582, 582
(Fla. 2d DCA 2026) ("An order determining entitlement to attorney's fees
and costs without setting an amount is nonfinal and nonappealable.").
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; dismissed in part; remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KHOUZAM and GUARD, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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