Villalobos v. Target Corp.

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Villalobos v. Target Corp. WENDY C. VILLALOBOS v. TARGET CORPORATION (AC 47392) Cradle, C. J., and Clark and Seeley, Js.* Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, for the defendant in her premises liability action. The plaintiff had sustained injuries when she was struck by a vehicle while traversing a cross- walk intersecting a roadway in a parking lot in front of the defendant’s store. She alleged, inter alia, that the defendant’s negligence in failing to divide the lanes of the roadway with a center yellow line was a substantial cause of the accident. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the court had improperly declined to charge the jury on the nondelegable duty doctrine. Held: The trial court improperly denied the plaintiff’s request to charge the jury on the nondelegable duty doctrine, as it was undisputed that the plaintiff’s proposed instruction was an accurate statement of the law, that the defendant had hired independent contractors to design, construct and maintain the subject roadway, that the defendant controlled the premises at all relevant times, and that it was possible that the jury could have found that the con- tractors, rather than the defendant, were responsible for any defects in the roadway, and the evidence provided a sufficient basis from which the jury could have found that the absence of a yellow line in the roadway constituted a defect that created an unreasonable risk of harm to pedestrians and was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries. Argued March 23—officially released October 20, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for the defendant’s alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Supe- rior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where Pamela Duval et al. were added as apportionment defen- dants; thereafter, the claims against the apportionment defendant NB-BTMC, LLC, were withdrawn, and the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the apportionment defendant Pamela Duval; subsequently, the case was tried to the jury before Knox, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed; new trial. * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Villalobos v. Target Corp. Jennifer B. Levine, with whom was Harvey L. Levine, for the appellant (plaintiff). Brian M. Paice, for the appellee (defendant). Opinion CLARK, J. In this premises liability action, the plain- tiff, Wendy C. Villalobos, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the defendant, Target Corporation. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly declined to charge the jury on the nondelegable duty doctrine. We agree and reverse the judgment.1 The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On October 12, 2016, the plaintiff was struck by a vehicle operated by Pamela Duval in front of the Target store in New Britain. Duval, who is nearsighted, was not wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the accident. Despite her nearsightedness, there was no restriction on Duval’s operator’s license requiring her to wear corrective lenses, and, prior to the accident, Duval had worn her eyeglasses only sometimes to drive. Duval did not see the plaintiff until the moment that she hit her. There is a roadway in front of the Target store that runs in a northerly and southerly direction. This roadway, which connects to Hartford Road, is the sole access road in and out of the Target complex. A pedestrian crosswalk 1 The plaintiff also claims that the trial court (1) improperly limited the testimony of her expert witness because the plaintiff failed to adequately disclose him as an accident reconstructionist and human factors expert pursuant to Practice Book § 13-4, and (2) abused its discretion in refusing to sanction the defendant for various discovery violations. Because we agree with the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the nondelegable duty doctrine, we need not address these other claims, which, if successful, would entitle the plaintiff to the same relief she seeks under her nondelegable duty claim and are unlikely to arise again at a new trial. Because we reverse the judgment, we also need not address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in the amount of expert witness fees awarded to the defendant.  Villalobos v. Target Corp. leading to the parking lot traverses the roadway in front of the store’s main entrance. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff exited the store and was pushing her shopping cart in the cross- walk when Duval executed a wide right-hand turn from one of the parking aisles onto the roadway, striking the plaintiff in the northbound traffic lane. The force of the impact threw the plaintiff onto the hood of Duval’s car and then to the ground, causing the plaintiff to sustain injuries. Surveillance video of the incident shows that Duval’s vehicle was considerably over the center of the roadway at the point of impact. Due to the position and elevation of the sun at the time of the accident, the Tar- get building cast a wide shadow along the front of the store, which extended into the northbound travel lane where the plaintiff was walking when she was struck. Surveillance video of the