Foley, K. v. Woodloch Pines
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledOctober 29, 2026
Docket677 EDA 2026
JudgeBowes
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
KERRI FOLEY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
WOODLOCH PINES, WOODLOCH : No. 677 EDA 2026
HOSPITALITY CORPORATION, :
WOODLOCH RESORT D/B/A :
WOODLOCH PINES RESORT, JOHN :
DOES #1-10, AND JANE DOES #1-10 :
Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Civil Division at No(s):
2025-00530
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 29, 2026
Kerri Foley appeals the January 21, 2026 order sustaining the
preliminary objections filed by Woodloch Pines, Woodloch Hospitality
Corporation, Woodloch Resort d/b/a Woodloch Pines Resort, John Does #1-
10, and Jane Does #1-10 (collectively “Appellees”), and dismissing the civil
action. As the appeal is untimely filed, we quash.
The trial court summarized the procedural history as follows:
This matter stems from a complaint filed by [Appellant] on
August 11, 2025, alleging that [Appellees] breached a duty of care
owed to [her], resulting in injuries she sustained while
participating in a water-skiing activity on or about August 20,
2023. Nothing else was filed in the docket until October 6, 2025,
when [Appellant] filed a praecipe to reinstate civil action
complaint. [Appellees] filed preliminary objections to [the]
complaint on November 13, 2025, maintaining that, since the
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statute of limitations passed before [Appellant] served [Appellees]
with the complaint—and had passed before [Appellant] even
attempted to do so—the complaint was now barred by the statute
of limitations. The court issued an order on November 14, 2025,
requiring the parties to submit briefs on [the] preliminary
objections and scheduling argument for January 8, 2026.
[Appellant] filed her response in opposition and accompanying
memorandum of law on December 4, 2025.
. . . On January 21st 2026 the court issued an order sustaining
[Appellees’] preliminary objections and dismissing [the]
complaint. . . . On March 4, 2026, [Appellant] filed a notice of
appeal of the court’s January 21, 2026 order.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/26 at 1-2 (cleaned up, unnecessary capitalization
omitted).
Appellant complied with the trial court’s directive to file a concise
statement of errors complained about in appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). She reiterates these claims in her brief as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
[sustaining] preliminary objections . . . against [Appellant] for
failure to effectuate service where [Appellant] made a good faith
effort to serve [Appellees]?
2. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
misapplying the good faith standard governing service of process,
despite [Appellant’s] diligent efforts to effectuate service?
3. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
dismissing the action where [Appellant] did not attempt to stall
the judicial process and [Appellees] suffered no prejudice from
any delay in service?
4. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
sustaining [Appellees’] preliminary objections and dismissing
[Appellant’s] complaint pursuant to Lamp v. Heyman[, when
Appellant] timely filed the action within the statute of limitations
and made good-faith efforts to effectuate service by reinstating
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the complaint, thereby tolling the statute[, and a]ny delay in
service was minimal, resulted from an administrative error
promptly corrected upon notice, and did not reflect an intent to
stall the judicial process.
Appellant’s brief at 4-5. (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We quash this appeal because it was not timely filed. Pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a), a party must appeal a final order within thirty days of its
entry. Rule of Appellate Procedure 108(b) further prescribes that the date of
entry of a civil order “shall be the date on which the clerk [of court] makes
the notation in the docket that written notice of entry of the order has been
given as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b).”1 In Carr v. Michuck, 234 A.3d 797,
805-806 (Pa.Super. 2020), this Court indicated that, ideally “[a] prothonotary
should make a notation that specifically states, for example, ‘Rule 236 notice
____________________________________________
1 Rule 236 provides as follows:
(a) The prothonotary shall immediately give written notice of the
entry of
....
(2) any other order or judgment to each party's attorney of record
or, if unrepresented, to each party. The notice shall include a copy
of the order or judgment.
....
(b) The prothonotary shall note in the docket the giving of the
notice and, when a judgment by confession is entered, the mailing
of the required notice and documents.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 236.
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provided on’ followed by the date the notice was given, in order to comply
with the notification mandate and procedural requirement of Rule 236.” We
continued, “[a]nything short of such a notation constitutes a failure by the
prothonotary to comply with the notification mandate and procedural
requirement of Rule 236, and is a breakdown in court operations.” Id.
Instantly, the prothonotary entered the underlying order for the purpose
of Rule 108 on January 21, 2026, as evidenced by the docket notation “served
1/21/26.” To the extent that this notation is not the model example proposed
in Carr, the entry does not fall short of compliance because it obviously
fulfilled the Rule’s purpose of ensuring that the parties obtained written notice
of the order. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(a) and (b) (“The prothonotary shall
immediately give written notice of the entry of” the order and “note in the
docket the giving of the notice.”). Indeed, seeing that Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “serve” as either “To make legal delivery of” or “To present with a
notice or process as required by law,” the reasonable meaning of “served
1/21/26” connotes that written notice was delivered on that date. See Black’s
Law Dictionary, at 1372 (Seventh Edition 1999).
As the docket includes the January 21, 2026 notation in accordance with
Rule 236(b) that the order was served on that date, Appellant’s notice of
appeal filed on March 4, 2026, forty-two days later, is untimely.
Appeal quashed. Case removed from the argument list.
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Date: 10/29/2026
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