Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LI, YE, Defendant-Appellant. SUPREME COURT NO. TR-06-0034-GA SUPERIOR COURT NO. 04-02844 Cite as: 2007 MP 21 Decided September 25, 2007 Samuel J. Randall, IV, Assistant Public Defender, Commonwealth Public Defender’s Office, for Defendant-Appellant. John V. R. Aguon, Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth Attorney General’s Office, for Plaintiff-Appellee. BEFORE: MIGUEL S. DEMAPAN, Chief Justice; ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO, Associate Justice; and JOHN A. MANGLONA, Associate Justice MANGLONA, J.: ¶1 Appellant Li Ye (“Li”) appeals his conviction of reckless driving. He maintains that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Because the Commonwealth’s lone witness failed to identify Li at trial as the driver of the vehicle in question, the Commonwealth failed to prove one of the essential elements of reckless driving beyond a reasonable doubt. We REVERSE Li’s conviction. I ¶2 On May 9, 2004, Detective Patrick Maanao (“the detective”) saw a white vehicle moving at a high rate of speed. As the vehicle approached a traffic signal, it switched to the outer lane, passed another vehicle waiting for the light to turn green, and proceeded through the red light without slowing down. The detective called for assistance. After catching up to the vehicle, the detective used the distance between telephone poles to calculate the vehicle’s speed at seventy miles per hour. Further up the road, another officer pulled the vehicle over. The driver exited the vehicle along with three or four passengers, and produced his license and registration. The detective issued a citation for running a red light, speeding, and reckless driving. Li’s driver’s license number, vehicle registration number, and signature appear on the citation. ¶3 At a bench trial, the Commonwealth called the detective as its only witness. The following exchange took place between the Assistant Attorney General and the detective: Q [I]s the driver of that vehicle here today[?] A [Y]es. Q Can you please identify him by what he’s wearing. A I have to be honest, I don’t remember this man, it’s been [] two and a half years [sic]. You know, almost two, two and a half years [sic], but obviously he’s being defended by the PD. Appellant’s Excerpts of Record at 6-7. No further questioning took place regarding the driver’s identity. Li did not put on any evidence. The trial court found Li guilty of reckless driving but not guilty of running a red light or speeding. II ¶4 Li argues that there is insufficient evidence of his identity to support his conviction for reckless driving because the detective failed to identify him at trial. The Commonwealth argues that despite the detective’s inability to remember Li two-and-a-half-years after issuing the citation, a rational trier of fact could find Li drove recklessly since Li’s driver’s license number, vehicle registration number, and signature appear on the citation. ¶5 The issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to support Li’s conviction of reckless driving is reviewed de novo. Commonwealth v. Yan, 4 NMI 334, 336 (1996). “Our review must encompass all of the evidence, direct or circumstantial . . . .” Commonwealth v. Ramangmau, 4 NMI 227, 237 (1995). We do not re-weigh the evidence, but we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and determine whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Yao, 2007 MP 12 ¶ 5; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). We “will not reverse the finding unless, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” Tropic Isles Cable TV Corp. v. Mafnas, 1998 MP 11 ¶ 3. ¶6 In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was committed. State v. Brown, 147 Wash. 2d 330, 339 (2002). A reckless driving conviction cannot be sustained without identifying a particular person. State v. Smith, 115 Wash. 2d 775, 781 (1990). For instance, in Commonwealth v. Blas, 2007 MP 17 ¶ 7, there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant drove the vehicle during the accident, even though he was not in the driver’s seat when police arrived, because the two passengers in the vehicle testified defendant was the driver. Reckless driving requires this same proof of identity, Smith, 115 Wash. 2d at 781, especially when viewed in light of the Commonwealth’s reckless driving statute. ¶7 The Commonwealth’s reckless driving statute provides that, “[e]very person who drives or operates any vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving which is a misdemeanor.” 9 CMC § 7104(a). To convict Li under 9 CMC § 7104(a), the Commonwealth must prove that he was the operator of the vehicle. The detective testified that he did not remember whether Li was the person he cited over two-and- a-half-years ago. The detective, however, stated that he assumed Li was the person he cited because the public defender defended him. Unlike in Blas, Li’s conviction cannot stand when the only evidence of identity is the detective’s assumption that the person seated next to the public defender in the courtroom must be the same person he cited two-and-a-half-years earlier. For whatever reason, the Commonwealth, unlike in Blas, did not have additional witnesses, such as Li’s passengers, testify as to whether Li was the driver of the vehicle the detective pulled over. Nor is there enough circumstantial evidence to prove the driver’s identity. See Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d 538, 544 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The corpus delicti of the crime, however, may be proven in whole or in part by circumstantial evidence.”); State v. Tripp, 158 Me. 161, 168-69 (1962) (finding circumstantial evidence that respondent drove the vehicle was sufficient to sustain a reckless driving charge when: (1) an eye witness recognized respondent driving the vehicle later involved in an accident, (2) respondent used crutches on the day of the accident and crutches were found in the vehicle, and (3) respondent was found unconscious near the vehicle and alcohol was found in the vehicle and detected on respondent’s breath). When the Commonwealth’s only witness could not identify Li at trial as the driver of the white vehicle, it failed to prove an essential element of 9 CMC § 7104(a) beyond a reasonable doubt. III ¶8 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we hold that a reasonable fact finder could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Li committed the offense of reckless driving. Accordingly, we REVERSE and VACATE Li’s conviction. 1 Concurring: Demapan, C.J., Castro, J. 1 We need not reach whether the trial court misapplied 9 CMC § 7104(a).