Rebuenog v. Aldan.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS RAMONA TAISAKAN REBUENOG, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOBIAS DELA CRUZ ALDAN and the COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendants-Appellants. SUPREME COURT NO. 2010-SCC-0001-CIV SUPERIOR COURT NO. 09-0463 E Cite as: 2010 MP 1 Decided January 29, 2010 Robert T. Torres, Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for Appellant. Richard W. Pierce, Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for Appellee. Michael Ernest, Assistant Attorney General, Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, for the Commonwealth Election Commission.  BEFORE: MIGUEL DEMAPAN, Chief Justice; JOHN MANGLONA, Associate Justice; EDWARD MANIBUSAN, Justice Pro Tem. PER CURIAM: ¶1 This case arises out of the Northern Islands mayoral election held on November 7, 2009. Defendant Tobias Dela Cruz Aldan (“Aldan”) was declared the winner over Plaintiff Ramona Taisakan Rebuenog (“Rebuenog”) by one vote. Out of 137 cast votes, Aldan received sixty-nine votes and Rebuenog received sixty-eight votes. Rebuenog challenged the election results, arguing that illegal voters had cast ballots, and that if these votes were removed there would be enough votes in her favor to declare her the winner. After subtracting votes cast by illegal voters, the trial court declared Rebuenog the election winner. Upon review, this Court finds that Rebuenog is a resident and domiciliary of the Northern Islands and she qualifies as a mayoral candidate. We further find that she has standing to bring this election contest. While we also affirm the procedures adopted by the trial court to deduct illegal votes from the election results, we hold that the trial court erred by declaring Rebuenog the election winner under 1 CMC § 6606 because the court could not determine with certainty which candidate received the most legal votes. Under this circumstance, 1 CMC § 6602(b) mandates that the election be set aside. Accordingly, we VACATE the trial court order declaring Rebuenog the election winner and order the Commonwealth Election Commission to conduct a new mayoral election as soon as possible. I ¶2 On November 12, 2009, which was after Aldan was declared the winner of the Northern Islands mayoral election, Rebuenog filed a Verified Complaint for Election Contest and Special Procedure with the Commonwealth Superior Court. Therein, Rebuenog asserted that she received the largest number of legal votes cast in the November 7 election and asked the court to declare her the winner.1 Specifically, Rebuenog claimed that approximately twenty-one voters who were ineligible to vote were nevertheless permitted by the Defendant Commonwealth Election Commission (“CEC”) to cast ballots. ¶3 A trial on this matter was held from December 1, 2009 to December 17, 2009. The trial court faced the difficult task of determining whether illegal voters had voted in the election, and if so, how to remedy the alleged tainted election results. Rebuenog argued at trial that twenty-one voters were not residents of the Northern Islands, and therefore were illegal voters.2 After interpreting the applicable statutory provision governing voter residency – 1 CMC § 6204 – the trial court initially determined that 1 Rebuenog also asserted two related requests for relief: that any certification of election issued to Aldan be declared void, and that Aldan and the CEC be found jointly and severally liable to Rebuenog for her attorney fees, costs and expenses. 2 Under 1 CMC § 6601(a)(3), “illegal votes” include “any vote cast by a person who is not qualified to vote because of failure to meet age, domiciliary or residency requirements . . . .”  seventeen voters failed to meet the voter residency requirements and consequently, that their votes should not be counted.3 Following Rebuenog’s filing of a motion for reconsideration, the trial court changed its tally and held that Jesus Igisomar Wabol was not qualified to vote, thus bringing the total number of illegal voters to eighteen. Out of the eighteen ineligible voters, the trial court subtracted seven votes from Aldan’s total and four votes from Rebuenog’s total. As a result the trial court declared Rebuenog the winner, with the final vote tally of sixty-four votes for Rebuenog and sixty-two votes for Aldan. ¶4 The procedures that the trial court adopted to reach this result are contested on appeal, and we find it necessary to examine them in greater depth. Broadly speaking, the process can be broken down into four steps. First, the trial court determined whether a voter was an illegal voter – that is, whether the voter was not a Northern Islands resident under 1 CMC § 6204. Second, each voter was asked to disclose who he or she voted for in the election. Third, the trial court allowed each party to challenge the testimony of each voter if the party contested the voter’s credibility. Fourth, if the trial court deemed the witness credible, one vote was subtracted from the candidate that the voter said he or she voted for in the election. If the voter was found not credible, no vote was subtracted from