accident shows that Duval’s windshield was in full sun until the point of impact. It further shows that Duval was not the only driver to execute a wide turn from a parking aisle onto the roadway at the time of the accident. Most of the vehicles leaving the parking lot did the same. The plaintiff commenced the underlying action on October 9, 2018, claiming that the defendant’s negligent design of the roadway and crosswalk was a substantial cause of the accident.2 The operative complaint specifi- cally alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had negli- gently failed to place stop signs in the roadway on either side of the crosswalk and to divide the northerly and southerly lanes of the roadway with a yellow line to keep drivers in their respective lanes. The plaintiff alleged that such a line would have prevented the accident in question by “command[ing] [Duval] . . . to not make a wide turn with her vehicle and to keep the travel path of her vehicle properly within the southerly lane of the . . . roadway . . . .” 2 The plaintiff brought a separate action against Duval, which was consolidated with the present action. The Duval action was settled prior to trial.  Villalobos v. Target Corp. The defendant denied these allegations and asserted a special defense of contributory negligence, claiming that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused not by the defendant’s negligence but, rather, by the plaintiff’s failure “to make proper use of her senses and faculties” and to “keep a proper lookout for vehicles” when using the crosswalk. The defendant also filed an apportionment complaint against Duval, alleging that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused, in whole or in part, by Duval’s negligent opera- tion of her motor vehicle. A trial commenced in January 2024. During opening arguments, the defendant’s counsel argued that “Target did not design the lot or the layout. Target hired [VHB] Design Professionals to do that. They’re the ones who got all the city and state approvals. . . . Target relied on its expert design engineers to conform to the local govern- ment requirements, and it met the standard of care at the time. Now, with respect to this yellow line, you are going to see that [VHB] did call for a yellow line [but] did not call for stop signs, just the yellow line, and there may have been a yellow line at some point in time. . . . We do know that this was repaved at some point . . . and we’ll hear that Target hired a vendor to do that and that they hired somebody to oversee it and that they are supposed to repaint it the way it was originally designed, and that may not have happened and that is wrong. That should not have happened. If there was a yellow line and it was repaved, that yellow line should have been put back.” On the second day of evidence, the defendant’s attorney stipulated in open court that the as built plans for the Target store, certified by the State Traffic Commission (STC), called for a center yellow line in the roadway and “that, in 2000, when the store was built, a single yellow line was present . . . .”3 The defendant further stipulated 3 The STC approval, which was entered into evidence, stated in relevant part: “The applicant is hereby ordered to comply with the conditions and requirements as set forth in the attached report and [site] plans. Failure to comply with all conditions and requirements will constitute sufficient basis for revocation of the Certificate. NO PERSON SHALL OPERATE THE DEVELOPMENT OR ANY PORTION THEREOF UNTIL  Villalobos v. Target Corp. “that, in 2016 when the accident occurred, the yellow line was not present.” Prior to trial, in affidavits, court filings, depositions and other forms of discovery, the defendant and its representatives repeatedly had repre- sented to the plaintiff that the STC approved site plan did not call for a center yellow line and that no such line ever existed in the roadway. Thereafter, Rodd Schmitt, a Target representative, testified that, sometime in the past, although he did not know when, Target hired a vendor to repave the parking lot and that the vendor failed to repaint the yellow line. He further testified that the store’s prop- erty maintenance technician “would [have] assume[d] that the vendor was doing the job correctly . . . .” Aaron Hemquist, another Target representative, testified that Target is not responsible for the design of its parking lots but, rather, hires licensed civil engineers to design them. Hemquist stated, “[s]o, Target . . . does not sign, you know, we don’t have any—we don’t sign off on plans. We have design professionals that will design and sign the plans.” The plaintiff’s expert witness, Jeffery Cissell, an inves- tigative engineer certified by the National Academy of Forensic Engineers and a former highway supervisor and town engineer for the town of Clinton, testified that there were numerous defects in the design of the roadway, chief among them the failure to install stop signs on either side of the crosswalk and the absence of a center yellow line. Such safety measures were needed, he stated, because the roadway is a high “conflict” area. Cissell testified that the conflicts to which he was referring—“[c]ar to car, car to pedestrian [conflicts]”—are attributable, in part, to the fact that all vehicles entering and leaving the facility—approximately 7000 per day—must traverse the roadway in front of the store, while all visitors to the store are required to cross the roadway to enter the SUCH TIME AS THE APPLICANT HAS COMPLIED WITH THE ABOVE UNLESS PERMISSION HAS BEEN REQUESTED AND RECEIVED FROM THE STATE TRAFFIC COMMISSION TO OPERATE PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF THE CONDITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS.”  