either candidate. ¶5 As explained above, first the trial court applied 1 CMC § 6204 to determine the number of illegal voters. After making this determination, the trial court next attempted to ascertain who each illegal voter had voted for in the mayoral election. The trial court determined that this step was an “indispensible requirement under the election contest rules” and necessary to determine whether the illegal voters affected the election’s outcome. Rebuenog v. Commonwealth Election Comm’n, Civ. No. 09-0463E (NMI Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2009) (Final Order Declaring Plaintiff Ramona T. Rebuenog Mayor of the Northern Islands at 5) (“Final Order”). Specifically, the court cited 1 CMC § 6602(b), which states that “[a]n election may not be set aside on account of illegal votes cast” unless “the number of votes given to the person enabled him or her to win or to tie the election and, if the illegal votes were taken from him, would reduce his legal votes so that he would have less votes than necessary to win or tie the election.” ¶6 The procedure used to determine who each voter had voted for varied throughout trial. The first witness, after testifying about his residency, was asked in open court to disclose his vote. Final Order at 5. Following an objection by the CEC, a new procedure was adopted whereby, following disqualification, the witness marked down his or her vote in their respective Voter Affidavit Exhibit. This process was carried out for eight witnesses. Id. The trial court then changed this procedure and returned to the practice of having each witness state in open court his or her vote. Id. at 5-6. The trial court, citing Commonwealth 3 These seventeen illegal voters were: Angelica Dela Cruz Aldan, Martin Palacios Ayuyu Jr., Alvin Kaipat Buekis, Isabel Kaipat Davis, Barcelisa Anastasia Saures Inos, Francisco Litulumar Kaipat Jr., Jacinta Ayuyu Kaipat, Natividad Carmen Romolor Litulumar, Rita Rafaela Satur Romolor, Linda Cruz Santos, Menjor Kaipat, Merced Litulumar, Clotilde Kaipat Aldan, Cabrini Celina Somol Hambros, Alfred Michael Kileleman, Santiago Litulumar Saures, and Juan Iguel.  precedent, found that disqualified voters had no right to a secret ballot, and thus determined that this process was permissible. Id. at 6. ¶7 Once a disqualified voter disclosed his or her vote, the trial court assessed witness credibility. This was accomplished by giving each party the opportunity to examine each voter to determine whether each voter’s statement concerning who he or she voted for in the election was credible.4 Significantly, only if the trial court found the witness to be credible was his or her vote removed from the appropriate candidate’s vote total. If the witness was found not credible, no vote was removed. ¶8 Of the seventeen individuals initially declared illegal voters, neither party challenged the credibility of eight of these voters – six who testified that they voted for Aldan5 and two who testified that they voted for Rebuenog.6 These eight votes were stricken from the vote totals of the respective mayoral candidates. This left the trial court with determining the fate of the votes cast by the nine remaining illegal voters. ¶9 Rebuenog challenged the credibility of four disqualified voters – Francisco Litulumar Kaipat Jr., Rita Rafaela Satur Romolor, Jacinta Ayuyu Kaipat, and Linda Cruz Santos. Each stated that he or she voted for Rebuenog, but Rebuenog argued that the testimony was not credible and that these votes should not be subtracted from her vote total. The court found that two of the four voters, Francisco Litulumar Kaipat Jr. and Rita Rafaela Satur Romolor, were credible witnesses, and therefore subtracted their votes from Rebuenog’s vote total. The court found that the other two voters, Jacinta Ayuyu Kaipat and Linda Cruz Santos, were not credible witnesses, and therefore did not subtract their votes from either candidate’s vote total. ¶ 10 Aldan challenged the credibility of four voters who each claimed to have voted for him. These voters were Celina Taisakan Somol Hambros, Santiago Litulumar Saures, Alfred Michael Kileleman, and Juan Iguel. The trial court concluded that Celina Hambros, Santiago Saures, and Juan Iguel were not credible witnesses. Accordingly, their votes were not subtracted from the election totals. The trial court concluded that Alfred Kileleman was a credible witness, and therefore subtracted his vote from Aldan’s vote total. 4 We note that this procedure varied somewhat throughout trial. For example, after Jacinta Ayuyu Kaipat testified that she voted for Rebuenog, no additional testimony was offered. However, both attorneys were asked whether they had any additional questions. Excerpts of Record (“ER”) at 356. 5 Angelica Dela Cruz Aldan, Martin Palacios Ayuyu Jr., Isabel Kaipat Davis, Natividad Carmen Romolor Litulumar, Menjor Kaipat and Clotilde Kaipat Aldan. 