Villalobos v. Target Corp. store. Cissell further testified that the hazards created by this design are compounded by the layout of the parking aisles, especially the aisle where Duval was parked prior to the accident. Cissell testified that the close proximity of that aisle to the crosswalk gives drivers very little time to detect and react to pedestrians in the crosswalk when they turn onto the roadway. These risks are fur- ther compounded, Cissell testified, by the lack of speed controls and pedestrian warning signs, and because, at certain times of the day, the Target building casts a wide shadow over the northbound traffic lane, which can further affect the perception, detection and reaction time of motorists, such as Duval, who are driving in the southbound lane into the sun. During cross-examination, the defendant’s counsel asked Cissell whether he was aware that VHB “[was] the one . . . responsible for the design of this parking lot.” When Cissell responded that he was aware, the defendant’s counsel stated, “they were the engineering firm hired by Target to design this lot, correct?” When Cissell responded that he did not know who hired VHB to design the parking lot, the defendant’s counsel stated, “[i]n doing an investigation as an expert in this case, as a parking lot design expert that you hold yourself out to, you did not even look into how VHB is involved in this case, did you?” Counsel further stated, “you assumed that Target designed this lot, didn’t you? . . . [Y]ou never did the background homework that an expert should do before you wrote your report, isn’t that true? . . . Did you do the background work that would have told you who all the players were in this case before you wrote your report?” At the conclusion of the trial, the plaintiff requested that the trial court charge the jury on the nondelegable duty doctrine. The court declined to do so, stating that the doctrine was inapplicable to this case. The court also denied the plaintiff’s request to submit interrogatories to the jury to elicit the specific grounds for the jury’s  Villalobos v. Target Corp. verdict.4 The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly denied her request to charge the jury on the nondelegable duty doctrine. The plaintiff argues that the defendant presented evidence and argument that it hired independent contractors to design and construct the subject roadway, thereby implying to the jury that any defects therein were the fault of those independent contractors, not the defendant. In light of this evidence, the plaintiff argues, the jury should have been instructed that, under the nondelegable duty doctrine, the defen- dant was liable for the negligence of the independent contractors who worked on the roadway. The plaintiff further argues that, under Garcia v. Cohen, 204 Conn. App. 25, 253 A.3d 46 (2021), appeal dismissed, 344 Conn. 84, 277 A.3d 788 (2022), the trial court’s refusal to give the requested instruction, “along with its instruction that the defendant could be absolved of liability if some other cause so powerfully caused the plaintiff’s injury that it trivialized the defendant’s negligence, constitutes harmful error . . . [because] the jury could have concluded that the [contractors], rather than the [defendant], acted negligently, and for that reason found that the defendant had not acted negligently or had acted less negligently than the plaintiff.” “In determining whether the trial court improperly refused a request to charge, [w]e . . . review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to support- ing the . . . proposed charge. . . . A request to charge which is relevant to the issues of [a] case and which is an accurate statement of the law must be given. . . . If, however, the evidence would not reasonably support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court has a duty not to submit it to the jury. . . . Thus, a trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with a party’s request to 4 The proposed interrogatories addressed the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence against the defendant and the special defense asserted by the defendant, as well as the defendant’s apportionment complaint against Duval.  Villalobos v. Target Corp. charge [only] if the proposed instructions are reasonably supported by the evidence. . . . Whether the evidence presented by a party reasonably supports a particular request to charge is a question of law over which our review is plenary. . . . Similarly, whether there is a legal basis for the requested charge is a question of law also entitled to plenary review.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Garcia v. Cohen, supra, 204 Conn. App. 31–32. “Nondelegable duties generally are imposed, most often by statute, contract or common law, in recogni- tion of the policy judgment that [some] obligations are of such importance that [certain parties] should not be able to escape liability merely by hiring others to perform them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Machado v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 364, 371, 972 A.2d 724 (2009). It is well established that “[t]he owner or occupier of premises owes invitees a nondelegable duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of such persons. . . . [T]he nondelegable duty doctrine means that [although the owner or occupier] may contract out the performance of [the] nondelegable duty, [it] may not contract out [its] ultimate legal responsibility. . . . [Thus, we have held] that the owner or occupier of a premises owes a nondel- egable duty to keep the premises safe by protecting third persons from foreseeable . . . injuries. Should the owner or occupier of the premises hire a contractor to maintain the property, the owner or occupier is vicariously liable for the consequences arising from that contractor’s tor- tious conduct. . . . In other words, the nondelegable duty doctrine creates a form of vicarious liability pursuant to which a property owner may be liable to an invitee for the negligence of its independent contractors or subcon- tractors in their performance of the [property owner’s] nondelegable duty, regardless of whether the property owner actually is at fault or the degree of fault.” (Cita- tions omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sola v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 152 Conn.  Villalobos v. Target Corp. App. 732, 743, 100 A.3d 864, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 941, 103 A.3d 165 (2014).5 To prevail on a premises liability claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had possession and con- trol of the premises in question. See, e.g., LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 251, 802 A.2d 63 (2002) (nondelegable duty doctrine applies only if plaintiff establishes that defendant maintained possession and control of property); Millette v. Connecticut Post Ltd. Partnership, 143 Conn. App. 62, 75, 70 A.3d 126 (2013) (same). “Our case law recognizing that a property owner may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor performing maintenance or repair work on the property is in accord with § 422 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which sets forth the following rule: ‘A possessor of land who entrusts the repair of a building or other structure thereon to an independent contractor is subject to the same liability to persons within or outside the land who are injured by the contractor’s negligent failure to put or maintain the building or structure in reasonably safe condition as though he had retained the making of the repairs in his own hands.’ . . . 2 Restatement (Second), [Torts] § 422, p. 405 [(1965)].” (Emphasis omitted.) Sola v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra, 152 Conn. App. 744. Moreover, so long as the owner maintains possession and control of the property, it is immaterial whether the repair work complained about was completed long before the injury was sustained. See 2 Restatement (Second), supra, § 422, illustration (3), p. 406 (“A, the owner of the land, employs an independent contractor to construct a building on the land. The building is completed, and A resumes posses- sion of the premises. Thereafter an awning negligently 5 As with other forms of vicarious liability, when the nondelegable duty doctrine applies, the property owner may bring an indemnification action against the independent contractor whose tortious conduct gave rise to the property owner’s liability. See, e.g., Smith v. Greenwich, 278 Conn. 428, 462, 899 A.2d 563 (2006) (“[i]t is widely recognized that, when one party is vicariously liable for another party’s conduct, the appropriate remedy for an innocent party who has been held vicariously liable is a claim for indemnity”).  Villalobos v. Target Corp. installed by the contractor above a window falls into the public street, injuring B, a pedestrian. A is subject to liability to B.”). In Garcia v. Cohen, supra, 204 Conn. App. 25, this court determined that the trial court improperly refused to charge the jury on the nondelegable duty doctrine. Id., 27–28. In that case, the jury found the owners of an apartment building not liable for injuries their tenant sustained when she slipped and fell on an exterior stair- case, allegedly due to an accumulation of sand and salt on the stairs. Id. At trial, one of the owners “testified that he hired individuals to assist him in removing snow from the . . . steps and in spreading salt and sand on them.” Id., 33. This court held that the owner’s testimony, “[o]n its face . . . implicate[d] the nondelegable duty doctrine because [the owner] testified that there were individu- als performing maintenance work on the . . . exterior staircase. Thus, he raised the issue, by implication, of whether he or the others may have been responsible for the claimed defect. It is well fixed in our decisional law . . . that [the owner or occupier of property] cannot shift legal responsibility to others when someone is injured due to the condition of property . . . .” Id., 33–34. In reaching that determination, this court rejected the owners’ argument that the nondelegable duty doctrine was inapplicable because the owners never attempted to shift responsibility for the tenant’s injuries to the contractors who removed the snow from the staircase. Id., 35. This court stated that it was “immaterial to the [tenant’s] claim that the [owners] never explicitly attempted to shift blame to their contractors or employ- ees. The proposed nondelegable duty charge was relevant to the issues in this case, was an accurate statement of the law, and was reasonably supported by the evidence adduced at trial.” Id. Finally, this court concluded that the trial court’s error was harmful because, “[on] the basis of [the owner’s] testimony that he hired workers for snow removal and sanding, it is possible that the jury could have concluded  Villalobos v. Target Corp. that the snow removal team, rather than the [owners], acted negligently, and for that reason found that the [owners] had not acted negligently or had acted less neg- ligently than the [tenant]. . . . Although the trial court instructed the jury on the duties that the [owners] owed to the [tenant] as a tenant-invitee, the invitee instruction itself (the [owner] has a duty to maintain and a duty to warn) is distinct from the nondelegable duty instruction (the [owner] cannot avoid liability by hiring others to maintain the premises). If the jury found that the snow removal crew had been negligent, that negligence under the nondelegable duty doctrine would have resulted in some allocation of liability to the [owners]. The jury’s estimation and allocation of negligence are intertwined with the nondelegable duty instruction, and the jury had no untainted route to the verdict.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 36–37. In the present case, the defendant does not dispute that the plaintiff’s proposed nondelegable duty jury instruction was an accurate statement of the law, that the defendant hired independent contractors to design, construct and maintain the subject roadway and that the defendant controlled the premises at all relevant times. Nor does the defendant dispute that it was possible the jury could have concluded that the contractors, rather than the defendant, were responsible for any defects in the roadway. Instead, the defendant argues that the trial court properly declined to give the requested instruction because there was no evidence that the absence of a center yellow line constituted a defect in the roadway, much less that it caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The defendant contends, “[c]learly, the lack of center line constituted, at worst, an imperfection; it certainly does not rise to the level of unreasonably dangerous.” (Emphasis omitted.) We disagree with the defendant’s contention that there was no evidence that the lack of a yellow line constituted a defect or that such defect caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The plaintiff’s liability expert, Cissell, testified that the omission of a center yellow line constituted a defect in the  Villalobos v. Target Corp. roadway that increased the risk of harm to pedestrians in the crosswalk. Cissell also testified that the increased risk was attributable, in part, to the fact that all vehicles arriving at and leaving the Target complex were required to use the roadway in front of the store and all visitors to the store were required to cross the roadway to enter the store. Cissell testified that a center yellow line would have forced drivers executing ninety degree turns from the parking aisles onto the roadway to maintain their proper lanes in a high conflict area with reduced driver visibility at certain times of the day. Cissell further testified that, if Duval had kept to her side of the road, she would have driven right past the plaintiff rather than strike her in the opposing traffic lane. This testimony provided a sufficient basis from which the jury reasonably could have found that the absence of a yellow line was both a defect in the roadway—one that created an unreasonable risk of harm to pedestrians—and a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.6 The defendant next argues that the trial court properly declined to give the requested instruction because the 6 In arguing to the contrary, the defendant relies on the testimony of its own liability expert, Charles Harlow, that yellow lines are not allowed in crosswalks and that the presence of such a line in the subject crosswalk would have rendered it unreasonably dangerous. The defendant’s argu- ment misapprehends the nature of the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff does not claim that the defendant was negligent for failing to place a center yellow line through the crosswalk. The plaintiff claims that the defendant was negligent by failing to place a center yellow line on the roadway on either side of the crosswalk, as required by the STC approved site plan. It is the plaintiff’s contention that, if that line had been in place on the day of the accident, it would have guided Duval into the proper lane when she turned onto the roadway from the parking lot, thereby preventing the accident altogether. The defendant also argues that the lack of a center line “did not render the premises unreasonably dangerous given that there were no other incidents involving pedestrians being struck by vehicles in the two years preceding the accident involving the plaintiff.” There are several problems with this argument, not the least of which is the lack of evidence to support it. The defendant relies, instead, on its May 21, 2019 response to an interrogatory asking whether, in the twenty-four months preceding the plaintiff’s accident, the defendant received any complaints about the defective conditions alleged in the complaint.  