6 Barcelisa Anastasia Saures Inos and Merced Litulumar. ¶ 11 Finally, Alvin Kaipat Buekis was disqualified as an illegal voter. However, he testified that he could not remember who he voted for in the mayoral election, and so the trial court was unable to make a credibility determination or deduct a vote from either candidate. ¶ 12 On December 15, 2009, Rebuenog filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Certain Voters. While the trial court had initially ruled that Jesus Igisomar Wabol was a qualified voter, it noted that this decision was based on “its mistaken view that he had a fixed habitation in the Northern Islands.” Final Order at 12. The court granted Rebuenog’s motion and ruled that Jesus Wabol was an illegal voter, thus bringing the number of illegal voters to eighteen. However, the court ended its inquiry there, stating that it “does not need to make a determination as to who Mr. Wabol voted for in the [election] because his vote would not affect the outcome of said election contest.” Id. at 13. As noted above, the trial court ultimately declared Rebuenog the election winner by a vote of sixty-four to sixty-two. Accordingly, the court ordered that “any certification of election issued to Defendant Aldan be declared void, and that the Defendant CEC issue a certification of election to Plaintiff Rebuenog” pursuant to 1 CMC § 6606. Id. at 18. ¶ 13 In addition to Aldan’s challenges to the trial court procedures, he also argues on appeal that Rebuenog herself was not a resident of the Northern Islands, and therefore was not a qualified voter, not qualified to run for mayor, and lacked standing to challenge the election results. The trial court determined that Rebuenog was a qualified voter in the Northern Islands election. The trial court also ruled that Rebuenog was a qualified mayoral candidate, finding that she met the residency and domicile requirements established in Article VI, Section 2(a) of the NMI Constitution and in 1 CMC § 6305. ¶ 14 We now consider this matter following Aldan’s timely appeal.7 II ¶ 15 We first address the issues of whether Rebuenog is a qualified voter and a qualified mayoral candidate. These determinations rest primarily on whether Rebuenog is a resident and domiciliary of the Northern Islands. A residency determination is a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., Butler v. 7 As a preliminary matter, we note the unusual procedural history in this case. Specifically, so that this Court could fully resolve this appeal, following oral argument we ordered the trial court to determine whether Rebuenog was a qualified mayoral candidate. Rebuenog v. Aldan, No. 2010-SCC-0001-CIV (NMI Sup. Ct. Jan. 19, 2010). This Court recognizes that 1 CMC § 6609 establishes deadlines for election contest appeals, including that oral argument must be heard within twenty days of entry of the trial court’s judgment, and that this Court’s judgment must be entered within thirty days of the trial court’s judgment. In Reyes v. Reyes, 2004 MP 1 ¶ 86-103, we held that a statute directing the CNMI judiciary to issue all opinions within one year violated the separation of powers doctrine and was unconstitutional. We have doubts about the constitutionality of provisions such as 1 CMC § 6609, and draw the legislature’s attention to the constitutional implications attending attempts to statutorily require this Court to issue decisions within prescribed time limits. We recognize the urgency in issuing decisions in election contests and will not examine the constitutionality of 1 CMC § 6609 at this time. However, we may address this issue in another case after we give the parties an opportunity to brief this issue.  Butler, 641 So. 2d 272, 273 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); Quinn v. Nevills, 93 P. 1055, 1056 (Cal. Ct. App. 1907). As is a domicile determination. See, e.g., Noble v. Franchise Tax Bd., 118 Cal. App. 4th 560, 567 (2004); Dozier v. Baker, 661 S.E.2d 543, 544 (Ga. 2008). Thus, the inlaid questions of law – in this case, questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation – are subject to de novo review, and the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See Islam v. Islam, 2009 MP 17 ¶ 7 (Slip Opinion, Dec. 22, 2009) (internal citations omitted). Applying these standards of review, we conclude that the trial court properly applied Commonwealth election law, and that its factual findings appurtenant to its legal conclusions – that Rebuenog is a qualified voter and mayoral candidate – are not clearly erroneous. A. Rebuenog is a Northern Islands Resident and Qualified Voter ¶ 16 Aldan argues that Rebuenog is not a Northern Islands resident and that the trial court therefore erred in ruling that she was a qualified voter in the Northern Islands and had standing to raise an election contest under 1 CMC § 6601. While Aldan admits that Rebuenog has some “connection” to the Northern Islands, he cites facts, adduced during Rebuenog’s trial testimony, that he feels show that she is not a Northern Islands resident for voting purposes. For example, that after coming to Saipan to care for her sick son-in-law, she did not return to Anatahan after he died. Also, that there is no school-related rationale for her staying on Saipan, as her children have all completed high school. She has additionally procured a homestead in Kagman. Also, while