Villalobos v. Target Corp. owner of land owes a nondelegable duty to invitees to keep the premises safe from foreseeable harm, and “[i]t was not foreseeable that the plaintiff would be struck by a vehicle, while walking in a crosswalk, due to the absence of a center yellow line.” (Emphasis omitted.) The defendant further argues that “this accident would have unfolded in exactly the same way regardless of whether . . . there was a center yellow line [meaning] that the plaintiff’s proposed nondelegable duty charge was neither relevant to the issues [presented], nor was it reasonably supported by the evidence adduced at trial.” It is axiomatic that whether injuries were foreseeable “ordinarily gives rise to a question of fact for the finder of fact, and this issue may be decided by the court only if no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the injury was within the foreseeable scope of the risk such that the defendant should have recognized the risk and taken pre- cautions to prevent it. . . . In other words, foreseeability becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion; if there is room for reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315 Conn. 320, 330, 107 Even if this court properly could consider the defendant’s response to the plaintiff’s interrogatory, the defendant cites no authority, and we are aware of none, for the proposition that the absence of prior, similar accidents is dispositive of whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous or compels a finding that the condition is not dangerous. In a premises liability action, evidence of prior, similar accidents is ordinarily relied on to prove that a defendant had notice of a defective condition, not that the condition was unreasonably dangerous. See, e.g., DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107, 117, 49 A.3d 951 (2012) (“business owners do not breach their duty to invitees by fail- ing to remedy a danger unless they had actual or constructive notice of that danger”); Claveloux v. Downtown Racquet Club Associates, 246 Conn. 626, 630–31, 717 A.2d 1205 (1998) (evidence of substantially similar accident is admissible for purposes of proving notice of danger or defect). In the present case, notice was not an issue at trial because the defendant stipulated that the STC approved site plan called for a center yellow line and that this line was mistakenly omitted by a con- tractor when the roadway was repaved.  Villalobos v. Target Corp. A.3d 381 (2015). The test for foreseeability is whether an “ordinary [person] in the defendant’s position, knowing what he knew or should have known, [would] anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen v. Cox, 285 Conn. 603, 610, 942 A.2d 296 (2008). We are not persuaded that no reasonable person could conclude that the plaintiff’s injuries were within the foreseeable scope of the risk created by the defendant’s failure to replace the center yellow line after the roadway was repaved. Indeed, the sole purpose of such a line is to prevent the very type of harm that occurred in this case (a vehicle crossing into the opposing traffic lane and colliding with another vehicle, a cyclist or a pedestrian) from happening. It is well established that “[as] long as harm of the general nature as that which occurred is foreseeable there is a basis for liability even though the manner in which the accident happens is unusual, bizarre or unforeseeable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, supra, 315 Conn. 335; see also id. (“focus of foreseeability inquiry should be on the general nature of the harm and not the specific manner in which the injury occurred or the conduct of a third party” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor can we conclude that the requested instruction was unnecessary because this accident would have unfolded in the same way regardless of the presence of a yellow line. It is axiomatic that “[t]he issue of causation in a negligence action is a question of fact for the trier . . . . [See] Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 611, 662 A.2d 753 (1995) (causation is essentially a factual issue); Fox v. Mason, 189 Conn. 484, 489, 456 A.2d 1196 (1983) ([c]onclusions of proximate cause are to be drawn by the jury and not by the court) . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Stamford, 115 Conn. App. 47, 87, 971 A.2d 739, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 912, 978 A.2d 1108 (2009). To prove causation, the plaintiff must establish “that it is more likely than not that the cause on which the plaintiff relies  Villalobos v. Target Corp. was in fact a proximate cause of the accident.