all parties agree that Anatahan has been declared uninhabitable since May 2003 following a volcano eruption, Aldan argues that since the Northern Islands is made up of multiple islands, Rebuenog could have chosen to live on another one of these islands in order to remain a Northern Islands resident. ¶ 17 Rebuenog responds that the record is replete with evidence establishing her Northern Islands residency. She cites her long-standing ties to Anatahan: that she was born and raised there, and that she stayed with her parents on Anatahan during the summer in the 1970s and 1980s. She also notes that she built a house in Anatahan in the late 1980s, subsequently became a registered voter, and has been voting in the Northern Islands district for twenty years without challenge. More recently, while she left Anatahan in 2001 to care for her sick son-in-law, Rebuenog testified that by the time he passed away in November 2003, the Anatahan volcano had already erupted and she was thus unable to return to her now ash-covered house. On the homestead matter, Rebuenog contends that if Anatahan is declared habitable, she intends to give her Saipan homestead to her children and return to Anatahan. ¶ 18 Under 1 CMC § 6201(f), “[n]o person shall register or vote in any other precinct than that in which the person resides.” Residency requirements are established in 1 CMC § 6204, which states that “[t]he residence of a person is that place in which the person’s habitation is fixed, and to which, whenever the person is absent, the person has the intention to return.” Id. § 6204(a). Moreover, a “person does not  gain residence in any precinct into which the person comes without the present intention of establishing the person’s permanent dwelling place within such precinct.” Id. § 6204(b). ¶ 19 The trial court found that Rebuenog was a resident of the Northern Islands as defined in 1 CMC § 6204. To support this conclusion the court reasoned that Rebuenog “voted in the Northern Island district in every election for twenty (20) years without challenge,” that she “has a home in Anatahan,” and that “she intends to return to Anatahan when it is open since it is her home.” Final Order at 15. The court found that “Plaintiff came to Saipan due to medical reasons, remained on Saipan because of her children’s education, and has consistently voted in the Northern Islands since 1989.” Id. Significantly, the court found that “Plaintiff returned to the Northern Islands on several occasions,” and that “Plaintiff has the present intent to return to the Northern Islands now that her children are done with school and also has a fixed habitation on the Northern Islands.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the trial court found that Rebuenog was a qualified voter and thus had standing under 1 CMC § 6603 to challenge the election results. ¶ 20 As previously stated, a trial court’s residency determination is a mixed question of law and fact; however, the trial court findings of fact associated with this determination can only be set aside if such findings are clearly erroneous. Islam, 2009 MP 17 ¶ 7. A finding is clearly erroneous when, “even though some evidence supports it, the entire record produced the definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a mistake . . . . The test is whether the trial court could rationally have found as it did, rather than whether the reviewing court would have ruled differently.” In re Estate of Young Kyun Kim, 2001 MP 22 ¶ 9 (citing Rogolofoi v. Guerrero, 2 NMI 468, 476 (1992)). ¶ 21 The trial record supports the lower court’s factual findings. For example, Rebuenog’s testimony provided ample support for the court’s finding that she had voted in the Northern Islands for 20 years8 and that she came to Saipan for her children’s education.9 One potentially confusing part of the trial court’s findings is its statement that Rebuenog “came to Saipan for medical reasons.” Final Order at 15. Why 8 The following exchange occurred concerning Rebuenog’s voting history: Q: And when you came back you registered to vote for the Northern Island correct? A: Yes. Q: And that was in 1989 I’ll show [sic] exhibit to help you [sic] is possible in 1989? A: Yes. Q: Now, ever since then you always voted in the Northern Islands district. A: Yes. Q: Every election. A: Yes. Q: Have you ever been challenged? A: No. ER at 515. 9 Rebuenog testified that her children were educated in Saipan. ER at 439-40.  