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 310 Conn. 768, 777, 83 A.3d 576 (2014). Causation is proven by probability, not certainty, and juries routinely must decide what a person prob- ably would have done under the circumstances. If a jury could find that a defendant was negligent in failing to replace a stop sign at a busy intersection, it reasonably could assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a driver approaching the intersection would have stopped at the stop sign. See, e.g., Sic v. Nunan, 307 Conn. 399, 408, 54 A.3d 553 (2012) (“our case law is clear that a driver is entitled to assume that other users of the highway will obey the law, including lawful traffic regulations, and observe reasonable care, until he knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the assumption has become unwarranted” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The assumption that drivers obey the rules of the road is well established in our case law. See, e.g., Zegarski v. Horton, 150 Conn. 212, 219, 187 A.2d 750 (1963) (“[o]ne of the factors to be considered by the jury was the rule that [the driver] had the right to assume, until he knew or should have known to the contrary, that [the driver behind him] was not following too closely in violation of the [law]”); Gross v. Boston, Worcester & New York Street Railway Co., 117 Conn. 589, 598, 169 A. 613 (1933) (“it was incumbent on the trial court, even without request, to give instructions upon [the rule]”). In the present case, therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a jury reasonably could conclude that Duval would have stayed within her lane if a yellow line had been there to guide her when she turned onto the roadway from the parking aisle. The defendant finally argues that, even if the trial court erred in refusing to give the requested nondel- egable duty charge, that error was harmless in light of Duval’s testimony that she was not wearing her glasses at the time of the accident and did not see the plaintiff  Villalobos v. Target Corp. until the moment that she hit her in the crosswalk. The defendant argues that “there is no situation where the presence of the center yellow line would have changed the outcome, either of the accident or of the trial,” and that, “based on the totality of evidence presented at trial, no reasonable jury could possibly find that the accident was caused by anything other than Duval.” Again, we are not persuaded. “[N]ot every improper jury instruction requires a new trial because not every improper instruction is harmful. [W]e have often stated that before a party is entitled to a new trial . . . he or she has the burden of demonstrat- ing that the error was harmful. . . . An instructional impropriety is harmful if it is likely that it affected the verdict. . . . In determining whether an instructional impropriety was harmless, we consider not only the nature of the error, including its natural and probable effect on a party’s ability to place his full case before the jury, but the likelihood of actual prejudice as reflected in the individual trial record, taking into account (1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel’s arguments, and (4) any indi- cations by the jury itself that it was misled.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Garcia v. Cohen, supra, 204 Conn. App. 36. Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, although Duval was not wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the accident, the jury reasonably could have found, on the basis of the store surveillance video and Cissell’s testimony, that Duval’s nearsightedness had nothing to do with the accident and that it was the layout of the parking aisles, the glare of the sun and the shadows cast by the Target building that caused Duval not to see the plaintiff until it was too late. The plaintiff’s principal argument at trial was that, if the center yellow line had been in place, it likely would have prevented Duval from making a wide turn into the opposing traffic lane, ensur- ing that Duval drove past the plaintiff instead of hitting her. If the jury agreed that the absence of a center yellow  Villalobos v. Target Corp. line rendered the roadway defective and dangerous and contributed to the accident in the manner alleged, but concluded that the contractor who repaved the roadway was negligent, as the defendant’s counsel argued at trial,7 that negligence under the nondelegable duty doctrine would have resulted in some allocation of liability to the defendant, even if the jury had found that Duval bore the lion’s share of the blame for the accident. Thus, as in Garcia, any estimation and allocation of negligence in the present case implicated the nondelegable duty doctrine such that, without the requested instruction, the jury had no untainted route to the verdict. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 7 Although the defendant’s counsel did not use the word “negligent” when describing the contractor’s actions, that was essentially what she argued in her opening statement: “We do know that this [roadway] was repaved at some point . . . and we’ll hear that Target hired a vendor to do that and that they hired somebody to oversee it and that they are supposed to repaint it the way it was originally designed, and that may not have happened and that is wrong. That should not have happened. If there was a yellow line and it was repaved, that yellow line should have been put back.”