Rebuenog first came to Saipan in the 1970s is not entirely clear from the record. However, she did testify that she left Anatahan in 2001 to come to Saipan to care for her sick son-in-law. These findings were integral to the trial court’s finding that “Plaintiff has the present intent to return to the Northern Islands.” Id. at 16. ¶ 22 A residency determination is tied in large part to the intent of the individual to return to their place of habitation whenever they are absent. See 1 CMC § 6204(a). Intent is a question of fact. See Yang v. Angel Enter. Inc., 2000 MP 6 ¶ 27 (“ratification requires intent to ratify” and “is a question of fact”); see also Clement v. Daniels, 235 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Ark. 2006) (“[I]ntention is a question of fact, and in election contests, the findings of the trial judge on factual questions have the force and effect of a jury verdict.”). While it is undisputed that Rebuenog spent considerable time on Saipan over a forty year period, the trial court found that the time Rebuenog spent on Anatahan combined with her trial testimony supported a finding that she intended to return to the Northern Islands. The trial court properly applied Commonwealth election law – specifically, 1 CMC § 6204 – and determined that Rebuenog was a Northern Mariana Islands resident. This Court finds that there is sufficient evidence for the court to have “rationally have found as it did,” and thus we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial court’s conclusion is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Rebuenog is a Northern Mariana Island resident and is therefore qualified to bring an election contest under 1 CMC § 6601. B. Rebuenog is a Qualified Mayoral Candidate ¶ 23 Aldan contends that Rebuenog is not a qualified candidate under the Commonwealth Constitution10 and 1 CMC § 6305. Section 6305 states that: A candidate for mayor shall be qualified to vote in the Commonwealth and on the island or islands served by the mayor, at least twenty-five (25) years of age, a resident and a domiciliary of the island or islands served by the mayor for at least three years immediately preceding the date on which the mayor takes office, and must reside in the island or islands served by the mayor after each election. No person convicted of a felony in the Commonwealth or in any area under the jurisdiction of the United States may be eligible for these offices unless a full pardon has been granted. (emphasis added). The trial court determined that Rebuenog met the resident and domiciliary requirements stated in the Commonwealth Constitution and 1 CMC § 6305, and ruled that Rebuenog was 10 “A mayor shall be qualified to vote in the island or islands served by the mayor, at least twenty-five years of age, a resident and domiciliary of the island or islands served by the mayor for at least three years immediately preceding the date on which the mayor take office, and must reside in the island or islands served by the mayor after each election, and shall meet other qualifications provided by law. No person convicted of a felony in the Commonwealth or in an area under the jurisdiction of the United States may be eligible for this office unless a full pardon has been granted.” NMI Const. Art. VI, § 2(a).  a qualified candidate for Northern Islands mayor.11 In response to the trial court’s order, Aldan argues that even if Rebuenog qualifies as a voter, “she fails to meet the three year residency and domicile requirement” of Article VI, section 2(a) of the Commonwealth Constitution. Appellant’s Br. at 17. ¶ 24 The cornerstone of Aldan’s argument is that the constitutional and statutory language at issue is clear and unambiguous and thus, the commonly understood meaning of these terms must be applied. The language in question requires that “every mayoral candidate be a resident and domiciliary of the island or islands served by the mayor for at least three years immediately preceding the date on which the mayor takes office.” NMI Const. Art. VI, § 2(a). Aldan argues that the “constitutional mandate is thus plain, clear and unambiguous,” and cites a series of Commonwealth cases standing for the proposition that unambiguous constitutional or statutory language must be given its plain meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Borja, 2003 MP 8 ¶ 9 (stating that the Court applies “plain, commonly understood meaning of constitutional language unless there is evidence that a contrary meaning was intended”). While this Court agrees that the Constitution unambiguously declares that a candidate must be a resident and domiciliary for three years, the terms “resident” and “domiciliary” are legal terms of art – subject to interpretation – and, as discussed below, are far from unambiguous. ¶ 25 The unclear meaning of these terms is grounded in the enactment of the CNMI Constitution itself, as the terms “resident” and “domiciliary” were intentionally left undefined. This fact is unmistakably conveyed in the Report of the Committee on Personal Rights and Natural Resources to the Constitution Convention, which stated: “The Committee’s recommended provision includes requirements for domicile and residence, as explained above, but does not define either of these terms. The Committee believes that it is appropriate to leave these definitions to the Legislature because the criteria for determining domicile and residence may change over time.” 2 Journal of the Northern Mariana Islands Constitution Convention of 1976 at 457 (1976). Committee reports are a highly authoritative source for determining legislative, or in this case constitutional, intent. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984). Thus, because the meaning of these terms was entrusted to the legislature, and neither term is defined in either the 11 In its Final Order dated December 30, 2009, the trial court ruled that Aldan did not challenge Rebuenog’s qualifications properly, and therefore found that it did not need to address the matter. Following oral argument on January 19, 2010, this Court issued an Order stating that pursuant to 1 CMC § 6605(c), when deciding the election contest the trial court was required to determine whether Rebuenog was a qualified mayoral candidate. Rebuenog v. Aldan, No. 2010-SCC-0001-CIV (NMI Sup. Ct. Jan. 19, 2010) (Order at 2). This Court reasoned that 1 CMC §§ 6601 and 6603(a) – relied on by the trial court – were inapplicable because Aldan was not a voter attempting to contest an election, but instead a defendant in an election contest. Id. at 4. The trial court subsequently ruled that Rebuenog was a qualified candidate. Rebuenog v. Commonwealth Election Comm’n, Civ. No. 09-0463E (NMI Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 2010) (Final Order Declaring Plaintiff Ramona T. Rebuenog Qualified Mayoral Candidate of the Northern Islands).  Constitution or the parallel statutory provision – 1 CMC § 6305 – we must examine the Northern Marianas Islands Election Law to determine the meaning of these terms.12 ¶ 26 We look first to the statutorily-provided definition of domicile and residence.13 “Domicile” is defined in 1 CMC § 6003(i) as “that place in which a person maintains a residence with the intention of continuing that residence for an unlimited or indefinite period, and to which that person has the intention of returning whenever absent, even for an extended period.” Residence is defined in 1 CMC § 6603(r) as: That place in which a person’s habitation is fixed, and to which, whenever a person is absent, the person has the intention to return; however, a person who is temporarily out of the Commonwealth or the election district for reasons of business, education, government representation, military service, medical referral, medical reasons, natural disaster, or environmental conditions, or employment by the Commonwealth, even for an extended period shall be considered a resident of the Commonwealth and the election district if during that period, he maintains a domicile in the Commonwealth and election district. Unfortunately, examining these two provisions exposes their limited utility. Specifically, 1 CMC § 6603(i) defines domicile as “that place in which a person maintains a residence with the intention of continuing that residence,” while 1 CMC § 6603(r) states that a party shall be considered a “resident of the Commonwealth and the election district if . . . he maintains a domicile in the Commonwealth and the election district.” In other words, domicile is defined in terms of residence, and residence is defined in terms of domicile. The circular result created by the definitions in § 6603(i) and (r) sheds little light on the meaning of resident and domiciliary.14 ¶ 27 Left with this unclear path for determining the intended meanings of residence and domicile, we follow the established canon of construction that when a term cannot be discerned from a particular clause, we look to usage of the term in other parts of the same statute.15 Thus, to inform our analysis of 12 Our interpretation of this Committee report is consistent with the superior court’s treatment of this issue over fifteen years ago. See Ruben v. Ogumoro, Civ. 94-14 (NMI Super. Ct. 1994) (Opinion at 10). 13 While this Court has already concluded that Rebuenog is a Northern Island resident, we examine residency statutes to the extent necessary to help determine the intended meaning of “domiciliary.” 14 The terms “residency” and “residence” are used interchangeably in Commonwealth election statutes, and thus attributing a different meaning to each of these usages is not an effective way to differentiate between the definitions provided in these subsections. See 1 CMC § 6204 (“For the purposes of this part, there can be only one residence for an individual, but in determining residency, a person may treat oneself separate from the person’s spouse.”) 15 “To discover the true construction of any particular clause of a statute, the first thing to be attended to, no doubt, is the actual language of the clause itself, as introduced by the preamble; second, the words or expressions which obviously are by design omitted; third, the connection of the clause with other clauses in the same statute, and the conclusions which on comparison with other clauses, may reasonably and obviously be drawn.” People v. Patterson, 410 N.W.2d 733, 744 (Mich. 1987) (citing 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05 (4th ed. 1985).  the meaning of domiciliary (and residence) we look to other sections in the Northern Mariana Islands Election Law containing these terms. ¶ 28 While the definition of domicile given in 1 CMC § 6603(i) offers some insight into how the legislature envisioned this term, other provisions are instructive. Section 6202 establishes five requirements to consider when determining one’s domicile.16 Aldan argues that the three-year domiciliary requirement “as written would undoubtedly require any candidate for Northern Islands Mayor to have been physically living on the Northern Islands for the three years prior to the November 2009 election.” Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 7. The Commonwealth Constitution and the Northern Mariana Islands Election Law do not support this position. Nowhere in this statute (or any Commonwealth election statute for that matter) is permanent physical presence required. Instead, 1 CMC § 6202 stresses that a person’s domicile is the place “where the person resides when not called elsewhere to work or for other temporary purposes,” and that the intent of the party to acquire a new domicile is a critical factor in a domicile determination. Moreover, while Aldan argues that Rebuenog has been on Saipan for too long for her absence from the Northern Islands to be considered “temporary,” the domicile statutes themselves state otherwise. As correctly stated by the trial court, a court “must apply the definition of 1 CMC § 6003 in conjunction with the factors set forth in 1 CMC § 6202.” Final Order Declaring Plaintiff Rebuenog Qualified Mayoral Candidate of the Northern Islands at 3. Significantly, Section 6003(i) explicitly states that an individual can be away from a place “even for an extended period” and still remain a domiciliary of that place. 1 CMC § 6003(i). Thus, we find that extended absences do not automatically change one’s domicile. ¶ 29 In reaching its conclusion that Rebuenog was a qualified mayoral candidate, the trial court cited the constitutional and statutory authorities governing mayoral qualifications, then determined whether Rebuenog met the resident and domiciliary requirements by applying the requirements in 1 CMC § 6202 in conjunction with the definition given in 1 CMC § 6003(i). This is the proper procedure to apply, and even under the de novo standard of review required for matters of constitutional and statutory construction, we find no error in the trial court’s methods. 16 1 CMC § 6202 reads: A person’s domicile shall be determined in accordance with the following: (a) Each person has a domicile; (b) Each person has only one domicile; (c) A person’s domicile is the place where the person resides when not called elsewhere to work or for other temporary purposes; (d) A person cannot lose a domicile until he or she acquires a new domicile; and (e) A person’s domicile may be changed by joinder of acts and intent. ¶ 30 Accordingly, the only remaining issue is whether the trial court’s factual findings concerning domicile were clearly erroneous. We find that they were not. The trial court examined each requirement of 1 CMC § 6202, and we find that the court had a rational basis for reaching each conclusion. It attached considerable weight to Rebuenog’s testimony concerning her intent to return to the Northern Islands. Specifically, the court stated that it “finds [Rebuenog’s] testimony to be consistent and emphatic regarding her intent to return back to the Northern Islands. Id. at 5. Applying § 6202(b) and (e), the court found that Rebuenog began life as a domiciliary of the Northern Islands, and remained a domiciliary of the Northern Islands because she “never desired to remain in Saipan.” Id. at 6. Applying § 6202(d), the court found that even though Rebuenog “is physically located in Saipan, her domicile has not changed” because “she has never disclaimed her domicile in the Northern Islands nor her intent to return to the Northern Islands” and that she has “stated time and time again that she would move back to the Northern Islands as soon as the CNMI would allow her to do so.” Id. Facts sufficient to permit the trial court to rationally reach these conclusions have been discussed previously, and need not be repeated here. See supra ¶ 21-22. ¶ 31 While the Commonwealth Constitution and the Northern Mariana Islands Election Law require that a mayoral candidate be a resident and domiciliary of the island or islands served by the mayor, nowhere in these authorities does it state that three years of continuous physical presence is required. Instead, the resident and domicile definitions provided by the legislature focus mainly on the intent of the party, and where a person resides when not called elsewhere for other temporary purposes, even when these callings are for an extended period of time. We hold that the trial court properly interpreted the mayor qualification requirements and that there were sufficient facts to support the trial court’s conclusion that Rebuenog is a qualified mayoral candidate. III ¶ 32 Having established that Rebuenog is a qualified voter and mayoral candidate, we now consider whether the procedures adopted by the trial court for removing illegal votes from the mayoral election and declaring Rebuenog the election winner violated Commonwealth election law. Since this question rests primarily on the proper interpretation of 1 CMC §§ 6602(b) and 6606, the trial court’s decision is subject to de novo review. Nansay Micronesia Corp. v. Govendo, 3 NMI 12, 16 (1992). To the extent that review of trial court credibility determinations is necessary to resolve this matter, such determinations are considere